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ABSTRACT
As a contribution to the social theory of organisations, 
this thesis develops a comprehensive conceptual framework 
for the analysis of "organisational intelligence". It is 
developed in the context of some of the empirical problems 
of information management in the NHS.
The framework is based on an information processing 
perspective. It has a number of components, each of which 
may be used, individually or collectively by information 
and social analysts. Organisational intelligence is, 
therefore, a relative concept, being concerned in essence 
with assessments of contextually appropriate behaviour 
and/or information.
Organisational intelligence focuses on and reflects how 
actors / organisations do knowledgework. A number of generic 
knowledgework processes are proposed, together with some 
associated pathologies. But the question for information 
management is how to develop the supporting knowledgebase 
component. The development of information products of, or 
for, intelligence is another component of the framework. All 
these processes and products need to be assessed in their 
historical, political and information-related contexts. 
Finally, attention is paid to assessments in the light of 
experience of the issues in question.
The case studies are based on material gathered firstly 
while working as a District Information Officer in a Health 
Authority, and then as co-ordinator for the project 
determining the information requirements of the NHS after 
the 1991. These studies are supplemented by analyses of 
secondary material.
After a series of case studies using the organisational 
intelligence framework to illustrate different aspects of 
the information management in the NHS during the 1980s, 
there are two detailed local studies, and then one 
concerning national developments in information policy in 
the early 1980s, followed by an analysis of the information 
requirements of the NHS post-Review. Finally, the case study 
material is drawn together to illustrate some 
characteristics of the organisation of intelligence.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis began as a study of the sociology of computing 
with reference to the development of distributed health 
information systems. It was to build on work recently 
completed on the computer selection processes in a hospital 
(Drury 1981) . It was conceived at a time when the rapid 
introduction of micro-computers to organisations offered new 
opportunities to end-users but threats to computer units 
established around large central mainframes, thereby 
presenting interesting issues for social research in the 
National Health Service (NHS).
During 1982 and 1983 it became clear that the work of the 
Steering Group on Health Service Information (DHSS 1982), 
chaired by Mrs Korner, was going to have a fundamental 
impact on the management of information systems as a whole 
in the NHS (see Chapter 8) . The context of any study of 
computing and information technology (IT) was considerably 
changed. For example, many District Health Authorities began 
creating new posts for District Information Officers and 
began to build up information departments, some but not all 
of which were also responsible for IT developments. It also 
became clear that other changes in the role of Districts and 
Units arising with the introduction of "general management" 
in line with the Griffiths proposals (Griffiths 1983) would 
make the management of information systems (information and 
IT) an important and interesting field for study.
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In September 1983 I was appointed to a newly created 
District Information Officer post in Ealing Health 
Authority. It was a time of great interest and activity. All 
Districts were digesting the implications of the series of 
"Korner" reports and preparing to implement new systems (see 
Chapter 5 Section 8.2), and in Ealing there was additional 
activity in information systems because it was one of four 
national pilot Districts for the introduction of management 
budgets (part of the process of involving clinicians in the 
management of resources). This required substantial 
improvements to data collection, processing and the 
presentation of meaningful information to managers. I soon 
realised that tracing the developments in computing was only 
part of what was to be my research problem.
What became the central problem for me had two facets. 
Firstly it was to find a conceptual framework which would 
help me make sense of what was happening in the embryonic 
and empirical field of information management in the NHS. 
Neither I, nor other District Information Managers had had 
formal training in information management, and yet the range 
of skills, both technical and organisational, that appeared 
to be needed to establish information systems within a 
District seemed to be very extensive (see Chapter 5 Section 
8.3). I was also aware that there was little in the 
extensive literature on information management (Davis and 
Olson 1985, Sanders and Birkin 1980, Vickers 1984) that was 
related specifically to the management of information
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systems in the NHS, although there was a considerable amount 
of interest in the development of computing policy (Herbert 
et al 1982, Scrivens 1985). I was also concerned that such a 
conceptual framework also had to be informed by existing 
organisation theory.
The second facet of the problem was that my research program 
was of necessity bounded by the constraints of a busy full­
time job. This meant that whilst I was able to “ground" my 
conceptualisations in a rich variety of issues encountered 
in my place of work, I was nevertheless severely restricted 
as to the comparative and longitudinal analyses that might 
be desirable to test out such a framework.
The objective of the research, therefore, became the 
development of a conceptual framework to enable 
comprehensive descriptions of information management issues, 
and assessments of the "appropriateness" of the approaches 
used to resolve them, with particular reference to the NHS. 
It was to be a framework that would be useful to information 
analysts, and also of theoretical interest to social 
analysts.
To formulate such a framework, there were three broad 
criteria which I believed were needed. Firstly, it had to 
have the potential to deal with both the micro- and the 
macro- aspects of organisational behaviour in the NHS. For 
example, it had to be of use in describing and analysing the 
decisions and actions of one or more people (in some aspect 
of information management) within a Health Authority, or the
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development of macro-level policies for the NHS as a whole. 
From this requirement stemmed a concern with the "context" 
in which action is embedded, whether this is "internal or 
external" to a health care organisation, or the "social 
context" of micro-sociological studies. In particular, the 
framework had to be able to integrate many different types 
of decision-making processes with the (organisation of the) 
stocks of knowledge accessed internally or externally by 
individuals or collectivities.
Secondly, it needed to be a framework appropriate to the 
study of information. Thus whilst it needed to be able to 
describe and analyse both the process of producing 
information, the product itself, the development of policies 
for information, and the management arrangements for 
information systems, if possible it needed to be a framework 
that used concepts that were themselves apposite in the 
context of information systems.
Thirdly, the framework had to be able to deal with both the 
monitoring of actions and the social processes of change. 
Whilst it had to be able to deal with the problems of 
control and communication in complex organisations, it also 
had to have the potential to deal with both episodes of 
action, as well as the processes of changing, learning and 
development. Thus it had to enable assessments to be made of 
information and behaviour.
As these criteria were crystallising, and as my practical
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knowledge of, and expertise in dealing with the empirical 
problems facing a District Information Officer grew, I 
became interested in exploring the potential of what 
appeared to be the suitable concept of "intelligence" in an 
organisational context.
I then became aware of Wilensky's work on organisational 
intelligence. Wilensky delineated the "institutionalised 
threats to the reasoned use of knowledge without abandoning 
the problem of the competent organisation of the 
intelligence function" (Wilensky 1967 p7). In discussing the 
varieties of organisational intelligence he focused on the 
types of experts that an organisation with different 
characteristics requires. For example, the more an 
organisation is in conflict with its social environment, the 
greater the need for "contact men" to supply political and 
ideological intelligence to the leader; the more an 
organisation depends on internal support for the achievement 
of its central goals, the more "internal communications 
specialists" are needed to provide the leader with, for 
example, information about the performance, politics and 
morale of various organisational units; the more both 
external and internal environments are rationalised the more 
"facts and figures" men are needed to provide the leader 
with data, records and arguments to build his case in 
dealing with outsiders and members. The analysis emphasised 
the ways in which the attributes of structure, such as size, 
specialisation, centralisation and heterogeneity of goals 
generate the need for different kinds of experts and 
knowledge.
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However, Wilensky's analysis was not deeply concerned with 
the processual aspects of intelligence, nor with developing 
a framework which considered the assessment of the 
"products" of intelligence themselves. Also, he was 
primarily concerned with the intelligence functions and 
information systems required by the leaders of an 
organisation, and not the more general issue of how 
organisational information systems can support human 
intelligence throughout an organisation. Whilst finding 
Wilensky's analysis relevant in many respects, my concern 
was to develop a complementary framework for the analysis of 
organisational intelligence.
I began by considering the analysis of intelligence 
conducted in other fields, in particular artificial 
intelligence and cognitive psychology. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, there are many different "types" of intelligence. 
I found Sternberg's conceptualisations of a "triarchic" 
theory of human intelligence particularly helpful in 
suggesting a cognitive approach to describing "contextually 
appropriate behaviour" and information-processing that could 
inform the analysis of organisational intelligence.
There are a number of theories of organisations which (as 
discussed in Chapter 3) are relevant to organisational 
intelligence. The contingency theory and information 
processing models of organisations discussed here emphasise 
the importance of "context" in explanations of
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organisational behaviour at a macro- level, whilst some of 
the behavioural theories of decision-making illustrate the 
importance of the goals of individuals and groups within the 
organisation with respect to "their" perceptions of their 
environment in understanding decision-making. To illustrate 
the way in which the alternative theoretical perspectives on 
organisations may be more or less appropriate in different 
contexts, Kling's approach to the social analysis of 
computing is discussed. As part of the setting of the 
context of the case studies, some of the goals of the NHS 
are briefly presented. This is followed by a brief resume of 
the kev concepts in my formulation of organisational and 
health intelligence.
Organisational intelligence as a product is then considered, 
before an extensive presentation of organisational 
intelligence as a process. Four key knowledgework processes 
are proposed as appropriate groupings of the many varied 
processes used at all levels of organisations to deal with 
change: scanning and selection; decision-making and
planning; communications and knowledge organisation; and 
monitoring and control. Some of the "pathologies" associated 
with these processes are outlined. These knowledgework 
processes may of course become routinised in "performance 
programs", and are both the medium and mediated by power 
relations in organisations. To be performed, they draw on, 
and update, knowledgebases. Such practical knowledge of 
individuals of "how to go on" may become increasingly well 
structured and "expertise" developed. Also available is the 
"organisational memory" or shared "maps" of the
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organisation. Of particular concern in this thesis is the 
third component - information systems.
The extent and limitations of data in the NHS are briefly 
presented, before the characteristics of information 
management in an organisation are outlined. Particular 
attention is given to the issue of defining information 
requirements, and the structural aspects of information 
management, which forms the starting point of Wilensky's 
analysis of organisational intelligence.
Chapter 4 presents a framework in which the ideas discussed 
in Chapter 3 can be considered in assessing organisational 
intelligence; the components of which are knowledgework 
processes and knowledgebases, products, context, experience 
and information management. The remainder of the chapter 
presents the methods I have been able to use, the research 
problem and its setting before briefly introducing the case 
studies and some further methodological issues.
Chapters 5 to 9 comprise the case studies. Chapter 5 
presents 11 studies which are used to illustrate different 
aspects of information management in the NHS with reference 
to the framework for organisational intelligence. Chapter 6 
presents an analysis of a product for organisational 
intelligence, an Annual Health Report, and its production 
process. Chapter 7, also set in Ealing District Health 
Authority, analyses the process of producing an information 
strategy. In Chapter 8, the first major policy development
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for information, by the Korner Committee in the early 1980s 
is examined, and is followed in Chapter 9 by the second 
major development. In Chapter 9 the framework for 
organisational intelligence is used, firstly to outline the 
process of producing the NHS Review, secondly to present a 
more detailed study of the determination of the consequent 
information requirements, and finally to consider some of 
the intended products.
Lastly, in Chapter 10 a summary is made of the 
characteristics of the organisation of intelligence. Using 
the framework for assessing organisational intelligence, the 
knowledgework processes in the four main case studies are 
then briefly discussed, before considering the findings of 
all the case studies regarding the developments of 
knowledgebases in the NHS. Some implications of the 
perspective of organisational intelligence for managers, 
information managers and social analysts are then presented.
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CHAPTER 2
THE INFORMATION PROCESSING APPROACH TO INTELLIGENCE
This chapter briefly considers different types and 
definitions of intelligence, in particular some concepts 
developed within Artifical Intelligence. The work of some 
cognitive psychologists in this field is then considered and 
Sternberg's "Triarchic" theory of human intelligence is 
described in some detail since it is used as the basis for 
the development of the approach, presented in Chapter 3, of 
assessing organisational intelligence.
1 TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence is a situation-specific word (Pyle,D 1979). It 
is a word in common use but with different meanings 
ascribed. Reconstructing people's informal theories about 
intelligence from their stated or inferred beliefs regarding 
intelligent functioning is an important field of research. 
Studies of laypersons' views of intelligence have been 
conducted in many cultures. Charlesworth (1979) has focused 
on intelligent behaviour as it occurs in everyday 
situations, in particular with regard to survival or 
adaptive value. Berry (1980) takes the view that 
intelligence has to be based on culturally specific or 
indigenous notions of what constitutes intelligent 
behaviour. Attention is focused on the social and practical 
intelligence of individuals and the tacit knowledge 
underlying the successful performance of tasks. Gardner 
(1983) suggests that there are multiple human
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"intelligences", including linguistic, musical,
logical/mathematical, and spatial intelligences.
The informal views of "experts" of intelligence are 
important because they underlie their formal theories of 
what intelligence is, or at least some aspects of it. 
Sternberg et al (1981) suggest that their study of experts' 
ratings of behaviours in ideally intelligent persons showed 
that three factors emerged; verbal intelligence, problem 
solving and practical intelligence characterised experts' 
views of intelligence. Hofstadter (1979) suggests the 
essential abilities of human intelligence are to:
1. Respond to situations very flexibly.
2. Take advantage of fortuitous circumstances.
3. Make sense out of ambiguous or contradictory 
messages.
4. Recognise the relative importance of different 
elements in a situation.
5. Find similarities between situations despite 
differences which may separate them.
6. Draw distinctions between situations despite 
similarities which may link them.
7. Synthesise new concepts by taking old concepts and 
putting them together in new ways.
8. Come up with ideas which are novel.
Minsky (1985), one of the leading investigators of
Artificial Intelligence suggests that the essence of 
intelligence is the ability to solve hard problems quickly,
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for which the essential ingredients are:
subgoals - to break down hard problems into simpler 
ones
sub objects - to make descriptions based on parts and 
relations
cause-symbols - to explain and understand how things 
change
economics - to efficiently allocate scarce resources 
planning - to organise work before filling in details.
Most analyses of human intelligence take place in a 
controlled setting, and usually involve assessing
performance on carefully defined tasks. It is evident, 
however, that the everyday problems of life in organisations 
require the application of human intelligence. But the ways 
in which organisations extend, or limit, human capacities 
for "intelligent" behaviour remain unclear. A great deal of 
attention, however, has been focused on the artificial world 
of "machine intelligence".
2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI)
Both psychologists and workers in AI seek to understand how 
intelligent information processing systems operate; whilst 
psychologists seek to do this by studying human behaviour, 
AI investigators seek to do this by building intelligent
programs which seek to simulate human behaviour only at a 
functional level, not a structural one (Sternberg 1984). The 
cognitive approach has been of mutual benefit to these two
areas of research, although there are dangers of mistaking
analogies for reality.
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It has been suggested that "progress in computer science has 
been the key factor encouraging researchers to develop an 
information-processing model for psychological phenomena. 
Thus it it clear that the success of cognitive 
interpretations of human psychology will to a large extent 
define the scope of artificial intelligence" (Simons 1984, 
22). Nevertheless, this scope is limited by what is 
technically possible.
Workers in AI have studied the ways in which computers can 
do things that would be called intelligent if people did 
them (Sternberg 1984). The claim is that the steps a 
computer goes through in executing a program can resemble 
the steps a human goes through in executing a strategy for 
solving a problem. However, in using a piece of AI as a 
model for intelligent behaviour there is always the danger 
of assuming that the methods or models successfully used in 
AI to do a particular task imply that humans must use the 
same methods or models to do the same task.
Hofstadter (1979) suggests that the crux of AI is the 
representation of knowledge. Knowledge, in one form or 
another, is central to all AI activity. Today it is the 
intelligence of the computer system that transforms data and 
information into knowledge. Traditionally, data was seen as 
raw input, relatively crude and unformed; information was 
data that had been evaluated, put into a meaningful context. 
Now the knowledge level has been added. Indeed, "We might
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even say that knowledge is information the computer can 
think about" (Simons 1984, pl05). The development of
knowledge representation has focused attention on the 
storage of fuzzy commonsense (as well as formal declarative 
and procedural) knowledge, and on how knowledge can be 
inferred.
Although most work in AI, for example in robotics or vision 
programs, assumes a stand-alone or closed system, 
developments in the technology of computer processing and 
networking means that the "intelligence" of open systems are 
now being considered. Distributed systems are always adding 
new hardware, software and users, often at physically 
different sites, and without direct access to other systems 
internal data. Hewitt (1985) suggests that continuous 
growth and evolution, arm's-length relationships, 
inconsistency among knowledge bases, decentralised decision 
making, and the need for negotiation are interdependent and 
necessary properties of open systems. He suggests that such 
"open systems" require new approaches in AI that are "more 
like organisational design and management" (Hewitt 1985 
p223) . He goes on to outline information-processing 
principles for the design of intelligent systems:
Pluralism: There is no central arbiter of truth in the 
system.
Accessibility: All knowledge of the system (including its
own procedures) should be applied to any problem. 
Parallelism: The system should be able to mobilise its full 
resources in parallel instantiations for different
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aspects of large-scale problems.
Due-process reasoning: The system collects and debates
alternatives to decide among beliefs and goals. 
Reflection in practice: Knowledge (including self-knowledge) 
should inform practice, and practice should modify 
hypotheses, beliefs, and goals.
Reasonableness: The system should perform efficiently in the 
face of conflicting information and inconsistent 
beliefs.
These principles suggest that there is some potential in the 
cross-fertilisation of ideas not only between AI and 
psychology, but also with organisation theory.
3 PSYCHOLOGY
Formal theories of intelligence use data on task performance 
to assess intelligent functioning. Piaget's (1972) model of 
development focused on how individuals, from babyhood to 
adolescence, continually construct hypotheses and thereby 
attempt to generate knowledge. His theories were a step 
forward from the IQ test approach in which the process of 
arriving at the correct answer to a "laboratory-type" test 
was not of concern. Of the other approaches, two of the 
most influential are the psychometric and the cognitive.
Psychometric theories have attempted to explain variations 
in individuals performance on a range of tests with 
reference to a number of underlying factors, which are 
discerned through techniques such as factor analysis. The
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number of factors has varied from two (Spearman 1927) to 
over 100 (Guilford 1982). Thurstone (1938) proposed that 
intelligence consisted of seven primary abilities which are 
relatively independent of one another as measured by 
different tasks. These abilities are: verbal comprehension, 
word fluency, numerical fluency, spatial visualisation, 
associative memory, perceptual speed and reasoning. Many of 
the differences between the differential theories are of 
emphasis and interpretation e.g. between higher- and lower- 
factors, or between •'general" factors and "particular" 
intel1igences.
In contrast to the emphasis in psychometric theories on 
discerning the structure of factors underlying intelligence, 
cognitive theories assume that intelligence can be 
understood in terms of the dynamics of information 
processing components.
4 HUMANS AS INFORMATION PROCESSORS
The cognitive model of the human mind is based on the idea 
of information processing. It is assumed that the human mind 
is equipped with the same basic information processing 
system, and that all mental processes can in principle be 
explained in terms of the operation of this system. 
Components of the system include receptors, short-term, 
long-term and external memories, a processor and an output 
effector (Newell and Simon 1972).
The receptors in human information processing systems have 
to filter out a range of inputs to avoid the problems of
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downgrading performance because of information overload. 
These filters are developed over time as individuals learn 
from past experience and assimilate from social customs and 
other socialisation processes; they also develop as 
individuals learn how to operate (or formalise their own 
understanding of) certain decision procedures and rules; 
they may be changed when the decision making process is 
under stress.
Short term memory in the Newell-Simon model holds only about 
seven symbols of which only about two can be retained while 
another task is being performed. Miller (1956) suggests 
that the number of symbols or 'chunks' that humans can hold 
in short-term memory and process is between five and nine. 
Short-term memory lasts seconds, not hours, and it is likely 
that there is some kind of intermediate memory that utilises 
temporary memory structures. Whether an intermediate-term 
memory item gets retained in long term memory depends on the 
significance of the item with respect to others already in 
long term memory. Intermediate-term memories may make use of 
external memory, which consists of external media such as a 
pad, chalkboard or a database.
Long-term memory has essentially unlimited capacity. Its 
content consists of chunks of information (digit, word, 
image), symbols and frames of reference. The organisation of 
long-term memory is of central importance since it must 
enable rapid access to appropriate information. A library 
system catalogues information coming in, but the categories
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it uses are not easily changed or elaborated; also their 
physical layout makes assumptions about the space (volume 
and location) that is likely to be needed in the future. 
Schank contrasts such a static memory with human memories 
which "can reorganise to reflect new generalisations - in a 
way a kind of automatic categorisation scheme - that can be 
used to process new experiences on the basis of old ones. In 
short, our memories dynamically adjust to our experiences. A 
dynamic memory is one that can change its own organisation 
when new experiences demand it. A dynamic memory can learn." 
(Schank 1982 p2) . Schank emphasises the importance of 
reminding in understanding the structures that it can be 
hypothesised are used in memory. He suggests that what is 
actually stored in long term memory are general structures 
which are used to generate a set of expectations. When an 
experienced event differs from the general structure, its 
difference may be noted; and, given enough differences from 
the general structure, it is necessary to create new general 
structures. Eventually we will recognise what was once novel 
as "old hat".
The concept of frames of reference was developed by Minsky 
(1977). The essence of Minsky's frame theory is that when 
one encounters a (new) situation, or makes a substantial 
change in one's view of a problem, one selects from memory a 
structure called a frame. Whilst the top levels of the frame 
have fixed representations, the lower levels have slots that 
must be filled by specific instances or data, indeed a 
frame's slots are normally already filled with 'default' 
assignments. These default assignments can be easily
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displaced by new items that fit the current situation 
better. Collections of related frames are linked together 
into frame-systems which share the same slots and this makes 
it possible to co-ordinate information gathered from 
different viewpoints. Once a frame is proposed to represent 
a situation, a matching process tries to assign values to 
the slots; when this proves impossible the information 
retrieval network that links different frame-systems is used 
to provide a replacement frame. These interframe structures 
make possible other ways to represent knowledge.
The concept of a network of knowledge state nodes, each of 
which describes what the problem solver knows at a moment in 
time was described in terms of the problem space by Newell 
and Simon (1972). Problem spaces are formulated by the 
problem solver to deal with a problem as it exists in a task 
environment. Finding techniques to improve the efficiency of 
search in memory is of great concern to cognitive 
scientists, (and database designers). However, searches may 
also be considered as the problem of generating indices in a 
memory structure sufficient to find a memory of an episode. 
But, as Schank (1982 pll5) comments "Any organisation we 
would propose for human memory is likely to be highly 
idiosyncratic. No one human can be expected to have a memory 
organisation exactly like another. Indeed, what we call 
intelligence may be no more than reasonable versus 
unreasonable memory organisation procedures". The memory, or 
knowledgebase, which underlies intelligent behaviour and 
knowledge is of fundamental importance in understanding and
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assessing intelligence.
Speed of processing information as a simple reaction time 
has been used since the time of Galton as a measure of 
intelligence (Berger 1982). Related studies of speed in 
making choices have also suggested some association the 
making of correct choices and psychometrically measured IQ 
(Jensen 1982). Hunt (1980) has proposed that individuals who 
can access information from long-term memory more quickly 
are able to perform better on a variety of tasks, especially 
verbal ones. There have been a number of studies of more 
complex cognitive processes to do with performance and 
higher-order control mechanisms.
Studies of intelligence in terms the processes individuals 
use in problem-solving from the time the problem is 
encountered to the time they respond have sometimes used 
analogical reasoning. The processes involved in solving 
analogies have been shown to be quite general across various 
kinds of inductive-reasoning problems (Pellegrino & Glaser 
1980) . Investigators seeking to understand intelligence in 
terms of executive processes seek to discover the processes 
by which individuals make decisions such as (a) what 
performance components to use, (b) how to combine them into 
an overall strategy, (c) how to represent information, and 
(d) how to trade off speed for accuracy.
The cognitive approach is weak in a number of respects. 
Firstly, it is difficult to test the appropriateness of the 
information-processing components being used. Gardner (1983)
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suggests that there seem to be no procedures by which to 
adjudicate whether there is a central executive or not; 
whether there are general problem-solving skills specific to 
particular domains; what elements change with development, 
the number and size of storage areas, the kinds of strategy 
available, or the efficiency with which operations are 
carried out.
Also, the testing of these theories has generally been 
without reference to any biological perspective and in 
tightly controlled laboratory situations with 
unrealistically simple tasks. Indeed the basis for selecting 
the tasks chosen for analysis is often unclear. The problems 
posed characteristically feature a single solution or a 
small set of solutions, and little attention is paid to 
problems with an indefinite range of solutions, the 
generation of new problems, creativity and giftedness.
The most comprehensive development of a theoretical 
framework for understanding the information-processing 
approach to intelligence has been Sternberg's "Triarchic 
Theory of Human Intelligence". It addresses some, but not 
all of Gardner's criticisms, but more importantly provides a 
fruitful source of theoretical concepts for consideration in 
other contexts. It will be considered in some detail here as 
it provides the basis of a conceptual framework which, I 
suggest, can be built on in the analysis of intelligence in 
the context of organisations.
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5 THE TRIARCHIC THEORY OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
Sternberg has developed a "triarchic" theory that seeks to 
understand intelligence in terms of three subtheories: a
contextual subtheory that relates intelligence to the 
internal environment of the individual, a componential 
subtheory that relates intelligence to the external 
environment of the individual, and an experiential subtheory 
that applies to both the internal and external environments. 
Sternberg's proposes that "Intelligence is the mental 
capability of emitting contextually appropriate behaviour at 
those regions in the experiential continuum that involve 
response to novelty or automatisation of information 
processing as a function of metacomponents, performance 
components and knowledge-acquisition components" (Sternberg 
1985 pl28).
5.1 THE CONTEXT OF INTELLIGENCE
Sternberg suggests that a contextual view of intelligence is 
needed to generate some kind of external standard against 
which (information-processing views of) intelligence can be 
tested, i.e. one that goes beyond the view that intelligence 
is what IQ tests happen to measure. Analysis of which 
(classes of) behaviours are intelligent in given (classes 
of) environments can elucidate the cognitive and other 
internal processes and structures that help form intelligent 
behaviour. This view also focuses attention on real world 
environments and behaviours rather than those used in IQ 
testing.
As a theory of the mental activities of individual
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intelligence Sternberg's contextual subtheory does not deal 
with the physical activity or with the external or internal 
influences that may facilitate or impede activity in 
context. Rather, it is concerned with the mental activity 
directed toward purposive adaptation to, and selection and 
shaping of relevant real world environments. Interestingly, 
Sternberg does not exclude laboratory settings from the 
"real world" arguing that to exclude testlike behaviour from 
one's view of intelligence is as much a mistake as to rely 
on it exclusively.
Whilst both the hardware and potential software of the 
cognitive system are the same across the known range of 
socio-cultural milieus, what differs, Sternberg argues, are 
the weights or importance that apply to defining what 
constitutes intelligent behaviour. Skills such as pattern 
perception, articulatory ability and comparison ability may 
exist in some amount in members in every culture, or 
subculture, but their importance to intelligent behaviour 
may be very different depending on how relevant they are to 
relevant tasks for that culture. Because of the specificity 
of tasks that are relevant to a culture and the different 
weightings attached to elements that may be common between 
cultures, intelligence cannot be completely understood 
outside a sociocultural context, and may in fact differ for 
a given individual from one culture to the next. The 
contextual aspect of intelligence when looking from outside 
inward is idiographic in nature, whilst the components of
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intelligence, when looking from the inside out, are 
nomothetic.
Intelligence, Sternberg states, is directed towards goals, 
however vague or subconscious those goals may be; the nature 
of these goals, maxima, optima, satisfaction etc., is a 
separate issue. Intelligence, however, does involve 
adaptation to the environment. In our own culture, it is 
likely that the logical skills required for computer 
programming and management will become successively more 
important to intelligent performance as computational skills 
become successively less important. If attempts to adapt to 
a given environment fail, then the ability to shape the 
environment (or select a new one) become more important. 
Here, the individual attempts to change the environment so 
as to increase his or her fit to the (new) environment 
rather than merely attempting to adapt what is already 
there.
When adaptation and/or shaping of an environment are not 
possible or desirable, an individual may attempt to select 
an alternative environment that 'fits' better. Sternberg 
argues that a key aspect of intelligence is the active 
selection of an environment that enables one to capitalise 
upon one's strengths and to compensate for one's weaknesses. 
Where possible, more intelligent people actively select 
environments that are more favourable for their adaptive 
skills, that is, environments in which they perform more 
intelligently. The more control the individual has and the 
greater the opportunity for expressing intelligence, the
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more relevant the circumstances are for evaluating the 
person's intelligence. The recognition of what can and 
cannot be changed in one's environment is part of one's 
ability to adapt, shape and select the environment, and 
hence of intelligence. However, if intelligence is, in part, 
the ability to attain success in real life contexts, a 
variety of forms of 'bad luck' may flaw its full 
realisation. Intelligence, then, is, in part, the ability to 
succeed in context. not the success itself, which may be 
moderated by a host of variables (such as wealth or poverty) 
that are unrelated to intellectual ability.
This view of the context of intelligence implies that 
intelligence is a relative concept. It stresses that there 
is a pluralism of niches to which one may ultimately adapt, 
with the niche partly determined by one's own choice and 
partly determined by circumstances beyond one's control. 
Nevertheless, contextual views can suggest where to look for 
what is intelligent in a given sociocultural context and of 
the criteria for assessing the operation of the components 
of intelligence.
5.2 THE COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE
Sternberg defines a component as an elementary information 
process (input, transformation, output) that operates upon 
internal representations of objects or symbols. What is 
elementary enough to be considered a component depends upon 
the desired level of theorising, and the same caveat applies 
to the proposed typology of components. He distinguishes
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between metacomponents, performance and knowledge 
acquisition components,
a) Metacomoonent s
These are higher-order executive processes used in planning, 
monitoring, and decision-making in task performance
1. Decision as to just what the problem is that needs to 
be solved. To solve a problem the individual must figure out 
just what the problem is.
2. Selection of lower-order components. An individual must 
select a set of lower-order components to use in the 
solution of a given task. Selecting a non-optimal set can 
often result in incorrect or inefficient task performance. 
Choice of components may be subject to differential 
availability.
3. Selection of one or more representations or 
organisations for information. A given component can often 
operate on any one of a number of different possible 
representations or organisations of information. The choice 
of representation or organisation can facilitate or impede 
the efficacy with which the component operates.
4. Selection of a strategy for combining lower-order 
components. In itself, a list of components is insufficient 
to perform a task. One must also sequence these components 
to facilitate task performance, decide how exhaustively each 
component will be used, and decide which components to 
execute serially and which to execute in parallel.
5. Decisions regarding allocation of attentional 
resources. One must decide how much time to allocate to each 
task component, and how much time restriction will affect 
the quality of performance of the particular component. One
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tries to allocate time across the various components of task 
performance in a way that maximises the quality of the 
entire product.
6. Solution Monitoring. As individuals proceed through a 
problem, they must keep track of what they have already 
done, what they are currently doing and what they still need 
to do.
7. Sensitivity to external feedback. External feedback 
provides a valuable means for improving one's task 
performance. The ability to understand feedback, to 
recognise its implications, and then to act upon it is a key 
skill on task performance.
b) Performance Components
Performance components are used in the execution of various 
strategies for task performance.
1. Encoding components. Encoding components are those
concerned with the initial perception and storage of new 
information.
2. Combination and comparison components. These components 
are involved in putting together or comparing information; 
in inductive reasoning these components include inferring 
relations between terms, mapping relations between 
relations, and applying old relations to new situations.
3. Response components. These components are concerned 
with producing a response to the problem.
c) Knowledqe-acauisition components
These components are processes used in gaining new 
knowledge, and, it is suggested, are relevant to acquisition
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of declarative and procedural knowledge in virtually all 
domains of knowledge.
1. Selective encoding. Selective encoding involves sifting 
out relevant from irrelevant information.
2. Selective combination. Selective combination involves 
combining selectively encoded information in such a way as 
to form an integrated, plausible whole. Simply sifting out 
relevant from irrelevant information is not enough to 
generate a new knowledge structure.
3. Selective comparison. Selective comparison involves
relating newly acquired or retrieved information to 
information acquired in the past. In the case of newly 
acquired information, a relation is seen between something 
just encoded and something that was encoded in the past. In 
the case of newly retrieved information, an item already 
stored in memory is related to some other item in a new way. 
Encoding and combination of new knowledge are guided by the 
retrieval of old information. New information will be all 
but useless if it cannot somehow be related t<? old knowledge 
so as to form an externally connected whole.
5.3 EXPERIENCE AND INTELLIGENCE
The experiential subtheory proposes that a task measures 
"intelligence" in part as a function of the extent to which 
it requires either or both of two skills: the ability to
deal with novel kinds of tasks and situations, and the 
ability to automatise the processing of information. For 
many kinds of tasks, the ability to deal with novelty and to 
automatise information processing may occur along a 
continuum. When one first encounters a task or kind of
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situation, ability to deal with novelty comes into play. The 
more intelligent person will be more rapidly and fully able 
to deal with the novel demands. As experience of the task or 
situation increases, the task becomes a more apt measure of 
automatisation skills. Moreover, processing resources 
allocated to novelty and to automatisation can interact with 
each other: greater automatisation of information processing 
frees additional processing resources to deal with novelty.
a) Ability to deal with novelty
Sternberg's view is that there may be novelty either in 
learning how to do a task (i.e. in comprehension) or in in 
its execution. He notes that tasks or situations that are 
novel for some persons may not be novel for others. Thus, a 
given task or situation will not measure "intelligence" to 
the same extent for some people as it does for others.
b) Automatisation of Information Processing
As with novelty, automatisation can occur either in task 
comprehension, task execution or both. The proposal is made 
that complex tasks (such as reading) can feasibly be 
executed only because many of the operations involved in 
their performance have been automatised. "Failure to 
automatise such operations, whether fully or in part, 
results in a breakdown of information processing and hence 
less intelligent task performance. Intellectual operations 
that can be performed smoothly and automatically by more 
intelligent individuals are performed only haltingly and 
under conscious control by less intelligent individuals" 
(Sternberg 1985, 71) .
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Sternberg suggests that, for an individual, there is 
automatic information processing that is not under the 
conscious control of the individual and is non-hierarchical 
in nature. All kinds of process function at a single level 
of analysis as a production system. Sternberg suggests that 
controlled information processing is under the conscious 
direction of the individual and is hierarchical in nature, 
with executive processes (to plan, monitor and revise 
strategies of information processing) directing nonexecutive 
processes.
In the domains where one has little expertise (ie events or 
problems are novel or memory of previous events is 
unavailable) processing is focused in the global processing 
and knowledgebase. As expertise develops, greater and 
greater proportions of processing are transferred to (or 
packed into) a given local processing system. This reduces 
the amount of attention that has to be directed to the 
problem by the global system freeing the 'expert7 to direct 
global processing resources for what, to them, are new 
situations. Once such a new situation has been successfully 
handled it is possible to pack what has been learned into a 
given local processing system so that next time such a 
situation occurs there will be no need to exit the local 
system, or systems if parallel processing can be engaged. A 
major constraint then is how much can be packed and 
retrieved in a usable way from a local system. A distinctive 
feature of this view is its emphasis on the allocation of 
resources by the metacomponents, rather than the speed of 
information processing that is critical.
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5.4 SUMMARY
In essence, Sternberg proposes a contextual theory of 
intelligence in terms of the purposive adaptation to, 
shaping of, and selection of real-world environments. This 
theory is constrained by regarding as most relevant to the 
demonstration of intelligence contextually appropriate 
behaviour that involves either adaptation to novelty, 
automatisation of information processing, or both, whilst 
the componential subtheory specifies the mental mechanisms 
responsible for learning, planning, execution and 
evaluation of intelligent behaviour. Thus Sternberg proposes 
that it is the components (meta-components, performance 
components and knowledge acquisition components) which 
enable individuals to deal with novelty and to automatise 
performance, and function in the context of (one or more) 
sociocultural milieux. The core definition of human 
intelligence is the "mental capacity of emitting 
contextually appropriate behaviour at those regions in the 
experiential continuum that involve response to novelty or 
automatisation of information processing as a function of 
metacomponents, performance components, and knowledge 
acquisition components. Behaviour involves intelligence to 
the extent it partakes of more aspects of this definition of 
intelligent behaviour" (Sternberg 1985 pl28).
Although this model is a helpful starting point, it must be 
considerably extended if it is to inform the analysis of 
intelligent information processing in social systems.
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CHAPTER 3
THE COMPONENTS OF ORGANISATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
This chapter presents the major components of a framework 
for conceptualising and assessing organisational 
intelligence. Theories relevant to understanding 
the contextual appropriateness of organisational structures 
and information processes are discussed. Then follows a 
brief synopsis of the approaches to health intelligence 
which introduces some of the key concepts for assessing 
organisational intelligence. Intelligence as a "product" is 
then considered, before the presentation of the four 
knowledgework processes and three aspects of knowledgebases 
which provide the major components of the framework.
1 CONTEXT AND ORGANISATIONAL THEORY
1.1 CONTINGENCY THEORY
If there is no such "thing" as an organisation, then "it" 
cannot have "intelligence". But, the actors who work in or 
comment on organisations use their human intelligence to 
process information and develop knowledge about roles, 
tasks, etc. Organisational intelligence, then, is 
maintained, developed or reduced by human behaviour. And, as 
we concluded in the previous chapter, human intelligence is 
in essence an assessment of contextually appropriate 
behaviour.
There has been extensive analysis of organisations in terms 
of structures and processes with respect to different types
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of environment. The work of contingency theorists seems an 
appropriate theoretical context in which to begin the 
development of a framework of organisational intelligence.
The external environment of an organisation can range from 
the static, to the dynamic and turbulent. In analyses of 
"the causal texture of organisational environments" Emery 
and Trist (1965) identified four types of environments a) 
static, randomised: where organisations can exist adaptively 
as single, and indeed quite small units; b) static, 
clustered: where strategies for survival are needed and
resources concentrated; organisations tend to grow in size, 
become hierarchical, with a tendency towards centralised 
control and co-ordination; c) dynamic, disturbed-reactive: 
the existence of a number of similar organisations is now 
the dominant characteristic. Such competitors seek to 
improve their own chances by hindering each other (by 
planning a series of tactical initiatives or operations), 
each knowing that the others are playing the same game, d) 
dynamic, turbulent: in these environments individual
organisations, however large, cannot expect to adapt to 
uncertainties simply through their own direct actions; their 
strategic objective shifts from optimal location (as in b.) 
or capabilities (as in c.) but now is formulated in terms 
of institutionalisation through the embodiment of 
organisational values which relate them to the wider 
society.
Thus firms have to deal with diversity of markets, products,
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technologies and regions where they operate. Contingent on 
these environments they have to balance the pressures for 
disaggregation of structures to deal with these diversities 
with the pressures for uniformity. These include economies 
of scale, needs for a standard product, and 
interchangeability. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) recognised 
that within the same firm departments may have to deal with 
different types of environment. For organisations facing a 
dynamic environment (e.g. the plastics industry) there would 
be much greater internal goal diversity; they would be 
highly differentiated. For firms facing a stable environment 
(e.g. container industries) there would be much less 
internal differentiation. "Differentiation" implies that 
different parts of the organisation appropriately have 
differing time-horizons, differing inter-personal styles and 
different degrees of formal structures.
As far as the operational systems are concerned, the 
transformations of inputs (labour, raw materials, capital 
etc.) to outputs (material goods and services) can be done 
by assigning tasks of different levels of "routineness" or 
"discretion" in the allocation of knowledgework (or other 
types of work). Meeting the needs of human beings in the 
organisation is also a functional imperative, but it is 
recognised that they may quite appropriately vary within 
different parts of the organisation from the instrumental 
orientations of Taylor's "economic man" (Taylor 1947) to the 
needs for "self-actualisation". There are no universal 
principles of management sought in the organisation. Rather 
it is recognised that organisations may vary in structure
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between the mechanistic and the organic (Burns and Stalker 
1961), and that styles of leadership may appropriately vary 
between the directive, authoritarian Theory X and the 
supportive, democratic Theory Y styles.
Contingency theories of leadership pay attention to the 
preferred styles of the leader, to the nature of the task 
and to the preferences of the subordinates for a leadership 
style given the task environment. Fiedler (1967) suggests 
that leaders are expected to be directive when they are in a 
strong position vis a vis his subordinates and the task is 
clearly defined or when in a weak position and the task is 
unclear, but to be supportive when the task is unclear but 
the leader is in a strong or respected position vis a vis 
the group. Handy (1967) suggests that leaders will prefer to 
be supportive or directive depending on his confidence in 
his subordinates, his habitual style, his assessment of his 
personal contribution, his need for certainty and values 
e.g. concerning organisational efficiency, beliefs about 
subordinate's participation in general in planning, deciding 
and controlling. Subordinates' preference for a particular 
leadership style will be influenced by a number of factors 
including their estimates of their own intelligence, past 
experiences as a group, interest in the task and their 
tolerance for ambiguity or need for structure. Handy also 
suggests that whether the task should be programmed or not 
will depend on whether the task requires decision-making or 
implementing, is it routine (administration) or creative (R 
& D) or problem-solving (consultancy) ; what is the time-
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scale, is the task complex or simple technically, 
conceptually or organisationally; do mistakes matter and how 
important is the task. These amplify the continuum suggested 
by Sternberg (Sternberg 1985) of the novel-routine nature of 
problems. The contingency or best fit approach argues that 
there is no "one best way" of leadership, but that "fit" 
between leaders, subordinates and tasks can be analysed. For 
example, there would be a "best fit" when a directive style 
of leadership was preferred by the leader and the group, and 
when the tasks were those that are simple, routine, with 
short time horizons.
Within contingency theory there is what Burrell and Morgan 
term the "congruency hypothesis" which postulates " that a 
necessary condition for the effectiveness of an organisation 
in meeting the demands of its environment is that the 
relationships between subsystem characteristics be 
congruent" (Burrell and Morgan 1979 pl77). In a turbulent 
environment, strategic management would ensure that there 
was "organisational learning"; that operational systems had 
high-discretion roles filled by self-actualising men managed 
in a supportive and democratic style within an organic form 
of organisation structure. An organisation meeting these 
characteristics with the exception of having directive 
leadership styles would be less effective.
To be fully effective in dealing with their external and 
internal environments, Lawrence and Lorsch found that 
organisations had a number of integrating mechanisms; 
hierarchy cross-over points, rules and procedures, direct
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managerial contact, co-ordinators and co-ordinating 
departments. However, those which had more than were 
required, or mechanisms which did not have the power to 
integrate, were less effective. For example where a 
coordinating group was set up to resolve a conflict e.g. 
sale/production liaison, when the need for co-ordination was 
endemic, the mechanism complicated communications. A key 
mechanism that can be used for either integration or 
conflict is information. For example political power of 
control of information, e.g. the gatekeeper function, has 
been shown to be substantial (Pettigrew 1973). Lawrence and 
Lorsch found that the capacity to influence decisions was 
distributed in the more differentiated industries and 
concentrated at senior management levels in the least 
differentiated. With increasing diversity, top management 
have to delegate power to take decisions to where the 
technical knowledge and relevant knowledge are found. The 
corollary of this is that, as Handy(1976 p300) suggests, "in 
a diverse environment, in a rapidly changing environment, 
the parts of the organisation in touch with the environment, 
who interface with the environment, will appropriately be 
the flexible, power-equalised, task cultures. Appropriately 
they will be the driving forces of the organisation and hold 
the greater balance of power...In more uniform environments, 
where there is less pressure for diversity, such departments 
if they exist at all are normally without power".
However, the contingency approach has proved difficult to 
operationalise. Early studies sought to establish general
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associations between organisations and environment using 
multiple regression, (ignoring historical or interpretive 
issues) but with little statistical success (Hage and Aiken 
1967). In the public sector there have been some studies 
that have found structure to be related to the range of 
environmental problems, resource flows, political complexion 
and financial climate (Greenwood et al 1980, Davies and 
Ferlie 1984). But the contingency approach does not help 
understand the processes involved in the activity of 
innovation, and the meaning which actors attach to that 
activity. Indeed, although the contingency approach 
implicitly identifies power as a variable it stresses the 
functional unity of system parts. The analyses of 
organisations from this perspective have tended to 
concentrate on the reified structural relationships of these 
parts (e.g. size, technology, degree of bureaucratisation or 
centralisation) rather than the processes of system 
development that are involved in understanding dynamic open 
systems.
1.2 INFORMATION PROCESSING MODEL
A substantial analysis of the importance of information 
processes in organisations has been made by Buckley (1967). 
He argues that the major concern of science, is now "with 
models of organisation sufficiently general and complex, 
though built from simple units, to embrace behaviour systems 
of any type - physical, biological, psychological, or 
sociocultural", and that there is now a "focus on 
organisation and its dynamics based on the 'triggering'
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effects of information transmission. Here is to be found the 
secret distinguishing living from non-living matter, 
adaptive, morphogenic processes from equilibrating, entropic 
processes" (Buckley 1967 p4).
For Buckley the generalised concept of organisation is 
closely linked to that of information and communication 
because "the socio-cultural system is to be viewed as a set 
of elements linked almost entirely by way of 
intercommunication of information rather than being energy- 
or substance-linked as are the physical or organismic 
systems" (Buckley 1967 p82). Buckley's framework emphasises 
that "information", as a carrier of "meaning", is not an 
entity that exists but a relation or "mapping" between sets 
of structured variety embodied in goal-oriented adaptive 
systems and their environments, and that "communication" 
involves a process of selection from such sets. Socio­
cultural systems continually attempt to 'map' the variety of 
the external environment through science, technology, magic 
and religion, and their internal milieu through common 
understanding, symbols, expectations, norms and values. This 
adaptive process involves many sources of variety (generated 
social differentiation, individual and subgroup differences, 
experience, exploration, turnover of components) which 
refine or revitalise the pool of commonly usable information 
and the set of common meanings and symbols. Although some 
variations may be adaptive, others will be pathogenic.
Buckley argues that in the normal operation of institutions 
energy of some kind from the environment is always needed to
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maintain a steady state, but that there will therefore 
always be external exigencies or unstructured events that 
lead to continual remapping and reorganisation. More than 
this, however, social systems will generate such 
exigencies: conflicts of interest, ambiguous standards, role 
discrepancies, and failure to achieve goals. Also, the 
amount of information available as the basis for the 
selective actions or decisions of the individuals in a 
complex system "is never sufficient to specify more than the 
general rules or broader outlines of the total structure. 
The total structure must thus be seen as generated both by 
the limited rules and decisions channelling the various 
actors taken separately, and also by the ongoing 
interactions and accommodations of these components as they 
come into conjuncture" (Buckley 1967 pl30).
Another important information-based processual view of an 
organisation has been developed by Galbraith (1973, 1975).
His framework is based on a hypothetical organisation which 
is large, employs a number of specialist groups and 
resources in providing the output; the problem of 
organisational design is the integration of subtasks around 
the completion of the global task. Organisations, he 
suggests, can respond to this problem by developing 
coordinating mechanisms, or those that reduce or increase 
the capacity to process information.
Galbraith's basic premise is that the need for variations 
in organisational structure is explained by differences in
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task uncertainty and the ability of different structures to 
process and communicate information to deal with task 
uncertainty. Galbraith suggests that the basic effect of 
uncertainty is to limit the ability of the organisation to 
preplan or to make decisions about activities in advance of 
their execution. Therefore it is hypothesised that the 
observed variations in organisational form are variations in 
the strategies of organisations to 1) increase their ability 
to preplan, 2) increase their flexibility to adapt to their 
inability to preplan, or, 3) to decrease the level of 
performance required for continued viability.
Coordinating mechanisms are: operating procedures and
decision rules; a hierarchy of authority that is used for 
handling exceptions to the decision rules; and co-ordination 
by targets or goals. To reduce the need for information 
processing organisations can create slack resources (e.g. 
reducing performance constraints) to reduce the amount of 
interdependence between units. Also, organisations can 
create self-contained structures with virtually the full 
range of resources needed to produce a given output. 
Accepting the performance standards and division of labour 
as given, organisations can increase their capacity to 
process new information generated during task performance by 
investing in vertical systems to pass information for 
planning and coordinating activities up and down the 
hierarchy.
Also lateral relationships can be created (e.g. direct 
contact, liaison roles, task forces, teams, integrating
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roles and matrix organisation). March and Simon (1958) 
commented on the specialist units found in large 
organisations. For example there are units specialising in 
a) the actual physical transmission of communications: a
telephone, messenger group etc.; b) units specialising in 
recording and report preparation; c)units specialising in 
the acquisition of raw information, usually referred to as 
intelligence units, sometimes as research units; d) units 
specialising in the provision of technical advice; e) units 
specialising in the interpretation of policy and 
organisational goals and f) units specialising in the 
storage of information: files, archive units. To these
divisions of work we can add those specialising in database 
administration, data communication, systems analysis and 
data processing. Computer databases may be used for lateral 
communications. If an interfacing subunit can interrogate a 
database to learn about factors generated by another subunit 
which affect its performance, the need for lateral relations 
may be reduced or the efficiency of lateral relations 
improved (Davis and Olson 1985).
The theories of Buckley and Galbraith suggest that the 
processing of information is central to any understanding of 
the nature of both the structures of organisations and the 
processes of organisational development. The flow of 
information is in itself an agency for change, conveying 
knowledge about the changing states of both the external and 
internal environments. It also conveys instructions to make 
changes that are (intended to be) appropriate to conceptions
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of the environment. These changes are made in relation to 
the goals, theories or models of the individual or 
organisation.
1.3 THEORIES AND GOALS
As indicated earlier, the approach taken here is to extend 
Sternberg's basic model into the analysis of organisational 
intelligence. He argues that "contextual analyses can 
elucidate which behaviours or classes of behaviour are 
intelligent in a given environment or class of environments" 
(Sternberg 1985 p44).
In the sociological theory of organisations, as we have 
seen, contingency theorists have shown how important is the 
"causal nature" of the environment. However, it is also 
necessary to consider the political and historical context 
of an organisation as a necessary part of organisational
analysis (Pettigrew et al 1988). Given that the focus of
analysis is on the development of data and information 
management and intelligence, it seems appropriate that any 
consideration of context should pay particular attention to 
these features.
However, as Sternberg also suggests, what is of importance 
is the purposive adaptation to and selection and shaping of 
real world environments. Thus, in assessing organisational 
intelligence, there should be concern at the ways in which
the actors attempt to use their definition of a task to
adapt, select or shape their organisation, department or 
themselves and their careers to the context of the
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organisation. But in doing so, it should also acknowledge 
the many complexities of organisational life which may, 
either singly or in combination, foil these attempts.
There are of course many different types of goals which 
individuals or groups may pursue. For example, in attempts 
to develop an artificial intelligence model of human 
behaviour, Schank (1975) develops a typology of goals in his 
"Conceptual Dependency Theory" vis: achievement;
satisfaction; enjoyment; preservation; crisis; instrumental 
and delta. Delta goals perform the function of organising 
knowledge about how to achieve standard sub-goals. Any of 
the above, with the possible exception of achievement, can 
be simple low level goals, but in analysing the high level 
goals of human behaviour, Schank offers three basic goal 
types: mutual goal pursuit; competition goals; individual
goal pursuit. In his model, the AI system has to consider 
for each action:
1. What high level goal is being pursued?
2. What particular goal is being pursued?
3. What conditions are affecting its accomplishment?
4. What conditions obtain after its accomplishment?
5. What aspect of the pursuit of a goal does any
given action pertain to?
In essence, then, goal pursuit whether perceived at the 
level of human psychology (even simplified for the purposes 
of artificial intelligence), within different parts of an 
organisation or by the organisation as a whole, form an
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important part of the context in which intelligence is to be 
assessed. Goals operationalise, either implicitly or 
explicitly, the theories or hypotheses on which 
organisational decisions and plans are made. Nevertheless, 
as Sternberg would suggest, it it is the ability to succeed 
in context rather than the success itself that must also be 
considered. Following this line of analysis is therefore 
much more subtle, qualitative and complex than examining 
performance of task performance using a set of structural 
variables.
The view that human intelligence is a relative concept 
follows from accepting that intelligence is manifest in 
behaviour appropriate in context. In assessing 
organisational intelligence, as has already been argued, 
such a contextual approach seems appropriate. However, the 
conceptualisations of what constitutes an organisation, its 
actors, its (or) their tasks and how appropriate performance 
is to be assessed are vastly complex and varied. 
Nevertheless, the key point is that a cognitive approach 
which includes acceptance of the relevance of context, 
allows, and indeed requires, that assessments of the 
situations or case studies in question be undertaken with 
respect to a relevant theory of organisation.
For example, to illustrate the alternative frames of 
reference that may be selected by an analyst, Kling's (1980) 
analysis of empirical studies of computing in organisations 
will be briefly reviewed. As a way of investigating the 
appropriateness of different conceptualisations of social
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life and their consequences for the social analysis of 
computing, Kling distinguished two major perspectives: 
"systems rationalism" and "segmented institutionalism". He 
notes that the former has been closely aligned with 
structural functionalism in American sociology, and the 
latter with the "conflict" perspective.
Kling suggests that systems rationalists typically assume 
that there is a marked consensus on major social goals and 
that efficiency, whether economic or organisational, is the 
predominant value. They rarely enquire into the relationship 
between computer use and the social order within the 
organisation and emphasise the "legitimate" tasks that users 
are formally required to perform. Their accounts have 
greatest descriptive adequacy or are most appropriate in 
situations where relatively few social groups are involved 
and where they are relatively well controlled by agents with 
centralised authority.
The "ideal-type" systems rationalists are the management 
scientists for whom the theories of Taylor (1947) imply "get 
the computer right and the appropriate behaviour and 
organisational performance will follow". If social conflict 
is perceived then it is to be resolved by appeals to 
administrative authority, but it is generally assumed that 
there is consensus.
Human-relations analysts, such as Mumford (1978), Morton and 
Huff (1980), have recognised the role of computer technology
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in altering the quality of working life and that conflicts 
may exist. But in assuming that it is possible to achieve 
common goals that reflect both the psychological needs of 
workers and the information requirements of management, 
albeit by participatory design strategies, they have more in 
common with systems rationalists than segmented 
institutionalists.
Segmented institutionalists. Kling suggests, assume that 
inter-group conflict is as likely as co-operation, and 
identify as dominant values the sovereignty and social 
equity of individuals and groups. They do not assume that 
the observed levels of conflict is necessarily optimal or 
even tends toward a healthy equilibrium. A central issue is 
the relationship between computer use, the political and 
social orders in the organisation and the interactions with 
vendors, computer consultancies etc. They also observe the 
way computers may be used to enhance personal status or 
credibility. Their accounts become particularly powerful as 
the social world of computing use becomes more dynamic and 
as a wider variety of groups is involved.
Within the broad label of "segmented institutionalism" there 
are also different perspectives. Symbolic interactionists 
view social life as constructed from the interaction of 
people and groups as they define the situation they work in. 
Attention is paid to how individuals negotiate the 
meaningful structures that are for them the "reality" of 
what constitutes e.g. a good computer system or information 
systems strategy. Nevertheless, it is difficult, as Burrell
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and Morgan (1979) suggest, to demonstrate this "subjective 
reality" without recourse to using as background features, 
the concepts of organisation, hierarchy, rules etc. which 
confirm the existence of an external "objective reality".
From the perspective of the political analyst, however, the 
objective reality of the organisation is not problematic. 
Social life is viewed as a continual contest for power by 
groups with conflicting interests. For example, in the 
"reinforcement politics" view it is argued that computer 
systems are likely to be used by already powerful groups so 
that they can differentially accumulate further advantage 
over their rivals. This may be done as Kling (1980 p90) 
suggests, either by using information about a computing 
system as a "political resource" to help convince or 
intimidate others into accepting ones preferred line of 
action, or, by controlling computing resources, being able 
to establish a base for other forms of influence. In the 
"pluralist" view, however, it is argued that many groupings 
may organise and bargain for their interests, but that no 
individual group dominates totally.
From the perspective of analyses of organisational 
intelligence, Kling's approach illustrates how different 
theoretical perspectives on the social analysis of computing 
may determine the context and methods used to examine 
computing-related organisational processes, and also which 
processes are of relevance in different perspectives.
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1.4 THEORIES AND GOALS IN THE NHS
To conclude the section of this chapter which is concerned 
with "context and organisation theory" the following 
provides a brief summary of the long-standing goals of the 
NHS, and then spells out the seven key changes which the 
Conservative Government are in the process of introducing 
from 1 April 1991. Whilst the details of the NHS Review are 
the subject of Chapter 9, the objectives and the sub­
objectives of the NHS Review provide a critique of the 
results of the previous approaches its management, albeit a 
critique that derives from Conservative ideology of the 
primacy of the market, which is being extended to here, 
essentially untested, to a key part of the public sector 
(Flynn 1989).
The approach to the management changes in the organisation 
of the NHS from its inception until 1989 have been 
essentially within the "professional/managerial approach" in 
which the recipients of services are regarded as "patients", 
providers are regarded as "professional experts", and 
priority questions are seen primarily in terms of competent 
clinical and managerial decision-making. Campbell (1978) 
discusses how this approach can be distinguished from the 
"commercial/competitive" in which recipients of services are 
regarded as "consumers", health care professionals and other 
suppliers of medical facilities are regarded as "sellers" 
and priority questions are seen primarily in terms of 
consumer preference and the laws of supply and demand. In 
the studies in the NHS prior to 1990/91 we are essentially 
working within the traditional professional/managerial
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approach; however, in the context of assessing the 
information requirements arising from the White Paper, 
Working for Patients, (DHSS 1989) we are moving into the 
commercial/competitive arena.
In the case of the objectives of the NHS as a whole, the 
Royal Commission (Merrison 1979 p9) commented on the lack of 
them and suggested that the NHS should:
- encourage and assist individuals to remain
healthy;
- provide equality of entitlement to health
services;
- provide a broad range of services of a high
standard;
- provide equality of access to these services;
- provide a service free at the time of use;
- satisfy the reasonable expectations of its users;
- remain a national service responsive to local 
needs.
The resources to achieve these objectives have to be 
allocated, and to do this a bureaucratic form of service 
organisation has developed. Resources are allocated down a 
hierarchy on the basis of proxy measures of need of a
District's catchment population; the policies governing 
these allocations have been trying to move away from the 
position in which the availability of good medical care 
tends to vary inversely with the need of the population 
served - the "inverse care law" formulated by Tudor Hart
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(1971) . To do this has required a complex set of rules 
governing priority setting, resource allocation, accounting 
and statistical information. Although the goals of the 
health service, particularly in terms of a service free at 
the time of use, have remained intact, or at least espoused, 
the means for achieving them are about to change 
dramatically, as is the interpretation of some of them e.g. 
remaining a national service responsive to local needs.
After a year long review, conducted in secret, the 
Conservative government introduced a White Paper in January 
1989 entitled "Working For Patients". It had two objectives: 
to give patients, wherever they live in the U.K., 
better health care and greater choice of the services 
available, and 
- greater satisfaction and rewards for those working 
in the NHS who successfully respond to local needs and 
preferences." (DHSS 1989 p3-4).
To realise these objectives, there were seven or sub­
objectives proposed (bold):
To make the Service more responsive to patients' needs,
responsibilities are to be delegated from Regions to 
Districts and from Districts to hospitals. All hospitals 
will be given much more control over the running of their 
own affairs.
To encourage a better service to patients, hospitals will be 
able to apply for a new self-governing status within the NHS
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as NHS Hospital Trusts. These Trusts will be given more 
freedom to take the decisions which most affect them, such 
as determining the pay of their own staff and (within 
limits) borrowing money.
To enable hospitals which best meet patients' needs to get 
the money to do so, the money required to treat patients 
will be able to cross administrative boundaries. In future, 
all NHS hospitals - whether run by health authorities or 
self-governing - will be free to offer their services to 
different health authorities and to the private sector.
To reduce waiting times and improve the quality of service,
100 new permanent consultant posts will be created over the 
next three years. These will be over and above the already 
agreed rate of expansion and will also help reduce the long 
hours worked by some junior doctors.
To help the family doctor improve his service to patients,
large GP practices will be able to apply for their own NHS 
budgets to obtain a defined range of services direct from 
hospitals.
To improve the effectiveness of NHS management, regional, 
district and family practitioner management bodies will be 
reduced in size and reformed on business lines. They will 
have executive and non-executive directors. Community Health 
Councils will continue to act as a channel for consumer 
views.
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To ensure that all who deliver patient services make the 
best use of resources, quality of service and value for 
money will be more rigorously audited.
In the foreword by the Prime Minister to the White Paper, 
Mrs Thatcher commented that "taken together, the proposals 
represent the most far-reaching reform of the National 
Health Service in its forty year history".
At the heart of the proposals is the theory, clearly central 
to the Conservative government's philosophy in all contexts, 
that a competitive market-oriented environment stimulates 
efficiency and enhances consumer choice. The key influence 
in the health context is taken to be Professor Alain 
Enthoven's (Enthoven 1985) advocacy of an internal market to 
achieve these objectives. The introduction of an "internal 
market" is proposed in which buyers (District Health 
Authorities and GP Fund Holders) are allocated budgets 
(based on the Districts resident population, with sums being 
transferred from this to provide GP Fund Holders with their 
budgets in proportion to the numbers of the District's 
residents on their list). Buyers then enter into contracts 
with "providers", whether these are directly managed 
hospital units in or outside their District, NHS Trusts 
(NHSTs), or the private sector.
The introduction of NHSTs, whilst it is emphasised that they 
remain "within" the NHS, make it inappropriate to examine 
the organisation of health care provision as a nested
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hierarchy of units within districts within regions as has 
been the case since 1974. Instead, NHSTs become autonomous 
providers of care as far as possible. The extent of this 
autonomy is still being clarified, as is the role of 
Regions, although they now become managerially responsible 
for the Family Practitioner Committees (who support the 
General Medical, Dental and Pharmaceutical Services). What 
is clear is that the role of Districts is to change 
radically. District Health Authorities are slimmed by 
delegation of all functions to units that do not relate to 
the Districts new role. This is essentially to act as the 
purchaser of health care services for its resident 
population. This implies that they must ensure that health 
needs of their resident population are met; that there are 
effective services for the prevention and control of 
diseases and the promotion of health; and that their 
population has access to a comprehensive range of high 
quality, value-for-money services.
It is clear that the goals needed to achieve the necessary 
transformation must be specified clearly if the necessary 
management changes, and consequent information system 
changes, are to be put into effect. The development of 
intelligent information systems in the NHS post 1991 will 
need to be assessed in part with respect to these goals and 
the theories from which they derive.
Given a set of goals and theories in a given historical and 
political context, the information systems established and
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the output of those systems can be evaluated against them. 
The implications of considering organisational intelligence 
in terms of (health) information products and structures are 
now considered further.
2 ORGANISATIONAL AMD HEALTH INTELLIGENCE
Although intelligence is an elusive concept to define, in 
the context of an organisation its essence, I would argue, 
is that it is contextually appropriate behaviour and/or 
information. It is provided to assist the human intelligence 
of the members of an organisation. The key concepts are 
briefly outlined in this section.
Organisational intelligence is information that is produced 
by or within an organisation. Whilst information is 
meaningful data (or understood signals) , as McLachlan et al 
(1985a, p22) note, in the context of health care,
"intelligence - the use of information for forward-working 
purposes - requires but supersedes information; just as 
information requires but supersedes data". A simpler 
definition, used by Hewett (1986, pl03) defines health
intelligence "as the further aggregation of information, 
usually from different sources, which is interpreted before 
being addressed to a particular problem". Knox (1987, pl7) 
proposes that "an essential role of a (health) intelligence 
service...is to construct and assemble assessments of demand 
and need, and of the operational practicality and cost- 
effectiveness of alternative interventions". To produce such 
products requires organisation. McLachlan et al (1985b, p5)
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define intelligence as "the extrapolation from information 
and research of findings which are significant for the 
organisation and running of health services. That is 
'intelligence7 is more than merely information or research, 
but implies the constructive use of their insights." I wish 
to elaborate on this distinction.
The "information or research" has to be contextually 
appropriate itself. That is, as a product of the 
organisation the information can be viewed in terms of how 
appropriate it is in the context in which it is needed by 
the "knowledgeworker" in question at whatever level in the 
organisation. The nature of the information is essentially 
that it concerns "news" about either the external or 
internal environment, rather than information which is 
simply a routine production of meaningful data. This equates 
more closely with lay definitions of, e.g. military 
intelligence.
However, such intelligence-as-news has to be interpreted, 
and some constructive use made of its insights. The result 
of such interpretations is a product for organisational 
intelligence. That is to say it presents a set of policy 
decisions, objectives or statements that may be assessed in 
terms of how they improve the appropriateness of 
organisational behaviour in the context in question.
The gathering of the information and its interpretation 
(though not necessarily the decision-making that it may 
instigate) may be done in many ways in many parts of an
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organisation. The way this is organised reflects perceptions 
of the role of the information systems and their management. 
If as Galbraith argues, the structures of an organisation 
can be understood in terms of their information processing 
capabilities, then to study organisational intelligence also 
involves examining the contextual appropriateness of its 
organisational structures. Such analyses can include the 
organisation of information systems needed to support the 
organisation of e.g. manufacturing, production and 
distribution, provision of health care etc., but of 
particular concern is the way in which the management of 
information systems are co-ordinated. The organisation of 
the organisation's information systems to provide 
intelligence (as basic product for central policy) is 
therefore an important aspect of organisational 
intelligence.
But, intelligence, as Sternberg argues, cannot be fully 
understood unless its processes are analysed. These 
processes include (at least) the scanning and selection of 
the internal and external environments, decision-making and 
planning, communications and the organisation of knowledge, 
as well as monitoring and control. Within such general 
headings there are clearly some perspectives that may be 
more contextually appropriate than others in understanding a 
given issue. This implies that both theory and method are 
contingent within an overall framework of analysis of the 
process of organisational intelligence.
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Another part of this processual framework includes the 
knowledgebase. An organisation has to collect, store* 
process* develop and produce knowledge. To do this requires 
organisational memory and information systems. The outcome 
of these processes are information-based products for 
organisational intelligence which, either singly or 
together, may result in an increase or decrease of the 
contextually appropriate behaviour and/or information, as 
assessed by external or internal observers. Following 
Sternberg's approach, in making these assessments, the 
products, processes and knowledgebases will also need to be 
considered in terms of the experience of the issue in 
question.
3 ORGANISATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AS PRODUCT
Organisational intelligence as a '’product", as suggested in 
the previous section, can be considered in terms of 
intelligence-as-news. Such intelligence may derive from 
routine monitoring or chance interceptions of a wide variety 
of qualitative and quantitative data. However, it should be 
noted that what may be passed on to a (progressively more) 
central "executive" for decision-making may be no more than 
data as far as the originator is concerned. The meaning 
attached by the receiver to such data to convert it to 
information may then render it to be appropriate in a 
particular context, i.e. it is a product of "intelligence", 
(though of course it may be misinformation or even 
disinformation). This is intelligence-as-product either in 
the sense of it being a product of an individual or group 
who sent some "intelligence-as-news" or as a product of an
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individual or group / network whose role is to provide an 
"intelligence service". From the latter products of 
intelligence may be self-generated or commissioned 
reports/assessments of issues and situations. Such reports, 
however, then shade into products for intelligence.
Products for intelligence are those whose purpose in essence 
is to increase the contextually appropriate behaviour and/or 
information of the organisation. In the conceptualisations 
made here this can be related to how such products help 
improve the knowledgework processes of the organisation, and 
in particular it policies for the development of the 
information systems of its knowledgebase.
Others have also stressed intelligence as being concerned 
with "information relevant to policy making" (Wilensky 
1967). For example, McLachlan et al (1985a) propose a 
"framework for intelligence" and distinguish the following 
types:
a) Intelligence of the macro policy sort (the remit of the 
NHS Supervisory Board). This includes policy choice of the 
sort not susceptible to mere 'evaluation' or comparisons of 
efficiency: instead, broad national priorities in health
service planning are a prime example which should be based 
on both information (on outcomes, outputs and inputs) and 
research, as well as political and social values.
b) Intelligence of the sort to translate 'macro policy7 into 
objectives (the remit of the NHS Management Board).
c) Intelligence of the sort to translate national objectives
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into local objectives (at District, Regional and Unit levels 
respectively)
and d) Intelligence of the sort to monitor and evaluate 
performance (at various levels).
The danger of defining organisational intelligence in terms 
of information relevant to policy is that attention focuses 
on the intelligence needed for "central" policy making. What 
must also be considered as part of the analysis are the data 
and information needed by operational managers.
For example, the Korner Community Medicine Working Group 
took a broad remit when it considered the needs of the 
community. They stated that "The main objectives of any 
centrally supported health-care system must be directed 
towards the good of the population as a whole and must be 
plainly utilitarian. They are to improve health and reduce 
suffering to the greatest degree possible for the greatest 
number" (Knox 1987 pl5). From this, as Knox suggests, it 
follows that information is needed about health, health 
status and outcome, both of individuals and aggregates. Also 
that effective use of resources (whether in terms of patient 
care, facility provision or service development) must be 
demonstrable in terms that can be related to health care 
objectives, (albeit via intermediate statistics such as 
throughput, case fatality ratios etc.), and in terms that 
can be understood by the population/consumers or patients in 
question. It is also clear that such an approach includes 
the health status, and ill-health behaviour patterns of the 
population in question; this may be a resident or a
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catchment population, and of any scale from household (e.g. 
in cases of meningitis or leukaemia), neighbourhood/patch, 
District, Region or National. Finally there is the 
implication that if outcome and quality of care is a key 
part of the process of providing health care, then some form 
of audit information will be needed based on data supplied 
about individual providers of care. Comparative indicators 
of performance in terms of process measures and outcome is 
also needed, as is the ability to do ad hoc analyses as well 
as the routine.
The requirements for overall improvements in organisational 
intelligence focus attention on the ways in which 
information relating to these issues is defined, collected, 
stored, retrieved, presented and interpreted. Further, it is 
concerned with how the information systems involved can be 
developed (e.g. linked together, speeded up, diversified) 
and the management of them improved (e.g. appropriate 
staffing levels, skills and training, IT selection 
procedures and cost-benefit analyses). These processes are 
relevant and interconnected at all levels in the 
organisation.
4 ORGANISATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AS KNOWLEDGEWORK PROCESSES
Wilensky suggests that there are four fundamental problems 
in the sociology of complex organisations: the problems of 
goal setting, control, innovation and intelligence. Of these 
intelligence has received least explicit and systematic 
treatment. Wilensky suggests that it is strange that social
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scientists "have been more impressed by the use and misuse 
of power than by the use and misuse of knowledge" (Wilensky 
1967 p7).
The analysis here assumes that an organisation is an agency
i.e. it is an instrument for continuing collective action. 
Its work is generally a complex task. Argyris and Schon 
(1978 pl4) suggest that "An agency is the solution to a 
problem. It is a strategy for performing a complex task 
which might have been carried out in other ways. This is 
true not only for the design of the task system and the 
division of labour, but also for the selection of strategies 
for performing component tasks".
The tasks of concern here are not directly concerned with 
transformations of matter or energy, but with information 
and knowledge. Knowledgework is work based on the knowledge 
possessed by an actor, not on the ability to perform 
physical tasks. It can be defined as work that involves 
thinking, processing information, and formulating analyses, 
recommendations, and procedures (Davis and Olson 1984). We 
are all knowledgeworkers. Knowledge is the means, though not 
necessarily the ends, of purposive acts.
An understanding of knowledgework processes in social 
systems is central to organisational intelligence. From 
Sternberg's analysis of human intelligence, and the work 
done by cognitive theorists in other fields, it is evident 
that there are a number of basic generic activities into 
which the many varied types of knowledgework processes in
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organisations can be grouped. Any such framework has to be 
flexible and able to deal with different levels of 
organisational analysis. Nevertheless, its purpose is to 
present a number of expectations or "default assignments" 
that may be applicable in different situations. They are, I 
believe a heuristically useful set selected with reference 
to the theories discussed in Chapter 2 and in Section 1 of 
this chapter, and the practice of analysing the case
studies. There is of course some overlap between them, and 
many other variations on these configurations are possible.
Using them, however, the framework can then be applied in a
variety of settings for studies of organisational 
intelligence. Assessing "products of", "products for", and 
the "production processes" of organisational intelligence 
can all be made against this framework and the adapted
results linked together to develop a deeper understanding of 
the "states" of organisational intelligence.
Set within the context of an organisation with an external
and internal environment and with goals and theories as
discussed earlier in Section 1, the scenario for
knowledgework processes starts when the scanning of the 
environment detects a problem/opportunity that needs to be 
addressed. Some may then be selected for decision-making, 
which may range from the short term to long term planning. 
The decision having been made (which may be for further work 
to be done on problem definition before a decision is made) 
it then needs to be communicated and organised so that the 
necessary tasks commence. Monitoring and control of task
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performance is necessary, and helps set the parameters for 
further scanning.
Each of the processes may operate at any given level in an 
organisation, from a central policy making executive, to 
more local decision-making at a regional/district level and 
indeed to a small group or individual, for whom Sternberg's 
theorising of internal cognitive intelligence processes 
becomes directly relevant.
The proposed framework therefore is:
- Scanning and Selection
- Decision making and Planning
- Communication and Knowledge Organisation
- Monitoring and Control.
As Wilensky (1967) showed, it is also helpful to consider 
the pathologies of knowledgework processes that affect the 
organisation of intelligence. The development of the analogy 
of a "pathology” in the context of public policy, and 
including the pathologies of information, in government 
organisations has been taken further by Hogwood and Peters 
(1985), and each section includes a selection of 
pathologies.
However, there are two particular features of knowledgework 
that permeate these four components: power and performance 
programs. Giddens argues that "the exercise of power is not 
a type of act; rather power is instantiated in action, as a 
regular and routine phenomenon. It is mistaken to treat
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power itself as a resource as many theorists of power do. 
Resources are the media through which power is exercised, 
and the structures of domination reproduced" (Giddens 1979 
p91) . Knowledgework of all types involves to some extent 
authorising or allocating resources, and thus power 
relations are key constituents in both its processes and 
outcome. Power relations are also reflected in rules. 
However, in examining the "rules" used in all forms of 
knowledgework we are concerned not just with their 
constitutive or regulative features, but in how they are 
used to interpret and store stocks of knowledge, some of 
which may be tacit, or "practical knowledge", but others 
which may be discursive.
Another key concept underlying all stages of knowledgework 
is what March and Simon term the "performance program". They 
note that "situations in which a relatively simple stimulus 
sets off an elaborate program of activity without any 
apparent interval of search, problem-solving or choice are 
not rare. They account for a very large part of the 
behaviour of all persons, and for almost all of the 
behaviour of persons in relatively routine positions. Most 
behaviour, and particularly most behaviour in organisations, 
is governed by performance programs" (March and Simon 1958 
pl42). Repertories of action or knowledgework programs are 
developed by organisations and individuals which serve as 
the alternatives of choice in recurrent situations; although 
serving a restricted range of situations and a restricted 
range of consequences, specific programs are capable of
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being executed in semi-independence of other programs, i.e. 
they are only loosely coupled together.
4.1 SCANNING AND SELECTION
4.1.1 PROCESSES
Scanning and selection knowledgework tasks are concerned 
with inputs to a social system. In Simon's (1960) model of 
decision-making there are three phases: intelligence, design 
and choice. The intelligence phase searches the internal or 
external environment for conditions that may indicate 
potential opportunities, or to find potential problems. The 
existence of an opportunity or a problem initiates the 
design and choice phases of decision making. This approach 
assumes that there is some model of what is desired that is 
selected or of what is expected or known against which a 
diagnosis can be selected or problem formulation or 
categorisation can be made.
However, the search for solutions may be stimulated by 
problems rather than a by-product of routinely available or 
scanned information. Cyert and March (1963) suggest that 
problemistic search is based on the simple procedures of 
local search and vulnerability. In the former, when a 
problem arises the search for a new solution is concentrated 
near the old solution (and the unit responsible for it). If 
this fails, search then focuses on vulnerable units (such as 
those with slack resources or overmanning, or with goals 
that are difficult to calculate e.g. research).
In formulating the nature of a problem, it is useful and
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usual to establish an analogy or relationship to some 
previously solved problem or class of problems. Minsky (1977 
p375) suggests that "the primary purpose in problem solving 
should be better to understand the problem space, to find 
representations within which the problems are easier to 
solve. The purpose of search is to get information for this
reformulation, not - as it is usually assumed - to find
solutions; once the space is adequately understood, 
solutions to problems will more easily be found". Pounds 
(1969) identifies four models which produce expectations 
against which reality is measured:
1 Historical models in which the expectation is 
based on an extrapolation of past experience.
2 Planning models in which the plan is the
expectation.
3 Models of other people in the organisation, such 
as superiors, subordinates, departments.
4 Extraorganisational models in which expectations 
are derived from customers and professional 
organisations.
The task of diagnosis by physicians requires an
understanding of the problem-space. On the basis of past 
experience, knowledge of the possible range of implications 
of physiological signs, e.g. blood pressure, of patient's 
body language, discourse and cultural assumptions prepare 
the ground for problem formulation and diagnosis (perhaps 
after further tests or a second opinion). This may in turn 
generate a further set of expectations embodied in a
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Itherapeutic plan. Both patient, and other colleagues (in the 
case of an audit) have models of what is expected in the 
diagnosis and treatment.
Financial analysts, indeed managers in general, have a 
concern with fluctuations in their internal or external 
environments. Indicators of internal performance (e.g. 
average length of stay), or of external environmental stress 
(e.g. socio-economic indicators of catchment sub­
populations) or inputs (e.g. cash, qualified manpower etc.) 
are scanned against expectations. Scanning and selection 
knowledgework is often semistructured or unstructured. 
Problems may be perceived but information on them be 
incomplete or inaccurate.
4.1.2 PATHOLOGIES
Information pathologies connected with the scanning 
processes can be considered, firstly, in terms of 
"resolution levels", organisational, spatial and temporal. 
Selecting the appropriate "level" or tier of the 
organisation at which to focus attention given a particular 
issue is important. The framework of organisational 
intelligence, however, does enable similar examinations of 
both the micro-level of the small group, or and the macro­
levels of national policy making.
The spatial resolution level problem has two components: 
coterminosity and appropriateness. For example, the 
boundaries of an organisation, such as a Health Authority, 
contain a hierarchy of resolution levels e.g. ward
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boundaries, within which are enumeration districts. Lack of 
coterminosity between these levels (e.g. postcodes are not 
nested within enumeration districts) , or with the levels 
used by relevant other organisations whose boundaries 
encompass the Health Authority (e.g. Social Services 
sectors), or with the other authority (e.g. there are 190 
Health Authorities but only 92 Family Practitioner 
Committees in England and Wales), present major problems in 
scanning.
The appropriateness of the spatial resolution level is 
another issue, and many studies in the medical geography of 
health care (Drury 1983, May 1977, Pyle G. 1979) have 
indicated the different resolution levels that may be 
appropriate for different types of ill health. If 
information is not available at the appropriate resolution 
level, either directly or after further analysis of a 
database, then the conclusions reached may be inappropriate.
The temporal dimension, again, has two aspects: 
retrospective and prospective. For example, in tracing the 
genesis of an outbreak of disease, or of trends in public 
health, historical data is needed. Is appropriate data 
available, and if so is it in the appropriate level of 
detail? Are the historical precedents in the organisation in 
question, or in the literature, or in other organisations, 
scanned? There is also the feature of time-lag. For example, 
the availability of some annual activity data in the NHS, 
e.g. (Hospital Episode Statistics) is available nationally
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on a quarterly basis 2-3 months after the end of the 
quarter, whilst other data, e.g. paramedical activity, is 
not available nationally until over 12 months have passed. 
These appropriateness of these time-lags may be justifiable 
given the use to be made of the data - if not, then the 
scanning of the "current situation" will be too crude.
What about the future? Is the forecasting period appropriate 
to deal with the expected, and more importantly to react to 
the unexpected. For example, the AIDS epidemic was not 
forecast until it was well under way. It was not an expected 
event. Having realised that there was an epidemic of a new 
type, are the information systems in place to enable 
predictions of the impact of new strains, mutations etc.?
The scanning of the environment for problems or 
opportunities involves selection of what is significant. 
Decision have to be made on what the appropriate levels of 
significance are. In health care, doctors are taught to 
detect significant signs and symptoms. Poor selection of 
diagnostic tests, or poor diagnostic data, may produce 
inappropriate information for diagnosis of the problem; 
however doctors are given considerable autonomy in making 
their decisions, although the consultant of a firm is 
responsible for the decisions taken by his junior staff. 
The decision to decide what is significant may be decided by 
local practice, e.g. the consultant tells the nursing staff 
what to "keep an eye on". But, in many other examples of 
health information systems the decisions of what to scan for 
are taken centrally. For example, certain diseases are
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"notifiable" by statute, many statistical returns are deemed 
to be mandatory "central requirements". Such information may 
be incorrectly collected because of insufficiently precise 
instructions given in central guidance. And, particularly 
where it is of no operational use, there is the possibility, 
if not probability, that the local data collector has little 
incentive to collect it accurately.
Conversely, information collected primarily for operational 
purposes may be inappropriate for use in "scanning" by more 
centralised policy makers. If, for example, data collection 
systems are designed primarily for local management, then it 
is tempting for the centre to define data sets that are too 
large "just in case its needed". This has been a continuing 
dilemma for the Department of Health, as it seeks to balance 
its need to answer Parliamentary Questions and develop 
central policy, and a (post Korner) requirement for reducing 
central requirements to a minimum.
Information about the delivery of health care, and the 
organisational performance of health authorities, are needed 
for a variety of purposes. The development of plans and 
performance reviews have spawned many different types of 
data that can be scanned to indicate areas for further 
attention and diagnose the existence of a problem.
4.2 DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING
4.2.1 PROCESSES
The second (design) and third (choice) phases of Simon's
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(1960) model of decision making are of concern here. The 
design phase proceeds from the recognition of a problem or 
opportunities (scanning and diagnosis) to invent, develop, 
analyse and evaluate alternative courses of action. In the 
design phase, the nature of the task is considered in 
detail. For example, boundaries of the problem are set, 
preceding conditions analysed, precedents recalled, the 
problem is decomposed into sub-problems (perhaps for 
analysis later or by others) and the elements that can, or 
should, be controlled are identified. In examining the 
alternative courses of action, there may be one certain 
outcome for each alternative and this is known. There may be 
a number of possible outcomes, for each of which a measure 
of probability either can or cannot be assigned. Even for 
alternative where the outcomes are believed to be certain, 
there is always the potential of unintended consequences of 
action occurring. Although Simon's model does not go beyond 
the choice phase, there are many other models that include 
implementation and feedback from the outcome of the decision 
(e.g. the monitoring and control aspects).
The distinction between structured (or programmable) 
decisions, and unstructured (or nonprogrammable) decisions 
is often presented as a dichotomy. Decisions are structured 
to the extent that repetitive and routine or a definite 
procedure has been worked out to deal with them. The input 
data and validation procedures needed must be clear, the 
processing of the input using the decision logic must be 
automatic or programmed and the output in a form that can be 
used. Examples of the spectrum of structured decisions in
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organisations are stock reordering levels, weekly allocation 
of wages, clerking of patients, allocation of nurse 
manpower, budget allocations, and planning systems. The 
latter has some elements of structure within it, but many 
more features of unstructured nonprogrammable decisions.
Decisions are unstructured to the extent that there are no 
preestablished decision rules or procedures. This may be 
because the problem has not occurred before, or because 
conditions change so much the rules cannot be formalised, or 
because the method of solving the problem or the problem
itself is particularly difficult or important.
Since structured decisions can be prespecified, many of them 
require little knowledgework. Many highly structured
decisions can now be automated (e.g. assembly line 
production, buying/selling at preset levels of stock price). 
However, there is always the danger that decisions will be 
made through inappropriate use of rules and procedures.
Also, where decisions are complex, appropriate decomposition 
of the problem may entail certain aspects being delegated 
and programmed decisions taken to solve the subproblems
whilst agents with specialised knowledge are called in to 
advise on those aspects for which there are no procedures. 
Davis and Olson (1985 p410) state that "Planning and
decision making are knowledgework because they depend on the 
knowledge and expertise of the decision maker and the 
manipulation of data using a decision model... Highly 
structured programmed decision making has less knowledgework
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content than unstructured decision making".
Turning to decision making in the organisation as a whole, 
the behavioural theories developed by Cyert and March (1963) 
are useful. In essence they view an organisation as a 
shifting multiple-goal coalition in which decisions and 
problems are decomposed and handled in different parts of 
the organisation. However, because each sub-unit sees its 
own objectives as paramount, managing the internal 
coalitions requires at least as much time and energy from 
managers as managing the external environment. To deal with 
the basic issues of defining organisational goals, 
expectations and selecting a course of action Cyert and 
March suggest that there are four features of the decision 
making process, (quasi-resolution of conflict, uncertainty 
avoidance, problemistic search and organisational learning) 
which taken together, form a theory to explain how these 
decisions are arrived at. The case studies here are not of 
the NHS or even a Health Authority as a whole. Nevertheless, 
some of these features of organisational decision making are 
relevant.
4.2.2 PATHOLOGIES
Starting with the decision-maker himself, there are a number 
of potential information processing pathologies. For 
example, high-level decision makers, whether consultants or 
senior staff in a health authority tier often have very 
limited time to give to considering the information relevant 
to making a decision. Where the information is complex, 
unfamiliar and/or technical, decision makers may make
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inappropriate decisions particularly when pressed for time. 
However, as cognitive psychology suggests, speed of 
processing data may be one indicator of human intelligence, 
and the intelligence of decision-makers, in terms of their 
processing of information, is another factor that may 
introduce bias. In situations where the problem is familiar, 
we would expect rules of thumb or practical knowledge, to be 
available to help him deal with novel information. Although 
time pressures may be unavoidable, there is evidence that 
management of time as a scarce resource is critical.
An alternative open to decision-makers is to rely on the 
judgement of their sub-ordinates which may again introduce 
bias into the decision making processes. In some respects
this bias may be intentional. Subordinates who are aware
that their leaders would prefer not to know about a state of 
affairs (e.g. failure to implement an unwanted externally 
imposed mandate) may not pass such information on, and in 
turn may cover themselves by saying that they had not been 
given any instructions to do so (Hogwood and Peters 1985).
The pathological aspects of "disavowability" by decision­
makers may be particularly in evidence when the decision­
making culture is one where decisions are made by consensus.
In the health service, one of the key changes introduced in 
1982 was the concept of general management with one person 
being clearly accountable for decisions; this replaced a 
system in which consensus management had been found to 
produce lowest common denominator decisions and then only
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very slowly. Whilst these are decisions taking place within 
an organisation, similar pathologies may be discerned when 
organisations exchange information and views, giving a 
superficial impression of analysis and action, but with the 
issue failing to be resolved because of the lack of any 
authoritative mechanism to insist on its resolution. Another 
variant is where, in order to get an issue of their agenda, 
organisations may be prepared to accomodate each others 
views resulting in a "least unacceptable policy" (Hogwood 
and Peters 1985).
Also, there may be deliberate ambiguities in the information 
given to the decision-maker (by a sub-ordinate covering his 
own interests) or in decisions given by the decision maker
who may wish to be able to offload responsibility for
failure in the future to a subordinate or reclaim success.
Decision makers may fear that they have not been given 
sufficient information but nevertheless make "informed 
guesses". The human intelligence of the decision-maker is
critical here in determining whether it was appropriate in
the circumstances (e.g. shortage of time) to make such 
inferences (based on previous knowledge of the situation, or 
analogies for it) or not. Where informed guesses are made 
because the decision maker does not ask for information 
because he fears that it will be biased (e.g. because it is 
incomplete, inaccurate, or deliberately slanted by a sub­
ordinate) then other pathologies are evident.
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4.3 COMMUNICATION AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
4.3.1 PROCESSES
In information theory, "information” is not an entity that 
exists, but a relation or mapping between the structured 
variety in both (goal-oriented adaptive) systems and in 
their environments; communication involves a process of 
selection from such sets. The meaning of the information is 
constrained by the what the symbolically mediated mappings 
have in common between source and receiver. Although certain 
of these mappings become stable enough to be generalised as 
codes or rules or norms, "organisation" results from rules 
plus interactions.
These interactions stimulate thought and reflection. 
Buckley quotes Mead to illustrate the importance of 
reflexiveness in self-organisation and its relationship with 
intelligence. "It is the entrance of alternative 
possibilities of future response into the determination of 
present conduct in any given environmental situation and 
their operation..as part of the factors or conditions 
determining present behaviour, which decisively contrasts 
intelligent human conduct or behaviour with reflex, 
instinctive, and habitual conduct or behaviour - delayed 
reaction with immediate reaction...The mental processes do 
not lie in words any more than the intelligence of the 
organism lies in the elements of the central nervous system. 
Both are part of a process that is going on between organism 
and environment. The symbols serve their part in this 
process, and it is that which makes communication so
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important” (Mead 1934 pp91, 98, 132-133). Indeed, there may
be a surplus of meaning in the symbols used to carry 
information to the extent that they are potent enough to 
stimulate the generation of new meanings (Giddens 1979).
In the context of knowledgework, the term knowledge 
organisation can be used to cover a number of different 
activities conducted by individuals. It includes personal 
organising activity. For example, the structuring of 
personal files, methods of scheduling meetings, priority 
setting etc. Whilst some of this may be routine programmed 
work, many other aspects require new solutions e.g. creating 
new information processing systems for controlling 
expenditure. The ways in which knowledge is organised for 
storage and retrieval as a matter of routine, and is 
acquired in a situation or task of novelty is an important 
aspect of human, (and organisational) intelligence.
Sternberg's model of the automatisation of human information 
processing suggests that if programmed decisions are 
preconscious, ie. not under the control of the individual, 
there will be no "hierarchy” in processing; however, when 
there is controlled information processing, to deal with 
nonprogrammed decisions for example, this is under the 
conscious direction of the individual and is hierarchical in 
nature, with executive processes (planning, monitoring and 
revising strategies of information) directing the 
nonexecutive processes that perform the task.
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Sternberg suggests that there are nonexecutive local 
processing units and knowledgebases, as well as global 
executive ones and that control passes to a local processing 
system when an executive process recognises a given 
situation as one for which a local system is potentially 
relevant. The local system is presumed to be of the nature 
of a production system, with a set of productions ready to 
act upon the problem at hand. The productions comprise 
functions that are executive in nature, as well as functions 
that are not. But all are integrated into a single, 
nonhierarchical system. Control is passed back to the global 
processing system when, during task performance, none of the 
productions in a system is able to satisfy a given presented 
condition. When the bottom of the production list is reached 
and no given condition is satisfied, global processing is 
necessary to decide how to handle the new task or situation. 
Once this task or situation is successfully handled, it is 
possible to pack what has been learned from global 
processing of the new experience into a given local 
processing system, so that the next time such a situation is 
encountered, there will be no need to exit from the local 
processing system.
Sternberg proposes that "In essence, a loop is set up 
whereby packing more information and processes into the 
local system enables one to automate more processing and 
thus to have global resources more available for what is new 
in a given task or situation. The expert is also able to 
perform more distinct kinds of tasks in parallel, because
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whereas the global processing system is conscious and serial 
in its processing, multiple local processing systems can 
operate in parallel." Sternberg (1985 p95).
The information-processing approach adopted by Sternberg 
emphasises the central importance of "performance programs" 
and experience. March and Simon (1958) suggest that the type 
of problem-solving used depends on both the characteristics 
of the problem and on the past experience of the problem 
solver. They distinguish between the "reproductive" type of 
problem-solving, which consists of searching the memory in a 
relatively systematic fashion for solutions that are present 
there in nearly finished form, and "productive" problem 
solving, when new solutions are constructed out of more or 
less "raw" material.
March and Simon also suggest ways in which the process of 
innovation can in itself become programmed. They suggest 
that the criteria of satisfactory solutions can themselves 
be stated in terms of rates of change of performance (e.g. 
programs are set to produce an annual percentage increase) 
which if not met would not require external environmental 
stimuli to instigate innovations. Also, they suggest that 
the organisation (or parts of it) can acquire criteria of 
satisfaction specifically stated in terms of rates of 
innovation. Innovation programs can be institutionalised in 
organisations, as they are in human memory. March and Simon 
note that "in virtually all human problem-solving, memory 
plays an enormous role. In memory are stored both the 
repertories of possible solutions to classes of problems
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that have been encountered in the past and repertories of 
components of problem solutions."(March and Simon 1958 
pl77) .
Selecting the appropriate performance program, whether for 
"productive” or "reproductive" problem-solving, requires 
knowledge about their content to be organised. What is 
stored in memory has to be readily searched, and the 
appropriate information, action program etc. retrieved. 
Methods for improving the efficiency, and thereby the 
appropriateness, of information include summarising data to 
reduce the size of the message to be transmitted and routing 
it only to those who need to receive the information.
In computer systems, extensive attention has been given to 
the problems of improving methods of indexing databases. An 
index may be defined as "a table which operates with a 
procedure that accepts information about certain attribute 
values as an input and gives information as output which 
assists in quickly locating the record or records that have 
those attribute values." (Martin 1977 p336). Referencing
blocks of records rather than individual records 
substantially reduces the size of the index. Even so the
index is often too large to be searched in its entirety, and
so an index to the index is often used.
In human memory in particular, but also in organisations, it
is episodes that are stored. Selecting appropriate indices 
to enable retrieval, generalisation and reorganisation is
83
necessary for "intelligent" information processing (Schank 
1982) .
4.3.2 PATHOLOGIES
The problems of information communication in information 
systems can be considered in terms of the accuracy of 
transmission and its presentation. In the mathematical 
theory of communication, information is defined as the 
average number of binary digits which must be transmitted 
(in a sequence of source - encode - transmission - decode - 
receiver) to identify a given message from the set of all 
possible messages to which it belongs. Errors in 
transmission can occur if the message is wrongly encoded or 
decoded, or if there is "noise" that affects the 
transmission media. The fewer the codes in number or size 
needed to convey the message, the more efficient the 
transmission in technical terms. Information therefore 
reduces uncertainty, but a communication may contain more 
codes than are needed. This "redundancy" is often useful for 
allowing the receiver to check that the received message is 
correct or needs to be retransmitted or reconstructed. 
Messages therefore may result in the reconstruction of 
codes.
Another aspect of redundancy is that alternative routes 
through a communications network may be used. This may be 
needed to avoid the pathology of "jamming" of channels; it 
may result, however, in the same message being received at 
different times and/or in different parts of the 
organisation and being interpreted differently. For example,
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information about bed closures is available on a day to day 
basis to hospital managers and has an impact on (reducing) 
throughput; throughput statistics are usually only available 
on a monthly basis and, if interpreted by people outside the 
hospital be more readily interpreted with reference to 
changes in average length of stay or turnover interval 
(which are statistics closely associated with it and 
available at the same time). The interpretation of the 
message concerning throughput may then not be explained with 
reference to the direct cause i.e. closures of beds, but be 
related to more indirect and descriptive statistics from 
which false inferences, e.g. concerning changes in clinical 
practice may be drawn.
The complete garbling of a message is a well known feature 
of communication pathologies. But there are other important 
features that may become omitted in the course of 
transmission. For example, the caveats placed on reports may 
be left out as it is passed up the organisational hierarchy. 
This may be initially because the receiver understands the 
caveats but believes that they complicate a message which he 
wishes to pass on. Reports may be summarised inaccurately, 
or accurately but inappropriately in that they leave out 
detail pertinent to the receiver. The motives of the sender 
in this process may be in conflict with those of the 
receiver; this may be particularly evident when information 
is completely withheld from transmission. Senders may wish 
to keep information prejudicial to them from their receivers 
(whether in a sub-ordinate - superior relationship or vice
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versa). When inferences from a body of data rather then the 
data are transmitted the recipient's interpretation must be 
based primarily on his confidence in the source and his 
knowledge of the biases to which the source is subject.
However, trying to define intentions too precisely may lead 
to near infinite regress of data definitions or lengthy 
and/or numerous communications. Indeed, receivers may be so 
overwhelmed with detailed definitional advice, which may 
conflict with separate clarifications of the same or similar 
issues, that they may not know what action to take. A 
general, but related point, is that the inability of a 
receiver to use his intelligence to discern the appropriate 
interpretation of the message in the context presents an 
endemic pathology for human communication systems.
A further pathology arises given the ability of receivers to 
use their intelligence to deliberately interpret the message 
in such a way that whilst technically correct, it can be 
used to justify action (including no action) that thwarts 
the intentions of the sender. Whilst receivers may 
deliberately misinterpret messages, they may also be given 
the most general of guidance and expected to use their own 
judgement, which may or may not prove to be appropriate. It 
will certainly be inappropriate if it does not give 
receivers sufficient information to know when they have 
actually taken the appropriate action. For example, if 
vaccination and immunisation uptake targets may be set but 
the necessary denominator data is not available until mid­
year estimates are published later in the year.
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Communications between machines is an increasingly important 
part of organisational information systems. The pathologies 
in such systems include a lack of common communication 
protocols to send messages, (although there has been a de 
facto and de jure convergence on the Open Systems 
Interconnection standard in the NHS), conflicting operating 
and application software in which to receive the message 
from the senders system, physical telecommunications 
breakdown and noise on lines.
There may of course be perceptual biases by the receiver who 
only wants to hear good news. The greater the distance, both 
in physical and status terms, the less the likelihood of 
communication, although telephone calls and other immediate 
methods of face to face communication are often more 
effective ways of presenting information than paper or 
machine based systems.
The presentation of information, the organisation of 
knowledge, brings additional pathologies. Presentation may 
be biased by the order and grouping of data, by the 
selection of limits that determine whether items are to be 
presented and in the choice of graphics (scale, size, colour 
etc.) For example, graphs may distort the meaning of the 
statistics on which they are based; averages may conceal 
significant variations; small numbers may be misinterpreted; 
definitions may vary etc. (Huff 1973, Yates 1982).
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4.4 MONITORING AND CONTROL
4.4.1 PROCESSES
Control using negative feedback normally involves four 
elements: a) a condition to be controlled that is
measurable; b) a sensor for measuring the condition; c) a 
control unit which compares measurements with preset 
standard; d) an activating unit which generates a corrective 
input signal to the process. Closed control loops are 
automated (e.g. a thermostat) and insulated from 
disturbances in the control loop. But there must be at least 
as many variations in the (knowledge of the) control unit as 
there are ways for the system to get out of control. 
However, enumerating all responses and developing decision 
rules for generating to control responses to them is only 
possible in simple cases. In open control loop systems, 
where the feedback loop is not isolated from the 
environment, as is the case with man-machine systems, the 
usual solution is for the machine to apply decision rules to 
generate control responses for all expected situations and a 
human decision maker to generate responses for the 
unexpected. Here the human element means that the system as 
a whole has the potential to become a self-organising system 
in order to generate the control responses. Management 
information systems, such as those for budgetary and 
planning purposes are examples of man-machine systems in 
which the self-organising capabilities of the performance, 
sensor, and control' units are central to the analysis 
(Lucey 1989).
Organisational learning occurs as individual members assess
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relevant past experiences of the organisation (and others) 
and adapt their goals. Organisational goals may change in 
response to the sub-goals or interests of those who form the 
coalition, to a minimal level all round (after restricted 
examination of a limited and selective range of 
information). One difficulty with learning from feedback 
from experience of outcomes is that learning may be 
concentrated on the short term adjustments to correct 
performance without any examination of the assumptions and 
theories that underlie performance deviations. The former 
style of learning Argyris and Schon (1978) term "single­
loop”, the latter is termed "double loop learning". Single 
loop learning is particularly important in monitoring the 
operational performance of the system, but in planning 
future developments, double loop learning becomes 
increasingly necessary.
"Morphogenic" systems develop monitoring and control systems 
where deviations from expectations may be amplified in such 
a way that the system changes form, structure or state 
(Maryuama 1963). These concepts are implied in the idea of 
double loop learning. The key idea is that sociocultural 
patterns are generated by rules (norms, laws and values) and 
by the interactions among individuals and groups. As Buckley 
(1967 p62) puts it "Attention must finally be paid to the 
interactions generated by the rules, seen only as limiting 
frameworks of action; to the new information, meanings, and 
revised rules generated by the interactions; and to the more 
or less temporary social products that represent the current
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state or structure of the ongoing process. Only one-sided, 
highly selective observation and conceptualisation could 
lead us to see a principle of 'social inertia' or a 
predominance of morphostatic processes operating in the 
sociocultural realm."
The monitoring and control of interactions between 
individuals and groups, and with their external 
environments, then can be programmed to some degree, but 
there must be some mechanism for dealing with new 
environmental events and constraints. This requires the 
generation of alternatives, the development of appropriate 
selection criteria, and methods of self (re)organisation and 
communication to adapt to the selected changes.
4.4.2 PATHOLOGIES
A budget or a plan sets a standard of expected resources and 
activity. Information support for control purposes is 
therefore based on the comparison of actual performance with 
the plan and the analysis of any deviations. However, 
figures used for the purposes of budgetary control, for 
example, may be required to form the basis for a plan, to 
act as a basis for control and the analysis of performance, 
and as a stimulant for change. In this situation, Handy 
(1976) suggests that the control and analysis of performance 
is likely to predominate, particularly if control is 
exercised by someone other than the individual performer. 
Further, that if rewards are tied to performance against 
target, the temptation will be to set that target low. If 
failure to meet a budget is punished, organisational slack
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will be built into the budget to give more leeway. If a 
budget means "availability of resources", the more that is 
budgeted for, the more slack or freedom will be available. 
"Performance figures used as feedback against targets should 
be separated from figures for control. Budgets for control 
are only useful if they lead to corrective action. They 
should, therefore, be instruments, in the first place, of 
the responsible executive." (Handy 1976 p344). The providers 
of such information and of associated interpretive comments 
are often in the position of having their reward structures 
dependent upon discovering and pointing out errors. This may 
lead to manipulation of the information being presented. The 
development of online databases, however, now offers 
executives a means of access to data for evaluation purposes 
without having it filtered by people being evaluated; this 
offers the opportunity for much greater centralised control, 
but also for misinterpretations.
Misinterpretations are particularly likely in cases where 
the criteria for evaluation and control have not been 
agreed, whether or not a computerised system is involved. 
For example, policy decisions made with no clear statement 
of objectives or criteria for judging success or failure are 
difficult to evaluate? indeed it may be too late to produce 
the baseline and monitoring information required once 
implementation has begun particularly when there are other 
concurrent policies and activities that may partially 
explain observed "effects". The measurement of any "effect" 
is in itself a major source of misinformation; particularly
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in public health programs, it is difficult to assess the 
effect of programs e.g. to reduce levels of smoking, and 
this illustrates another information pathology in the 
difficulty of identifying all the individuals who ought to 
be affected by the introduction of a policy change since 
without this knowledge it is difficult to assess if the 
policy has actually reached them (without resorting to 
survey methods). Supplementing formal monitoring information 
by use of informal feedback may be biased in terms of the 
perspectives of the reporter, and there is often the problem 
of inappropriate generalising from small numbers. 
Nevertheless, "management by walkabout" is a favoured method 
of many (District General) managers for getting a close 
subjective feel of the problems (Stewart et al 1987).
Finally, there is pathological learning, when the lessons 
drawn from experience reduce rather than increase the 
subsequent capacity to learn and self-organise. Criticism 
may be taken as always being negative rather than positive 
and constructive. Conversely, a program or organisation 
evaluated as a success at one period may as a result be 
reinforced to emphasise the apparently successful features, 
but these features may have reduced the capacity of an 
organisation to identify further threats or adapt to them. 
Another pathological form of reaction to feedback is 
oversteering: moving back past the correct path to another 
set of mistakes in the opposite direction. This may be also 
be associated with delay as a feature both of collecting 
evaluation information and reacting to it. The result of 
delays may be a program which produces perverse results in
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the opposite direction, whether because of overreaction, or 
because the target problem has developed further during the 
reaction time (Hogwood and Peters 1985). Speed of processing 
is clearly closely associated with appropriate performance, 
whether human or organisational. As suggested by the work of 
cognitive psychologists, such performance has to be 
understood with reference to the knowledgebases which are 
needed during the processes of knowledgework.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Though each of the knowledgework processes outlined above, 
and their associated pathologies, have been the subject of 
many more detailed analyses, I hope to demonstrate that they 
are useful categories in analysing different conceptions of 
organisational intelligence and at different levels of an 
organisation. They each, however, depend on access to a 
"knowledgebase” in which the procedural rules and known 
facts are stored in (preferably dynamic) information 
systems.
5 KNOWLEDGEBASES FOR ORGANISATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The term "knowledgebase" is used to denote the different 
types of human, artifactual and organisational aspects of 
memory (in which are stored the repertories of rules, 
programs and heuristic procedures) which are drawn on to 
enable knowledgework to be performed. We can distinguish 
between the knowledgebases which are stored internally in 
individual human memory, and those which are external.
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"Organisational memory" is a helpful metaphor, but it is 
only the knowledge of individuals, or that which is 
"contained" (and available to be interpreted) in artefacts 
that exists. Among the media of artifactual knowledgebases 
are books, procedure statements, and computerised databases.
Knowledge is used when knowledgework is to be performed, and 
may be generated as a product. A piece of knowledge is said 
to be declarative if it is stored as a fact. Procedural 
knowledge is not stored as a fact, but as a program or 
procedure. Declarative knowledge is usually stored locally, 
whilst procedural knowledge can be in both local and global 
knowledgebases. Although a large amount of work in 
Artificial Intelligence has gone into systems in which the 
bulk of the knowledge is stored (declaratively) in specific 
places, some knowledge has to be embodied in programs, 
otherwise one would not have a program at all, but merely an 
encyclopaedia.
Knowledgebases are not encyclopaedias, but memories with 
rules or programs that access items in memory and generate 
(or confirm) knowledge in the mind of the user. These rules 
or programs may have become "tacit" through the process of 
automatisation, to use Sternberg's term. If they are 
"forgotten" then what is stored in memory is not part of 
the knowledgebase because it has become inaccessible and/or 
uninterpretable. The characteristic ability of humans to 
learn new rules or procedures (or ideas) for looking at 
existing (or new) data and the ability to (re)interpret data 
using given analytical techniques are central to the dynamic
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nature of knowledgebases.
5.2 PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE
Underlying the idea of contextually appropriate behaviour or 
successful performance in the real world is tacit knowledge, 
that is never explicitly taught. Sternberg (1985) reports 
findings suggesting that a major factor underlying success 
in academic and business occupations is "a knowledge of the 
ins and outs” of the occupation. These ins and outs are 
generally bits of information one learns on the job rather 
than in any preparatory academic or other work. Other 
related aspects of what he terms "practical intelligence" 
concern the facility in dealing with human beings e.g. by 
judging correctly feelings, moods and motivations of others.
Giddens (1979 p5) distinguishes between "practical
consciousness, as tacit stocks of knowledge which actors 
draw upon in the constitution of social activity, and 
discursive consciousness, involving knowledge which actors 
are able to express on the level of discourse." Practical 
consciousness is not necessarily unconscious knowledge of 
social institutions, it is knowledge about "how to go on", 
or "know what to do". But it is non-discursive. Discursive 
consciousness is used by Giddens to refer to the capability 
of actors to "give accounts", or to be able to reflexively 
monitor their conduct.
The importance of the grey areas of practical consciousness 
that exist in the relation between the rationalisation of
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action and actors7 stocks of knowledge are acknowledged by 
Giddens. An actor does not have to be capable of formulating 
the knowledge he applies as an abstract proposition, nor 
does it have to be the case that such knowledge is valid. To 
enquire into the rationalisation of action "is to enquire 
into (a) the logical connection between various forms of 
purposive act, or projects, and (b) the 'technical 
grounding7 of the knowledge that is applied as 'means7 in 
purposive acts to secure particular outcomes" (Giddens 1976 
p83). The technical grounding refers to the linkage between 
the empirical content of the activities and the logical 
consistency with their purpose whether as an "end" or as a 
"means to an end". The adequacy of the reasons given, by an 
actor, or inferred by others, are grounded in "principles of 
action" which constitute "an explanation of why a particular 
'means' is the 'correct','proper7 or 'appropriate' one to 
achieve a given outcome, as specified by a particular act- 
identification"(Giddens 1976 p84). Giddens notes that all 
social interactions involve the relations of meaningful 
communications (as well as normative sanctions and power); 
therefore the meaning of some of the communications or 
accessions to the common stocks of knowledge may be 
"sanctioned" as more legitimate/appropriate than others; in 
turn this reflects the power relations that make some 
accounts count for more than others.
An important distinction is made by Argyris and Schon 
between espoused theories and theories in use. They suggest 
that when someone is asked how he would behave under certain 
circumstances, the answer he usually gives is his espoused
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theory of action for that situation. This is the theory of 
action to which he gives allegiance and which, upon request, 
he communicates to others. "However, the theory that 
actually governs his actions is his theory-in-use, which may 
or may not be compatible with his espoused theory;
furthermore, the individual may or may not be aware of the 
incompatibility of the two theories" (Argyris and Schon 1974 
p7) . Organisational theory-in-use may remain tacit either
because its incongruity with espoused theory is
undiscussable or because individual members of an
organisation know more than they can say - because the
theory-in-use is inaccessible to them. (Argyris and Schon 
1978) .
Organisational theory-in-use is to be inferred from the
decisions and actions taken by individuals using the
collective rules for decision and delegation of the 
organisation. These rules may remain tacit, unless for some 
reason they are called into question. "Whatever the reason 
for tacitness, the largely tacit theory-in-use accounts for 
organisational identity and continuity" (Argyris and Schon 
1978 pl5).
Rules are of different types and need to be accessed and 
applied appropriately. As Giddens puts it "Rules are not
simply constitutive or regulative which generalise what 
people can do, but rather rules are the medium of the
production and reproduction of practical social life. Rules, 
therefore are part of the stocks of knowledge drawn upon by
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actors; indeed they are embedded in practical consciousness, 
in knowing 'how to go on'" (Giddens 1976 p85).
Whilst the practical knowledge of individuals working in 
organisations entails knowledge of a number of rules, some 
of which may be tacit, but others may be "accountable for", 
there are those who may develop particular expertise in 
operating these rules, and indeed developing new ones. The 
essence of Sternberg's experiential sub-theory is that to 
deal appropriately with novel situations requires 
intelligence, and that to deal appropriately with familiar 
situations requires information processing to be 
automatised, thereby freeing up processing time to deal with 
novel situations (e.g. by making more thorough searches of 
memory to retrieve contextually appropriate analogies, or to 
invent appropriate responses). The "expert" is often someone 
who has a well structured knowledgebase from which, using a 
set of tried and tested rules (e.g. rules of thumb), 
contextually appropriate responses can be quickly generated.
Experts typically solve problems that are unstructured and 
usually by applying heuristics of some form based on what 
they have learnt from past experience. An expert solves 
problems in his area of expertise more rapidly, more 
accurately, and with less conscious deliberation about his 
plan of attack than a novice does. Experts are also capable 
of using incomplete data, being able to make plausible 
inferences and being able to explain what they have done, 
though this is often on the basis of quoting specific 
examples rather than being able to articulate the general
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rules underlying the analysis and advice given. Indeed 
experts have almost as many exceptions as they have rules. 
Experts know when to make referrals if a problem is outside 
their area of expertise.
Amarel (1984 p2) suggests that "expert problem solving
requires the conceptualisation/formulation of a given 
problem within the framework of one or more problem solving 
schemas in such a way that solutions can be attained with 
accuracy and with very little search. This means that 
available knowledge must be used in a very effective manner 
to instantiate parameters of the schemas in accordance with 
the needs of the task at hand. In other words, an expert 
problem solver works within a highly appropriate problem 
formulation - where appropriateness refers mainly to 
computational efficiency and is task specific."
5.3 ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY
The relationship between organisational memory and 
organisational maps is presented by Argyris and Schon (1978 
pl60). They suggest that "Organisational memory may be 
contained in individual heads, in files, in documents, or 
more recently, in computer memories. Organisational memory, 
therefore, may contain information that is scattered and 
inaccessible to the agents of organisational learning. 
Organisational maps, in the view of Argyris and Schon, are 
shared descriptions of the organisation which individuals 
jointly construct and use to guide their own inquiry. They 
include, for example, diagrams of work flow, compensation
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charts, statements of procedure, even the schematic drawings 
of office space. A building itself may function as a kind of 
map, revealing patterns of communication and control. 
"Whatever their form, maps have a dual function. They 
describe actual patterns of activity, and they are guides to 
future action. As musicians perform their scores, members of 
organisations perform their maps. Organisational theory-in- 
use, continually constructed through individual inquiry, is 
encoded in private images and in public maps" (Argyris and 
Schon 1978 pl7). As a means informing action, for example 
in terms of interventionist action or systems analysis, 
organisational mapping can be used as a diagnostic tool. The 
map is used to draw on the stocks of knowledge of members of 
the organisation to construct a map that indicates "where" 
the organisation is now and "where" it wants to get to.
Artefacts, such as books, journals, libraries, memos, and 
computer databases are accessed and created by individuals 
who may or may not be using them as a means of extending the 
organisational knowledgebase. Organising such artefacts to 
enable their contents to be readily accessed and converted 
into appropriate information is an important aspect of the 
organisation of intelligence. Examining the requirements for 
databases highlights issues applicable to the organisation 
of the other types of knowledgebase.
An important corollary of this is that individuals can 
develop a detailed mental map or knowledgebase of the 
organisation in their heads, or even in their files, but on 
leaving the organisation may take all this knowledge with
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them. Their knowledge of the informal history of issues is a 
valuable resource that is often not "handed over"; instead 
it is for their successor to interpret what has happened.
Other information pathologies concern the initial storage of 
the information. Inappropriate decisions on what to encode, 
how it is indexed for retrieval, and the medium on which it 
is stored may result in loss of "memory". Changes in the 
classification and coding of medical information and its 
storage on medical records illustrates attempts to improve 
this aspect of a hospital's organisational memory. Failure 
to maintain the memory, e.g. updating organisational 
handbooks, telephone directories, collections of relevant 
literature from outside the organisation is an obvious 
pathology of lack of appropriate knowledge (though a 
destruction policy for dated material may also be needed). 
Failure to link records within memory (e.g. because there is 
no procedure for recognising that they refer to the same 
person and/or maintaining a common index) may lead to 
unnecessary duplication of storage, and the inability to 
relate what is recorded in one part of the organisation with 
relevant records elsewhere. Nevertheless there is always the 
danger of misinformation, e.g. a wrong diagnosis, being 
retained, and indeed elaborated in the system. However, even 
where such a diagnosis is wrong, the supporting evidence, if 
it has been recorded accurately, is available for 
reinterpretation.
Whilst record linkage relates information about discrete
101
individuals, or events, another aspect of failure in 
organisational memory may be found in the need to store 
policies and plans in such a form that they can be fully 
understood when they need to be reviewed or replaced. What 
may be available is the statement of policy, but its genesis 
is seldom recorded in a form available for subsequent 
evaluation and organisational learning. A major reason for 
memory failure is that it "frequently does not occur to 
policy-makers or policy advisers that their predecessors had 
been there or somewhere similar before and that their 
consideration of the 'new' issue might benefit from learning 
about the outcome of treatment of similar issues in the 
past" (Hogwood and Peters 1985 p84).
5.4 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
5.4.1 BACKGROUND
Whilst organisations have always needed access to a 
knowledgebase, drawing on practical knowledge and 
organisational memory as already discussed, it is only in 
the last two decades that computerised data processing and 
the use of information technology have become a significant 
feature.
In the late fifties it was predicted that by the 1980s, with 
the advent of computer systems middle managers would 
disappear and that the number of top managers and computer 
specialists would increase (Leavitt and Whisler 1958). 
Later studies, however, suggest that there has been 
relatively minor impact on managerial employment level 
because, for example managers are able to stay in their jobs
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for power reasons (redundancies coming from subordinate 
staff), and because often new managerial jobs are associated 
with the introduction of computers to enhance management 
monitoring and control. Bjorn-Andersen and Rasmussen (1980) 
suggest that there has been an increase in the 
"bureaucratisation" (assessed in terms of increases in 
specialisation of tasks and roles, standardisation of rules 
and procedures, and formalisation of prescribed practices). 
Also they report a shift in power to those in control of 
computer resources, and that whether they be workers, clerks 
or managers, people are not particularly more dissatisfied 
with their jobs following the introduction of computers than 
previously.
During the 1980s there has been a significant change in 
technology. The introduction of micro-computers has 
increased both the number of options in terms of computer 
configurations and the number of staff, at all levels, who 
may have direct access to a computer and its database. There 
has been a shift in power away from those with centralised 
control over computing (easiest when it was all done by one 
large mainframe) and towards the end-user. Down and Taylor 
(1976 p32) summarise the argument by suggesting that the 
"ability to make the structure of data processing compatible 
with the general administrative structure of the 
organisation, yet at the same time to be able to show 
economic advantage plus a reduced need for specialist data 
processing staff at all but the centre of data processing 
competence, is perhaps the strongest argument in favour of
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adopting the philosophy of distributed computing by the 
commercial data processing sector. The principles recur, to 
different degrees, in almost all the areas of potential 
advantage including flexibility, services to users, 
utilisation of resources and human involvement. The approach 
can be summarised as local control and local resolution of 
local problems".
5.4.2 DATA AND DATA MANAGEMENT
In the context of the NHS (pre 1991), there are a number of 
different sources and types of routinely available data. A 
brief review of these helps put the remainder of the 
argument in context. The sources and limitations of 
statistical data systems have been extensively reviewed 
(Acheson et al 1976, Alderson & Dowie 1979, Alderson 1985, 
Ashley & Mclachlan 1985). A simple listing of the some of 
the key data sources involved and of the returns required to 
be sent to the Department of Health (the DH Central 
Requirements amount to over 100 returns from a single health 
authority) indicates the complexity of the provision of 
health care and for the management of information.
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION; OPCS Census data, including Small 
Area Statistics; mid-year population estimates, PPl series; 
national population projections, PP2 series; population 
projections by area, PP3 series; Socio-economic indicators 
(e.g. Jarman scores, ACORN; Vital Statistics by area, VS 1 & 
2 series).
MORTALITY STATISTICS: OPCS publications on Mortality (Deaths 
General causes, DH1; Deaths by cause, DH2; childhood and
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maternal deaths, DH3; deaths from accident and violence, 
DH4; deaths by area, VS3 series;
MORBIDITY STATISTICS: Abortions (OPCS AB series); Congenital 
malformation (OPCS MB3 series); Infectious diseases (OPCS 
MB2 series); Cancer registration, and cancer statistics 
(OPCS series MB1); General Household Survey; Hospital 
discharge statistics for acute and maternity from the 
Hospital Activity Analysis system; Mental Health Enquiry and 
inpatient psychiatric census; morbidity statistics from 
general practice national morbidity study; sickness absence 
statistics; locally available registers of disease, 
handicaps and child surveillance registers.
CENTRAL INFORMATION RETURNS:
Hospital activity (KH01 - KH18)
Patient administration based returns (KP19 - KP22) 
Paramedical activity (KT23 - KT31)
Patient Transport (KA32 - KA 34)
Miscellaneous activity returns (K035 - K040)
Manpower returns (KM41 - KM47)
Community activity (KC50 - KC64)
Summary hospital episode statistics return (KP70)
Drug agencies return (K071)
Estates returns (KE81 - KE86, and CONCISE 1 & 2))
Hospital Episode Statistics (for individual consultant 
episodes via OPCS)
Staff in post (medical and non-medical censuses)
Earnings Related Base of Data (ERBOD)
Health Authority Annual Accounts and Notes 
Financial returns (FR1 - FR20)
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Receipts and Payments returns (RP1 - RP4)
Family Practitioner Committees annual accounts.
Management Accounting Framework (MAF) tables required for 
planning purposes.
SURVEYS AND STUDIES
In addition to these types of data are special surveys 
carried out for particular purposes and problem specific 
studies. These include disease related topics and also those 
relating to resources (e.g. medical manpower) and use of 
services as well as evaluations of medical care. (Alderson 
and Dowie 1979).
The limitations of these sources of data can be summarised 
in terms of their coverage as follows:
1. There are few comprehensive indicators of population 
morbidity. Some morbidity indicators apply only to a 
subgroup of the population (e.g. the economically 
active). Some are recorded at infrequent intervals 
(e.g. decennial census) or on small samples (e.g. 
National Morbidity Survey), or for standard 
statistical, rather than NHS Regions (e.g. General 
Household Survey). Some are difficult to collate (e.g. 
GP records). In short, there is little data relating to 
need or unmet demand (except when expressed in terms of 
waiting times and lists for hospital care).
2. There is a great deal of data available on general 
service utilisation, but very little relating to 
specific resource utilisation by individual patients.
3. There is virtually no linkage of information systems
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(other than in summary tables in the Management 
Accounting Framework) either within or between the 
following three areas:
a) finance, resource availability and resource 
utilisation
b) the delivery of services in different sectors - 
in-patients, out-patients, community health 
services, family practitioner services
c) successive episodes of individual patient care 
in different sectors, or in different providers of 
care.
4. There is virtually no routine information relating to 
the effect of health care on the health of patients.
5. There is virtually no routine information relating to 
the quality of care provided to patients.
6. The data from routine systems relating to resource 
availability (buildings, equipment, manpower) does not 
reflect the quality of those resources.
In terms of their status as "official statistics", such data 
can be analysed in terms of technical and conceptual
adequacy (Hindess 1973). For example, there are the 
technical issues of inadequacies concerned in all stages of 
data processing: in the origination of observations (e.g.
sampling errors), misclassifications (observer bias), 
erroneous sorting, incorrect calculations, inappropriate 
summarisations, biased communications, insecure storage, 
faulty retrieval and errors in reproduction.
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To reduce such technical errors, guidance is given to the 
recorders of data to standardise data collection methods, 
whether these are census rules, user guides for Korner 
statistics, data definitions etc. However, as sociologists 
have emphasised, data recorders, particularly those (e.g. 
doctors) dealing with the construction of data from 
conversations and observations have "background
expectancies" or "tacit knowledge" which function in making 
an environment of object recognisable to himself and, 
through his reports, to other individuals (Hughes 1977) . In 
addition, data once collected is transformed, and at each 
stage there may be negotiation and reinterpretation of what 
happened. Cicourel (1964) argues that the functioning of 
these background expectancies is to render intelligible the 
environment of objects.
The data provided in official statistics, nevertheless, is 
issued by "the centre" to monitor and control the 
organisation and to develop policy. One of the key policy 
recommendations in the Korner report on Health Service 
Information (DHSS 1982) was to view henceforth the 
Department of Health's requirements as subsets of the 
minimum sets of data needed by local managers. They were 
concerned that data that was not appropriate in the context 
of operational requirements at a local level would be of 
poor quality. The development of Korner policy for data and 
information is considered further in Chapter 8, but the 
point to be made here is that, viewed as a product of the 
organisation, the question has to be asked "in what context 
is information based on this data appropriate"?
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Data for operational purposes, e.g. the provision of 
laboratory test results for clinicians, may suffer from 
biases introduced in the processing of the sample, and hence 
be biased; but it may still be entirely appropriate to have 
the information. However, particularly when automated 
systems can run a wide range of tests easily, it may be 
questioned whether, in the context of the overall management 
of resources, requests for large numbers of tests ("to be on 
the safe side") are appropriate. From the perspective of the 
doctor however, such an assessment has to be made bearing in 
mind their expertise. Consultants are expected to have 
sufficient expertise not to need the number of tests that an 
inexperienced House Officer may require facing large numbers 
of "novel" cases. Doctors are trained in the art of 
interpreting signals from patients, both formally in class 
and textbook, and informally "on the job", e.g. on teaching 
ward rounds. The knowledgebase of the mainstream medical 
professions is founded on a scientific method and documented 
extensively in journals. Nevertheless there is an increasing 
interest in developing expert systems and formalising the 
knowledgebase of clinical experts (Salamon et al 1986, 
Barber et al 1989).
5.4.3 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
What is "information management"? Davis and Olson (1985 
pl52) suggest that "information systems management has 
responsibility for management and control of the development 
and operation of the overall information system of the 
organisation". They give the following as examples of
109
activities associated with this responsibility:
- Maintenance of qualified staff (selection,
training and evaluation).
- Acquisition of appropriate hardware and software.
- Scheduling and control of work of development 
staff.
- Control over software resources of the
installation (documentation, program change 
controls, etc.).
- Control over maintenance (correction and
revisions) of existing applications.
- Control over the database (definition,
authorisation for access, etc.).
- Establishment and enforcement of guidelines, 
standards, and technical support for user 
facilities.
This list indicates the wide range of skills and 
competencies that information managers are expected to have, 
or manage (see also Chapter 5 Section 6.1). However, whilst 
these activities may be useful in assessing the roles of 
information managers, they do not give the characteristics 
of information management in an organisation. One 
comprehensive definition of them has been provided by 
Vickers (1984 ppl23-4) who suggests:
1) Information has to be accepted as a resource requiring
proper management, like money, manpower and materials.
2) Someone in the organisation has to be designated as
responsible for information management.
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3) At the simplest level information management should 
entail responsibility for co-ordination, if not direct 
control, of the following:
- information handling skills as found in
information scientists, librarians, data 
processing personnel, systems designers, 
statisticians, records managers and others
- information technology of all kinds - computers
and peripherals, word processors, networks, 
photocopiers, telecommunications etc.
- information sources and stores. including
databases, internal and external information 
resources, internal and external document 
collections.
4) Co-ordination should also be applied to all expenditure 
on information systems and resources.
5) Information management also entails maintaining an 
awareness of new developments, new techniques, and new 
sources that can contribute to the better management of 
the information resources of the organisation.
6) There must be an understanding of the patterns of 
information flow within the organisation, which will 
usually entail systematic means of mapping and 
monitoring such flows.
This presentation was made explicitly to "promote the 
concept" of information management, and the author commented 
that "with such a large bureaucratic organisation as the NHS 
it becomes extremely difficult to introduce proper 
information management - or any other kind of management
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come to that...It is hard to see where any permanent form of 
information management will spring from in the DHSS or the 
Regional Health Authorities" (Vickers 1984 pl26). However by 
1986 the DHSS had produced "The National Strategic Framework 
for Information Management in the Hospital and Community 
Health Services", (DHSS 1986a) and expected all Regions and 
Districts to produce information strategies. It is perhaps 
surprising that Vickers' analysis does not explicitly 
include the management of change in information systems, in 
particular the existence and/or development of strategies 
for information systems as part of the characteristic 
features of information management in an organisation.
Information requirements can be determined in many ways, and 
for at least three levels: organisational, application and 
database. Methods may include:
1. Asking (assuming thereby that users can structure the 
problem accurately, and are not biased etc., and are 
understood by the analyst).
2. Deriving from an existing system (assuming that 
knowledge of the inputs and outputs of data from an 
existing system, which may be the one to be replaced or 
one in another organisation, can provide a sufficiently 
stable base on which to construct the new 
requirements).
3. Focusing on end-user requirements, assuming that, by 
use of structured techniques, such as critical success 
factors (Rockart 1979), or task analysis (Bardsley et 
al 1988) the information requirements of the system as
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a whole are fully met.
4. Experimentation (assuming that by producing prototype 
systems it is possible to use iterative procedures to 
develop a progressively more elaborate specification 
and final product).
Davis and Olson provide an interesting and helpful 
contingency approach which indicates how such methods may be 
appropriately selected. "The selection procedure is 
contingent on characteristics of the environment in which 
the determination of requirements is conducted" (Davis and 
Olson 1985 p488). The underlying basis for selecting a 
strategy is uncertainty. Characteristics that reduce 
uncertainty are suggested as a stable and well defined end- 
user system that is not in the process of change and with 
programmed activities or decisions; simple sets of 
requirements of the information system itself (e.g. a 
clerical support system); one or few users who are highly 
experienced; and trained and experienced analysts 
experienced with similar information systems.
However, there may be uncertainty with respect to the 
existence and stability of a usable set of requirements. For 
example, end users may have confused objectives, 
nonprogrammed activities and decisions; application systems 
may have complex or unusual requirements; there may be a 
lack of stability in use of the application systems with 
changes in user personnel creating unstable use patterns. 
There may also be uncertainty with respect to users' ability 
to specify requirements, not only because of human
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limitations but also because of the characteristics of the 
information system or application. For example, there may be 
no conceptual model of the end-user system, the systems may 
be complex and the use made of its outputs may be 
continually changing, users (managers or operational staff) 
may be inexperienced in defining their requirements, and a 
large number of users will affect the level of participation 
and users' feelings of responsibility in specifying 
requirements. Finally there may be uncertainty with respect 
to the analyst's ability to elicit requirements and evaluate 
their correctness and completeness.
Essentially then, the characteristics affecting the 
un/certainty of determining organisational information 
requirements are:
- stability of technology and operational systems
- stability in management and control
- maturity in use of computer systems
- extent of high level management applications
- complexity and level of integration of information
- level of experience in end user systems
- experience in planning information systems.
Having evaluated the combined effect of the uncertainties in 
the process of determining the information requirements, 
Davis and Olson propose that the appropriate strategy will 
be "asking" if the uncertainty is low, then, as uncertainty 
increases, progressing towards deriving it from an existing 
system, then focusing on end-user systems and finally by
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experimentation if the uncertainty is high.
One of the features of this set of criteria is the concept 
of "maturity in the use of computer systems". This alludes 
to the Nolan stage theory of growth in information system 
use in organisations. In the six-stage version of the theory 
(Nolan 1979) the idea is presented that after the first 
three stages of initiation (experimentation, decentralised 
control and minimal planning), contagion (proliferation of 
computers and applications), and control (cost-effectiveness 
controls introduced, centralisation introduced), there is a 
transition from the management of computers to management of 
organisational data resources. The stages that follow this 
transition are integration (of technologies, (with more 
emphasis on user control of information system costs), data 
administration (but with some experimentation with 
application features which contribute to the strategic 
advantage of the organisation) and finally maturity. In the 
maturity stage, the applications mirror organisational 
processes, there is joint information systems-user 
accountability for information resources, and there is a 
match between information system structure and 
organisational structure.
Nolan assumes that it is organisational learning that 
permits evolution through the stages which cannot be skipped 
because experience is necessary before the organisation is 
ready for the next stage. The stages thus represent a 
sequence for planned management of change (which may proceed 
faster in some sectors of the organisation or its
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applications, than in others) . Yet it is not until the 
organisation is "mature" that its information managers will 
have the characteristics suggested by Vickers and discussed 
earlier. It should be noted, however, that whilst the model 
provides a useful diagnostic tool, it is essentially a 
descriptive model of the organisational evolution of 
in format i on management.
Given that there may be a variety of organisational 
structures which are appropriate to the organisation which 
may reflect the uncertainties of the task environment (as 
well as the number and interdependencies of units) e.g. 
functional, product and matrix as suggested by Galbraith 
(see Section 1.2), there are important questions concerning 
the organisation of the information systems, and the 
provision of organisational intelligence to be addressed.
In a structural approach to assessing organisational 
intelligence, attention focuses on the ways in which such 
structures as hierarchy, specialisation and centralisation 
affect, or explain, the production of intelligence. This has 
been the concern of Wilensky (1967) who defines intelligence 
as denoting "the information - question, insights, 
hypotheses, evidence relevant to policy" (Wilensky 1967, 
viii) , ie. defining it as a product. But, it is also clear 
that his explanation of the pathologies of organisational 
structure lead him to consider intelligence as the "problem 
of gathering, processing, interpreting, and communicating 
the technical and political information needed in the
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decision-making process" (Wilensky 1967 pi). He discusses 
organisational processes in terms of the nature (urgency, 
cost, innovation and uncertainty) of the decision, 
institutionalisation and growth. Whilst concerned with the 
problem of the competent organisation of the intelligence 
function, Wilensky's analysis focuses on the institutional 
threats to the reasoned use of knowledge. His analysis deals 
with the pluralist elements in organisations and recognises 
many variants of bureaucratic dysfunction in the development 
of intelligence.
As Wilensky points out information is a resource that 
symbolises status, enhances authority, and shapes careers. 
Therefore, in reporting at every level, hierarchy is 
conducive to concealment and misrepresentation. 
Subordinates are asked to transmit information that can be 
used to evaluate their performance. Their motive for "making 
it look good", for "playing it safe" is obvious. He 
suggests that for the purposes of intelligence, the optimal 
shape of the hierarchy would be relatively flat (few ranks 
permit a speedier diffusion of more accurate information) 
with a bulge in the middle (with more specialists who have 
information and more potential managers motivated to command 
it) .
Wilensky suggests that the dilemma of intelligence vs 
specialisation is twofold: specialisation is essential to
the efficient command of knowledge but antithetical to the 
penetrating interpretation that bears on policy; 
specialisation and its concomitant, inter-unit rivalry,
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frequently block the sharing of accurate information, but if 
problems of upward communication can be solved, rivalry can 
result in great gains - the clarification of clashing 
alternatives and the presentation of opposing cases. The 
primary cost of specialisation in intelligence is 
parochialism - the production of misleading or irrelevant 
information. The professionally biased producer of 
intelligence remains too distant from the intelligence user, 
top ignorant of policy needs, and is forced to compete with 
other producers for the support and guidance of the user.
Related to the information pathologies of hierarchy and 
specialisation is the dilemma of centralisation: if
intelligence is lodged at the top, too few officials and 
experts with too little accurate and relevant information 
are too far out of touch and too overloaded to function 
effectively; on the other hand, if intelligence is 
scattered throughout many subordinate units, too many 
officials and experts with too much specialised information 
may engage in dysfunctional competition, may delay decisions 
while they warily consult each other, and may distort 
information as they pass it up.
Wilensky points out that the debate about departmental or 
local vs central or national intelligence has obscured two 
important points. "First, there is need for interpretative 
skills at every point where important decisions are taken; 
the ideal is the close integration of data collection and 
evaluation in every department and division and, within the
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limits of budget and personnel, at every level. Second, 
various degrees and kinds of decentralisation are 
appropriate for various purposes and measures of 
effectiveness and kinds of intelligence. If the pathologies 
of hierarchy and specialisation can be minimised, 
decentralisation of intelligence can be effective. But the 
one decisive argument against it is usually the 
costs.... This typically dictates a concentration of 
intelligence at headquarters."(Wilensky 1967 p59).
In the context of health care the morphogenetic processes 
involved in establishing, as opposed to maintaining, a 
health intelligence system have been described by Alderson 
and Dowie (1979 pl99). They suggest there are four basic 
steps in setting up a "model intelligence system in the 
health service":
(i) Examination of the resources for the intelligence 
system, both resources of data, staff, expertise and 
equipment for handling the information.
(ii) Review of the problems faced by all levels of 
management in the health service; this includes study of the 
problems facing those responsible for administering the 
hospitals, and community health services, at national, 
regional and local level.
(iii) Having identified the problems that management face, 
one wants a detailed study of how information is currently 
used and whether decisions on current problems are reached 
without need for or use of information.
(iv) Consideration of the extent to which more efficient 
handling of presently available data can be used for a more
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profitable examination of problems faced by management, and 
review of the need to alter the collection of routine or ad 
hoc information.
The case studies presented later suggest that the experience 
of setting up such arrangements for health intelligence is 
not widespread.
6 ORGANISATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND EXPERIENCE
The analysis of organisational intelligence which focuses on 
the processes of knowledgework and the associated 
knowledgebases developed here provides a framework within 
which to assess a wide variety of information processes in 
organisations. However, the model developed by Sternberg 
also draws attention to assessing "experience" in analyses 
of intelligence. The experiential component of the 
framework is simply concerned with assessing the 
knowledgebases, knowledgework processes, products and the 
context as already discussed in the light of (or lack of) 
previous experience of similar circumstances.
The essence of this component is to examine whether an actor 
/ organisation responds "appropriately" to a situation 
perceived as novel or one that is routine. The importance of 
the experiential component, particularly in analyses of 
information management, is that it focuses attention on how 
the knowledgework processes, or products are organised, 
retrieved and stored in knowledgebases.
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In assessing organisational intelligence, therefore, the 
ways in which a novel problem is approached and decomposed 
within the organisation is important. The findings of 
various investigators of different "types" of intelligence 
stress this ability to respond flexibly to new situations, 
to break down hard problems to smaller ones and be able to 
use all available resources to tackle different aspects of 
them (see Chapter 2) . With experience, the small sub-parts 
of a complex problem should become routinised and performed 
"automatically" by increasingly more localised processors. 
An organisation with a well organised knowledgebase, 
however, should be able to handle novel situation more 
appropriately (e.g. faster and/or more thoroughly) than one 
in which the relevant knowledge has to be newly developed, 
or cannot be retrieved from memory.
One of the pathologies of organisational memory is the 
failure to recognise that a situation is similar to one that 
has previously occurred, or to make attempts to retrieve 
knowledge of previous events from those people, or 
documents, where knowledge of what was successful or failed 
is stored. Such knowledge is more to difficult to acquire if 
it has now "left" the organisation (e.g. it is only in the 
minds of people working elsewhere). As Schank (1982) 
suggests, a dynamic memory may be the key to intelligence. 
So, in organisations, the retrieval, storage and management 
of all aspects of knowledge is crucial to organisational 
intelligence.
However, much depends on those who are the key "central"
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decision makers. Their perception of the nature of the task 
in its historical and political context orientates the 
methods used to deal with the problem, particularly if it is 
a novel one (for them). The case studies here concentrate 
largely on the approaches to novel problems. This is a 
reflection of the very rapid developments in the 1980s in 
information management issues, and associated policy 
developments.
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CHAPTER 4
ASSESSING ORGANISATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
1 INTRODUCTION
We are now able to combine the perspectives developed in the 
previous Chapter to form a framework of analysis for 
assessing organisational intelligence. The essence of the 
argument is that organisational intelligence is not 
something that can be assessed by applying the equivalent of 
an organisational IQ test, but has to be assessed with 
respect to a number of facets of contextually appropriate 
behaviour and information. Having presented the framework, 
the approach taken and the methods used in the case studies 
are discussed.
2 KNOWLEDGEWORK PROCESSES AND KNOWLEDGEBASES
Whilst the work of psychometricians has been to try and 
explain how test performance can be explained by reference 
to underlying "factors", the triarchic theory of human 
intelligence developed by Sternberg emphasises that 
"intelligence" is a relative concept. It is relative both 
with respect to the context or environment and to the 
experience of the situation; it cannot be fully assessed by 
a single (IQ) test. However, cognitive psychologists suggest 
that the information processing components of any human are 
organised to perform the same basic processes.
In an organisational context, these basic processes have 
been interpreted in terms of the knowledgework processes of
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scanning an (internal or external) environment for problems 
and opportunities and selecting an item/issue for further 
action; making decisions and plans to deal with the issue; 
organising the knowledge obtained and communicating it; 
monitoring and controlling the solutions/outcomes. Of 
course, each of these knowledgework processes can be refined 
in much more detail, but this fourfold grouping provides an 
adequate framework for use in the range of case studies 
selected here. It can be used (in some respects as a 
"performance program" itself) to describe what processes 
happened, and, where appropriate, to analyse any associated 
pathologies of knowledgework, such as those commented on in 
Chapter 3. The fewer the pathologies, the greater the 
likelihood of contextually appropriate behaviour.
But, to support these processes individuals need to access 
knowledgebases. These may be expressed in their own 
"practical knowledge" and expertise, or stored in the 
"organisational memory" and/or be available from information 
systems. An organisation in which the practical knowledge 
and expertise of members is not developed on a personal 
basis, and in which the knowledge is not stored in a way 
appropriate for use by others will be less likely to exhibit 
contextually appropriate behaviour. In particular, if the 
information systems of an organisation (data collection, 
storage, processing and information management) are 
inappropriate so will be the production of contextually 
appropriate information.
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3 PRODUCT
Since organisations "produce" information, the question can 
be posed "is what is produced intelligence?" If information 
is meaningful data, and intelligence is also (contextually) 
appropriate information, then, we can assess the information 
products of an organisation in terms of the extent to which 
they help, or are intended to help, the organisation perform 
its knowledgework processes■ Since some of these processes 
focus on dealing with inputs from the external or internal 
environment some of the information products will 
appropriately be concerned with supporting the "scanning and 
selection" of problems/opportunities. Other processes, such 
as communications and knowledge organisation, and monitoring 
and control, will require different types of information 
products to support their operation and implementation. 
Decision making and planning can be short or long term, and 
the information products concerned will reflect both the 
inputs to and outcomes of the process.
By analysing these processes involved in the production 
processes of intelligence (including their pathologies and 
the use of information in routine "performance programs" and 
as a political resource), attention is focused on the way 
information is used in key aspects of organisational life. 
Any piece of intelligence-as-product of or for knowledgework 
processes can, therefore, be examined for its relationship 
with them, e.g. indicating changes in scanning procedures 
are needed, or indicating failures to communicate knowledge 
effectively etc. Alternatively, the development of
126
intelligence as an information product for policy can be 
examined to assess the adequacy of existing information 
processes. For example, the development of intelligence for 
policy making about a new disease, such as AIDS, can 
illustrate the non-existence of key sources of information.
This thesis is particularly concerned with the provision of 
information products about information systems and, 
following the argument above, it is proposed that, any given 
policy product concerning information systems management 
can be assessed for its appropriateness in terms of the 
extent to which it enables knowledgework to be performed 
more appropriately (e.g. by information specialists and 
systems) . That is to say, the framework of organisational 
intelligence can be used to analyse the contents of 
information policy documents to establish how far they 
foster the processes, structures and products of 
organisational intelligence.
4 CONTEXT
But whilst such information products and processes, taken 
singly or together, enable assessments of "task performance" 
to be made (against for example a set of knowledgework 
processes and knowledgebases) and thus indicate the extent 
of organisational intelligence, the argument made here is 
that this is only one facet of the problem. These products 
and processes must be assessed in context. The historical 
and political contexts, for example, need consideration, as 
do those of information systems, particularly given the 
subject matter of this thesis. "Theoretical" perspectives,
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as developed within the NHS, by politicians, or in 
organisational theory in general, will of course influence 
assessments of "intelligence"; for example, they may focus 
attention on the political objectives of key actors, or on 
the influence of the external political environment of the 
NHS. Finally, the "goals" of the actors and organisations 
involved form part of the assessment of the "context" with 
respect to which their behaviour is analysed.
5 EXPERIENCE
But Sternberg also draws attention to the importance of 
"experience". This gives the analysis the capability of 
dealing with changes over time. The focus is on what the 
individual, or organisation, has learnt from experience of 
similar problems in the past and the extent to which ways of 
dealing with them have been internalised, or "automated", so 
as to free up information processing capabilities to deal 
with novel problems.
6 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Finally, throughout any assessments of organisational 
intelligence particular consideration must be given to how 
information systems have been or are being managed. This 
thesis is concerned with information management and 
intelligence rather than intelligence management. This 
distinction is made in recognition of the obvious point that 
the majority of users of information who produce 
intelligence as news or as a policy product are not part of 
the organisation of information management. But they require
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ready access to appropriate information, and directly or 
indirectly the information manager has a role in ensuring it 
is provided.
The organisation of information systems to support the 
knowledgebase of the organisation, and thereby its 
knowledgework processes, also needs to be contextually 
appropriate. Different organisations require different types 
of information systems, and within an organisation their 
development will need to change over time to adapt to 
changes in the external environment (both in the "business" 
of the organisation and in the information systems 
technology). The information systems needed to support 
changing organisational knowledgework processes may in turn 
require changes in the management of them. The selection and 
development of information systems, and associated 
information management, is but one aspect of the 
knowledgework processes of an organisation. The capability 
to produce the information products required can be one 
means of assessing organisational intelligence, but another 
is whether the organisational structures (and processes) 
underlying their production are appropriate. Thus, the 
organisation of data processing systems to produce ad hoc 
and/or routine reports for local and/or central use will 
need to be considered in such analyses, as will the skills 
and organisation of information processing specialists, as 
Wilensky (1987) stressed.
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7 METHODS FOR ASSESSING ORGANISATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
From the perspective just outlined, organisational 
intelligence can be assessed in many different ways; again 
the important point is the selection of a contextually 
appropriate methodology.
For example, to study Wilensky's perspective on the 
structures for organisational intelligence in the NHS it 
might be appropriate to follow the approach to the 
measurement of concepts such as specialisation, hierarchy 
and centralisation of information services by following the 
approach of the "Aston Studies" (Pugh et al 1983) in 
developing quantitative indicators via the use of interviews 
and scaling techniques. Further research into skills and 
roles could then elucidate the contexts in which "contact 
men", "internal communications specialists" or "facts and 
figures men" are being employed. Complementary to this 
research program might be another to compare the products of 
different organisations (e.g. Health Authorities) such as 
the submission of central returns, by assessing their 
completeness, accuracy, and timeliness. This would require a 
large scale quantitative survey. The results would give an 
assessment of organisational intelligence in the narrow but 
important domain of speed of processing of a routine task. 
Other aspects of information systems might be studied using 
large scale survey techniques. For example, studies 
investigating the development of a corporate knowledgebase 
of IT systems would need to know what systems were installed 
or planned etc., or studies focused on the development of an
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internal communications network for the gathering or 
dissemination of information.
Thus there are many aspects of organisational intelligence 
which can be appropriately assessed using quantitative 
techniques. But knowledge about organisational intelligence 
is also derivable from qualitative techniques. Qualitative 
research, for example, is well suited to assessing the 
processual aspects of organisational intelligence. Research 
into policy development, for example, is frequently 
undertaken using qualitative techniques, such as participant 
observation. The description of social settings is seen as 
an important aspect of an ethnography, particularly as it 
pays attention to the context in which actions are to be 
interpreted and assessed. Both quantitative and qualitative 
research may, of course, be combined. For example, to study 
experience in dealing with novelty in a situation, a 
qualitative approach may be appropriate, but the analysis of 
the automatisation of routine tasks which may be undertaken 
in a large number of organisations may be more appropriately 
studied using quantitative survey techniques.
I see no grounds, therefore, for arguing that assessments of 
organisational intelligence are epistemologically oriented 
to either qualitative or quantitative methods; it is 
essentially a matter of selecting an appropriate technique 
given the research problem and research setting (Wyatt 
1989).
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8 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH SETTING
As outlined in Chapter 1, my research problem developed 
because the research setting changed. The changes were both 
in the external context of the NHS, with the Korner reports 
and associated development of information management, and 
the internal context of a change of role and organisation. 
The objective of the research was the development of a 
conceptual framework which could be used to interpret 
information management in the context of the NHS in general, 
and to illuminate this by case studies, particularly those 
which I was able to participate in as a result of my full­
time work.
This change in the nature of the research problem (initially 
the development of distributed health information systems) 
to one which was much more open encouraged a largely 
qualitative approach. I wished to become familiar with the 
new organisation I was working in (Ealing District Health 
Authority); I needed to become an accepted member of it 
whilst developing what was both a new role for myself and a 
new post for the organisation, that of District Information 
Officer (DIO).
Much of the period from October 1983 to October 1985 was 
spent on four main projects:
- implementing management budgets
- preparing for the introduction of the Korner 
recommendations
- developing an information strategy
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- developing the District Information Unit.
During this period I also convened meetings of DIOs in the 
North West Thames Region, and began to establish contacts 
and exchange views with colleagues who faced similar 
empirical problems.
Gaining access to both DIOs and to the management networks 
within Ealing was necessary to interpret what was happening. 
Whilst I made it known that I was also doing some part-time 
research, I did not emphasise the point. I felt that given 
the nature of the research problem, and the fact that my 
formulations of a framework were far from clear during this 
period, I should not be seen as a "total researcher" (i.e. 
observing but not participating in events), nor a 
"researcher participant" (i.e. participating in events, but 
as a researcher rather than a DIO), but in what Gans (1967) 
terms the "total participant" role, i.e. acting 
spontaneously as a DIO and subsequently analysing the 
activities in which I had so participated.
It was during 1985 that my reading of the literature in 
organisation theory, cognitive psychology and artificial 
intelligence, together with my growing understanding of the 
variety of types of problems/issues/roles a DIO, and 
information managers in the NHS in general, were expected to 
deal with, produced the idea of using "intelligence" as a 
concept that was particularly appropriate in studies of 
information management in organisations, and that 
information management was in turn particularly important in 
the development of organisational intelligence.
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The fleshing out of such a framework then became a matter of 
elaboration and testing. This thesis presents the results 
which, on the one hand, present a general framework for 
assessing organisational intelligence, but on the other hand 
can only produce evidence in support of it in a limited way. 
As indicated earlier, organisational intelligence is perhaps 
well suited to analysis by multiple observers, theoretical 
perspectives, sources of data and methodologies - the 
triangulation approach (Denzin 1970). But because of the 
part-time nature of the research undertaken in addition to a 
full-time, though related, job, the research program had to 
be limited essentially to a series of case studies.
9 THE CASE STUDIES
The case studies in Chapter 5 were chosen to illustrate 
different aspects of information management. Some use 
secondary material, but most use material collected between 
1983 and 1988 in the course of my work as DIO at Ealing, 
through involvement in a national working party on 
information strategies, and as a result of joint work with 
other researchers on two projects. The structure of Chapter 
5, however, is based on the knowledgework and knowledgebase 
model of the processes of organisational intelligence to 
indicate the ways in which each of the components can be 
studied and assessed in much more detail. But this approach 
also indicates the wide range of issues which the 
management of information is concerned with, and, although 
provided with a section on "context", as a Chapter itself
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provides a sketch of the context of information management 
in the NHS within which the other case studies are set.
The remaining chapters are concerned with individual case 
studies. Two are set in Ealing, and deal with the processes 
of producing an Annual Health Report (Chapter 6) and an 
information systems strategy (Chapter 7) . Chapter 8 uses 
secondary material at a national level to consider the 
development of information policy by the Korner Committee, 
and Chapter 9 uses material, collected whilst working at the 
Department of Health during 1989/90, on the information 
requirements of the NHS after the NHS Review is implemented 
in 1991. With the exception of Chapter 8, the material has 
been analysed from documentary sources collected during my 
work, minutes of meetings and notes of conversations or 
comments made by the participants. Whilst such a qualitative 
approach was, I believe, justified given my interest in the 
production processes of organisational intelligence, I was 
aware that "there is a tendency towards an anecdotal 
approach to the use of 'data' in relation to conclusions or 
explanations in qualitative research" (Bryman 1988 p77) .
Bryman goes on to suggest two approaches to circumvent this 
difficulty.
The first approach, the constitutive ethnography, attempts 
an exhaustive analysis of behaviour in the flow of events so 
that other researchers can preserve the data for others to 
(re)interpret. Whilst I think that organisational 
intelligence as an approach is well suited to such a 
detailed analysis of events such detailed micro- studies
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have not been the focus of this research, since to do it in 
the detail required would have jeopardised my "status" as a 
co-worker, and also because I was concerned to develop a 
framework that encompassed the macro- aspects as well.
I considered the second approach of submitting a version of 
the findings to the subjects themselves. But such 
"respondent validation" might invite defensive reactions 
which would have jeopardised my long-term need for access 
for other projects. I was also aware that, in developing the 
concept of organisational intelligence in which to frame the 
analysis I was dealing with a largely new concept, 
particularly for my respondents. In essence I was generating 
a second-order interpretation of events for the purpose of 
developing an aspect of organisation theory? in these 
circumstances respondent validation is I believe of little 
assistance. Confirmation or otherwise of the usefulness of 
the approach taken is more appropriately sought from 
response to articles in the academic and health service 
literature.
There is, however, another major methodological issue which 
needs to be addressed concerning the generalisations that 
can be made from the case studies based in one health 
authority. Given that I was neither able to conduct 
comparative studies in another district nor able to employ 
team research techniques within Ealing, how "typical" was 
Ealing of other Health Authorities? Ealing was exceptional 
in the sense that it was one of four (out of 190) District
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Health Authorities selected to conduct a national pilot 
study for the introduction of management budgets in 1983. 
However, it was selected in large part precisely because it 
was felt to be a typical District, with an average
population, budget, configuration of units (acute, long-stay 
and community) and in an outer-urban area. I think that the 
problems associated with the selection of a "deviant" case 
study have been avoided.
Whilst comparative analyses of organisational intelligence 
would no doubt reveal additional complexities, and enable 
the interesting issue of indicators of comparative
performance to be carried further, in many respects this is 
not a fundamental flaw given the nature of the research 
problem. Although it was set in the context of information 
management in the NHS, the essential theoretical aim of the 
research has been to develop a framework for assessing 
organisational intelligence. Subsequent research to test out 
the appropriateness of the conceptual categories chosen 
could be undertaken in another type of organisation 
altogether. Using qualitative case studies does not preclude
the development and testing of a theoretical framework.
Indeed Mitchell (1983) suggests that what is important is 
the relevance of such case studies to the central 
theoretical framework. I trust that the amplification of 
Wilensky's pioneering approach to organisational 
intelligence has been sufficient to sketch out a framework 
that can now be used to describe and analyse aspects of 
information management and intelligence in the NHS.
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDIES IN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
This chapter uses the knowledgework processes of 
organisational intelligence as its framework of analysis and 
sets within it a series of case studies. Some of the case 
studies are drawn from the literature, others from field 
work conducted whilst working as District Information 
Officer at Ealing. Taken together the studies reflect many 
different aspects of the management of information in the 
NHS in the 1980s, and also the adaptability of the basic 
conceptual framework of organisational intelligence. Each 
study has been selected to illustrate some of the ways in 
which each component of the organisational intelligence 
framework can inform the analysis of information management 
in the NHS.
1 CONTEXT
The case studies chosen illustrate some aspects of the 
developments of the information management at a national 
level. They focus on policy development, the state of 
information systems and the information services at District 
level.
The contextual theories of human intelligence emphasise that 
intelligence is relative to the cultural context: different 
behaviours are intelligent in different cultures. It is 
relevant, therefore to consider very briefly the information 
systems of the NHS in an international context.
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After a decade which began with the Korner reviews and 
reports and by the end of which a Secretary of State for 
Health was emphasising that "information is the lifeblood of 
the NHS" (Freeman 1990 p332), the NHS spent about 1% of its 
total budget annually on information technology. However, in 
the USA the figure is about 6% of health care expenditure, 
and the European average is between 2 and 3%. Freeman noted 
that "judged by comparison with other industries it is also 
extremely low. Banking, for instance, has an average spend 
of about 6%. The Government is convinced of the importance 
of information and IT in implementing the NHS review". Thus 
we can see that by the end of the 1980s the political 
judgement was that the information and IT systems were 
perceived as inadequate to support an NHS organised on the 
basis of contracts and markets (see Chapter 9 for an 
analysis of the NHS Review) . And that in making this 
judgement, international comparisons were used to indicate 
that the level of investment in IT was inappropriate.
1.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIES
The context for much of the case study material can be set 
within the findings of a survey conducted in 1985 of 
District Information Strategies, and which gives an 
indication of the stage of development of information 
systems in District Health Authorities. The study was 
initiated by the King Edward's Hospital Fund for London, the 
findings analysed by myself and another researcher engaged 
on a related study for the King's Fund, and the findings 
presented at a conference in December 1985 (Scrivens, Drury
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and Molteno 1986). In a letter to all Health Authorities in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland in May 1985 it was 
explained that the King's Fund were trying to "collate a 
collection of district information strategies or policy 
documents" prior to convening a meeting for District 
Information Officers to discuss the topic.
Replies to the request for information strategies were 
received from 135 of the 192 districts. Fifteen districts, 
for a variety of reasons had not started any consideration 
of their plans for information. Most of the replies were 
letters declaring intentions or citing stumbling blocks to 
progress or minutes of committee meetings at which 
information matters were discussed; about 30 contained 
sections of district plans which covered information 
systems; and there were 15 comprehensive, detailed and 
lengthy documents laying out the precise intentions and 
procedures to be followed in districts. Some Regions 
replied, in particular those who had engaged management 
consultants to help frame their strategies. The variations 
in the replies in some cases reflected a positive decision 
to handle information matters in a particular way, such as 
through the writing of strategies or through committee 
processes, while in other districts progress had been 
delayed until general managers were appointed.
The nature of the response meant that any analysis would be 
highly subjective but it was evident that districts had a 
range of preoccupations: computing matters (hardware and
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software), the implementation of the Korner recommendations, 
and the role of information services in districts, 
particularly their relationship to the general management 
function. A common starting point for many districts was the 
implementation of the Korner recommendations. Over half of 
the replying districts identified this as the central plank. 
However, attitudes to implementation varied. A number of 
Districts were concerned that they could not implement 
Korner without computer systems. Others felt that Korner was 
simply a suitable place to start providing the data for 
computer systems. Feelings also appeared mixed about 
implementing the totality of the recommendations: while a
number were making plans to implement all the 
recommendations, others saw the whole set as prohibitively 
expensive; in others the relevance of the data sets to 
management decision making was not felt to be clear.
About 10% of the documents only considered the technological 
aspects of information systems and concentrated on the 
procurement, location and linkage of computer systems. In 
four districts the underlying motivation appeared to be the 
development of information of information systems for 
budgeting purposes.
Balancing the demands for management information and 
operational information was also a common concern. For some 
districts, the development of statistical information such 
as performance indicators was a priority. In contrast, 
others said they were pursuing operational systems at the 
expense of developing management information. Some districts
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chose to see information in a broader way than simply 
concerned with computerised or statistical information. They 
argued that managers needed a wide range of information 
from outside the district in which they worked and outside 
the NHS and health service matters, and elaborated the role 
of the library services. One district only documented plans 
for the development of a district-wide communications 
system.
Clearly there was already a great diversity in ideas about 
how to handle information systems. These differences suggest 
that some districts had devoted considerable time and energy 
to learning about particular information related issues and 
possessed expertise in these areas. But it was apparent that 
there was no generally accepted view of the scope or 
structure of information systems. It was suggested that 
"perhaps for innovative developments there should not be, 
but as the NHS is developing pockets of expertise, there is 
much to be gained from collaboration. An important part of 
this process should be coordinating knowledge of how roles, 
responsibilities and resources are being assigned to manage 
information issues that are of high strategic and/or 
operational priority, at district and other levels of the 
NHS" (Scrivens, Drury, Molteno 1986 p 77) . To date this 
extension of any corporate memory in the development of 
information strategies remains unrealised. In part this 
reflects the continuing "turbulence" of the environment. 
Although guidance on producing information strategies was 
issued (DHSS 1986b), and it was intended that each District
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should send copies of its strategies to the Department of 
Health, via Regions, by June 1989, this plan slipped by a 
year and then was abandoned when the publication of the NHS 
Review in January 1989 caused a complete change of context 
(see Chapter 9) .
Nevertheless, reviews of the experience of 13 pilot 
districts using five different structured methodologies to 
develop information strategies have recently been published 
(Bardsley et al 1988, Wickings 1989). Wickings et al suggest 
that there are now some directly transferable results 
between the projects. In particular:-
- business function descriptions (which disaggregate 
the functions performed in the NHS, in an 
increasingly organisation-independent way)
- operational-level information requirements, 
descriptions, and data models for non-clinical 
information.
However, they also reported that descriptions of objectives, 
key result areas (or critical success factors), top level 
management information requirements, and management 
priorities do not transfer directly between Districts. "Even 
if the underlying issues were the same between Districts, 
their expression must be local if they are to be locally 
"owned". However, other Districts' expressions of these 
items may be of value in checking whether things have been 
omitted, or whether local issues have been expressed in more 
helpful ways elsewhere." (Wickings et al 1989, p2). The
development of new roles for Districts, and provider units,
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will require a "dynamic restructuring" of the knowledgebase, 
e.g. the data models, that such comparative analyses can 
draw on.
2 SCANNING AND SELECTION
2.1 THE USE OP HEALTH SERVICE INDICATORS
In the early 1980s nationally produced performance 
indicators became available, initially from their 
originator, John Yates, at the Inter Authority Comparisons 
and Consultancy (IACC) at the University of Birmingham, and 
then from the DHSS (Pollitt 1985). In an attempt to reflect 
their uses more appropriately, these performance indicators 
were later relabeled "Health Service Indicators" (HSIs), and 
will be referred to in this way here. The two sets provided 
largely complementary information, that from the IACC 
containing more indicators for hospital clinical 
specialties, and the DHSS HSIs offering more comprehensive 
coverage of manpower, hotel and estates services. After the 
initial DHSS paper based version of HSIs in 1983, they 
shared the common media of a BBC B micro, but their methods 
of presentation also differed in terms of the types of 
graphs, histograms, scattergrams etc. that were available 
(Day 1989). Nevertheless, they both used existing data 
nationally available from routinely gathered statistics, and 
having combined it to produce indicators from each District 
then ranked the Districts to help in the comparative 
analysis.
The objective of HSIs "is to gain an overall view of a
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district's deployment of resources as compared with the 
deployment in other districts. The indicators are presented 
as a starting point for a districts' assessment of 
performance not its conclusion11 (DHSS 1983 p6) . However,
HSIs are not neutral. Brotherton (1985) argues that HSIs 
reflect the dominant "medical model" of health, and notes 
that this fails to emphasise the importance of social, 
economic and environmental aspects of health. Forster et al 
(1986) in fact present HSIs in terms of a "clinical analogy" 
using criteria such as severity, high risk groups, treatment 
etc. McCarthy (1983) argues that HSIs deal only with the 
process of health care, and not with the effect of the NHS 
on the population's health. Carter (1989) sees such 
indicators in a broader political context. He argues that 
the Conservative administration's policy is to decentralise 
service delivery as far as possible, but to retain control 
and accountability the centre must be able to state 
explicitly the form, quantity and quality of inputs, outputs 
and outcomes it expects the decentralised service to 
provide. "The problem was that when the government came to 
implement decentralisation it discovered the inadequacy of 
existing information and management systems" (Carter 1989 
pl31). HSIs were to become an important means of "hands of" 
control as part of the process of comparative performance 
evaluation.
The DHSS was clearly aware of the problems of comparability 
between authorities but concluded, somewhat ambiguously, 
that "the ranks must not be regarded as having the same 
purpose as 'league tables'. The purpose of ranking is to
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show the position of a district or hospital within a 
national perspective" (DHSS 1983 p7). This enables Districts 
(and Regions and the DHSS) to see where the "outliers" are.
A number of commentators offered criteria as to the features 
of good performance indicators. These include the qualities 
of: relevance, accuracy, availability, sensitivity, clarity, 
comprehensiveness (Best 1983, Barnes 1984, Flynn 1986). 
Others suggested that HSIs fell short of such standards 
(McCarthy 1983, Mullen, 1985). Four Districts undertook an 
intensive evaluation of the indicators in 1986, and it 
became clear that the reports were not being fully utilised. 
Concerns were expressed about the accuracy of the data, the 
scope of the indicators and access to them. The DHSS then 
commissioned a comprehensive research report from CASPE 
Research on the usage of indicators (Jenkins 1988), which 
ran in parallel with its own consultative exercise in 
preparing the development of indicators using Korner data 
(DHSS 1988a).
The CASPE survey was conducted by a postal questionnaire to 
750 managers (in 9 categories) and 132 face to face 
interviews. Their findings showed that the great majority of 
respondents were aware of HSIs, and that the percentages of 
each management category using HSIs (examining them more 
often than once a year) and with hands on experience were:
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Using HSIs Hands-i
Information Specialist 95 75
District General Manager 85 12
Health Authority Chair 80 3
Planner 81 51
Finance 57 27
Unit General Manager 58 31
Nurse 54 18
Chair of Medical Advisory Committee 25 17
Secretary to Community Health Council 24 4
The uses of HSIs was also examined. But they found that 
reliable evidence of their influence was impossible to 
gather. About half the respondents felt that HSIs had been 
influential, but usually this meant that a decision was made 
quicker and with less controversy when HSIs were used. The 
most frequently quoted areas of use were in decisions on 
cost saving, rationalisation and reduction of services and 
for selective review. They received hundreds of responses to 
a request for local examples of HSIs in action. For example 
Jenkins (1988 p22) quotes the following uses:
- to identify priority or problem areas for attention - 
"their use has narrowed the search for cost savings" 
(Finance), "they have suggested priorities for waiting 
list reduction" (DGM)
- clarifying an issue - "the levels of acute 
activity have made it easier to defend demands on 
mental illness and mental handicap from the acute 
sector" (Planner), "they improved the level of debate .j
and led to speedier resolution" (UGM).
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- bidding for resources - "HSIs helped in putting 
together a package for waiting list money" (UGM), 
"money would otherwise have gone to those that shouted 
the loudest" (HA Chair)
- outlier reviews - "those involved considerable effort, 
but unless firmly linked to an active issue had very 
little influence" (Finance). "Regional reviews often 
used HSIs ineffectively" (Information Specialist).
A number of recommendations were made, such as the creation 
of "templates" of selected indicators to be created for 
different levels of managers, more unit-level indicators, 
and a need was identified for improved knowledge in the 
service about the potential uses of the indicators. But 
"perhaps the most important change that is needed is an 
alternative to the mechanistic use of HSIs that concentrate 
mainly on the review of outliers. The clarification of what 
better performance would look like, how indicators should be 
moving over time and the provision of more commentary and 
text rather than purely numbers and tables is needed" 
(Jenkins et al 1988 p 32).
The features of HSIs discussed so far provide the context 
for the use made of them in the particular context of 
"scanning and selection" of issues, though they clearly have 
many other uses. In March 1988 all Health Authorities 
received the 1986/87 HSI indicators together with a 
"booklet" entitled "Comparing Health Authorities" (DHSS 
1988b). It discussed the meaning of and relationships
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between a number of key indicators and, for each, 
illustrated the range of values across English Health 
Authorities. It was also to be made available to authority 
members, Community Health Councils and local MPS. The 
accompanying circular, HC(88)24 (DHSS 1988c) stated that 
"Districts should undertake an analysis of their indicators 
for the past four years. Regions should carry out a similar 
analysis of the indicators for their Districts. These 
analyses, combined with local information, should form the 
basis for a commentary to be presented to Authority members, 
and also to local MPs, and Community Health Council 
members... The NHS Management Board intends to build on this 
process in this year's reviews with regions". It was a 
requirement that the commentary should "identify those main 
areas requiring further investigation". This circular marked 
an important step in the legitimisation of the use of HSIs - 
they were now considered robust enough to be circulated 
outside local management, and the results of the analyses 
had to be presented to authority members by 31 July 1988.
The production of HSI reports for this audience was a novel 
task. Each authority had to scan the HSI packages and then 
select from them those which were to be highlighted. Whilst 
the issues of importance to each District were in principle 
unique, there were common problems of presenting an account. 
Should the style be essentially a narrative explanation of 
the range of issues facing the authority with particular 
attention paid to illustrating these with reference to HSIs? 
Or should the report focus primarily on the HSIs and offer 
explanations for them? In deciding how many HSIs needed to
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be commented on should the document make extensive use of 
the 89 HSIs selected in the Comparing Health Authorities 
booklet or be concerned with the full range of HSIs? Or 
should attention focus simply on those HSIs which were 
outliers? How much emphasis should be paid to the trend data 
available? Were illustrations needed; if so should these be 
tables, histograms, time series graphs or the diagrams 
developed for the "Booklet" which indicated changes in the 
range of values for each HSI over 4 years? How long should 
the report be? Was an explanation needed of the nature and 
use of HSIs, and caveats in using them? Colleagues in eight 
Districts responded to a request for copies of their 
reports, and a summary of their content follows.
HEALTH SERVICE INDICATOR REPORTS IN NW THAMES RHA - 1988
North Bedfordshire
Focus on management
narrative or HSIs: Primarily on HSIs,
HSIs based on Booklet: Yes.
Orientation to outliers: Detailed comment on 8 outliers;
less detailed comment on 27 
unusual indicators; observations 
on some of the 54 'normal' 
indicators.
Use of trend data: Low
Number of sides: 24 (A5 size)
Illustrations: 3 histograms, 2 graphs, 3 box
plots
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Explanations of HSIs: History, caveats
Other comments: A booklet clearly designed for
public consumption.
East Hertfordshire
Focus on management 
narrative or HSIs:
HSIs based on Booklet:
Orientation to outliers:
Number of sides: 
Illustrations: 
Explanations of HSIs: 
Other comments:
Primarily on HSIs, though summary 
emphasises that HSIs demonstrate 
increased resources needed.
Not exclusively, though values 
given in appendix for all Booklet 
HSIs
Not of primary concern; 
considerable emphasis given on 
placing E Herts in the Regional 
context. Use of trend data: High 
13
16 tables; 1 histogram; 3 graphs 
Low
Hand drawn histograms and graphs
Focus on management 
narrative or HSIs:
HSIs based on Booklet: 
Orientation to outliers:
Use of trend data:
Parkside
Primarily on HSIs, though with 
extensive narrative explanation 
to "questions" posed by each HSI. 
Entirely
No, only if highlighted by being 
in Booklet.
High
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Number of sides: 
Illustrations:
Explanations of HSIs: 
Other comments:
10 histograms, 54 Booklet 
diagrams
Caveats, use of standardised HSIs 
A long report, even though it 
includes figures for both 
Paddington & North Kensington and 
Brent DHA which had not merged to 
become Parkside by 1986/7 HSIs
36
South Bedfordshire
Focus on management 
narrative or HSIs:
HSIs based on Booklet:
Orientation to outliers; 
Use of trend data:
Number of sides: 
Illustrations: 
Explanations of HSIs: 
Other comments:
Management issues extensively
illustrated by HSIs
Yes, but supplemented by other
relevant ones. Table gives 85/86
data for Booklet HSIs in
appendix.
Not the main focus 
High? each graph gives trends for 
S Beds, Region and National 
26
23 graphs; 3 tables 
Caveats
Extensive use of standard graph 
embedded in narrative.
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Hillingdon
Focus on management
narrative or HSIs: Management narrative
HSIs based on Booklet: No, though Booklet circulated to
Health Authorities members with
Orientation to outliers: 
Use of trend data: 
Number of sides: 
Illustrations: 
Explanations of HSIs: 
Other comments:
HSI values given
Not explicitly considered
None
3
Nil
None
A minimalist overview
North West Hertfordshire
Focus on management 
narrative or HSIs:
HSIs based on Booklet: 
Orientation to outliers: 
Use of trend data:
Number of sides: 
Illustrations: 
Explanations of HSIs: 
Other comments:
Commentary on selected HSIs (and 
for clinical services only)
No
Not the main focus 
High 
11
14 tables 
None
Based entirely around the 14 
tables giving standard HSIs for 
each specialty
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South West Hertfordshire
Focus on management
narrative or HSIs: Primarily on HSIs
HSIs based on Booklet: Entirely
Orientation to outliers: Focused on them, but only those
given in the Booklet 
High 
11
11 tables, 2 Booklet diagrams 
Uses and caveats
Use of trend data: 
Number of sides: 
Illustrations: 
Explanations of HSIs: 
Other comments:
Riverside
Focus on management 
narrative or HSIs:
HSIs based on Booklet: 
Orientation to outliers: 
Use of trend data: 
Number of sides: 
Illustrations: 
Explanations of HSIs:
Other comments:
Management narrative 
No
Not the main focus 
Low
7 (plus 8 in appendix)
None
Extensive appendix on use and 
caveats, plus worked example of 
use of Booklet diagrams for 
Treatment Intensity HSI.
Begins, unusually, with overall 
picture for staffing levels and 
estate management
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Ealing
Focus on management 
narrative or HSIs:
HSIs based on Booklet: 
Orientation to outliers:
Use of trend data: 
Number of sides: 
Illustrations: 
Explanations of HSIs: 
Other comments:
Primarily on HSIs 
No
Oriented around all outliers in 
key management areas 
Low 
7
1 table 
Caveats
Summary of which were high or low 
HSIs in each section given, 
followed by explanatory comments.
What is evident is that faced with the same problem entirely 
different solutions were found. Some Districts focused their 
reports entirely on the Booklet. Parkside used its 
structure, the illustrative questions it posed and the 
diagrams used, in a lengthy analysis of all the HSIs 
selected in the Booklet. Others produced shorter reports by 
focusing primarily on those HSIs reported in the Booklet 
where they had outliers, e.g. North Beds. Others ignored the 
Booklet in their main text, but gave their values for the 
Booklet's HSIs in an appendix, e.g. East Herts. Others 
ignored the Booklet completely, e.g. Ealing, but 
concentrated on outliers from HSIs from the full range 
available. Some Districts did not concentrate on outliers 
explicitly, but were more concerned to present a standard 
set of indicators for each main specialty or service (e.g. 
North West Herts). A balance between presenting text
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entirely devoted to explaining a small subset of HSIs (e.g. 
North Beds) and a narrative account of management issues 
arising in each area (e.g. Riverside) was struck by South 
Beds where a narrative of management issues was illustrated 
with a standard graph indicating trends over the last four 
years. Some documents used tables to convey trend data for 
the four sets of HSIs, but other documents made little use 
of trend data, and Hillingdon had none. Not surprisingly, 
the shorter documents, e.g. Hillingdon, Ealing and Riverside 
did not have illustrations.
Why was there such diversity in the documents produced? It 
must be noted that this was a novel task. Although reports 
on activity and performance indicators were given as a 
matter of routine to some Health Authorities, the analysis 
of such a comprehensive set (400 in the full set and 89 in 
the Booklet) in a single document HSIs was new. There was no 
model available to construct a response, except that 
provided by the Booklet itself, and this only justified 
their selection by saying that it gave "a broad national 
overview of a selection of indicators covering key issues 
currently facing the NHS" (DHSS 1988b p7) . Whilst District 
Information Officers will have increased their practical 
knowledge of the HSI system, and if the analyses were 
produced (as they were at Ealing) after discussion with the 
relevant managers, then organisational memory of what HSIs 
contain (of particular) relevance to each District will have 
been enhanced.
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It is also likely that the perceptions of the levels of 
understanding of the target Health Authority audience were 
very different, but without seeing any follow up documents 
it is difficult to assess how District information staff 
have "learnt" and improved their presentation. The reason 
for this is that the next set of HSIs were the first Korner 
HSIs. They arrived late and were inaccurate, being based on 
the first uncertain years worth of data collection. They 
were also much more extensive, having been increased, after 
a consultation exercise (DHSS 1988a), to over 3,000. 
However, the NHS Review will completely change the basis on 
which HSIs are collected (see Chapter 9 Section 4.5.3.3). 
Getting any benefit from the "experience" of scanning 
historical analyses of data is difficult, and since there 
was no requirement for a copy of the reports to be stored 
centrally cross-sectional comparative analyses of District 
reports is not possible either. They were not discussed 
amongst District Information Officers in the Region, so no 
opportunity was taken to develop the knowledgebase on an 
intra-Regional basis. A firm of consultants was commissioned 
to analyse a sample of reports, but the results were never 
published.
3 DECISION-MAKING AND PLANNING
A case study is not presented here because the studies 
presented in the remaining Chapters are in part studies of 
how decisions and plans were made to produce information 
policies.
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4 COMMUNICATIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
4.1 COMMUNICATING WITH DISTRICT GENERAL MANAGERS
In the discussion to date, the sources of data discussed 
have been essentially quantitative. However, it is apparent 
that there are many sources of data that can be collected 
and communicated in a variety of ways. Stewart et al (1987) 
found that DGMs use essentially six main types:
1 management information systems
2 reading reports, minutes, agenda papers etc.
3 formal meetings
4 informal meetings and individual discussions with 
senior staff
5 a wide network of contacts
6 visits, observations and chats with staff.
She suggests that the managers varied greatly both in their 
preference for these sources and in the extent to which they 
balance and structure their use. "DGMs who rely too heavily 
on one or other type of information sometimes receive a 
distorted picture of events, and perhaps make inappropriate 
decisions as a result" (Stewart et al 1987 p3) . As a piece 
of action research, Stewart's study is commendably replete 
with suggestions for action, in particular on the benefits 
of good time management which, it was found, is closely 
related to their abilities to keep well informed.
In their comments on DGMs' use of management information 
systems, Stewart et al noted that DGMs vary in how they 
choose to receive their statistical information, quoting one
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DGM as saying "There is no way I want that stuff pre­
digested for me. Nothing is more instructive than all the 
nooks and crannies in the data". This was a view apparently 
shared by several of the sample who "scrutinise the figures 
as a way of scanning for management problems". In contrast, 
they also found that many preferred summaries, exception 
reporting or information digests - "The Finance department 
give me an idiot's guide to the figures, and I know I can 
rely on them to point out anything important. Unfortunately 
that is untrue of many other departments".(Stewart et al 
1987 p4) . Clearly there are potential communication 
pathologies to be monitored here.
4.2 PRESENTING INFORMATION TO MANAGERS
The presentation of data to senior District-level managers 
was the subject of a study I conducted with Dr John Gabbay 
in 1985 to determine how Korner data items could most 
helpfully be presented. At the time of the study Ealing 
District had developed, for some of the wards in its 
district general hospital, a data base containing 12 items 
(about one third) of the minimum data set given in the first 
report of the Steering Group on Health Service Information 
(Korner 1983), plus five derived ones (such as length of 
stay). Most of the data items could be useful by themselves, 
for example the number of available beds, but by simply 
combining them we found over 100 pairs of data that had some 
potential as useful management information. Of these about 
2 0 pairs were judged to be potentially the most useful to 
managers, and a sample of eight graphical displays from 
those 20, using a multicolored graphics package, were
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produced. Semi-structured interviews about the presentation 
and use of information were held with 11 managers at 
district level from five districts in three regions. The 
five districts were not strictly a representative sample, 
but they nevertheless had a wide range of attitudes (and 
organisational responses) towards implementing Korner.
All the interviewees saw the eight graphical presentations. 
The important finding to emerge was that although all the 
graphs elicited a wide spectrum of response (and some were, 
understandably, less popular than others) all of them 
received at least one favourable response. For example, for 
the graph shown in Figure 1, the responses were:
1 Good; shows pressure at a glance
2 Good to monitor bed use
3 Misleading because categories over distinct
4 Too much information
5 Potentially useful but by consultant not wards
6 Clear and useful for planning
7 Of no interest by ward, useful over hospital; 
aggregate consultant for each ward.
8 Maybe useful for planning and problem solving. Not
routine.
We concluded that "while central prescriptions to local 
managers on how to present and use their own datasets are 
clearly inappropriate, it will be helpful to pool experience 
of what has succeeded or failed so that managers can select 
and develop the data items which they wish to use" (Gabbay
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Figure 1: method of admission, by consultant. Ward B May/June
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and Drury 1986 p389). There is as yet no databank of reports 
to which to refer for ideas about what to present and how to 
present it. Each information officer designs and refines 
their own reporting systems (see Section 5 below). Whilst 
this has the merit of "local ownership" it does not indicate 
any concern for providing information about information 
systems. One book has been published specifically on the 
topic of presenting information to managers and health 
authority members (Day 1985), and articles in the literature 
are on occasion an indirect source of suggestion. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that there is no 
comparative analysis of how information is organised and 
presented to managers in different health authorities. This 
reflects a lack of any tradition of sharing of practical 
knowledge acquired by District Information Officers (see 
also Section 7.2 below).
5 MONITORING AND CONTROL
Some of the key components of an organisation are the 
systems with which managers control and plan their 
activities and those of their staff and their activities. 
Systems theory emphasises "control" as an important aspect 
of morphostatic or morphogenetic feedback processes 
(Maryuama 1963). In the context of a hospital Unit General 
Manager (UGM), Evans (1983) presents management control as 
the process of establishing targets or expectations of the 
organisation's activities, of examining the gap between 
expectations and outcome (the "variance"), and of 
attributing that variance to causative factors, identifying 
whether or not they were subject to the determination of
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managers. By means of information about budgetary 
performance, unit costs, activity rates, manpower and 
service levels the monitoring and control processes should 
establish whether failure to achieve what was intended was 
due to unanticipated events or poor managerial action. "The 
concept of control is the corner-stone of any systematic 
management geared to learning and the improvement of 
performance. In the short run, the development of a strong 
management control orientation linked with the information 
systems to sustain it, would be a major achievement. In the 
longer term, the task is to develop planning systems as the 
context for control.... the linkage between planning and 
control provides a context for the provision of information" 
(Evans 1983 p52—3). In the pre-Review NHS, the same concepts 
of monitoring and control apply to the District General 
Manager. Post-Review, the nature of the management role, and 
thus the information systems needed to support it, will 
change (see Chapter 9)
The case studies here concern (pre-Review) activity reports 
produced by information specialists for managers to use in 
monitoring and control. They are based on the development of 
reports in Ealing DHA and in North West Thames Region. The 
first case study, set in Ealing DHA, traces the development 
of the monthly clinical activity report; the second study 
presents an analysis of the contents of such reports within 
the Region in the third quarter of 1988. These reports are 
the most routinely available means for information managers 
to bring to the attention of Board or Health Authority
164
managers activity levels and issues during the preceding 
period. The construction of such reports over time reflects 
the interaction between the sorts of issues that the central 
executive wants to be informed about (and in what format), 
and the knowledge of the information specialist in 
interpreting, (and developing new sources of) , available 
data.
5.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN ACTIVITY REPORTS IN A DISTRICT
In 1983 the District Management Team (DMT) in Ealing 
received no information on clinical activity on a monthly 
basis. Neither did it receive any formal analysis of the 
annually produced central returns, except insofar as they 
affected the planning process. The provision of information 
services was located within the planning function under the 
control of the Deputy District Administrator. However, on my 
arrival in the District, the situation changed. Firstly I 
was accountable to the District Medical Officer, and
secondly he was anxious to start presenting the DMT with
summaries of activity on a monthly basis.
In the first reports analysis focused on the six largest 
acute specialties and the activity was presented in terms of 
deaths and discharges, throughput, average length of stay, 
turnover intervals and %occupancy. Over the next three years 
the following variations were developed:
a) comparison with the same quarter/month the
previous year
b) comparison with regional averages as reflected in 
the Regional Strategic Plan
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c) graphical presentations (histograms)
d) inclusion of the Mental Illness Unit
e) intermittent inclusion of the Community Health 
Services Unit
f) inclusion of the DHSS HSIs
g) reference to target figures for beddays quoted in
the Management Accounting Framework (a separate 
planning document).
These changes reflected different perceptions of the most 
appropriate ways to communicate and present the information, 
but here we are concerned with development of the monitoring 
and control systems.
The early reports when submitted to the DMT met with 
indifference. Although there was no criticism there was no 
constructive comment either: "We like to see it" was
essentially all that was said. However, the reasons for this 
became clearer later in discussion with the District 
Treasurer, and corroborated with what I could infer from 
what the DMO had said. Firstly, the DM0 believed that since 
he now had responsibility for information, the "expertise" 
of himself and his staff would be sufficient to provide the 
DMT "with the information they needed". The DMT, in other 
words, was not involved in deciding what it wanted to know 
about, in what format it wanted to know it or what data were 
to be used. The suggestions for changes and improvements 
only began once the DMO began to ask for them, rather than 
simply saying he would be making some improvements in the
next version, and then relaying his instructions to me. But 
even then the DMO was not prepared to let me sit down and 
discuss requirements with the chief officers (see also 
Chapter 7) . He was concerned that what was presented was 
seen as coming from "his" Department of Community Health, 
and not from the District Information Unit which was located 
within it.
There continued to be a struggle for power between the 
District and Unit level managers in the uncertain 
interregnum of eighteen months after the publication of the 
Griffiths Inquiry (Griffiths 1983) and before the new role 
and appointment of a District General Manager was confirmed. 
Anything produced by the District that indicated a 
tightening of the monitoring and control over the units, 
such as the production of activity reports, was resisted by 
them in the knowledge that they would by given greater 
delegation of responsibility by a District General Manager 
once in post. Efforts made by District level managers to 
bolster their position during this period were interpreted 
as political manoeuverings by District-level colleagues, and 
the production of activity reports by the "Department of 
Community Health" was no exception. The continual revisions 
and developments of the activity reports did not only 
represent improvements in the presentation of information. 
They were products of intelligence designed largely to 
change the status of the system which produced them - they 
were on the surface examples of morphostatic controls, but 
were also vehicles for morphogenesis.
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The arrival of a general manager in 1985 was a significant 
development in increasing the interest at Board level in 
monitoring, and improving control, of activity in the 
District. The format for the reports had settled down, and 
the production process had become much more automated. They 
were now produced on a regular monthly basis, whereas the 
early reports had been quarterly. Also it was no longer my 
sole responsibility to produce them. Much of the data was 
extracted in raw form from the Unit based computer systems, 
taken on paper or disk to the District Unit where it was 
processed by an information assistant, who had developed a 
suite of "performance programs" on a microcomputer which 
produced much of the necessary output. Also by this time a 
software package had been developed within the District 
Information Unit to record the waiting lists in the Acute 
Unit. The data was collected by the Acute Unit but entered 
and processed at District.
With the change in management culture, so it was appropriate 
to decentralise. The waiting list performance programs were 
now transferred to a micro-computer in the Acute Unit, and 
the knowledge about how to use them also transferred for 
local use. The waiting list information was then integrated 
locally to the rest of the activity report from the Acute 
Unit. The provision of a commentary became a local unit 
responsibility. The role of the District became to monitor 
and co-ordinate the production of reports from each unit. 
This was a role which the DMO fought hard to retain. Without 
it the pressure to decentralise the District Information
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Unit would have been irresistible, thereby severely 
weakening the status of the Department of Community Health.
The Acute and Community Units provided a commentary which 
became much more analytical than the descriptive summaries 
that are all those in a "central" District Information Unit 
and less familiar with the richer understanding of the 
context of the figures can provide. Although, the Mental 
Health Unit never wished to assume this role, the reports 
submitted to the DMT went on behalf of the Unit General 
Manager and the opportunity was taken to hold him to account 
for anomalies in the figures. Whilst it was one of the DMO's 
objectives to stimulate some inter-unit rivalry in the 
presentation of the activity reports, the Mental health unit 
largely dismissed the figures, which continued to be 
produced by the District Information Unit, on the basis that 
they were derived from a Patient Administration System that 
the Mental Health Unit wished to phased out and replace with 
a system which their own (internally funded) computer unit 
was prototyping. The DMO perceived this as a substantial 
threat and wished to use the activity figures produced by 
the District Information Unit (by downloads from the Patient 
Administration System) to demonstrate that they indicated 
substantial scope for improvements in local management 
within the Unit, and that the District had no need to invest 
in any system developed within the Mental Health Unit.
Nevertheless, by decentralising an already tried and tested 
format for presenting figures that had been developed over 
three years, the local units were not faced with a
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completely novel problem. The quality and timeliness of the 
information about key issues improved, and the time freed up 
in the District Information Unit was used to concentrate on 
developments of a more extensive corporate database which 
was planned to include the important new innovation of the 
integration of manpower, activity and finance information, 
the lack of which indicates the embryonic state of 
development of health service information systems in Ealing, 
as well as in most other Authorities.
5.2 ACTIVITY REPORTS IN A REGION
The information for monitoring and control of issues 
included in reports produced by information units going to 
the District Management Boards (DMBs as the DMTs became 
after the implementation of the Griffiths Report) and the 
District Health Authority at Ealing can be put in the 
context of what was produced in other Districts in North 
West Thames in the third quarter of 1988. Colleagues in nine 
Districts responded to a request for this information.
To assess the content of these reports is difficult. Each 
District in North West Thames Region has developed its 
reports in response to local initiatives and requirements. 
Nevertheless, the underlying reason for producing them is 
the same: to enable the District management to monitor, and 
"control", the activities of their Units. The variables for 
comparison, therefore, focus on generalisable features of 
the reports. They include the data selected, the ways in 
which it is presented, and the time period within which it
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is set. Also of importance is the nature of the commentary 
given (is any needed and the figures speak for themselves, 
or is a textual description required of the data, or is an 
analysis of possible reasons for the figures needed?)
ACTIVITY REPORTS BY HEALTH AUTHORITY IN NW THAMES RHA - 1988
Riverside
Title: Patient Activity Report - (One of a
series; it contains a selection of Korner 
statistics for 1987/8 for surgical 
specialties with comparisons with (pre- 
Korner) 1986/7 statistics where possible) 
Services covered: Surgical specialties by unit: in-patient;
out-patient clinics; day case and 
waiting times/lists 
Number of Sides: 23
Graphs: Line 10
Tables: 13
Trend information: Caseload data with previous year; waiting
time/list with last four quarters 
Commentary: At the front; analytical and explicitly
educational for Authority members.
Parkside
Title: Quarterly Activity Report
Services covered: Acute hospital services by total local
acute, total other acute; for 6 
individual specialties; total, numbers on 
in-patient waiting list by hospital; out-
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Number of sides: 
Graphs:
Tables:
Trend information:
Commentary:
Title:
Services covered:
Number of sides: 
Graphs:
Tables:
Trend information: 
Commentary:
patient attendances by specialty and out­
patient waiting numbers; priority care 
services; community services (clinic 
attendances, nursing visits)
21
Line 16; Histogram 2 
18
Graphs for each month of last 12/12; 
tables for months of last 3/12 plus 
difference from same quarter previous 
year
Associated with data; analytical 
NW Herts
Quarterly information bulletin No. 9 
Acute services caseload by group of main 
specialty; out-patient waiting times by 
individual specialty: in-patient waiting
times by hospital (sum of all 
specialties) : utilisation of routine
scheduled theatre time by hospital; 
planned transfers vs. target from mental 
handicap hospitals.
15
Line 22; Bar 3; Histogram 6 
3
For last four quarters 
Associated with data; descriptive
172
North Herts
Title: Information report No 4. December 1988
Services covered: Acute services caseload for total acute,
and 8 specialties; in-patient waiting 
numbers by specialty; out-patient 
attendances by specialty; GP referral 
letters, Did Not Attend rates by 
specialty 
Number of sides: 18
Graphs: Bar 12; Pie 2; Line 1
Tables: 48
Trend information: In-patient activity for last 5 quarters;
out-patient sessions for previous three 
years with guesstimate of final total for 
current year.
Commentary: Associated with data; descriptive.
Hammersmith SHA
Title: Patient Activity Report; quarter ending
31st December 1988 
Services covered: Caseload by unit and specialty; Detailed
figures for two wards; Theatre activity
by unit and specialty; out-patient 
activity by unit and specialty 
Number of sides: 11
Graphs: Histogram 1
Tables: 8
Trend information: Last quarter 
Commentary: At the front; analytical
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Title:
Services covered:
Number of sides: 
Graphs:
Tables:
Trend information: 
Commentary:
Title:
Services covered:
Number of sides: 
Graphs:
Tables:
Trend information: 
Commentary:
North Bedfordshire 
Activity and Workload September 1988 
quarter
Acute specialties in general hospital; 
single specialty small hospitals 
22 
Nil 
22
Last four quarters; % change on quarter 
previous year if <> 10%
Nil
East Herts
Monthly statistical report for November 
1988
By specialty for in-patient; out-patient; 
day case; ward attenders; Theatres; 
radiology; physiological measurement; in­
patient waiting lists by specialty. 
Special "briefing on births" in the 
District.
11
Line 3 
16
Figures for previous months from April 88 
Nil, except in briefing annex
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Title:
Number of sides: 
Graphs:
Tables:
Trend information:
Commentary:
Ealing
Clinical Activity November 1988. Reports 
from 3 Units Services covered: By local
acute, other acute and individual 
specialties for: in-patients; day case;
out-patient; waiting time/list (by 
specialty and consultant), detailed 
figures for one ward. For Mental Health 
Unit activity figures by sub units of 
management and bedstate figures for all 
wards as at 1st December; admission rate 
per '000 population in 4 sub-District 
sectors. For Community Unit Nursing 
activity statistics by 4 sub-District 
sectors; attendances at community 
clinics.
25
Stacked bar 4; Line 2; Maps 2 
17
Hospitals: none, except for a l/12th
annual planned beddays figure for 
comparison, and waiting times/lists with 
previous month; community nurse activity 
figures with previous 21 months, clinic 
activity with previous 7 quarters.
At start of each Unit report; analytical
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Barnet
Title: Report to District Management Board on
Surgical Inpatient Waiting List 
Services covered: By surgical specialty for in-patient
waiting time/lists 
Number of sides: 5
Graphs: Line 5; Stacked bar 1
Tables: 2
Trend information: 1/2 yearly figures for previous 4 years. 
Commentary: At the front? descriptive.
The issues selected for presentation vary substantially. 
Several of these reports commented on the new Korner data 
being used, but, despite its novelty, it is apparent that 
the information (as product) for monitoring and control, 
presented to the authorities is very crude.
For example, many commentaries simply gave a textual 
description of data given with no analysis at all. The range 
of services covered seldom included the community health 
services, only one report contained any maps and none 
considered any analysis of the needs of residents as opposed 
to the efficiencies of service provision. No report included 
any integration of manpower, finance and activity. Very 
little of the information presented appeared to be 
appropriate in the context of reports designed to inform 
DMBs and DHAs of important issues that arise from scanning 
available data. Despite suggestions that Districts pool 
knowledge and experiences in producing management reports 
(Gabbay and Drury 1986), there are no collections at any
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central point (e.g. Kings Fund Centre, DHSS), nor is there 
any guidance, or even examples of good practice available 
from the DHSS or Region. In short, the quality and quantity 
of the intelligence derived from routinely available data is 
poor.
6 PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE
Although the need to establish an "expert information 
function" had been recognised in 1972 (DHSS 1972a) , it had 
been intended to develop it at Area and Regional level (see 
Chapter 8 Section 1.2). However, in the NHS, prior to the 
Korner reports few Districts had a District Information 
Officer; the management of medical records was part of the 
long established role of the Medical Records Officer, but 
there was usually nobody whose main role was the development 
and presentation of management information at a District 
level. It was only in the Korner report on "Converting Data 
into Information" (Korner 1982) that it was proposed that 
the effective operational management of the district 
information service was best carried out by a designated 
officer who "should be responsible to either a member of the 
district management team or an immediate subordinate". It 
was clear that, although the original discipline from which 
such an officer came was unimportant, in contrast to the 
Medical Records Officers, DIOs were expected to be 
graduates, and additional qualifications and training in 
information management were recommended.
A survey of 201 health districts in England and Wales to
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identify whether districts were appointing information 
officers and the management arrangements being adopted was 
conducted by Scrivens (1985b). She reported that, of the 173 
authorities replying with completed questionnaires, 115 
(66.4%) had a post entitled "information officer", 27 
(15.6%) were intending to create such a post and 31 (17.9%) 
reported no intention to create such a post (of which 5 
provided the function as part of their planning department's 
work). Of the 115 Districts, 65% of DIOs were accountable to 
the District Administrator or his deputy, 18.3% to the 
District Planning Officer and 9.6% to the District Medical 
Officer; the remaining 7% were accountable to other District 
officers.
In September 1984, staff training became the responsibility 
of the NHS Training Authority, but it was recognised that 
the education of information specialists required a 
comprehensive review. "Traditional groupings by discipline, 
such as specialists in community medicine (information), 
regional statisticians and information officers are no 
longer appropriate now that information is being managed as 
a corporate resource....When the district restructurings 
caused by the Griffiths proposals have been completed it 
will be easier to identify the long-term educational 
requirements of the new information specialists" (Wainwright 
and Dearden 1985 p36).
The next study with a similar concern was not undertaken 
until 1989. A study was conducted in three Regions by CSL 
(CSL 1989) , on behalf of the Department of Health, which
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indicated that there were on average six specialist 
information staff per District Health Authority. Although 
this indicated there had been a substantial increase in the 
number of staff at District level, the CSL report found 
there were only two or three staff at individual Unit level. 
However, the introduction of the White Paper and the 
introduction of Resource Management, together with the 
associated guidance given to devolve the role of 
information as far as possible to Unit level, is resulting 
in increasing numbers of information staff being employed at 
Units.
An important feature of these developments is that their 
extent and nature are unknown. Whilst detailed occupational 
codes exist for staff such as nurses, therapists etc. so 
that manpower planning can be conducted by the Department of 
Health, or Regions, and so that pay review bodies can be 
informed of the impact of potential pay awards, the numbers, 
roles, relationships and skills of information specialists 
are not recorded on any routinely available manpower 
returns. In part, this is a reflection of the recent 
emergence of the role of information specialists and also 
the lack of its professionalisation.
The range of skills needed by information managers has 
become extensive. The CSL study was structured on the basis 
of the skills needed by an information manager to fulfil the 
following responsibilities:
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a) develop and implement information strategies to
provide the information required to support the 
achievement of the business objectives of the 
health authority or hospital
b) identify the systems required to meet these 
information requirements and determine the 
priorities for their introduction
c) specify in detail these systems and to co-ordinate
their development or procurement and
implementation
d) organise and manage the operational support
required to maintain these information systems
e) provide and manage an information reporting and 
analysis service to support clinicians, 
operational managers and general managers
f) organise appropriate training and development for 
non specialist managers and health professionals 
in the field of information and computing.
These responsibilities were agreed by an advisory panel of 
senior NHS information staff. In addition, the panel agreed 
a set of skills that a director of information needs to
possess or have access to in order to carry out these
responsibilities. These skills are in the area of :
a) Business analysis (e.g. identification of 
objectives, information requirements, business 
planning processes)
b) Systems analysis and design (e.g. structured
design methods, data modelling, database design
methods)
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c) Communication and Networks (e.g. basic awareness 
of Open Systems Interconnection standards, local 
and wide area networks)
d) Operational computing (e.g. operating systems, 
programming languages and fourth generation 
products)
e) Information Analysis software (e.g. enquiry 
languages, spreadsheets, mapping software)
f) Information analysis - techniques (e.g. simple 
statistics, use of indicators, social surveys)
g) Data Management (e.g. data audit, clinical coding, 
quality control, database management)
h) Project management (e.g. project management 
methodologies, project control, contract 
negotiation)
i) Presentation and human interaction (e.g. time 
management, communication skills, interviewing)
j) Data and information awareness skills (e.g. Korner 
data sets and central requirements, mortality and 
census data, market research data).
These criteria suggest that by the end of the 1980s 
expectations of the necessary knowledge and expertise of an 
information manager were certainly clear in theory. How far 
were they being realised in practice?
As part of a survey conducted to determine levels of 
proficiency and training needed at District and Unit level, 
data was also collected from a total of 144 individual
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information specialists in Yorkshire, South East Thames and 
Oxford Regions. Since only 33% of Districts and 14% of Units 
replied, and because it was evident that the figures quoted 
in the organisation-level questionnaire were inflated by the 
inclusion of staff who were not information specialists, 
attention is given here to reanalysing the raw data on 
responses from the 144 individuals who responded to a 
questionnaire for individuals. Unfortunately, no analysis is 
given of the Unit/District, or level of education etc. of 
these 144 respondents.
Each individual was asked to assess their proficiency level 
in terms of specific skills grouped within the categories of 
skills listed above. Non-response was not shown in the data 
tables. Therefore it is only possible to make comparisons 
between the percentages of those replying. These percentages 
have been calculated for each skill, as shown in the table 
on the following page.
When the %s are summed and averaged, the totals indicate 
that over two thirds of information specialists deem 
themselves to be inexperienced in the skills needed to 
fulfil their role. Indeed it is only in presentation and 
human interaction skills that over 20% feel themselves to be 
confident. Of course, within these broad categories there
i
are some important variations, e.g. nearly 40% of 
individuals considered themselves to be either expert or 
confident in simple statistics, but the dominant finding is 
the substantial lack of "specialist" skills.
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ANALYSIS OF % OF RESPONDENTS ASSESSING THEIR INDIVIDUAL
PROFICIENCY LEVELS BY SKILL TYPE
I = Expert; II = Confident;
III = Occasional; IV = Inexperienced
SKILL I II III IV
Business analysis 1.1 7.6 20.0 71.2
Systems analysis and design .1 66. 6 13.2 79.6
Communications and Standards .8 9.8 20.5 68.8
Computing 1.0 3.7 9.9 85.4
Info, analysis software 1.4 7.4 11.7 79.5
Info, analysis techniques 2.4 11.5 18.7 67.4
Data management 1.1 11.4 19.6 67.9
Project management . 6 10.8 20.6 68.0
Presentation and interaction 1.7 28. 6 27.2 42.5
Data sources & awareness 1.5 14.0 27.6 56.9
TOTAL 1.2 11.1 18.9 68.7
Source; CSL 1989, Part 3 Section 4.
The CSL report then asked 144 suppliers of training courses 
to indicate whether they provided courses against each of 
the skills categories. Responses were received from only 33 
commercial and 18 academic organisations. The existence of a 
training course has been summarised from the tables 
presented in part 2 of the report and is shown below.
183
SKILL SPECIFIC COURSES PROVIDED BY COMMERCIAL AND ACADEMIC
ORGANISATIONS
SKILL COMM ACAD TOTAL
Business analysis 13 7 20
Systems analysis and design 14 7 21
Communications and Standards 10 2 12
Computing 11 6 17
Information analysis 16 13 29
Data management 12 7 19
Project management 14 5 19
Presentation and interaction 9 12 21
Data sources & awareness 6 7 13
Source: CSL 1989, Part 2, Appendix A.
With such a low response rate (35%) no firm conclusions 
concerning the availability of courses can be drawn. But of 
those who replied, it is apparent that the availability of 
training is focused on information analysis (57% of all 
respondents provide it) ; little is available for 
communications and networks (about 24% provide it) and the 
remaining skills are provided by between 3 3 and 41% of the 
suppliers who responded. The association between the 
predominance of academic institutions over commercial 
concerns only in the area of human interaction skills, and 
the findings in the previous table, suggest that 
information specialists rely essentially on an academic 
training to give them proficiency in their "specialist 
skills". To have such an unskilled workforce responsible for 
the "lifeblood" (Freeman 1990) of the organisation indicates
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an endemic and serious pathology of organisational 
intelligence.
7 ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY
Two aspects of organisational memory are illustrated by 
material gathered during the course of my involvement in the 
production of a "Framework for Information Management in the 
Hospital and Community Health Services" in 1985 (DHSS 
1986a).
7.1 ORGANISATIONAL SEARCH
The case study here concerns one view of the state of the 
organisational memory of those concerned with information 
management in the NHS in general, and the DHSS Health 
Services Information Branch in particular. In 1985 I was 
asked to join a NHS/DHSS working party examining proposals 
for an information strategy for the Hospital and Community 
Health Services (HCHS). How was it that I came to be asked?
The project had been decomposed into a number of working 
groups. One was to be concerned with "roles and 
responsibilities" and its chairman, then head of the Health 
Services Information Branch, wanted to have someone 
fulfilling the relatively new role of District Information 
Officer who might have the same practical knowledge of the 
issues. Without personal knowledge of a suitable person he 
had to search the organisation for one. However, such search 
procedures could not involve activating a set of rules to 
select someone (perhaps from a database) who met certain 
criteria. Also, there was no professional organisation of
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District Information Officers who could be asked to nominate 
a suitable person. To take a short cut by tapping into 
informal networks of contacts was clearly a more appropriate 
procedure. Such networks exist within Regions. A Regional 
Information Manager could have been asked to suggest a 
suitable person. But other educational organisations, such 
as the King's Fund Centre, also have informal contact with 
those who attend conferences and workshops.
Fortuitously, the King's Fund had written to the Director of 
Health Information on 2 0th July 1985 inviting him to talk 
about "the need for documented strategies" at a conference 
of District Information Officers it was organising for 4th 
December, so they in turn were simply asked to suggest a 
suitable District Information Officer. They were referred to 
me as I had been one of those DIOs expressing an interest 
having such a workshop, and, more importantly, was engaged 
in an analysis of a survey of District Information 
Strategies (see Section 1). Had an article on the topic been 
published, then a search of a bibliographic database would 
have been another method of searching the knowledgebase of 
the organisation for information concerning the identity of 
a suitable DIO. The problem of finding suitable people to 
join national working parties is far from "automated", 
although there are strong informal networks of known 
"suitable people", who may become almost "automatically" 
considered. Much of this knowledge, however, is not 
documented, and may be lost when individuals move out of the 
organisation.
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7.2 SHARING KNOWLEDGE
The objective of the Roles and Responsibilities working 
group were:- to clarify responsibilities for information 
issues between and within authorities 
- define a common approach to the common 
information needs of the HCHS.
After the first meeting of the group it was apparent that 
there was no common knowledge of the scope of issues that 
might be considered part of the role of Information 
Management within the HCHS. To examine this problem, I 
undertook a brief content analysis of the Information 
Strategies received as part of the King's Fund survey. My 
analysis was simply intended to delineate the extent of 
issues highlighted and to ensure there was a record of this 
available as a contribution to the knowledgebase on which 
those concerned with the development of Information 
Management and Information Strategies could draw.
The following was prepared by me for inclusion in the 
report:-
The range of issues outlined below is illustrative rather 
than exhaustive: they have all been included in the
Information Strategies of one or more Health Authorities, 
and so are within the scope of information as a corporate 
resource.
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The issues can be grouped naturally under such categories 
as:
Information for general management:
- for/about policy development
- for option appraisal and performance review
- for setting/monitoring management budgets
- development and interpretation of Health Service 
Indicators
- quality assurance and outcome evaluation
- decision support systems
Information on these issues will be underpinned by those 
listed below:
Routine information provision:
- control and co-ordination of the provision of data
- presentation and dissemination of information 
about the need and demand for, and the use of, 
health services
- information for the public
- costs and resources of providing information
- quality of care
Maintenance of registers and profiles:
- profiles of resource provision
- demography
- topography
- small area profiles
- registers of research
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Surveys and research:
- surveys of information systems
- customer satisfaction
- epidemiological surveys
- statistical analysis and interpretation
- applications of health economics
- operational research
Library services:
- care and treatment guidelines
- management information library
- medical
- co-ordination of library services
- selective dissemination of information
Technical standards:
- systems design methodology
- systems development procedures
- systems standards and communication protocols
- policies on new technology, health and safety
Data administration:
- data protection and storage
- data collection, processing and output standards
- data dictionary maintenance
Communications:
- data capture systems
- public databases
- wide area and local area networks
- telephone systems
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Users:
- staff consultation procedures
- training of data collectors
- training of IT specialists
- training of information users
This paper was one of those considered at a workshop held in
York for members of the strategy working groups on 11/12 
November 1985 to discuss their findings. At the workshop 
each working group chairman presented the key issues raised 
and conclusions reached by his group. These presentations 
were followed by syndicate work. Each syndicate was given a 
list of suggested questions to address (produced by the HS 
Information secretariat) and then reported back its 
findings. I was particularly concerned that the views of 
these syndicate groups were not simply recorded by those 
concerned with preparing the draft strategy. I suggested 
that each member attending the workshop should receive in 
due course a copy of the notes prepared by the secretariat 
containing the feedback from each syndicate. This proved to 
be a novel suggestion, but one which was endorsed. A month 
later the workshop attenders received copies of the 
syndicate reports. This meant that there were documented 
records of views stored in the files of participants. It was 
the closest to a documentary record of how the working 
groups' views were tested and developed.
In short, the process of producing the Framework for 
Information Management was not stored in hard copy in
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organisational memory, but only the product of the process, 
the document itself. And, concerning the management of the 
knowledgebase derivable from linking available sources of 
information from within the NHS as a whole, such as in the 
Information Strategies, there was none in 1985/6, and there 
is none now in 1990. Experience and expertise is scattered 
and it is very difficult to tap into the informal issue- 
specific networks that exist, except by word of mouth, 
attendance at conferences and reading the literature. The 
only corporate knowledgebase (as opposed to national centres 
of responsibility, e.g. for procurement of IT) in existence 
is the NHS Central Register of Computer Applications 
(Reardon 1989). It began as a paper-based system, but is now 
computer-based and with on-line access. It suggests one way 
of improving organisational memory by using better 
information management. However, the NHS Review may well 
stimulate the development of different types of corporate 
database (see Chapter 9, Section 4.5.3.3).
8 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
8.1 INFORMATION AVAILABILITY FOR ANNUAL REPORTS
A key role for District Information Officers is the (direct 
or indirect) management of information systems to make 
available a wide range of information. In April 1988 I 
undertook a brief survey of the availability of information 
in 12 District Information Units in North West Thames 
Region. The information asked for was based on the data 
items which had been needed in Ealing in compiling its 
Annual Report (see Chapter 6) . This had been published in 
January 1988, as was the Acheson Report which recommended
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the production of Annual Reports by all DPHs in all DHAs. In 
April 1988, therefore, it was a 'novel task' for a District 
Information Officer to be presented with a "shopping list" 
of likely items for inclusion in an Annual Report.
With the introduction of Annual Reports there is a 
requirement for a wide range of data concerning socio­
demographic indicators, primary medical care, mortality, 
morbidity, resource use and provision (though the latter two 
are not strictly required to produce a report on the state 
of the Public Health).
I did not ask whether the information was accessed using a 
computer or by looking up paper based reports, as my main 
interest, bearing in mind its use in assessing 
"intelligence", was in the speed of retrieval. The items 
were selected to cover a wide range of sources (see also 
Chapter 3 Section 5.4.2). Some are available from OPCS 
publications sent routinely to all DHAs (e.g. age-sex 
population estimates, live births and mortality). Other 
sources will be internal to the Health Authority (e.g. 
community clinic numbers, waiting lists), others include 
Regional, Family Practitioner Committee and Local Authority 
sources. District Information Officers were asked to say 
whether the information was readily to hand (R) , available 
within one hour (H), available within one day (D), available 
within a week (W) , or available from other staff or from 
outside the District or after more than 1 week (0).
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AVAILABILITY* OF INFORMATION IN TWELVE DISTRICT INFORMATION
UNITS IN NORTH WEST THAMES
SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC
R SH SD SW 0
Age sex estimates 12 0 0 0 0
Live births 11 0 0 0 0
Infant mortalities 10 0 1 0 1
Abortions 7 2 1 1 1
Social Class 7 2 3 0 0
Deprivation Indices 7 1 2 0 2
Unemployment rates 4 0 1 1 6
Ethnic minorities 10 0 1 0 1
Housing quality 9 0 2 0 1
PRIMARY MEDICAL CARE
No. Of GPS 5 2 3 0 2
No. of Practices 5 2 2 0 3
Patients registered 2 0 2 2 6
Ophthalmic services 0 1 0 3 7
Pharmaceutical services 0 1 0 3 8
MORTALITY
Deaths - all causes 10 2 0 0 0
Deaths - selected causes 9 1 1 1 0
Deaths - preventable 6 1 2 2 1
MORBIDITY
Acute hospitalisation - all 10 0 0 1 1
- by specialty 10 0 0 1 1
- by hospital 8 0 1 1 2
- by cause 3 0 1 2 6
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R SH SD SW 0
- % emergency 8 0 3 1 0
Psychiatric n. admissions 8 2 0 1 1
- no. out-patients 8 2 0 1 1
- community services 3 2 3 1 3
Cancer Register 0 0 0 2 10
Mental Handicap Register 2 0 1 2 7
AIDS cases 3 0 1 1 7
Communicable diseases 3 4 2 0 3
Vacc & Imm levels 3 5 2 1 1
RESOURCE USE AND PROVISION
Community clinic nos. 6 3 1 1 1
Community clinic services 4 4 2 0 2
Community staffing levels 0 1 3 4 3
Hospital bed complements 9 3 0 0 0
Hospital staffing levels 0 1 4 3 4
Waiting lists 10 1 1 0 0
Waiting times 10 0 1 1 0
* Availability: R = Readily to hand; H = Available within 1 
hour; D = Available within 1 day; W = Available within 1 
week; 0 = Outside District or more than 1 week.
Although this survey was conducted in the context of the 
"novel problem" of the data needed for an Annual Report, it 
was evident that the "speed" of retrieval varied. The 
simplest explanation would be that speed of retrieval is 
closely related to frequency of use. The need to produce 
regular reports on (usually hospital) activity has been 
discussed earlier. It is not surprising, therefore, to find
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hospitalisation and specialty information readily available, 
together with waiting time and waiting list information. 
Indeed the figures as a whole suggest the dominance of the 
hospital sector in the structuring of information retrieval 
systems. The only other readily available data are 
essentially the basic demographic data (age-sex estimates, 
live births, infant and general mortalities) that are 
routinely requested of a District Information Unit and 
supplied to it in standard annual reports by OPCS. However, 
it is interesting to note that data concerning ethnic 
minorities was readily available, since its only source 
(with some contentious inferences needing to be made) is 
the 1981 census. It reflects an increased concern during the 
late 1980s with the health care of ethnic minorities (see 
also Chapter 9 Section 3.2.3).
However, the lack of readily available data concerning 
community services reflects the concern of most Districts 
with the hospital sector. Information about community 
clinics, services and staffing levels certainly exists in 
all Districts, but evidently not within most District 
Information Units, reflecting perhaps the relative autonomy 
of most Community Information Services. Some items of data 
are clearly difficult to access within the District at all. 
Information concerning cancer registration is available from 
Regionally based Cancer Registers; Mental Handicap Registers 
are often run by Local Authorities in collaboration with 
Health Authorities, and on stand alone systems that may not 
be readily accessed by a District Information Unit; AIDS
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information is clearly of importance in some Districts (e.g. 
inner London Districts) but for most within the North West 
Thames Region data concerning AIDS cases would no doubt take 
more than a week to collate.
The lack of readily available data about primary medical 
care, such as the number of GPs and practices, is an 
indication of the (pre-Review) structural separation of the 
Family Practitioner Committee services from the Hospital and 
Community Health Services. Although it is the referral 
patterns in the primary health care sector that determine 
the demands placed on hospital services, the lack of 
knowledge of this is not critical when resources are 
allocated on the basis of each Districts' catchment 
population. The switch in funding to being based on a 
District's resident population (post 1991) means Districts 
will need to know who is referring their residents to which 
hospitals and why. Initially this will be a novel problem 
that will take time and effort to mount ad hoc surveys. 
However, because money will follow GP referral patterns, 
(via the mechanism of contracts between purchasing Districts 
and providing hospitals) it can be expected that data to 
retrieve this information will become automated quickly (see 
Chapter 9 Section 4.5).
It would be possible to assess the performance of each 
District Information Unit in performing the basic task of 
data retrieval. The view of organisational intelligence with 
regard to novelty would suggest that it would be those units 
with automated retrieval systems that would be best able to
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respond to such novel requests. However, it is important to 
note that such systems are not necessarily computer based. 
Instead, the 'automation' may be of dealing with similar 
requests. Units used to responding to enquiries about the 
population patterns, throughput by specialty, numbers of 
diagnoses treated etc. will be able to respond quickly to 
different collations of data, provided they are 
appropriately indexed. This may be in a series of files, or 
in the (dynamic) memory of the information expert, from 
which access is may be rapid, but dependent on his/her 
availability. One of the major problems in accessing data, 
however, is the wide variety of data processing systems both 
within and between different Districts.
8.2 DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS
The history of computing in the NHS has been one of tension 
between central initiatives (in terms of standard systems, 
experimental projects and more recently a corporate data 
model) and local initiatives. The latter were both a 
stimulus and a response to the recommendations of the Korner 
committee (DHSS 1983, and Chapter 8), and have vastly 
complicated the range of data processing options within and 
between different health authorities.
To examine the variety and operational status of systems 
within one region, I undertook a brief survey of the 
operational status and the type of systems in place in each 
of the 13 Districts in North West Thames Region (the 
analysis excludes the Hammersmith Special Health Authority
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as it has no defined community; interestingly, it is the 
only hospital to have opted for an integrated solution). 
Also, some services are not provided in every district, e.g. 
mental handicap hospital services. In cases where there was 
more than one system, e.g. because there were two acute 
hospitals, the status of the one most close to being 
operational was used. Each District Information Manager, or 
equivalent, responded to a request for this information as 
at the 1st April 1988. The significance of this date is that 
it marked the completion of the implementation of all the 
recommendations of the Korner reports.
NORTH WEST THAMES REGION 
IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF SYSTEMS AT 1st APRIL 1988
STATUS
1 = Operational
2 = Implementing
3 = Planned
4 = Not planned
5 = Not applicable
 1______2______ 3_____ 4________5
13 
13
3 7 4
2 5 7
12 1
12 1
3 7 3
7 1 6
1 Patient Master Index
2 PAS Inpatients
3 PAS Out-patients
4 PAS Waiting List
5 PAS DIS
6 Maternity
7 Mental Handicap PAS
8 Mental Illness PAS
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1 2 3 4
9 Child Health Register 11 2
10 Vacc & Imm 10 3
11 Pre School 5 4 3 1
12 School 1 1 5 6
13 District Nurses 2 11
14 Health Visitors 1 12
15 Com. Midwives 5 2 6
16 Com. Psych Nurses 1 2 5 5
17 Specialist Nurses 1 3 5 4
18 Speech Therapy 1 7 5
19 Occupational Therapy 5 8
20 Physiotherapy 6 7
21 Dietetics 3 5 5
22 Chiropody 5 4 4
23 Dental 6 7
24 Audiology NIL
25 Clinical Psychology 2 2 2 7
26 Haematology 5 3 5
27 Microbiology 4 4 5
28 Histopathology 4 3 5 1
29 Chemical Pathology 6 2 5
30 Cervical Cytology 7 2 2 2
31 Radiology 5 3 3 2
32 Theatres 2 1 2 8
33 Estates 11 2
34 Manpower 11 2
35 Payroll 13
36 Finance 11 1
37 Health Service Indicators 13
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1______ 2______ 3______ 4______ 5
38 Mental Handicap Register 10
39 Diagnostic Register 1
40 Accident & Emergency 1
In the same survey, the types of different computer system 
that were planned / being implemented or installed were 
asked for.
APPLICATION
1 Patient Master Index
2 PAS Inpatients
3 PAS Out-patients
4 PAS Waiting List
5 PAS DIS
6 Maternity
7 Mental Handicap PAS
8 Mental Illness PAS
9 Child Health Register
10 Vacc & Imm
11 Pre School
12 School
13 District Nurses
14 Health Visitors
15 Com. Midwives
16 Com Psych Nurses
17 Specialist Nurses
18 Speech Therapy
SYSTEM
ICL/PAS 13 
ICL/PAS 13 
ICL/PAS 13
ICL/PAS 7, PC/SMART 1 
ICL/PAS 13 
ICL/St Mary's 13 
ICL 4, Westminster Medical 1 
ICL PAS 6, Protechnic 1, PIMS 1 
ICL/National C.H.System, 13 
ICL/National C.H.System, 13 
ICL/National C.H.System, 12 
ICL/National C.H.System, 7 
ICL/COMCARE 3, GA/PEAK 10 
ICL/COMCARE 3, GA/PEAK 10 
ICL/COMCARE 3, GA/PEAK 4 
ICL/COMCARE 2, GA/PEAK 4,
PC/SMART 1, PROTECHNIC 1 
ICL/COMCARE 3, GA/PEAK 6 
ICL/COMCARE 3, GA/PEAK 4,
PC/DELTA 5, Local system 1
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APPLICATION SYSTEM
19 Occupational Therapy
20 Physiotherapy
21 Dietetics
22 Chiropody
23 Dental
24 Audiology
25 Clinical Psychology
26 Haematology
27 Microbiology
28 Histopathology
29 Chemical Pathology
30 Cervical Cytology
31 Radiology
32 Theatres
33 Estates
34 Manpower
35 Payroll
ICL/COMCARE 3, GA/PEAK 3, 
PC/DELTA 2, Local system 1 
ICL/COMCARE 3, GA/PEAK 3, 
PC/DELTA 4, Local system 1 
ICL/COMCARE 3, GA/PEAK 2, 
PC/DELTA 6, Local system 1 
ICL/COMCARE 3, GA/PEAK 5 
ORAC 1, KENDATA 1, HEALTHNET 1 
Local systems 4 
Nil
ICL/COMCARE 2, GA/PEAK 2 
Local systems 2 
DEC/PATHCOM 10, TELEFILE 1 
BBC Micros 1
DEC/PATHCOM 8, TELEFILE 1 
BBC Micros 1, PHLS 1 
DEC/PATHCOM 9, BBC micros 1 
DEC/PATHCOM 9, BBC micros 1 
TELEFILE 1 
DEC/Exeter FPC 12 
DEC/RADCOM 5, ICL/MERIT 1 
Amstrad/DBasell l,Amstrad/ 
RADOS 1, Local system 1 
Local micro 3 
PC/WIMS 11 
Regional IBM/IPS 13 
Regional ICL/RCC 13
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36 Finance Regional ICL/RCC 12,
IBM/Norskdata 1
37 Health Service Indicator BBC/Yates/DHSS 13
38 Mental Handicap Register ICL/Westminster Medical 7,
Local system 1
39 Diagnostic Register Local system 1
40 Accident & Emergency Burroughs/Footman-Walker 1
From the table above it is clear that there was considerable 
local autonomy within this Region. Only for the main Patient 
Administration System, the basic modules of the National 
Child Health system (run on a batch basis at the Region), 
and the manpower, payroll and finance systems was there any 
uniformity of solution. Only two District opted for the "ICL 
solution" wherever it was available, thereby creating an 
extensive, but not total, single-supplier environment; the 
GA/PEAK solution opted for in a number of Districts as a 
solution for paramedical and community nursing systems was 
incompatible with the ICL solution, as was the alternative 
Delta solution (which was being developed by the Regional 
Computer Centre). The DEC/Pathcom solution which many 
Districts opted for as the Regionally preferred and funded 
solution for the other major application area of pathology 
computing was incompatible in terms of both hardware and 
software with all of the other systems; the Regional 
Director responsible for scientific equipment had convinced 
the Regional Steering Committee that this disbenefit was 
outweighed by the benefits and price performance of the 
systems selected.
APPLICATION SYSTEM
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The variety of solutions to a common problem, the 
implementation of data processing systems to ensure that 
Korner data sets and (central and local) information 
requirements were being met by April 1988 suggest that in 
this Region there had been uncertainty about the nature of 
the most appropriate ways to fulfil the task. It was a 
mixture of a centrally led "rationalist" set of solutions 
that were centrally funded, and locally funded small systems 
that were clearly "segmented" (Kling 1980). One of the 
crucial systems from the Korner perspective was the Patient 
Administration System. The Region decided to standardise on 
the ICL PAS. However, it had been designed prior to the 
Korner recommendations; the software used proved very 
inflexible when meeting the new specification. The new 
Korner "District Information System" module was also 
produced by a consortium of six Regions, though the 
management reports to be extracted from it were developed 
within North West Thames. It arrived late, and needed 
several releases before being usable. From the perspective 
of users locally, it was a system which both they, and the 
Regional implementation teams, had to accommodate 
themselves to. Although it was a rational systems solution 
it could not readily be tailored to meet local requirements 
for management information (although it was acceptable as a 
"first generation" operational system).
Partly in response to this scenario, over which they had 
little control, the Regional Computer Centre did try to
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develop some systems which they intended to be used as 
standard systems within the region. In conjunction with St 
Mary's hospital a maternity system had been under 
development since the early 1980s, and had had time to be 
thoroughly tried and tested: it became a de facto Regional 
standard. The micro-based Delta paramedical system was 
another which was developed in a pilot District within the 
Region, but this time within a very short time period to 
enable the Korner deadlines to be met. It met users 
requirements for a basic stand alone statistical system; but 
many Districts preferred the GA/Zebra system, which had been 
developed by a software house in conjunction with a pilot 
District in another Region. Although it ran on novel 
hardware and software (in terms of experience within the 
Region) it offered the possibility of developing patient- 
based systems, something which the rival ICL/COMCARE systems 
(whose initial development had been sponsored by the DHSS) 
did not. It should be noted, however, that many districts 
either planned to introduce "home grown" solutions on local 
micros, or had no intentions of introducing computers, 
intending to use manual data collection methods, at least 
until more cost effective computer solutions became 
available. Other solutions, such as the Norskdata system 
were being developed by the computer companies as loss 
leaders and were acquired by interested DGMs who had the 
necessary resources.
Social analyses of computing in North West Thames could 
utilise both "systems rationalist" and "segmented 
institutionalist" perspectives to describe the decision
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making process at both Regional and District level. The 
former view would stress the existence of a Regional 
Information Technology Strategy produced in 1985, and the 
establishment of a representative body of all interested 
professions in the Districts, as well as the Region called 
the Regional Information Technology Agency (RITA). This 
agency determined how the funds, top-sliced from District's 
allocations, were to be allocated on Regional standard 
systems over a five year plan. It agreed priorities 
evaluated different systems before choosing the most "cost- 
effective" etc.
However, the development of data processing systems can also 
be appropriately be examined by paying attention to the 
conflicts that arose between Districts unhappy with RITA's 
choice of preferred supplier and on the political pressures 
brought to bear to release funds to Districts who chose to 
provide their own solution in some cases, e.g. paramedical 
systems, but not in others, e.g. pathology. Also of interest 
would be the relationship between Districts and the 
suppliers, and the conflicting pressures between cost- 
effective local solutions that departmental users are happy 
with but which realise no economies of scale (in terms of 
support and maintenance) and which cannot be linked (because 
they use different operating systems and communications 
protocols) . Will the Hammersmith SHA, as the only single­
solution site in the Region or the two Districts with 
essentially an ICL only approach, realise the full benefits 
of standardised and integrated solutions, or in due course
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regret being "locked into" one manufacturer's culture?
9 SUMMARY
The essence of the "context" for the case studies in this 
chapter, and indeed for the remaining chapters, is 
summarised in the findings of the surveys of information 
strategies in the mid 1980s. This is the lack of a generally 
accepted view of the scope or structure of information 
systems. Only 15 Districts (8%) had comprehensive and 
detailed strategies. There was clearly a great deal of 
uncertainty as to whether and how to construct information 
strategies, yet substantial interest, particularly by 
District Information Officers and IT managers to develop 
them so as to improve their "fit" in their local 
organisation. What was less evident was concern by DGMs that 
information strategies were needed and implemented. At the 
time of this survey, there was no direct financial penalty 
for poor information systems. However, the NHS Review is a 
major change in this respect.
As an illustration of the developments in the scanning and 
selection aspects of organisational intelligence, the HSI 
case study suggests that HSIs are used primarily to clarify 
and resolve past problems rather than in identifying future 
opportunities. They are in widespread use in the NHS, albeit 
hands-on expertise in their use is primarily with 
information specialists. Their use has now become routine, 
but is largely restricted to comparative analyses at 
District rather than Unit level, and over a four year 
period. This time period is short, and yet, because the
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basis of the indicators changed post-Korner, and will again 
post-Review, it is likely to be the longest period of 
directly comparable HSIs until the mid to late 1990s - a 
penalty of organisational change.
Whilst the example of scanning and selection has been inter­
authority HSIs, clearly there are many other local 
indicators, or critical success factors (Rockart 1979), 
which may serve to define the parameters of internal 
performance which can be scanned and reported, on an 
exception basis, to decision-makers.
A comparative analysis of the presentation of a report on 
HSIs to a number of Health Authorities showed a wide variety 
of response to a novel problem. This in itself is not 
surprising, nor necessarily inappropriate. However, 
it is symptomatic of the poorly perceived need for a 
corporate organisational memory that, although a study was 
commissioned by the Department of Health to conduct a 
comparative analysis of a sample of 40 reports, its results 
were never published.
The case studies of communications and knowledge 
organisation here (in contrast to those in the remaining 
chapters) are concerned with internal presentational issues. 
The importance of having more than one type of communication 
channel to help form views on complex problems is well 
illustrated by the study of DGMs by Stewart et al. Whilst 
some clearly preferred to avoid the pathologies of
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information overload, others, aware of the pathologies of 
data summarisation and transmission, preferred the raw 
product. Perhaps, however, this is merely a recognition of 
the requirement by executives to "dig down" to the data if 
their "executive information system" (Dawson and Faulkner 
1990) indicates a problem may be present. The lack of such 
systems indicates the underdeveloped state of information 
management.
Another aspect of the way knowledge is presented, via 
graphs, was used to exemplify the importance of any 
information system to adapt to local styles and 
interpretation; and, as a corollary, of the way bias is an 
endemic problem in such graphical presentations. But the 
lack of any corporate knowledgebase of the range of such 
possibilities that had been tried (and their relative 
merits) was also noted.
The development of information management in the NHS can be 
interpreted from the perspective of improved planning, 
management and control systems, (Mumford and Flux 1988), but 
the studies here are concerned with the state of the 
reporting of activity data, rather than the planning and 
managing of budgets important though this is. The case 
study in Ealing suggests how the presentation, and 
representation, of (activity) reports change as the 
organisational structures develop, and are in turn a part of 
the political process of those changes. Whilst the graphs 
and reports presented on a routine basis may appear to be 
an illustration of negative feedback and control, they are
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more appropriately seen as part of the "morphogenic" 
processes of organisational development.
Activity reports viewed across the Districts in the Region 
suggest that the criteria for monitoring and control are 
highly variable (and almost certainly far from clear). Few 
reports gave any indication of the expectations against 
which reported activity was to be assessed. In an 
organisation the collection of data and converting it to 
information and then presenting information which is 
contextually appropriate is the special area of expertise of 
information managers (and/or one which he seeks to foster in 
others). The case studies in Section 6 suggest that over two 
thirds of information specialists deem themselves to be 
inexperienced in the skills needed to fulfil their role. 
Perhaps given the very wide range of skills required, and 
the fact that even in 1985 only two thirds of Districts had 
an "information officer" post, this is not surprising. 
Whilst a professional organisation for information managers 
within the NHS might have encouraged improvements in this 
situation, there are no external national professional 
bodies for information managers that offer training and 
qualifications.
The lack of any corporate knowledgebase concerning 
information officers themselves was illustrated in the 
search for one by the national working party developing an 
information strategy. The search procedures demonstrated the 
capabilities of human memory to make the necessary linkages
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to find someone who might be suitable, ie. it was an example 
of organisational memory being contained in individual heads 
rather than files. The appendix that I prepared for the 
National Strategic Framework document was an attempt to 
document the scope of issues in strategies elsewhere; 
thereby it helped to broaden the conceptualisations of what 
information management was concerned with. The recording of 
the knowledgework processes of the Working Groups developing 
the strategic thinking at the workshops was not a matter of 
routine. This illustrates how organisational memory can 
remain undeveloped, although the individuals concerned have 
their own memories enriched.
An aspect of information management that relies on good 
organisational memory is the retrieval of data, particularly 
that which may not be needed on a regular basis. The survey 
of information requirements for an Annual Health Report 
showed that in terms of retrieval or speed of access, the 
state of organisational intelligence is generally poor. 
However, this was a novel requirement, and for much data 
which was not in regular use. But it suggests that data is 
not readily available concerning some key processes of the 
organisation and relevant inputs form the environment. The 
retrieving of data from computer systems was not directly 
studied, but part of the explanation for poor management 
information systems is the variety of systems, and their 
state of implementation, and the lack of linkage between 
them. The study of the implementation status of systems, at 
a time when the full recommendations of the Korner reports 
were to operational suggested that, from a Regional
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perspective, information requirements have not been 
appropriately determined, nor managed as a corporate 
resource. The variety of local solutions suggests that from 
a District's perspective this view must be tempered by one 
which stresses the appropriateness of local resolution of 
local problems.
Taken together the case studies suggest that information 
management is not developed or organised in an appropriate 
way given the context of the organisation. Though it may be 
conceptualised as moving through the stages towards 
"maturity", when the information management structures and 
information systems are congruent with those of the 
organisation, the difficulties of defining its information 
requirements remain formidable. There is likely to be 
continuing uncertainty as to how to do this given that the 
organisational systems have been continually changing, rapid 
technological innovations continue, the complexity of the 
information to be integrated remains and the level of 
experience in planning information systems and expertise of 
users remains low.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ANNUAL REPORT CASE STUDY
1 CONTEXT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This case study reports on the product, and the experience 
of producing, an "Annual Report on the State of the Public 
Health" (but referred to simply as an Annual Report) within 
Ealing Health Authority. It does not offer a detailed 
comparative analysis with other Authorities and only 
analyses the production of one Annual Report, a task 
undertaken by one Directorate in the Authority.
An Annual Report can be assessed in terms of the 
appropriateness of information contained within it, ie as a 
product for organisational intelligence. To do this the 
context in which it was constructed must be considered, 
before analysing its content and the uses the report may 
have. But a fuller assessment of organisational intelligence 
requires analysis of the appropriateness of the processes of 
producing a report.
The case study applies a conceptual framework for a 
qualitative assessment of organisational intelligence that 
has been developed in earlier chapters. This framework 
comprises analysis of
a)the external context
b)the internal processes of knowledgework, in particular 
- scanning and diagnosis
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- decision making and planning
- monitoring and control
- communication and knowledge organisation
c)the knowledgebases used
- practical knowledge and expertise
- organisational memory
- information systems
Organisational intelligence is not an absolute concept. It 
changes over time. Also it can develop as comparative 
analyses are carried out to evaluate progress at one point 
in time. The Annual Report in this study is presented as a 
unique case in the sense that it was produced essentially in 
isolation without guidance on form or content, or with 
access to a substantial collection of other Reports from 
which comparative assessments could be made.
1.2 HISTORICAL
Prior to the 1974 reorganisation of the NHS the Medical 
Officer of Health was responsible to the Local Authority. 
Part of the duties of the post was "as soon as practicable 
after the 31st day of December in each year to make an 
annual report to the county council for the year ending on 
that date on the sanitary circumstances, the sanitary 
administration and the vital statistics of the county, in 
addition to any other matters upon which he may consider it 
desirable to report" (quoted in Acheson 1988 p4). The report 
was debated in an open meeting of the council with the press 
and public present.
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In the 1974 reorganisation, the office of Medical Officer of 
Health was abolished and medical advice on environmental 
health and communicable diseases became key parts of the new 
post of Community Physician created within all Health 
Authorities. However, there was no requirement to produce an 
Annual Report.
In 1988 a Committee of Inquiry, chaired by Sir Donald 
Acheson (the Chief Medical Officer) reported on the 
development of the public health function. The Acheson 
Report recommended that each Authority commission an annual 
report from their Director of Public Health on the health of 
the population. The Acheson Report did note that some 
Medical Officers of Health "did not mourn the passing of 
what they had come to regard as an annual chore of 
questionable value. In certain cases reports had become 
stereotyped and stale, an annual statistical exercise which 
diverted resources from other work" (Acheson 1988 p20).
1.3 ORGANISATIONAL LOCATION
The case study in Ealing DHA focuses on the work of the 
Directorate of Patient Care Services. This Directorate was 
headed by the District Medical Officer. In this District the 
DMO managed two Specialists in Community Medicine, and also 
the Information and Computing services, comprising 5.5 staff 
and two secretaries.
The District is coterminous with the Local Authority, which 
eases the difficulties of delivering co-ordinated community
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based services for the whole of the Districts population 
which numbers 295,000. The District's one General Acute
hospital, however, serves only about 50% of the resident 
population. Situated in the west of London, there are six 
acute hospitals in neighbouring districts where the 
remainder of the residents are referred for care, or go
directly for emergency admission. The District has one large 
psychiatric hospital and two small long stay hospitals.
The District is managed by a District Management Board, of 
which the District Medical Officer is a member. There are 
Unit Management Groups for the Acute, Mental Health and
Community Units.
2 THE ANNUAL REPORT AS A PRODUCT FOR ORGANISATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
What does a report tell us about the state of an
organisation, and in particular in this case its external 
environment? How can reports be assessed as pieces of text? 
Annual reports on the state of the public health are indeed 
intended to provide information relevant to policy and 
therefore, in Wilensky's (1967) terms, are legitimate 
subject matter for studies of organisational intelligence.
2.2 EVALUATING AN ANNUAL REPORT
2.2.1 PRE-ACHESON
Producing a report on the state of the public health between 
1974 and 1988/9 was an option that few Districts pursued.
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When they did it was often termed a "District Profile". 
However, examination of six such reports that were procured 
by informal contacts, suggests they reports can be assessed 
on a scale ranging from the decentralist to the centralist.
The decentralist reports are characterised by accounts of 
the work performed by various departments; often these 
included work done by hospital departments. These sorts of 
reports were often corporate efforts, every author being 
credited for the section they wrote. Inevitably, these 
reports vary in style, content and presentation. They tend 
to describe rather than analyse and offer no directions for 
future developments. However, they clearly provide a means 
for different parts of the organisation to document their 
achievements, problems and shortfalls. With little central 
direction given, and little editorial control exercised 
then they are readily compiled.
The centralist reports are characterised by a much more 
uniform structure. The narrative is consistent, the style 
for tables, headings, graphs is standard. They have been 
usually been prepared by the DMO and/or a Specialist in 
Community Medicine alone. Some reflect a more analytical 
rather than simply descriptive approach.
Another important dimension on which to assess the reports 
is in terms of their concern with spatial disaggregation. A 
few reports are concerned primarily with the health of the 
population of the District as a whole. But others emphasise 
wherever possible the intra-District variations in
218
demography, health need and service provision.
The trend pre-Acheson was for the reports to provide 
"baseline" information derived from routinely available 
sources of data particularly those concerning the "state of 
health" (usually mortality and disease incidence rates for 
the District), including departmental contributions, but 
without detailed analysis of specific issues. The transition 
to the post-Acheson report has been referred to in the 
introduction to the "Health Authority Profile" for Milton 
Keynes DHA produced in June 1987: "The Milton Keynes
District Health Authority Profile sets out some of the basic 
facts of relevance to the health status and health care of 
the District's population. It highlights demographic issues 
such as social demography and vital statistics" (Pedley 1987 
p2). The Profile also covers some information on facilities, 
services and resources relating to health care and health 
promotion in Milton Keynes. Of necessity, space has not 
allowed in-depth comment or analysis of specific health 
problems or activities. "The Profile is intended as a first 
step in providing annual reports on Health Trends in this 
District. These will continue the tradition of the former 
Medical Officer of Health reports and will include more in­
depth commentary of important health problems facing the 
District as well as a review of health trends updated each 
year".(Pedley 1987 p2).
2.2.2 POST-ACHESON
The Acheson report was published in January 1986. It
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recognised that trying to identify the principal health 
problems (such as the special needs and health care problems 
of ethnic minority communities) was a key step in maximising 
the return to be obtained from the resources available for 
health care. "We believe that it is important that the 
reports should be regular and have therefore recommended 
that they should be annual. They do not need to attempt to 
be all-embracing every year, however. We suggest that 
different topics should be highlighted from year to year, 
perhaps those where there is greatest opportunity to promote 
change. A major overview might be produced every 5 years 
linked to the strategic planning process" (Acheson 1988 
p21) . The report went on to suggest that "whilst central 
prescription is to be avoided, a minimum of guidance on the 
form and content of the report would be helpful, not only 
permitting comparisons between district to be made but 
removing some of the burden of design for all health 
authorities" (Acheson 1988, p 21).
Knowledge that annual reports were to be reintroduced as an 
important recommendations in the Acheson report was 
widespread well before the report was published. However, 
the detailed guidance on the production of such reports was 
not.
2.3 EALING 1988s A PICTURE OF HEALTH? THE CONTENTS
In what sense can a report be assessed as a product for 
organisational intelligence? Evaluating any report must 
include an assessment of how its content compares with its 
stated objectives. Reports can also be assessed in terms of
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their presentation and data. Where possible analyses need to 
examine how the contents can be used appropriately.
In assessing this document, the initial stance is to examine 
it from the perspective of the external observer in the 
period between the publication of the Acheson Report but 
before the publication of the NHS Review White Paper and the 
issuing of specific guidance on constructing Annual Reports.
In the introduction to this document it is stated that "This 
Annual Health report is intended as an independent 'Medical 
Officer of Health' type statement that can be used by all 
key agencies as a starting point for discussion on health 
priorities. It is important that the report is seen as 
'independent' for it to have credibility in an ever changing 
political/financial environment. Key agencies include Ealing 
Borough, Ealing Health Authority, the Family Practitioner 
Committee and, of course, the Community Health Council and 
voluntary agencies" (Briggs 1988).
The stated intentions of the document were not unusual. 
However, the explicit recognition of the importance of 
"credibility in an ever changing political/financial 
environment" is unusual. Nevertheless, the Ealing document, 
like many others is vague concerning the purposes for which 
the document is to be used. Whilst it is presented as a 
baseline "starting point" document that is "independent" it 
clearly has many other objectives and uses.
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The Annual Report contains 14 chapters, including the 
Foreword (chapter 1). The topics selected were:
2 Health Information Sources
3 Major Determinants of Health
4 Prevention
5 Public Health
6 Acute
7 AIDS
8 Child Health
9 Women's Health
10 The Health of Ethnic Minorities
11 The Health of the Elderly
12 Mental Health
13 Mental Handicap
14 Physically Disabled
There is no explanation given of how or why the chapters or 
the specific issues were selected. It is difficult therefore 
to make an external judgement on the appropriateness of 
their selection, except by way of linking them with known 
Government and Regional guidance and knowledge of general 
health issues; for example, the chapter on AIDS is unusual 
in that it refers to one specific health problem, but it is 
appropriate given the nature of the epidemic and the current 
uncertainty about how best to deal with it as a public 
health issue. A chapter on ethnic minorities is appropriate 
given the high proportion of ethnic minority groups within 
the District.
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2.4 EALING 1988: A PICTURE OF HEALTH? KNOWLEDGEWORK USES OF 
THE REPORT
Assuming that the report alone is available for assessment, 
what can be inferred about its possible use as a vehicle for 
storing knowledge that is relevant for policy analysis, or 
other aspects of knowledgework i.e. as a product for 
organisational intelligence? Here we will use the framework 
for assessing Organisational Intelligence already described.
2.4.1 SCANNING AND SELECTION
To provide a baseline of information, priorities and plans 
an Annual Report has to involve scanning the environment and 
diagnosing where there are potential problems or 
opportunities. The models of reality against which these 
selections are made are primarily historical models (Pounds 
1969) or those of the author and/or chief editor.
The historical models are based on trends in available data. 
For example, the central argument in the chapter on the 
Acute services is summarised in chapter 1 in the statement 
that "further acute bed reductions, in line with existing 
Regional Strategy, would appear inappropriate if 
comprehensive local acute care is to be provided". The 
chapter has several tables demonstrating the increases in 
workload since 1983, and the imbalance between the notional 
inpatient catchment population and that of the accident and 
emergency services.
The same chapter also shows how routinely available data can
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be used to scan the hospitalisation rates of residents in 
the 22 Local Authority Wards that comprise the District. 
Analysis of the figures for 1986 show that the there was an 
average crude hospitalisation rate of 65.0 per 1000 
residents, with a range between 84.2 and 39.9. The ward with 
the highest rate for local acute services as a whole was 
also picked out as having particularly high rates in four of 
the five main acute specialties.
The scanning of maps showing mortality rates was also given 
prominence. The data here was aggregated over a five year 
period. To help the selection process, the maps have been 
constructed using four shadings: two were for the the wards 
within one standard deviation above and below the mean, and 
the other for wards above or below one standard deviation. 
The following questions were posed in the text: given the
major causes of death, where within the Borough are death 
rates relatively high and low? Where might preventive health 
campaigns be most effectively targeted? Nevertheless, 
although the wards with high and low rates for selected 
causes were given, the recommendations in The Way Forward 
show no recognition of any opportunity to target preventive 
services on a geographic basis. Rather, the emphasis is on 
scanning the international environment for indicators of 
acceptable mortality levels.
For example target reductions in mortality from circulatory 
disease for Ealing's residents aged under 65 are given on 
the basis of targets set for Europe; the national "Look 
after your heart" campaign has also influenced the
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recommendations. Five of the seven recommendations do not 
make reference to these externally derived policy targets, 
and all the recommendations refer to the District as a 
whole. There is an unexplained mismatch here with the 
summary of the chapter on prevention, as summarised in 
chapter 1, which was that "Scope for prevention, 
particularly cardiovascular disease and cancer is high with 
major differences within the Borough requiring better 
targeting of effort by all agencies." The link between the 
policy based targets derived from scanning the literature 
and the geographical targets derived from scanning the 
intra-District variations in mortality has not been made.
2.4.2 DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING
As an artefact the report can tell us little about how it 
will be used in practice in the process of decision making 
and planning. It makes frequent reference to the need for 
inter-authority planning. In Chapter 1 it is stated that "to 
effect change, the health authority needs to work closely 
with many other agencies including the London Borough of 
Ealing, Family Practitioner Committee, voluntary 
organisations and the general public" and the first of the 
four recommendations made in this introductory chapter is 
that "there should be debate among the principal agencies on 
the recommendations put forward in this Annual Report with a 
view to agreement on their respective contributions to 
individual proposals". It is of course not possible to tell 
from a document whether these espoused theories became 
theories-in-use (Argyris and Schon 1978).
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It should be noted that although the "ever changing 
political/financial environment" is explicitly recognised, 
there is nevertheless a conflict of interest between the 
report of a Medical Officer of Health as an "independent" 
advisor to a Health Authority, and his role as a member of a 
District Management Board, although the latter role is not 
mentioned in the document. To some extent this conflict may 
be revealed in the first sentence of The Way Forward in 
Chapter 1, which states that "health will always be up 
against resource limitations so that targeting of available 
resources where they are most needed is essential". As a 
document it is properly seen as a snapshot of one part of a 
continuous planning process. Indeed, the fourth and last 
recommendation in The Way Forward in Chapter 1 is that "This 
Health Report to be updated annually by the District Medical 
Officer and made available to principal agencies involved to 
enable them to monitor 'their' contributions to the 
improvement of health of Ealing residents. Specific and 
measurable health targets will be further developed 
throughout 1988".
2.4.3 COMMUNICATIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
Each chapter has the same basic structure. Firstly, there is 
a "Situation Summary". For most chapters this is a two 
paragraph summary of the main body of text, but in some 
chapters, notably The Health of Ethnic Minorities, it 
extends for 2.5 pages, including one table and four pie 
charts. Secondly, the main text of each chapter is set down
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in a section entitled "Specific Issues". Selected issue are 
subdivided where necessary. Finally, each chapter contains a 
section entitled "The Way Forward".
In "The Way Forward" of each chapter, there are a series of 
recommendations, some of which reflect agreed District 
priorities, others give statements of intent, and others 
propose joint action with other agencies. There are marked 
variations in the relationship of these sections to the rest 
of the chapter. In the Public Health chapter, there are two 
recommendations that comprise 10% of the text; the Physical 
Disability chapter has 25% of its text in this section. 
Although these differences may reflect the proportionate 
amount of work to be done to develop services, there is no 
necessary connection.
The profile has a large number of graphs, maps and tables. 
Only the chapters on health information sources and physical 
disability are pure text. In contrast, the chapter on acute 
services has 16 maps, 9 tables and 1 graph. A particular 
feature of this profile is that most of the maps are at ward 
level, i.e. characteristic of a spatially disaggregated 
report.
The document has been produced on A4 paper, double sided, on 
using a desk top publisher; it is bound with a semi-hard 
cover containing the Authority logo and a map of the 
District.
Despite the efforts made to standardise on a common format
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and layout, the document has clearly been produced by a 
number of authors; although none are named in connection 
with a chapter, three people are named as contributing to 
the report in addition to the District Medical Officer. 
Apart from stylistic differences in grammar, sentence 
length, propensity to use tables etc., some chapters, e.g. 
Mental Handicap, include detailed references to academic and 
service literature, some focus on analyses of available 
quantitative information sources (e.g. Acute services) 
whilst others focus on descriptive accounts of service 
provision with an emphasis on policy development, e.g. the 
health of the elderly.
As a vehicle for communication, its overall presentational 
style is clear, but its appropriateness as a means of 
organising the knowledge available has to be assessed in the 
context of the lack of guidance on producing such documents. 
Its chapters contain a client group approach typical of many 
such reports. Whilst appropriate in a medically oriented 
report, a report produced for an Authority that is concerned 
with the purchasing of services for its resident 
population's health care may have a different emphasis, e.g. 
being more concerned with patient flows and referral 
patterns, costs and quality assurance.
2.4.4 MONITORING AND CONTROL
In that the Report sets targets and reports on levels of 
health need and service provision it provides a framework 
for monitoring progress on an annual basis. But it should be
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noted that the chapters in the report do not reflect service 
provision or management structures so much as a coherent and 
reasonably comprehensive overview of health needs. The needs 
of ethnic minorities have to be met by all types of service, 
but it will be difficult to assess how effectively this 
happens without improved information. The implication is 
that with more specific and measurable targets becoming 
available, Annual Reports will increasingly be used to 
monitor performance.
2.5 EALING 1988: A PICTURE OF HEALTH? KNOWLEDGEBASE USES OF 
THE REPORT
2.5.1 ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY
The report provides an "organisational map" that has been 
constructed by a collective effort, albeit one that was more 
restricted in its collective authorship than some others. 
The perspective of the map is focused on the health needs 
and service requirements of the resident population; the 
scale of the map is District or Ward based. But there are no 
accounts of the needs of particular spatially defined 
communities. As a map it describes the current position, but 
also gives "ways forward". Its use in terms of 
organisational memory is that it is available to all and can 
be used as a source document to provide information for 
smaller studies of specific issues. Its appropriateness as a 
means of constructing a dynamic organisational memory is 
doubtful; as a paper-based document it can document shifts 
in the state of the organisational maps from one year to 
another. It would be a more useful product in terms of 
enabling the organisation to enhance its collective
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knowledgebase if its data were primarily the by-product of a 
database with issues selected according to the agreed 
exceptions thrown up by collective examinations of 
performance indicators and supplemented by the judgement of 
experts on the critical issues (including those for which 
there is only qualitative evidence).
2.5.2 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
As far as the quantitative data contained in the report is 
concerned, the section on health information sources 
outlines the routinely available information and some of its 
shortcomings. A major problem is having to present a profile 
for 1988 based on 1981 demographic data. The data available 
on a yearly basis from OPCS has often been used to show 
trends over the preceding 5 years. As the report was 
published in January 1988, the most recent full year for 
which such demographic trend information was available from 
OPCS was 1986.
There are obvious gaps in information. For example, the 
chapter on Mental Handicap states that there is no clear 
estimate of the District's mentally disabled population, and 
gives a wide range of estimates (789 to 3,275). The lack of 
any proper census baseline data for ethnic minority groups 
is compounded by the lack of any standard service-wide 
production of information on ethnicity.
The data contained in the document has been culled from a 
variety of sources. There is no evidence that any of these
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sources are integrated prior to being included in the 
document. If this were the case, then it would be reasonable 
to expect that much data would have been included in 
standard tables for each client group, and probably shown as 
appendices. Instead, the document makes retrieval of 
information a matter of searching through the text.
The only evidence of any integration of data concerns the 
extensive use of maps. But there is no direct comparison of 
ward based hospitalisation and mortality data, or any 
analysis of covariation by social class etc. Although OPCS 
is a prime source of data, it is not evident that its 
information is available for the District, or the wards 
within it, in the form of standard database formats. Instead 
it comes piecemeal in a variety of different paper formats. 
Constructing the paper based Annual Report may be the 
closest these sources of data come to being integrated.
The corollary is that retrieving the data is time consuming, 
updating it is piecemeal, linking it in new ways to generate 
and test hypotheses is prohibitively costly for Districts 
without specialists devoted to the job.
2.6 SUMMARY
The report provides information appropriate for policy 
development and considerable data that could be used to 
guide the planning process (albeit integrated in the text 
rather than in accessible appendices). The document is a 
statement of what the organisation knows about the external 
environment of health need, and how this is, or is not,
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matched with service provision. It contains information 
relevant to the key components of knowledgework, but there 
are many gaps in the a available knowledgebase, and as a 
product of organisational intelligence it can be much 
improved. Since there is no account given in the Report on 
the time and man days taken to construct it and the 
production costs, no "value for money" assessment can be 
considered. Comparative analyses of Annual Reports will give 
an indication of how they can be assessed as products of 
organisational intelligence, but only given an understanding 
of the process of production can an appropriate overall 
assessment be made.
3 ORGANISATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE
ANNUAL REPORT
3.1 INTRODUCTION
There are a number of theoretical perspectives relevant to 
different aspects of this study. As a case study of work 
within a department it could be used to assess the 
appropriateness of the project-management and leadership 
styles. But, from the perspective of organisational 
intelligence its focus and framework is based on the 
approach of Sternberg's studies of human intelligence 
(Sternberg 1985). This has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 
3. It is a case study in how an organisation begins to 
develop a public health oriented Annual Report, rather than 
in how a well established process for producing such 
documents works.
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Participants 
In addition to myself, the participants were:
PB District Medical Officer
JR
WC
LJ Registrar in Community Medicine 
Systems Development Manager 
Information Assistant
JD Programmer
LJ Information Librarian
HH Secretary
CG Local Authority Social Services
3.2 CONTEXT
3.2.1 THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
PB began to talk about the need to produce such a District 
Profile in the summer of 1987, with the expectation was that 
it would be complete before Christmas. As Chairman of the 
Association of District Medical Officers, he knew of the 
general timetable of the Acheson report, and wanted the 
prestige of being the first to produce such a document. But, 
equally importantly, he had been promising such a document 
to the District Management Board and local planners for the 
preceding three years without producing anything 
substantial. The matter had almost become a standing joke, 
and he was losing face at DMB level.
PB was particularly keen to impress the District Health 
Authority members with the report, in part to bolster his 
own personal standing with them but also because he wanted 
to ensure that the report was accepted by them as advice 
made directly to them. This would enable him to be seen as
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giving "independent" advice, rather than having produced a 
document that had first to be agreed by, and then presented 
on behalf of, the District Management Board. PB also wanted 
a document with which he could use to "wave around" at 
meetings with the Local Authority, and FPC.
PB had been acutely aware of the both the "political 
sensitivities" of certain parts of the document and the need 
for specialist expertise in constructing it. For example, 
the AIDS chapter was largely written by a medical expert in 
the field who was not employed by the Health Authority, but 
whom PB knew and whose estimates of need were credible. The 
chapter documented a list of "current concerns", among which 
was the "worry that Ealing Hospital may be overwhelmed with 
AIDS cases thus obviating further potential for routine 
waiting list admissions". The second of four
recommendations in The Way Forward in Chapter 1 was that 
"high priority be given to every possible means of reducing 
the rate of increase in AIDS among Borough residents by co­
ordinated action among all agencies concerned. Additional 
Regional Health Authority funding is essential to this 
process." Dealing with the AIDS epidemic at present is 
clearly a political issue, with efforts to provide adequate 
services being dependent on securing external support. 
Documenting the case for this particular client group was 
appropriate; an equivalent in-depth analysis of food- 
poisoning might require a chapter in a report produced in 
1989 or 1990, but a chapter on diabetes, for example, would 
not be appropriate.
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The political context is most easily considered from the 
perspective of PB. But it is clear that he was only one 
actor whose goals shaped the process of producing the 
report.
3.2.2 GOALS
There were four principal authors (PB, PD, LJ, CG). LJ was a 
training to be a Specialist in Community Medicine, and CG 
was on secondment from the Local Authority to assist in 
matters of joint interest with the Health Authority. For LJ 
and CG the primary concern was to write adequate chapters on 
their area of concern. For PB and PD the writing of "good 
chapters" was secondary to their primary objectives of 
prestige and overall production respectively.
GR had the technical expertise on all the software packages 
used to produce the reports, and WC, JD and LJ were 
knowledgeable concerning the sources of available data. HH 
was a competent typist, though unused to word-processing 
software. For all these staff the types of goals were 
essentially administrative support.
In summary, the goals of the participants were different:
PB: prestige and political power
LJ: appropriate analysis, and training experience
PD: overall production
CG: appropriate analysis, and establishing joint working
GR: technical aspects of production
WC: collation of information, especially maps
235
JD: collation of information,
LJ: collation of information, especially textual
information 
HH: typing production
However, over the period of 6 weeks the production of the 
report became the primary mutual goal shared by all the 
participants. But this was supported by a secondary mutual 
goal of good public relations that would benefit the 
Directorate and the Information Unit once the report was 
produced. Indeed it is likely that the prospect of success 
in meeting the secondary goal was a necessary condition for 
achieving the primary production goal. Gearing the 
Directorate up to producing the report had taken PB several 
months. Not only were there hardware issues, but there were 
many other pressing work priorities. Eventually, producing 
the report completely dominated the work of the Directorate. 
Hardly any leave was taken by any of the participants during 
the Christmas and New Year period, nor could time be readily 
spared to attend departmental parties. Producing the report 
was done in a spirit of hard work and co-operation. It is 
another matter, however, as to whether producing a report in 
this concentrated way was appropriate.
Prior to the project starting it was clear that it 
conflicted with other work priorities. Indeed that explains 
in part why PB had been promising but not producing an 
Annual Report. Once it had started, however, the only 
conflicting issues were how some annual leave etc. could be
236
fitted in over the Christmas period. Everyone felt able to 
push all other work priorities "on the backburner", dealing 
with them if time permitted, but knowing that producing the 
Annual Report was the Directorate's key corporate objective. 
Normally regular monthly activity reports to the District 
Management Board, for example, were allowed to be suspended 
until the Report was produced.
3.3 KNOWLEDGEWORK PROCESSES OP PRODUCTION
3.3.1 ACCOUNTS OF ACTION
3.3.1.1 Introduction
As District Information Officer, working within the 
Directorate responsible for producing the Annual Report, I 
was a key participant in this project. I was able to observe 
most of the relevant types of interaction and discuss with 
all the participants how they felt and what issues were 
important for them. My accounts of the episode draw on these 
collective observations. But the analysis of the episode is 
then bedded into the framework for assessing organisational 
intelligence in the production of the Annual Report.
3.3.1.2 Episode: December 1987-January 1988
In summary the sequence of events was as follows:
September PB starts to mention the need to do the
Profile as high priority.
October Multi-user supermicro and laser jet printer
installed and word-processing package
installed. Datalink to the secretaries office
established using the telephone system.
November Desktop publishing package purchased and
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installed on existing micro. Scanjet
purchased and installed. Soon clear after
experimentation that existing micro was
too slow and had insufficient capacity to 
handle the volumes of data produced by 
scanned images. New machine purchased.
December New machine installed, and connected to the
multi-user micro and scanjet.
December 9: One days training in Desktop publishing.
December 16: First editorial Board meeting: PB,LJ,PD.
Discussed chapter headings and authors, 
format, and timetable.
December 17: Writing commenced 
December 20: First chapter produced 
December 23: Second chapter produced 
January 30: Document published.
The sequence of events was determined by PBs decision to 
produce the Report using a desktop publishing package and to 
use the hospital's printers. The decision to purchase a 
desktop publishing package, however, had a chain of
antecedent events. The most immediate was that it could not 
have been made without the ability to fund the necessary 
hardware to support it. It was fortuitous that the Authority 
appeared at that time to be heading for a capital 
underspend, and that there were additional funds available 
to purchase small items of capital equipment. The spending 
spree within the Directorate meant the purchase of an 
additional micro, laser jet printer and scanner, within a
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matter of weeks. More usually, the process of making a case, 
finding and agreeing the resources would take 3 to 4 months. 
However, the intention to develop an Office Automation 
facility using the departments multiuser supermicro had been 
the subject of proposals made in September. The intention 
was to demonstrate that this machine, which had become 
redundant on the demise of another project in August had to 
be demonstrably productive quickly. At that time multiuser 
word-processing was the key objective. Adding on the desktop 
processing facility was not then a matter of making a case 
de novo but extending the scope of the facilities already on 
offer, albeit on a different micro.
The decision to use the mental illness hospital's printshop 
rather than use external printers was made on the grounds of 
cost. It was relatively cheap - the materials cost of the
paper and printing being paid for by the Authority from its
Occupational Therapy budget, and the labour being supplied 
by patients as part of their occupational therapy. There was 
a very important corollary. Because a calm and ordered 
working atmosphere was important for therapeutic reasons in 
the printshop, the printshop manager stipulated that he was 
not able to produce a document given en bloc in a short time 
scale, as a commercial printshop would be able to do.
Instead, he very much preferred a regular supply of
chapters over as long a period as possible.
Although the training day in desktop publishing was given to 
GR, HH, WC, JD and LJ, it was clear that HH did not have the 
ability to pick it up quickly. As she was the only secretary
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this meant that this job would have to be performed by 
someone else. LJ only worked in the mornings. WC had the 
lead role in retrieving information for authors, and was 
most skilled in the use of the mapping package. GR was 
clearly the most able to master the package, and since two 
chapters were wanted by the printshop before Christmas, 
speed in production was essential.
It was agreed by the editorial group (PB, LJ, PD and CG) to 
concentrate on producing first the two chapters that 
required relatively straightforward updating of the previous 
Profile. These concerned the "Health Information Sources" 
and the "Major Determinants of Health". Fortunately these 
chapters could be allocated chapters numbers 2 and 3 (with 1 
being reserved for the Forward) without risk of proving to 
be in an undesirable sequence at a later stage.
The Health Information chapter was slightly edited and 
updated and typed by myself (into Wordstar), and agreed with 
PB and then given to GR to produce. This chapter contained 
straight text only. The stylesheet to be used contained 
three levels of heading and types of indent bullets. 
Producing the text meant loading the prepared text into 
Ventura. It soon became clear that inserting any print 
controls other than a simple end of paragraph return meant 
that editing had to be carried out in Ventura. Once the 
first chapter had been produced under Ventura, which took 
two days and little difficulty, and had been agreed by PB, 
it was sent to the printshop in the knowledge that the
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documents style of presentation was now set.
The next chapter was a different proposition. It contained 
graphs, maps and tables. The text had to be loaded in to 
Ventura first, and then the images inserted. There were 
judgements to be made for each image scanned about the scale 
and location on the page, and its relationship with the 
text. It also became clear at this stage why it was 
necessary to insist on absolutely minimal changes to the 
text after it had been loaded into Ventura, since 
rearrangements were quite likely to have drastic effects on 
the relative location of the scanned images.
The major problem turned out to be connected with Ventura's 
inability to handle tables in the same way as a 
word-processing package. It took two days to produce the 
first simple table. The manuals were not helpful on this 
point, and calls to the suppliers did not simplify matters. 
There were no other users of Ventura known to any of the 
participants. It was simply a case of learning by 
experimentation and doing. The second chapter took a week to 
produce and was rushed off on Christmas Eve. This meant 
that, although no work would be done in the printshop 
between Christmas and New Year, a chapter was ready for work 
immediately thereafter. GR took leave between Christmas and 
New Year, so during this period work was focused on 
producing the text, tables and maps for further chapters.
After the New Year, the remaining chapters were produced by 
each author, typed onto the wordprocessor, and given to PB
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for editing. Once agreed, the text was then loaded into 
Ventura and the appropriate tables, maps and graphs scanned 
and loaded in. The results were returned to the author for 
checking and then to PB for "minor amendments". Once the 
final version had been produced they were taken to the 
printshop. The folders for the report arrived on January 
25th and the last chapter delivered just before the deadline 
of 26th January. The first run of reports was available on 
January 30th.
A series of meetings had been arranged by PB at which he 
discussed the report with the Joint Care Planning Team, 
District Management Board, Community Health Council and 
District Medical Advisory Committee. Copies were sent to all 
Districts in the North West Thames Region, local MPs, the 
DHSS and the local press. A summary of the document, 
comprising of the Situation Summary and The Way Forward from 
each chapter, was compiled and made available to interested 
parties, as were copies of the complete document.
3.3.2 SCANNING AND SELECTION
Here the concern is with the process of scanning the 
environment and selecting appropriately the internal 
knowledgework that was needed. The scanning of the 
environment in this case study corresponds closely to the 
"intelligence" phase in Simon's (1960) model; the external 
environment was continually being searched by PB for 
potential opportunities to "put Ealing on the map".
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As far as the selection of what was wanted to realise these 
opportunities was concerned, the basic problem was that the 
nature of the task was difficult to determine. There was 
access to some reports done by six other Health Authorities, 
as mentioned earlier, but these had been constructed in very 
different ways and had very different contents. This search 
of the problem space was difficult to conduct. No thought 
was given to reviewing the old Medical Officer of Health 
Reports. This was because it was assumed that there was no 
central index to them stored anywhere and that no content 
analysis had been made of them that could be readily 
retrieved: they were constructed well before the advent of 
automatic text retrieval systems. Given that there was no 
hard data readily available, it should be noted that there 
was no attempt made to retrieve knowledge from ex-MoHs. 
Whatever expertise they had had been lost to the NHS, or at 
least to Ealing. Producing an "Acheson" style report was a 
novel task for all the participants.
However, the Directorate had produced documents in the three 
preceding years which gave simple summaries of available 
statistical information. PD and PB, however, were the only 
ones left who had been involved in these earlier 
productions. Others who had been involved in producing them 
had left, and there was no database established on which to 
build a new report. None of them had taken more than five 
manweeks to compile, and they were only disseminated on 
demand within the District.
Not only were there no historical models readily available,
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but there were no extraorganisational models (prior to the 
publication of the Acheson Report) in which the expectations 
of professional organisations, such as the Faculty of 
Community Medicine or the DHSS, could be deduced. The 
expectations of potential customers or users of the profile 
were unknown. Although previous "profiles" or "digests" had 
been produced, no systematic evaluation of their use had 
been undertaken. There had been little feedback, except an 
acknowledgement of the desirability of a "proper" profile 
that "pulled it all together".
The need for a document that could be used by all health 
agencies as a starting point for discussion on health 
priorities was clear, and stated in its "forward". The 
presentational style had to be simple, attractive yet 
comprehensive. The design decisions were made by PB and PD, 
with advice from WC on the graphics and maps that could be 
produced and from GR on the layout possibilities of Ventura.
Particular emphasis was given to presenting information 
that could give an indication of the spatial aspects of the 
health status and service provision of the population. The 
objective being to enable quick "scans" of the District to 
be made and thereby enable areas of concern to be 
"diagnosed".
3.3.3 DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING
3.3.3.1 Text
Scanning and diagnosis of the problem to be solved is the
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first of the metacomponents in Sternberg's model. 
Thereafter, there are a number of different types of 
decision to be taken. In the context of this case study, 
this meant decision-making and planning was needed to 
produce the text, and also to organise the manpower and 
system aspects of production.
Some profiles have been written by twenty or so people 
working throughout the organisation. The benefits of this 
approach include reducing the volume of work required of 
individuals whilst being able to specialise on their 
particular individual skills. Unless a housestyle has been 
agreed, a disbenefit is that the document lacks coherence 
and continuity.
The approach taken in Ealing was for PB, PD, and LJ, all of 
whom worked in the Directorate to undertake three chapters 
each. But the chapters concerning AIDS was largely written 
by an external expert, and the chapters on the health of the 
elderly, mental handicap and the physically disabled were 
written by CG, who was contracted from her job with the 
Local Authority to write these chapters as there was not the 
information or expertise readily available and able to 
produce them in a period of three weeks over the Christmas 
and New Year period.
Were these "lower order components" appropriately selected 
by PB? Given the problem of scheduling the effort, he had 
little choice. There was no time to spend briefing a large 
number of individual experts; therefore it was critical that
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the authors selected were able to produce appropriate text 
at high speed for three chapters.
Each author had to produce text that summarised the 
situation, described and analysed specific issues, and gave 
a concluding "way forward". Within those basic parameters, 
there was considerable freedom. Some chapters could be 
produced essentially by updating those done in the previous 
year (e.g. Health Information Sources, Major Determinants of 
Health). Others were written de novo, e.g. AIDS, Acute, 
Health of the Elderly. PB, as editor, decided on the balance 
given to the issues discussed in each chapter.
The selection of a single representation or organisation for 
the information facilitated the work for authors. It 
corresponded reasonably closely with the standard format for 
papers produced within the Authority (key points, main 
issues subdivided and with little discussion, 
recommendations and no references) . For PB, LJ and PD this 
was familiar, but CG clearly wrote in a different style, and 
PB had to spend a considerable amount of time editing her 
chapters. Her more discursive and heavily referenced 
chapters remained distinctive.
PB took drafts of the chapters to certain "key individuals" 
to ensure that he "had their backing". He believed that were 
he to permit the decisions about content to be made by too 
many other interested parties, the document would no longer 
be perceived as being one he and his department could take
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credit for producing. It was widespread consultation in 
terms of the implications of the output of the Annual Report 
rather than on input to the document that was planned.
3.3.3.2 Production
What is the context in which to assess the decisions and 
plans that were made? Firstly, it has been already made 
clear that the problem of constructing a report was a 
"novel" one for the participants. There were no performance 
programs to draw on above the level of those embedded in 
typing skills and computer software.
The overall production process was managed by PD. The key 
decisions here were how to schedule the writing of pieces, 
their typing, editing, rewriting/retyping, transfer to 
desktop publishing, preparation of tables, maps and their 
scanning and combination in text within the desktop 
publishing package, printing, reediting, redrafting, 
rescanning etc. until final agreed proofs could be sent to 
the printers. To complicate matters the Christmas holiday 
period came in the middle of the process, and the print shop 
closed down for ten days.
The selection of the people to be involved in the production 
process was not problematic. Everyone in the Directorate was 
available. The main issues focused on ensuring that the 
tasks requiring new skills that needed to be learnt were 
allocated to the most appropriate people. This involved 
deciding the order in which the various tasks had to be 
performed, concentrating on those that could only be
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performed serially. The key problem in the case study, as 
far as resource management was concerned turned out to be 
how to schedule the production of chapters to produce a 
smooth flow that could be handled as a matter of routine by 
the mental illness hospital's print shop. But, this was only 
because of the short timescale imposed on the project.
Given this, it may have been inappropriate to leave the 
actual construction process to begin in December when 
completion was expected by the end of January. It meant that 
there was a very limited search of the alternatives 
available, and that an intense amount of knowledgework was 
required of all the participants during a short period to 
produce a document that was "satisfactory". Alternatively, 
given that it was a novel experience for all concerned, and 
that each person had many other activities and goals, it may 
have been entirely appropriate to focus effort solely on 
this one issue. GR, for example, spent his time acting as 
the compositor on Ventura. As a skilled programmer, he was 
only prepared to perform this role for a specified purpose 
and for a limited duration. Had he been unwilling to do 
this, there was noone else who had the capability to acquire 
the necessary proficiency in this new skill in the time 
available.
The work of WC and JD in producing the graphs, tables and 
maps for each chapter had to be subdivided as WC was much 
more skilled in using the mapping package, and also 
carefully synchronised with the efforts of the authors so
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that text and graphics were ready simultaneously. However, 
some leeway could be provided if the graphics were prepared 
earlier than needed.
As far as PDs role as production co-ordinator was concerned, 
the majority of time was spent making sure GR was supplied 
with material and helping in deciding on the page layouts. 
If GR had not been able to work at near maximum capacity for 
a four week period the report would not have been completed 
by the end of January, or at least, what was produced would 
not have looked as professionally produced and the number of 
graphics, in particular the tables, included would have been 
severely curtailed.
In these production processes we can see that there are 
components processes of intelligence that are concerned with 
selecting lower order components, selecting representations 
of organisation for information, selecting strategies for 
combining lower order components, and allocating attentional 
resources.
3.3.3.3 Performance Components1 and Knowledge Acquisition 
To perform each of these tasks the requirements had to be 
understood. The authors had to understand what was required 
of them. PB discussed his perception of the key points that 
needed emphasis with each author. PD had to make sure that 
the typist HH knew what to do when given text, that WC, JD 
and LJ knew what the authors required of them. It was then 
the task of each person to decide how these instructions 
could be compared with what they already knew and what they
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needed to find out and/or do. Their responses were part of 
the overall problem solution. Each individual was expected 
to keep track of what they had already done, and respond to 
feedback from PB (for text) and PD (for production).
Of the many tasks necessary to complete the report, there 
were some that involved gaining new practical knowledge and 
expertise. GR, for example had to sift out the relevant 
instructions from the Ventura manuals and acquire new 
knowledge in desk-top publishing. His facility in doing this 
was aided by his previous experience in acquiring knowledge 
of new software packages; he "knew" what sorts of 
instructions were necessary, and which could be ignored (for 
the moment). These skills in selective comparison were also 
needed by the authors as they grappled with the task of 
constructing their chapters.
New knowledge was acquired (for storage in the document) 
from a variety of sources. In writing the chapter on the 
Acute services, for example, PB was concerned that the high 
proportion of emergency workload was adequately 
demonstrated. A new dimension to this problem was 
constructed when I recalled that it would be possible to use 
some data that the Region had available in a slightly new 
way so that some maps showing the distribution by Local 
Authority ward of immediate and non-immediate admissions 
could be produced.
But there was a cost in acquiring new knowledge. Many
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desirable items of data, e.g. % smoking, would cost too much 
and take too long to acquire.
3.3.4 COMMUNICATIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
3.3.4.1 Communications
As part of the production process there were communications 
with outside organisations, such as OPCS, the Regional 
Health Authority and the Local Authority, but this was done 
essentially to extract particular data items rather than 
confer on content and presentation.
People of many different backgrounds and professions were to 
receive the profile. It had to be comprehensible to student 
nurses, people with no knowledge of Ealing, and unit 
managers within the District. It was also acknowledged that 
probably noone would read the document from cover to cover. 
Certain chapters would be read in detail, and others 
skimmed. Situation summaries and concluding statements of 
"the way forward" were included to help in this respect. 
They were also included in a separate document that 
summarised the Profile. The titles and order of the chapters 
was discussed in the early stages of the project in the 
knowledge that this was an essential part of effective 
communication.
The layout of the text and the graphics was not 
prespecified, except in the sense that there was an agreed 
font and stylesheet. Rather, it developed as each chapter 
was assembled on the screen. With a large number of 
illustrations, balancing their size and location on the page
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with the placing of the text relevant to them was the main 
role of JR. This organisation of knowledge rested on a 
series of performance programs that had to be developed; in 
March and Simons' (1958) terms this was "productive" problem 
solving involving new solutions.
3.3.4.2 Performance programs
Few of the performance programs needed were readily to hand. 
There were the scripts of other profiles produced within the 
District, but these were only relevant as a guide to the 
contents of two chapters. There were also the scripts of 
other profiles that had been accumulated in an ad hoc 
fashion from other District over the preceding 18 months. 
However, these were not used in any systematic way as a 
basis for "how to construct" the profile.
Deciding on the common format for the chapters was done by 
selecting from among the "stylesheet" settings allowed 
within the Desk top publishing package. A major difficulty 
was to establish that the desk top publishing package should 
not be used as a word-processor but rather to take an error 
free document and "print" it. This meant that the program 
that had been established at the outset to set fonts and tab 
settings etc. had to be used throughout, and could not be 
readily altered.
Another performance program needed was typing skills. This 
would not normally be expected to be a major problem, but 
the word-processing system being used had not long been
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installed and was new to HH. Also some small (but novel and 
therefore time-consuming) programs needed to be written to 
transfer it from the system direct to the desk-top 
publishing machine.
For WC the using the mapping package was also a skill that 
had to be learnt in a short time. Once the ten or so maps 
had been produced, however, she became adept at using the 
package and able to spend time on other tasks. Both WC and 
JD were familiar with the spreadsheet and associated 
graphics package and able to produce graphs with little 
difficulty.
LJ and WC retrieved text based data from the library system, 
but for many items requested, special searches had to be 
made of what was in stock, because the material had not been 
appropriately indexed, or requests made to other sources, 
e.g. OPCS, DHSS.
The Desk-top publishing package (Ventura) was purchased just 
before production began on the profile. Noone was familiar 
with such a package. A days demonstration by the suppliers 
was provided which was attended by JR, HH, WC and JD. It was 
clear that JR was quickly able to understand the basic 
concepts, and also was most prepared to experiment. HH felt 
uncomfortable with it. Because of his ability and also 
because it needed to be linked with a scanning device and 
experiments made on scanning in maps and diagrams, JR became 
skilled in its use.
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The hospital's use of a printing workshop as occupational 
therapy for its psychiatric patients had a standard set of 
performance programs that could not be rushed or altered 
without jeopardising the ability of the patients to perform 
the routine collating tasks.
3.3.5 MONITORING AND CONTROL
An obvious aspect of monitoring and control of text was 
proof reading. One word processing system had an automatic 
spellchecker which saved time, but HH did not use it as a 
matter of routine. But the major proofreading work was done 
by PB, who was adept at spotting the typographic errors that 
authors and typists had overlooked.
From 14 to 18 December, effectively the first full-time week 
of the project, there was considerable interaction between 
data processors (GR,WC, and JD) and the departmental text 
producers (PD, PB and LJ) to decide on the most appropriate 
stylesheet for Ventura (heading sizes, indents, bullet point 
types etc.) and for map and graph design (scale, title, 
mapping intervals etc.). This was done by the data 
processors giving the text producers three text layout 
options to choose between. One was selected, and minor 
modifications made. A further key issue was chapter 
numbering. There was considerable debate concerning whether 
the Health Information Sources chapter should come at the 
beginning, or as an appendix at the end. It was retained as 
a chapter because it raised important issues about links 
with the Local Authority concerning local population
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projections which PB did not want "lost" in an appendix. 
There was also discussion about whether an Acute services 
chapter should be included, and if so where. Once these 
issues had been decided the numbering was set and could not 
be changed.
At the beginning of the project I drew up a detailed 
programme with target dates when chapters needed to be 
drafted, edited and finally produced by. This entailed 
agreeing priorities with the authors that took account of 
the volume of work for the data processors. This program 
gave a framework for monitoring and control of the process.
The sequence of events has already been outlined. After the 
first few chapters had been produced, the initial programme 
was abandoned as progress on certain chapters and delays on 
others developed. However, because there were now agreed 
standards and numbering for each chapter, they could be 
produced in any sequence. The critical factor was to ensure 
a steady supply of chapters to the printers. This meant that 
effort was focused on the long and/or complex chapters (e.g. 
Acute) with the shorter and/or simpler chapters (e.g. Public 
Health) being worked on in parallel to be produced at 
relatively short notice when needed to fill a gap in the 
production line. An important corollary of the restricted 
timetable for production was that there was little 
opportunity for considered evaluation of issues which 
occurred in different chapters and consequent revisions.
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The editorial and production management roles provided 
authors and data producers with feedback on their 
performance. In assessing how this was done, and on how 
roles were assigned and managed it should be noted that the 
Directorate had not worked together on one major project 
before. The overall task of producing the report was clearly 
defined, but the nature of the task required both creativity 
and routine production skills (whilst dealing with some 
complex technical problems). It also had to be completed in 
a very short timescale, but to a standard, both in 
presentation and content, that would gain PB prestige and be 
good public relations for the department.
Both PB and PD were in strong managerial positions vis a vis 
the authors and data producers respectively. PBs leadership 
style was to be directive in terms of setting the objectives 
of producing and completing the chapters and the report as a 
whole. He was certainly able to see the particulars of a 
text-related situation in relation to the overall context. 
He was concerned that PDs style needed to be supportive of 
the data producers. This balance between the directive and 
supportive styles proved appropriate in this context: the
objectives were achieved in the timescales set, but the 
quality of the content could have been improved (see Section 
2) .
3.4 KNOWLEDGEBASES
3.4.1 PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE
There were several types of practical knowledge drawn on in 
producing the profile. There was no discussion, for example,
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as to how the typing was to be done since HH was a skilled 
typist. However, she had to learn not to include certain 
control sequences, such as underlining in typing text before 
sending it to the Desk Top Publisher.
The skills of the authors of each chapter were not 
explicitly examined. They were asked to do each chapter 
since, given the parameters of format and agreed key issues 
for inclusion, PB knew they knew "how to go on" and produce 
the relevant text. He knew that CG had the necessary 
experience of voluntary organisations and local authority 
services, and assumed that her postgraduate training would 
enable her to produce well argued reports. In fact, the 
quantity and quality of research in her chapters became an 
issue since they were noticeably greater than the other 
chapters. Since no chapter authorship was to be 
acknowledged, a great deal of editing and paring down of her 
contributions had to be done since there was no time, and 
often no equivalent information, to bring the other chapters 
up to her standard. The practical knowledge of the other 
authors was no less, but was attuned to more to the dominant 
health authority housestyle of report production. The 
expertise of GR in software packages, hardware and machine 
communications was a necessary condition for success in the 
time available.
3.4.2 ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY
The organisation, or rather the Directorate, had some memory 
of what had been done in the preceding three years. But this
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was only to the extent that the documents existed. With the 
exception of PD, noone had had any experience of how to 
construct a profile. There were no established procedures, 
rules or routes to access relevant data. What did exist was 
contained in the Management Information Library, but it was 
not indexed specifically for the purpose of producing a 
profile. It was held under general headings: e.g.
"population". There were no procedures for updating it in 
such a way that the information needed for the purpose of 
producing a profile were readily to hand since the 
parameters required were not known.
3.4.3 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
The Annual Report is concerned with the state of the Public 
Health. The sources of data on this topic were derived from 
the following sources:-
1 Selected 1981 OPCS population data held in a database 
structured on the basis of Enumeration Districts and 
Local Authority Wards and linked to a mapping package.
2 Data from the DHSS Health Service Indicators package, 
stored on the HSI database.
3 OPCS Vital Statistics data (births and deaths) provided 
on paper for each Local Authority Ward.
4 Regional Health Authority data (provided on paper) 
concerning the patient flows (by specialty on discharge 
by hospital) for Ealing residents by L A Ward.
5 OPCS provided data in the form of paper based reports 
(e.g. notifications of infectious diseases, Abortion 
statistics etc.) for the District as a whole.
6 Data extracted on paper from the Patient Administration
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System in the Acute and Mental Illness Hospital.
7 Data extracted on paper from Registers (e.g. Cancer and
Mental Handicap).
8 Data from national surveys (e.g. General Household
Survey).
9 Data from local surveys (e.g. needs of the disabled).
Only sources 1 and 2 contained data that was already in a 
database that could be readily accessed locally. By the end 
of the production process sources 3 and 4 had been 
transferred to a local database and combined with 1. Data 
from the sources 5 and 6 were routinely filed in the 
Management Information Library. But sources 7,8 and 9 were 
only accessed for the purposes of producing the Annual 
Report, and were not produced in a format which readily be 
loaded onto a local database. There were many other types of 
data that were desirable but unavailable (either because 
they are not collected or because the task of retrieving 
them would have taken too long).
One of the beneficial by-products of producing the Annual 
Report was that it encouraged the development and linkage of 
these sources of data. For the first time it became possible 
to extract mortality and hospitalisation rates for different 
wards as a matter of routine, rather than as a unique 
exercise. Nevertheless, the process of automatisation 
remains embryonic.
There was no computerised database established that could be
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used specifically for this purpose. Information held on 
computers at the Region was retrieved, by making requests 
for Hospital Activity Analysis reports to be run at the 
Region, but it was only available in hard copy and the 
relevant aspects had to be rekeyed to enable a series of 
hospital utilisation maps to be produced. However, there was 
a database of demographic data for each Enumeration District 
that was linked to a mapping package, and via a postcode­
Enumeration District lookup table could hold postcode 
indexed downloads from patient-based systems. There was no 
access to databases held by the Family Practitioner 
Committee or Local Authority to add or crosscheck such 
demographic data. Without such access health profiles are of 
limited operational value, though as vehicles for broader- 
brush long term planning they suffice. Post-Review, accurate 
population profiles and assessments of health needs become a 
necessity for letting and monitoring contracts for a 
resident population (see Chapter 9).
4 ASSESSMENTS OF THE ANNUAL REPORT CASE STUDY
4.1 PRODUCT
The assessment of the Annual Report as a product for 
organisational intelligence has been the subject of Section 
2 .
4.2 CONTEXT
As a political document, the report was intended to select 
and shape the real world environments of policy development. 
Because it was a new development it did not have to be 
adapted to the expectations of DMB or Authority members as
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to what an Annual Report should contain. This problem will 
face succeeding versions. In fact an unintended by-product 
was that it was realised that producing a report in 
January/February would enable it to influence the planning 
guidelines that were normally compiled in April. That this 
was not a primary objective is clear from the lack of 
reference to such guidelines in the document. Nevertheless 
it was intended that they would be included next time round.
A further contextual aspect of intelligence concerns the 
extent to which PB was able to use the document to ensure he 
"fitted" better into his political environment. For example, 
he was concerned to have a chapter on Mental Health that 
would enable him to divert criticism from that unit that he 
did not recognise their problems and achievements.
The Report did indeed give PB some prestige, for example 
within his peer group of the Association of District Medical 
Officers, in that it was the first report to be published 
after (indeed in the same month as) the Acheson report. A 
quote from the Acheson report was included on the title 
page. PBs intention was that it be used as a "model for all 
other authorities to use". It also was perceived by one DMB 
member as being "something useful at last", and it succeeded 
in impressing the Local Authority and Community Health 
Council as being a helpful document.
261
4.3.1 NOVELTY
Assessing organisational intelligence in the production of 
an Annual Report has involved considering the external 
political and psychological context and the internal 
component processes of production. Sternberg (1985) proposes 
that a task measures "intelligence" in part as a function of 
the extent to which it requires either or both of two 
skills: the ability to deal with novel kinds of tasks and 
situations, and the ability to automatise the processing of 
information. Study of the context and components of 
intelligence helps to explain the response to novelty or 
automatisation of information processing.
The process of producing an Annual Report was essentially a 
novel one, but it was also the first of what should become 
an annual exercise. Assessments in the future would have to 
take account of the experience of the District in producing 
such reports before assessing performance and outcome (the 
Report itself) in any one year. Ealing's approach to 
producing its first Acheson-type Annual Report was to 
centralise the text production within the Directorate of 
Patient Care and to concentrate the process into a period of 
5 weeks.
How appropriate, then, was the response to this novel 
problem? The approach adopted was to treat the production of 
an Annual Report in the same way that any other piece of 
work was treated. Its novelty was minimised. As discussed 
earlier, no thorough search was conducted of what had been
4.3 EXPERIENCE
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produced elsewhere. Even if this had been done, there would 
have been no guidance on the resources (time and mandays) to 
produce these reports. There was no Directorate meeting 
called to discuss how everyone was going to respond to this 
new situation and to allow anxieties about the lack of 
relevant knowledge, technology, skills etc. to be surfaced. 
The Directorate met at most twice a year as an entity. This 
was in part because its business was fairly clearly 
differentiated into information/computing issues and of 
medical issues. How to deal with the novelty of the Annual 
Report project as a whole-Directorate issue was not 
discussed by the whole Directorate. "As usual", the main 
task was identified by PB, discussed with the two senior 
managers (LJ on the medical side and PD on the Information 
and Computing). PD then discussed with the remainder of the 
staff how the production aspects could be tackled. This was 
done on an issue by issue basis when necessary. In part this 
was because the full scope of the production problems could 
not be appreciated until the project was nearly complete; 
for example, on the last day of production work (27 January) 
with the last map left to scan the hard disk became full, 
and the printshop then came within 100 pages of running out 
of paper.
The essential point is that the organisation dealt with this 
novel situation by decomposing the problem into familiar 
sub-tasks. Production management issues were dealt with by 
PD and editorial text production issues by PB.
263
It is clear from section 4.3.4.2. that there were a very 
limited number of performance programs readily available. 
Those that were included
- typing skills
- writing skills in the housestyle (except CG)
- spreadsheet and graphics production.
However, the participants had a good deal of relevant 
'practical knowledge' of their own roles in the 
organisation. For noone, with the exception of CG, was 
trying to learn how the Directorate worked during the 
production process an additional "novelty". The management 
roles and relationships were already in place.
A central feature of both PB and PDs approach to their roles 
was that it was not just guidance on what needed doing, but 
encouragement and praise. In a novel situation for all the 
actors it was important to foster the creation of new 
skills. The freedom to experiment with new ways of doing 
things (e.g. to speed up map production by developing macro 
programs) to achieve objectives was encouraged. Because 
everyone was learning new skills there was a sense of 
collective excitement and interest. Also, noone could claim 
unchallengeable knowledge of what and how things should be 
done.
During the course of the project a large number of 
performance programs were constructed. GR learnt how to use 
Ventura, scan in images and produce good quality output. The 
first chapter (pure text took two days to produce. Three
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weeks later the Acute chapter, which was twice as long and 
contained over 30 maps and graphs etc. was produced in the 
same amount of time). WC and JD produced graphs and maps as 
a matter of routine by the end of the project when at its 
start they needed advice, guidance and encouragement from PD 
on each one. After 10 days or so HH was able to remember as 
a matter of routine not to include carriage returns and 
underlines in her word-processing prior to loading into 
Ventura.
But, more importantly, the Directorate developed the 
experience of what performance programs were needed, and how 
they could be combined and refined, to produce an Annual 
Report. There is now stored in the Directorate's 
knowledgebase of what is entailed, in terms of knowledgework 
and data to produce an Annual Report. Assessing 
organisational intelligence in the production of the next 
Annual Report must take this knowledge as a starting point. 
As experience of this sort of task increases, the task 
becomes a more apt measure of automatisation skills.
4.3.2 AUTOMATISATION
4.3.2.1 Background
It is relevant to note the Acheson report findings, referred 
to in Section 1.2, that Medical Officers of Health had found 
the production of Annual Reports a "chore". It had become a 
routinised activity, but one that proved time consuming.
The linkage between novelty and boredom, in an information-
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processing view of intelligence, has to do with the nature 
of automatisation. At the level of the individual, in 
domains where one has little expertise, (ie events or 
problems are novel, or memory of previous events is 
unavailable), processing is centralised and under conscious 
direction. As expertise develops, greater and greater 
proportions of processing are transferred to (or packed 
into) a given local processing system. This reduces the 
amount of attention that has to be directed to the problem 
by the global system freeing the "expert" to direct global 
processing resources to new or "interesting" situations.
For the production of an Annual Report to have become a
"chore of questionable value" (Acheson 1988 p20), we may
suggest that the Medical Officer of Health had been unable 
to pack what had been learnt about how to produce them into 
their local support systems and/or had been unable to 
retrieve usable and appropriate information from them. 
Instead the Medical Officer of Health had had to allocate 
his/her resources to dealing with what was not a novel 
situation but a stale paper-based "statistical exercise" in 
a way that tied up their expertise and prevented it being 
used to deal with many other issues and situations.
Prospectively if such Reports build on dynamic
knowledgebases using decision-procedures or rules developed 
elsewhere, or locally, to scan the data for important issues 
then they should remain as a stimulating a task as when 
first performed.
Automatisation depends on having the necessary resources
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available. In manpower terms, there are wide variations in 
staffing levels in Public Health in different Health 
Authorities. The Acheson report found ratios of public 
health doctors per 1 million varied in 1986 from 8.1 per 
million to 15.3 per million. This disguises the even larger 
variations at district level from those with no Directors of 
Public Health in post to those with 1 DPH and 1 Specialist 
in Community Medicine, and finally those with well 
established departments with a variety of support staff. 
Ealing's baseline review type report involved 150 mandavs. 
of which 50 were spent on writing and editing, and 100 in 
data retrieval, text preparation and page layout - this work 
being done by the Information and Computing Unit. The 
Directorate was relatively well resourced in terms of 
manpower and hardware and software to produce such a 
baseline report, and in doing so it laid the basis for 
further automatisation.
4.3.1.2 Component Processes of Text Production 
What are the features of the process at Ealing that were 
automatised as a result of the process of process of 
producing an Annual Report? On the text production aspect, 
PB ensured that his diagnosis of what the chapters should be 
and the main points to be included in them was reflected in 
the final report. In his editorial role he therefore 
monitored and controlled the content of the texts. As he did 
not delegate, the whole editing process was serial in 
nature, although text production was done in parallel by the 
authors.
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The decentralised approach to constructing an Annual Report 
is clearly one way to increase the level of automatisation 
from the perspective of the executive director. Guidance is 
given to authors selected throughout the organisation to 
report on their perspectives and the results collated, a 
brief summary overview is written by the director in charge 
and the report has been produced. The suggestion in the 
Acheson report that Annual Reports might focus on different 
key areas each year with a comprehensive baseline review 
every five years is an approach that avoids the charge that 
reports can become repetitive and dull, and is one that 
could be handled either in a centralised or decentralised 
way.
Nevertheless, it is likely that Directors of Public Health, 
anxious to retain their status and/or unable to delegate the 
text production will not decentralise (or automatise) the 
text production process entirely. The process of 
automatisation, then, also becomes focused on the 
knowledgebases used.
4.3.1.3 Automatisation of Knowledgebases 
Practical Knowledge and Expertise 
The participants in the project developed a variety of 
performance programs as already discussed. As these programs 
developed so there was more readily available an automatic 
and sometimes subconscious response to a problem, or one 
which was adopted as a matter of course. The individuals 
learnt a great deal. From the perspective of human
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intelligence, their individual responses to the tasks set 
could have been assessed; but given the concern with 
organisational intelligence what is more relevant is what is 
placed in the Organisational Memory.
Organisational Memory 
A test of organisational intelligence from the perspective 
of automatisation comes when the exercise is repeated. Is 
knowledge about what needs to be done readily available; 
does it reflect what was learnt from the previous episode; 
do people know 'how to go on' given a particular role or do 
they have to create an entirely new and personal response? 
What is it that is 'remembered' about what has been done? In 
the case of an Annual Report exercise, one major component 
of Organisational Memory is the report itself. From it can 
be reconstructed the data sources required for an updated 
version of the same product (provided it is clear what those 
sources of data are). From this perspective the practice of 
quoting sources for all numeric data is "standard practice", 
but the names of those with whom particular issues have been 
discussed is not.
The Ealing document, like those produced elsewhere, does not 
record the resources that went into compiling it. No 
appendix, for example, is given detailing the planned and 
actual timetable, the method of approach, the resources 
involved in mandays and costs, the production costs, the 
problems encountered etc. Were these details recorded as a 
matter of routine then Annual Reports could be analysed on a
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more comparative basis.
The memory of what is entailed in producing an Annual Report 
is retained in the minds of the individuals who constructed 
it (albeit in a dynamic human memory in which knowledge can 
be forgotten, restructured, reinterpreted etc.). These 
memories will be available to those individuals, but when 
they leave the organisation the memories go with them. What 
may be retained in the Organisational Memory, however, is a 
collective memory of "what it was like".
Information Systems 
Retrieving relevant information from a database requires a 
high level of automatisation. At present the component data 
sources are varied, produce data in different formats for 
different time periods and at different times. Establishing 
a database to hold the data is therefore a complex problem. 
But even when such databases become available, a key issue 
will be how to use them efficiently.
To optimally automatise the production of Annual Reports 
will require Districts to hold maximum detail (assuming data 
storage costs are relatively insignificant) at minimum data 
entry cost (i.e. direct data entry rather than rekeying), 
but be able to develop and examine key indicators (to be 
reported on an exception basis or selected from the decision 
procedures of "experts" embedded in an expert system) or 
follow up lines of analysis indicated by the 
political/health need context. The focus is increasingly on 
what is contextually appropriate information, and what are
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contextually appropriate processes of producing it.
4.4 SUMMARY
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 considered the Annual Report as a 
product for organisational intelligence. This summary 
concerns the additional perspectives in the framework of 
organisational intelligence. Firstly, as a production 
process the problem space was not searched thoroughly. The 
few reports that were available for comparative purposes had 
not been systematically collected nor assessed. No doubt 
there were others who were thinking about producing 
something similar, but there was no simple and quick way of 
establishing this - an indication of the lack of any NHS 
wide organisational intelligence in this respect.
The task was decomposed appropriately, with responsibilities 
for the different aspects of it clear, but there was a poor 
allocation of time given to the project as a whole. Its
scope required a much longer time period, yet it been long
awaited, so there was considerable pressure to produce 
something that looked impressive whilst knowing that the 
opportunity to do one thoroughly had been missed. The 
centralised approach to its preparation was a necessity 
given the time schedule eventually imposed, but this meant 
that there was little discussion of the issues before their 
inclusion, either within the text production group, or, more 
importantly, with others in the organisation. PB checked
that the decisions would not be disavowed by others, but
this did not make the proposals in themselves any more
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soundly based. The management style of PB suggested that he 
was comfortable in delegating responsibilities for what 
(were not initially, but soon became) the routine tasks of 
production. Although he exercised an editor's directive 
powers over the content of the text, he recognised the need 
to include outside expertise in areas he and his internal 
staff of PD and LJ were not able to deal with, deferring to 
their views.
The process of communicating the results and agreeing an 
appropriate means of conveying the information were 
perceived as an important issue. Given the time constraints, 
and the skills that needed to be acquired, there was 
considerable time and thought given to determining a 
meaningful layout and presentation. The feedback from 
recipients indicated that it was indeed clear and 
comprehensible.
The novelty of the task presented major problems of 
monitoring and control of the process. The obvious negative 
feedback of spellchecking, and editing were necessary, but 
the project as a whole needed close co-ordination to ensure 
that the processes of text production by authors, the 
addition of graphs, maps and their scanning into a desk-top 
publishing package produced a steady flow of material for 
the printers. This meant that there was no opportunity to 
view the product as a whole in its final proof form.
The compressed production timescale also enforced some major 
assumptions about the practical knowledge of the authors.
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There was little time to debate and test the assertions 
thoroughly. The differences in the tacit understanding of 
what was required by PB were clear from the initial 
contributions made by the two internal authors compared to 
the two external experts (for the chapters of the elderly, 
and AIDS). The whole process was dependent on the technical 
skills of GR, and his ability to deal with a variety of 
novel problems in setting up new hardware, and learning new 
software.
There was effectively no organisational memory to support 
the novel knowledge work. The availability of routine 
sources of data for the purposes of producing an Annual 
Report was also limited and took time to access and 
manipulate (see also Chapter 5 Section 8.1). There was 
little linkage that could be made between the data sets, 
either with those held outside the Authority by other 
organisations or within it, though the use of maps indicated 
one way this could be done at an aggregate level.' This of 
course is in lieu of the availability of anonymised person- 
based health related information concerning residents, which 
is clearly is appropriately required in the context of a 
health authority.
Whilst this report was intended as an "independent" report 
to all interested parties locally, it was also a vehicle for 
raising the political profile of both PB and the his 
Department of Community Health. The opportunity, that being 
the first of the new Acheson reports gave for impressing^ c*
wider audience too were perceived and take. Advantage was 
taken of the fortuitous availability of capital to improve 
the computing base to support its production. But the real 
window of opportunity had been opened much earlier when PB 
had first begun to promise its production.
The explanation for the delay in starting the process may be 
ascribed to lack of experience in the complexities and 
effort required to produce such a report. Whilst its novelty 
was minimised, this was probably not appropriate. Had the 
implications of producing it been collectively discussed and 
assessed earlier, there might have been a greater 
likelihood, though no certainty, that the resources to do 
the work, in terms of time, authors and production 
arrangements would have been better organised. Nevertheless, 
the concentration of effort made very obvious the process of 
developing the wide range of performance programs necessary 
in producing such a document.
As a product for organisational intelligence, The Annual 
Report documented the state of knowledge in the health 
Authority at this time in a way which that was contextually 
appropriate. However, the process of producing it was 
inappropriate in that it was too centralised and rushed, and 
the knowledgebases which supported it were clearly 
inadequately developed. Nevertheless it secured the 
objectives of enabling PB (and his department) to shape the 
local political environment. The internal political impact 
of such documents will become less as they become more 
routine, though as the knowledgebases become more refined
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and automated, the information contained in them, and the 
processes of producing them, should become contextually 
more appropriate.
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CHAPTER 7
THE PRODUCTION OF AN INFORMATION SYSTEMS STRATEGY 
1 CONTEXT
1.1 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL
In 1984, when the process of producing a District 
Information Systems Strategy (DISS) for Ealing District 
Health Authority began, there was no requirement from Region 
or the Department of Health to produce one. However, the 
process was stimulated by the publication of the document 
"Developing a district IT policy" produced as part of the 
work of the NHS/DHSS Health Information Services Steering 
Group. (Korner 1983). It was also stimulated by the 
experience of the District as a pilot site for Management 
Budgets, and for local "political" reasons associated with 
the development of a District Information Service.
By October 1983 the District had completed a management 
restructuring as part of implementing the 1982 
reorganisation, as required by the "Patients First" 
proposals (DHSS 19879a). The Unit Management and District 
Management Teams were in place, working on the basis of 
consensus management, but with each group trying to clarify 
its roles and responsibilities. However, the establishment 
of the Acute Unit as one of four national pilot sites for 
Management Budgets had ensured that the District had moved 
further down the road of devolving decision taking to Unit 
level than many others at this time. Nevertheless, one area 
of conflict between these sets of Teams was the role of
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information services, where the District Medical Officer 
retained responsibility - indeed, there was also conflict 
within the District Management Team on this issue.
The publication of the Griffiths Inquiry in October 1983 
(Griffiths 1983) was important in that it heralded the end 
of consensus management, and the introduction of general 
managers with sole responsibility for all decision taking 
and devolving decision-making to Units. A corollary was that 
many District chief officers might have their current 
responsibilities redefined once the new general managers 
took up post. It was accepted that there was clearly going 
to be another period of uncertainty and jockeying for power 
for the following eighteen months or so. The Griffiths 
report gave a clear steer to extending the Management 
Budgeting pilot work to all Units. The District had already 
embarked on an exercise to introduce Management Budgets in 
the Acute Unit as one of the four sites in the national 
pilot study. The Griffiths report also focused attention on 
the need for better information systems.
1.2 INFORMATION
1.2.1 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
In response to the common impetus being provided by the 
Korner recommendations to developing information services to 
ensure District Health Authorities and their officers were 
"adequately informed", and the build up to acquiring the 
status of one of four national pilot management budgeting 
sites, the District wanted to develop a District
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Information Service. Whilst this was not an unusual desire 
for a District in the early 1980s, the solution was novel. 
The salary scale the District wished to pay to attract 
applicants to the post conflicted with the restrictions on 
the recruitment of Administrative and Clerical staff that 
could be employed at that time. However, this gave the 
District Medical Officer the opportunity to strengthen his 
department by establishing a "joint appointment" with the 
University of London who would employ a Lecturer in Health 
Information, working one day a week in that role at the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the 
remainder as District Information Officer at Ealing. The DM0 
thereby got the kudos of an academic link to his Department 
of Community Health.
To the DM0, the production of an Information Strategy was 
one way in which to justify this investment and strengthen 
his role, and department, in managing the information and 
computing services in the District. In most Districts at 
this time Information was associated with Planning and 
Administration, and most DMOs were virtually single handed? 
this remained a source of conflict between the two chief 
officers concerned. During 1984 the DM0 succeeded in getting 
agreement to the creation of an identically structured post 
for a Lecturer in Health Computing/District Computing 
Officer and an appointment was made in September 1984.
Whilst developing the management structures at District 
level, it should be noted that there was no information 
officer in the three Units of management. The Medical
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Records Officers had responsibility for the processing of 
patients medical records, and the completion of the 
statutory central requirements for information. Beyond daily 
bedstate statistics, they did not provide any collations of 
data to management beyond what was required for statutory 
purposes, and certainly did not convert this data into 
information. As Korner appreciated, the role of the Medical 
Records Officers was low status, yet vital to the 
operational running of the hospital; the development of the 
"information officer" role in the units was beginning to be 
perceived as a necessary one, and the question of to whom 
such a person should be accountable was being raised (see 
also Chapter 5 Section 6.1).
1.2.2 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
By July 1984, in addition to the work on the Management 
Budgets project (see below), work had begun on defining the 
scope of the District's information systems. A survey done 
under my supervision by the Management Services department 
had revealed that there were (at least) 38 different types 
of patient record in use in the District used for a variety 
of purposes by medical, nursing and paramedical staff. A 
more detailed analysis of these records, which were stored 
in 24 different locations (the majority being community 
clinics) showed that there were at least one million records 
in the district which contained the following data; surname, 
forename, address, date of birth, sex and identification 
number. It was already clear that delays in returning and 
collating relevant, accurate and timely data about
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individual patients suggested that linkages between systems 
was needed, particularly the development of a District 
Patient Master Index which contained a single identifier for 
an individual patient together with the numbers by which the 
patient was known in local systems.
A further relevant development in information systems was 
the introduction of clinical activity reports. The clinical 
activity reports had become established during 1984 as a 
routine item on the agenda of the monthly meetings of the 
District Management Team (see also Chapter 5 Section 5.1). 
They were only available at that time for the Acute Unit. 
Producing them was time consuming, but soon became a matter 
of routine although the format of them was continually 
changing: for example, comparisons with the same period in 
the preceding year, with Regional and National averages, and 
the introduction of graphs. However, the information was not 
linked to analyses of finance and manpower. Also, this was a 
product of the District Information service, rather than a 
(non-existent) Unit Information service, and the DMO 
regarded them as an illustration of an expert service he was 
able to provide to. the units, rather than making 
collaborative arrangements for a report to be produced in 
conjunction with them.
The other innovation in information systems was the 
introduction of Health Service Indicators (see also Chapter 
5 Section 2.1). Although the paper based 1981 HSIs had been 
exhaustively analysed, there had been very little interest 
taken in them. However, the computer-based 1982 HSIs had
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been produced in 1984 and begun to attract attention. This 
was partly because they were much more effectively 
presented, but also because the NHS Management Inquiry 
Report noted that the "NHS lacks any real continuous 
evaluation of its performance against criteria...real output 
measurement, against clearly stated management objectives 
and budgets, should become the concern of management at all 
levels" (Griffiths 1983, plO, 12).
1.3 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
The production of the Information Strategy came at a time 
when the issues of control over computing and information 
were being debated. During 1983 a Computer Steering Group 
(CSG) had been established. It was chaired by the Director 
of Finance, with representatives from each Unit Management 
Team, medical and nursing interests and from District based 
functions, e.g. Planning and Personnel. The secretariat was 
provided by the planning staff until I took up post. The 
remit of this group was to vet all proposals for computing 
equipment, and stimulate proposals where it was felt 
necessary. Although there was no budget held at District for 
the purchase of all computer systems the CSG's approval was 
needed.
In the period December 1983 to March 1984 the decision to 
install an ICL Patient Administration System, as supplied by 
the Regional Health Authority, was made. This was to be a 
key component of the Management Budgets project, but in 
addition there were "feeder systems" from which data was
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also required. The Management Budgeting exercise reviewed 
the information available from;
- Out-patients
- Operating Theatres
- Pathology Laboratories
- Pharmacy
- Physiotherapy
- Speech Therapy
- Occupational Therapy
- Central Sterile Supplies Department
- Nurse Movement recording
- Manpower
- Financial systems.
Manual and/or computer systems were then specified to 
provide the data required. This data was structured to 
provide analyses of work carried out for individual 
consultants and specialties. Whilst the Management 
Budgeting exercise focused attention on the short term 
problems of getting systems up and running as quickly as 
possible, it was clear that there were a number of longer 
term issues that should be considered in an Information 
Strategy.
The second background issue was the need to introduce 
systems to implement the Korner recommendations by April 
1986. Plans for systems in the Mental Health and Community 
Units, in addition to those listed above, were needed. No 
guidance had been received from the Region concerning 
implementation of Korner.
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The Region had recently produced a draft computer strategy. 
This emphasised the need to develop computing services at 
District level. It did not produce any parameters within 
which a DISS could be formulated directly, but did discuss 
plans for key computing systems such as Patient 
Administration Systems, Pathology, Child Health, Finance 
systems and links with the Regional Computing Centre.
By July 1984 the work on introducing the patient activity 
collection information systems for Management Budgets had 
been completed, and it was appropriate to begin the 
preparation of a DISS.
1.4 GOALS AND THEORIES
1.4.1 GOALS
There were three people, The District Computing Officer 
(DCO), the District Information Officer (DIO - myself) and 
the District Medical Officer (DMO), who were directly 
involved in producing the strategy.
The DMO's goals derived from primarily from the political 
context of the organisation. He wanted to retain and extend 
his power as a DMO by demonstrating that his department was 
able to tell the organisation what was needed, and to secure 
consent for these views. Simultaneously, he wanted to 
justify his staffing levels, and if possible expand them. By 
July 1984 it was already clear to him that groups, such as 
the Computer Steering Group, were unlikely to continue in
284
the culture of general management: they smacked far too much 
of consensus management. To the DMO, the dissolution of the 
District-based Computer Steering Group diminished his 
authority and power as the Director with responsibility for 
computing: he had no steering group via which to exert
influence based on his formal organisational status and any 
operation of sanctions over what Units wished to develop was 
now a much more complex process of manipulation. Producing 
an Information Strategy which enhanced the stature of his 
Directorate and himself was one way to retain his power 
within the organisation.
Another route to the same objective was to use the 
production of an Information Strategy to bolster his status 
within the Region. He wished to be a member of the Regional 
Information Technology Agency, the newly constituted 
decision-making body on IT matters. Being able to market an 
Information Strategy was one of the ways in which he was 
able to demonstrate (successfully) his capabilities at 
Region, although a stronger influence was probably his 
unique status within the Region at this time as a 
Computer/Information-minded District Medical Officer. Being 
a member of RITA, he believed, replaced much of the power 
lost by disbanding the CSG in that he was able to use his 
knowledge of forthcoming Regional decisions on key computer 
systems to advantage in discussions with UGMs over their 
computing requirements. However, to do this an agreed 
Information Strategy, that included analyses of existing 
information and computing capabilities in the three units, 
was required.
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Having joined the organisation only four months after 
preliminary work on the strategy had already begun, the DCO 
wanted to use the process of developing an Information 
Strategy to familiarise himself with the organisation's 
computing facilities and requirements.
As DIO, I was concerned with developing an Information 
Strategy that provided a framework within which the 
information requirements of managers at all levels could be 
examined and planned for. In a paper prepared by me and 
discussed at the July 1984 meeting of the CSG, entitled 
"Initial Developments of a District Information Strategy", 
it was made explicit that "An Information Strategy is needed 
to help managers at all levels within Ealing Health 
Authority co-ordinate and improve their existing 
capabilities to manage different types of resources so as to 
meet the objective of providing health care services during 
the next 5 - 1 0  years as efficiently, effectively and 
equitably as possible within the resources available" (Drury 
1984 p2). The political benefits of producing a strategy 
were secondary, but not unimportant. The difficulty was that 
there was no experience of producing Health District 
Information Strategies to draw on either locally or 
nationally. Nevertheless, I was also concerned to develop 
the strategy using a framework of analysis that was of 
general application.
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The "Initial Developments" paper was intended to stimulate 
discussion on the parameters within which the DISS was to be 
produced. The "Initial Developments" paper presented an 
assessment of the organisational parameters (Korner, 
Griffiths, Regional computer strategy, local planning and 
financial resource assumptions and progress in the Local 
Authority and Family Practitioner Committee) and the 
technical parameters (data models, data communications, 
hardware, operating systems, applications software, software 
development), and the administrative standards needed (for 
documentation, data quality and data collection, education 
and training, confidentiality and security, and new 
technology agreements).
Many of these parameters had been gleaned from experience of 
introducing the information systems needed for Management 
Budgets, and others e.g. concerning data models, from 
analysis of the Wessex Regional Information Systems Plan 
(Wessex RHA 1984) which had recently been produced and was 
the only information strategy widely published at the time.
In a further paper, produced in October 1984, I proposed 
that the most appropriate planning philosophy for developing 
a DISS was the "mixed-scanning" approach. An analogy to 
illustrate mixed scanning used by its originator, Etzioni 
(1974), would be setting up a world-wide weather observation 
system using weather satellites. Unlike "rationalism" which 
would try to examine the entire sky in every detail and 
"incrementalism" which would focus on those areas in which
1.4.2 THEORIES
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similar patterns developed in the past, and perhaps on a few 
nearby regions, "mixed-scanning" would use two types of 
camera: a wide angle that would cover all parts of the sky 
but not in great detail, and a telephoto, which would zero 
in on those areas revealed by the first camera to require a 
more in depth examination. However, the key idea is not so 
much that one first has to get a broad overview and then 
look at the details, but that implementation is seen as 
being an integral part of planning - i.e. planning, whether 
operational or strategic, is an iterative learning process.
I suggested that, given the goal of an information strategy 
was as stated in the section above, the "value" of being as 
efficient and effective as possible in the use of resources 
was not contentious but the concept of "equity" was. It 
implies "fairness" in distribution, suggesting recourse to 
the principles of natural justice, in which people or groups 
may be given differential treatment if it is thought just. 
How do/should we decide which individuals/groups or 
application areas get more resources than others? I stated 
my theory that a DISS is needed so that we can start a well- 
informed debate of these issues. In other words, debate on 
priorities for development at a strategic level can only be 
"equitably" conducted when there is at least an equal 
minimum amount of information available about need, demand, 
supply and utilisation and outcome for the services which 
are required by the resident population and the District's 
patients.
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A "fundamental decision", then, in my view was to ensure 
that minimum data sets were defined that provided a baseline 
of information on which managers could make equitable 
decisions about resource allocation and monitor their 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of resource utilisation. 
"In more concrete terms this means that we take the task of 
defining the requirements of clinicians, nurses and other 
health professionals for data of high quality (accurate, 
timely etc.) on which to take decisions for patient care as 
of equal priority, for example, to the definition of
requirements for information about healthcare of the 
resident population. At present, attention has been focused 
on developing information systems to assess the efficiency 
and, we hope, the cost effectiveness of services, notably in 
the Management Budgets project. I believe that this has
provided us with a number of departments where, in 
conjunction with the recommendations of Korner, not much 
further work is needed to develop minimum data sets and
considerable impetus has developed for producing them in the 
operational term, i.e. next 1-3 years. But this emphasis on 
information systems for managers of hospital
departments/functions etc., should be kept in perspective. 
Such systems might well be amongst those under 
development/enlargement using the telephoto lens, but it is 
minimum data sets across all parts of the organisation that 
should be brought into focus first using the wide-angle with 
those areas where no information exists at present having an 
equitable share of the resources available allocated to 
develop them" (Drury 1984 p3).
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2 COMPONENTS
2.1 ACCOUNTS AND CONTENTS
2.1.1 ACCOUNTS OF ACTION
The "Initial Developments" paper proposed four phases for 
the development of DISS:- 
Phase 1 - Mid October 1984:
Assess the parameters and agree management and system 
objectives 
Phase 2 - Mid February 1985:
Define requirements; agree resources and priorities 
Phase Three - Ongoing thereafter:
Agree and implement a transition strategy 
Phase Four - As part of the District planning cycle:
Review and revise parameters, requirements and 
performance.
In Phase 1 it was proposed that particular attention must be 
paid to developing plans for the implementation of Korner 
and to developing global data models. These models would 
define a concise "picture" of the whole organisation. An 
illustration of the only known NHS data modelling 
application at the time, developed to define an Information 
Systems Plan by Wessex RHA, was included. It was also 
proposed that "until this work is at or near completion no 
further major computer systems be approved".
As proposed in the "Initial Developments" paper, advice was 
sought from some outside resources. Not surprisingly, given 
the political context, a meeting was held on 29th October
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with two staff based at the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine. For the DMO, this was as much to indicate 
the sort of "innovative" work that he was doing in Ealing as 
it was to get their help specifically for developing an 
Information Strategy; in fact they had little to offer since 
neither had any experience of developing DHA information 
strategies.
The process of developing the conceptual framework was one 
that I undertook myself. At this stage it seemed appropriate 
that this sort of task was undertaken by "our information 
expert" as I was described, despite the fact that I had no 
trained expertise in this field, though I had had direct 
experience of analysing organisational information systems 
elsewhere (Drury 1981). The framework was developed during 
the period October - December 1984.
The DCO took up post on 15 October 1984, and having no 
experience of the Health Service had little to contribute at 
that stage. In fact, his arrival delayed the program because 
it was felt that he should undertake a survey of all the 
computer systems in the District. It took some time to agree 
protocols and the survey was not finished until March 1985.
After a months leave in January 1985, I discussed the 
framework with the Assistant Treasurer and Assistant 
Personnel Director, both of whom were part of the Management 
Budgets Implementation Team and therefore familiar with 
information issues in the District. After this meeting on
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February 13, I began to draft out the contents of the 
document.
A first draft of the Strategy was produced on March 15 1985 
but it was not discussed in detail with the DMO until April 
9th. The slippage in the original timetable was not felt too 
be critical; it was more important to have the computer 
survey done, and for me to be involved in the implementation 
of the Patient Administration System which was in a 
particularly detailed stage in early 1985, than to have 
produced a Strategy by mid-February. But, with the new 
District General Manager taking up post in April 1985, it 
was now important to get the Strategy finished. The DMO 
wanted to present it as a fait accompli.
The first draft had extensive changes made to it, and a 
second was produced by 9 May and discussed with the DMO and 
DCO. A final draft was considered on 10 June by the CSG, and 
a seminar was then arranged for forty senior managers on 18 
June. The DMO then presented it at the July District Health 
Authority meeting where it was accepted.
2.1.2 CONTENTS
This section does not examine the contents of the DISS as a 
product for organisational intelligence. The final document 
had six chapters and sixteen appendices. The introduction 
began with the statement that the strategy "needs to be put 
in the context of the District's overall strategic 
objectives. These are to provide acute services to
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approximately 180,000 people, plus a self-sufficient service 
to all Borough residents (282,000) for care of the elderly, 
mentally ill and handicapped, plus younger disabled" (Ealing 
1985 pi). To explain this further, the catchment population 
of the hospital services is substantially less than the 
resident population of the District, or Local Authority 
Borough with which the District is coterminous. As a 
statement of strategic objectives, this is admirably 
concise, but it reflected the absence of a formal District 
Strategy at this time.
The second chapter contained a "systems framework", and is 
discussed further below. The third chapter gave a "Strategic 
Overview", which described, for each Management System, some 
of the key features which should be available by the mid- 
1990s. Chapter 4 described implementation plans for the 
three major information system developments that the 
District had to comply with:
- Implementing the Korner recommendations
- Development of management budgets
- Compliance with the Data Protection Act.
Using the systems framework developed in chapter two, the 
fifth chapter analysed planned and potential developments 
for each of 66 information systems, and gave a development 
timetable. Finally a summary of recommendations was given 
concerning the objectives, extra-District issues, Management 
issues, and planning issues.
The appendices were presented in two groups. Firstly there
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were those which contained "User Guidelines". Topics covered 
here were: Korner minimum data sets; data quality and
standards; developing the use of Health Service Indicators; 
a protocol for purchasing computer systems; hardware and 
software selection and contractual checklists; and 
guidelines for data protection systems. Secondly, there were 
appendices concerned with describing aspects of information 
systems in the District. These included analyses of the 
types, details, location and range of records holding 
patient identification details; current computer systems and 
word processors; current computer applications; stages in 
the development of a District Patient Master Index; and an 
information systems schema indicating the logical 
connections between some of the application systems.
The main text of the document comprised 19 sheets, (but 
double sided and single spaced), and the appendices (colour 
coded to indicate the two groups) totalled a further 57 
sheets. It was not bound, but simply punched and tagged.
2.2 SCANNING AND SELECTION
The problems of scanning the 'problem space' and selecting 
appropriate models of the organisation which to use in 
deciding how to develop the DISS were addressed in the two 
preparatory papers. One approach I tried was to develop a 
systematic analysis of the organisation's information 
requirements using a process of hierarchical decomposition. 
The first two levels were:
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I PREMISES AND ISSUE SELECTION
1.1 Health Care Information Systems Model
1.2 Organisational Parameters
1.3 Forecasts for Information Technology
1.4 Review of Current Information Systems & Issues
II SELECTION OF STRATEGIES
1.5 Selection of objectives
1.6 Selection of strategies
1.7 Development of Information Plan
III IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMME
1.8 Development Control
1.9 Learning/Evaluation
Taking 1.4 as an example, it was then possible to decompose 
the problems further. For example, the following phrase 
"Review current information systems and issues for the 
community unit concerning direct patient services by 
District Nurses" was composed of the following nested 
hierarchy of statements:
Review Current Information Systems and Issues 
For the Community Unit
Concerning Direct Patient Services 
By Nurses
District Nurses.
The objective of this systematic approach was to ensure that 
the DISS was comprehensive (wide-angle) i.e. the scanning of 
issues was deliberately as comprehensive as possible. In 
some respects, this approach provided a set of rules which 
could be used by managers to clarify their thinking, at 
least to the extent of making explicit the areas which were
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not going to be analysed in any further detail. However, its 
only use in this instance was to clarify for myself the 
basic issues that needed to be covered. Later on many other 
much more detailed ways of defining information requirements 
were developed and published by the Department of Health 
(DHSS 1986b, Bardsley et al 1988, Wickings et al 1989).
2.3 DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING
2.3.1 STRUCTURING THE REPORT
Following Simon's (1960) model, the design and choice 
aspects of decision making are of concern here. Having 
created a hierarchy of issues that logically could be 
considered for inclusion in an information strategy, the 
next stage was to decide which would be included. To do this 
I compiled an outline, in effect a chapter and sub..sub 
heading listing. This was discussed with the DMO, DCO, and 
Assistant Treasurer and Assistant Personnel Director. There 
were several refinements made to this before the final 
structure for the report was agreed.
In the final report, there was a chapter which reflected the 
analysis of issues in a chapter giving a "systems 
framework". This comprised three major dimensions:
I MANAGEMENT PROCESSES (concerning patients, staff, 
money, data, estate, etc.,)
Planning
Coordinating
Monitoring
Controlling
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Investigating
Evaluating
II MANAGEMENT UNITS (e.g. Individual person, department, 
ward, Unit of Management, care group)
III MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Population Health Care 
Patient Health Care 
Facility Services Management 
Functional Services Management 
Resource Management 
Administrative Support.
Within the "boxes" in a three dimensional matrix formed by 
these categories, it was suggested that there would be three 
types of information systems:
CORPORATE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
To provide management at District level with the 
information required to manage the organisation. Such 
information enables the performance of the organisation 
as a whole, or of any particular management unit, to be 
monitored, co-ordinated, investigated and evaluated. 
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
These are required by any Unit of Management to manage 
the services it provides.
MANAGEMENT DATA SYSTEMS
To provide the information specified by (corporate and 
other) management systems requires that data outputs 
and then inputs are defined before considering the most 
appropriate form of (systems selection) and data 
processing.
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This was the basic conceptual framework used to define the 
sections of the main text to be written, in particular 
chapter 5. As a conceptual framework with which to organise 
the material to be incorporated in the document, the 
approach was helpful. Whether it would have proved helpful 
to a number of different authors remains unknown, as I wrote 
95% of the text, with the DMO contributing the introduction, 
and the DCO two appendices.
2.3.2 DECISION MAKING IN THE PRODUCTION PROCESS
It should be apparent that there was an incongruity here. An 
attempt to discuss the full range of issues with the 
Computer Steering Group in the "Initial Developments" paper, 
had been followed by a paper outlining an appropriate 
planning philosophy that suggested that minimum data sets 
were to be defined across all parts of the organisation for 
all managers, whether administrative, clinical, nursing etc. 
But these ideas and the development of a conceptual
framework that enabled a structured approach to analysing 
the premises and key issues, selection of objectives,
strategies and plans and introducing both development
control and learning/evaluation questions into the process 
had resulted in the end in a DISS produced essentially by 
one person, myself. It was in practice a "closed
centralised" approach set within a theoretically open and 
decentralised framework.
However, the DMO, to whom I was accountable, interpreted the
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situation very differently. Although he was intent to 
produce an information strategy that was "state of the art" 
that he would be able to use to "put Ealing on the map", his 
approach to decision making was based on "local politics". 
He was, at this time, essentially single-handed so far as 
fulfilling his role as the District Medical Officer was 
concerned; he was intent on building up a Department of 
Community Medicine to support him both in terms of giving 
the Authority medical advice and fulfilling certain 
statutory duties, but also to develop his, and its, role in 
terms of both planning and information. The conflict alluded 
to earlier (see Section 1.1) revolved around the planning 
responsibilities. There was a long running conflict over 
whether the DMO or the District Administrator should have 
this responsibility. The uneasy compromise that had been 
reached was that the DMO would "take the lead" in the 
provision of policy and planning guidelines, and the 
Assistant District Administrator (ADA) would be responsible 
for the production process.
The production of the District Plan was always 
compartmentalised, with each of the three Management Units 
producing its plan within the guidelines laid down by the 
District (based on its interpretations of guidelines 
provided by the Region and the DHSS) . Within each Unit it 
was the administrative manager who had the lead role in 
producing the plan, but this was done in discussion with 
local planning forums; those responsible for contributions 
to the plans at both Unit and District level also met to 
discuss progress in meetings chaired by the ADA. The key
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point is that the ADA used a collaborative style of planning 
to develop and reinforce strong links with the Units; he was 
also helped by his background in unit administration and 
respected for his competence and ability to deliver.
The DMO, on the other hand, did not have as substantial 
power base within the Units. He perceived his power as 
deriving from his abilities to "use my skills in politics 
and psychology" in Board meetings (to which the ADA did not 
have access,) and where he had more influence than the 
District Administrator; and also behind the scenes at the 
District and Health Authority level, an environment with 
which the DMO was familiar from his previous work 
experience.
The Director of Finance, having taken the initiative in 
putting forward Ealing as a Management Budget pilot site had 
also taken on chairmanship of the Computer Steering Group. 
With his resignation in the summer of 1984 a power struggle 
had commenced between the DMO and ADA to control this group. 
The ADA was already on the group, the DMO was not although I 
was. Eventually, the DMO joined, having established that he 
was the board level member with responsibility for 
information (and computing, for which a case for the DCO was 
already being made). He therefore chaired the next meeting 
(in July 1984). However, there was then a complete change of 
policy. Instead of agreeing with Unit Managers a set of key 
issues to address, he took a highly centralist stance. The 
Information Strategy would be produced "by my department".
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In this way he hoped to avoid the uncertainty of allowing 
other managers, over whom he had no line management control, 
from "doing their own thing", whilst being able to assert 
his authority as the Board member who was unarguably the 
person both knowledgeable about, and solely responsible for, 
information and computing issues. I was forbidden from 
holding meetings with groups of mangers to discuss the 
problems and issues, and simply had to build on my knowledge 
already acquired from the Management Budgets project in the 
Acute Unit, and from initiatives already underway in the 
Community Unit.
The DMOs centralist style of decision making was 
complemented by an incrementalist approach to the problem. 
He was most concerned with ensuring that he could get 
agreement for what was being proposed, that we could "carry 
them with us". This involved phone calls and late night 
"chats" with key people in the Units to ensure that 
proposals already formulated by myself us would not be 
objected to when the Strategy was discussed in the District 
Management Team meetings, or at the Authority. The policy 
options that he was concerned with related primarily to the 
exigencies of the operational planning timetable and 
finance; he was not particularly concerned with the 
strategic planning period, but much more with ensuring that 
the means for providing what what was proposed in the 
operational planning period would be available.
The DMOs approach to managing this process was in many 
respects a shrewd preparation of his own position prior to
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the introduction of general management. The new General 
Manager, who had had no prior experience of the NHS, took up 
post in March 1985. The DMO wanted to be able to present him 
with the District's Information Strategy already formed and 
produced by his department which, demonstrably, knew what 
was going on. Moreover, it would have been produced without 
the Units being able to claim any ownership of the process 
of production. The corollary of whether they would have 
"ownership” of the product was a secondary issue, because, 
in the new era of general management, if the District 
General Manager agreed with a set of proposals, he had the 
power to enforce compliance from the Units. Also, in 
producing the proposals without recourse to such dated 
consensus management-style groups as the Computer Steering 
Committee or Information Strategy groups (as opposed to 
planning groups) within the Units, the DMO was clearly able 
to demonstrate he could make the general management approach 
work.
2.4 COMMUNICATION AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
As previously described, the process of producing the DISS 
was not a collaborative effort in which relevant managers 
directly communicated their views; rather it built on my 
knowledge of the organisation and that of a few selected 
others, e.g. the DCO, Assistant Treasurer, Assistant 
Personnel Manager and some medical records staff in the 
Units.
However, the document itself was an attempt to organise the
302
knowledge acquired in a conceptual framework that would 
enable the DISS to be updated easily, and also which could 
also be easily compartmentalised should the Units be given, 
or acquire, much more control over the plans for developing 
their information systems. The appendices were intended to 
provide managers with the knowledge (or references to it) 
that would enable managers to develop information systems 
with greater autonomy by using checklists; the only attempt 
to retain the central control of computing developments as 
stated in the appendix specifying the process of "agreement 
to a request for computer development", was never 
implemented and the protocols for computer system 
evaluations were similarly unused.
There are other aspects of the communication process that 
should be considered also. As a document, the DISS was an 
attempt to communicate. The sender was the Department of 
Community Medicine, the receiver, the rest of the 
organisation. Was the message received and understood? The 
answer in hindsight is no. During the process of production 
the DMO was concerned that it would appear "too academic", 
and tried to simplify the categorisations used. Nevertheless 
the main text of the end product remained daunting and 
unfamiliar to most managers; it contained unfamiliar terms 
("systems framework", "facility services management" and 
"resource management"), and a three-dimensional diagram.
I had hoped to overcome these ways of simplifying the 
complexities of the information processing components of an 
organisation at the launch of the document. This occasion,
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which forty senior managers attended, and which had 
introductory comments by both the new District General 
Manager and the Chairman of the Health Authority, did not 
get the message across. It was clearly not possible to 
convey the thinking behind these new concepts to an audience 
for whom they were unfamiliar. What succeeded was a much 
more pragmatic analysis of the importance of good 
information systems in the context of nursing given by the 
Assistant Nursing Officer; she dwelt on the concrete issues 
and terms with which staff were familiar, but emphasising 
the point that forward thinking and planning was required. 
My more abstract presentation was a failure; managers felt 
as though they should be able to understand what I was 
getting at, and was "sure it was right", but nevertheless 
were left with a feeling that it did not have to involve 
them.
2.5 MONITORING AND CONTROL
Given the style of decision-making and planning adopted, the 
monitoring and control process in the development of the 
DISS were simple. Essentially, I was responsible for 
ensuring that the strategy was produced, and would brief the 
DMO on progress on an ad hoc basis. Slippage on the 
timetable occurred for the reasons discussed earlier 
(Section 2.3.2) .
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3 KNOWLEDGEBASES
Developing a DISS was a novel experience in the sense that 
no DISS had been developed in Ealing Health Authority 
before. It was also novel in that there was no knowledgebase 
on which to draw either inside or outside the organisation 
of the NHS, although, as discussed in the previous section, 
there were other information strategies being developed in 
isolation elsewhere in the NHS. It was a not an entirely 
novel experience for me in that I had been involved in the 
development of a computing strategy elsewhere before joining 
Ealing. Noone else at Ealing had any direct experience of 
developing a DISS, although there had been recent experience 
of evaluating information requirements in the light of the 
Management Budgets project.
3.1 PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE
The knowledgebase that I drew on in developing the DISS 
produced a conflict between what Argyris and Schon (1974) 
would term my espoused theory and my theory-in-use. Based on 
my experience of earlier work in an organisation developing 
a computer strategy (Drury 1981), and from my knowledge of 
the usual steps in the process, I espoused a participative 
approach to the development of the DISS. My understanding of 
the situation was that to achieve the end of a DISS that 
was accepted as a corporate product it was necessary to use 
the means of participation, albeit using a structured 
approach that ensured a comprehensive and rational 
organisational wide framework of analysis. I also assumed 
that the the organisational theory-in-use, as evidenced by
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the production of the District plan, was one which welcomed 
participation. I acknowledged, however, that with the coming 
demise of consensus management, this approach might become 
the exception rather than "the rule", that it might become 
increasingly tacit rather than explicit. My theory-in-use, 
however, revealed the opposite as has already been
described.
The explanation for this dichotomy, viewed from the inside,
is based on the power relations existing between the DMO and
myself. Using Abell's (1977) terminology, the DMO was able 
to change my action through the agency of sanctions even in 
the face of my opposed state of mind. Since staying in the
job was more important to me than not giving way to his
views, the sanction which was operative was the non-renewal 
of my contract due in a few months time. However, I was also 
aware that his ability to interpret the organisation's
changes in its theory in use, ie. how the forthcoming new
rules of general management would change both espoused 
theories and theories in use, might be more 
legitimate/appropriate than my own. I acknowledged,
particularly after the management seminar to launch the 
DISS, that his understanding of what would be understood by 
most of the managers was much more appropriate than my own.
3.2 ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY
In the production of DISS, the full extent of the 
organisational memory (although there had been no previous 
experience of a DISS) was inaccessible to me; instead, it 
was essentially that part of the organisational memory that
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was contained in my head, and in the files to which I could 
refer, that was accessed.
However, one of my objectives in developing the DISS was to 
present a map which had the dual function described by 
Argyris and Schon (1978) of being a description of actual 
patterns of activity and a guide to future action. It was my 
intention that the DISS, as a map, would be drawn on as a 
diagnostic tool to indicate where there were areas of 
ignorance of information systems requirements, and that it 
could also be used to indicate the way ahead to the 
objective of establishing a comprehensive coverage of 
minimum data sets which extended into areas beyond those 
which would necessarily be covered, (or uncovered), as a 
result of complying with the three mandatory developments 
(see Section 2.1.2).
3.3 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
In constructing the DISS there was no database within the 
organisation to draw on; for example, there was no computer 
based data model of the organisation. Nor, at that time, was 
there any way in which I could find out which other 
Districts in the NHS had produced strategies but not 
published their findings since there was no requirement for 
such documents to be catalogued (still less in a full text 
retrieval system) for access from an on-line database.
In this connection, however, the DISS contained some 
proposals for providing a corporate management information
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library service, and went on to propose that "the 
possibility of establishing a corporate information centre 
will be examined. This will allow managers to have online 
access to both numerical and textual data base systems, 
together with modelling, simulation and statistical 
packages. Such a centre would act as a 
conference/planning/discussion room where corporate 
decisions can be made". The ideas here reflected a strategic 
interest in executive information systems. It is only at the 
end of the 1980s that these are beginning to be developed 
(Dawson and Faulkner 1990).
A communications network was envisaged in the DISS which 
connected the management information systems together, and 
to the corporate database. A stated objective in DISS was to 
provide a detailed plan (using data modelling concepts where 
appropriate) of these communication requirements, and to 
develop a data administration capability to ensure that the 
same data was defined in the same way in different systems.
4 ASSESSMENTS OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE INFORMATION 
STRATEGY
4.1 PRODUCT
The document was a product for improving organisational 
intelligence. It stated that its "prime objective at this 
stage is to provide managers at all levels in the District 
with a 'framework' for reviewing their current information, 
computing and communication needs and agreeing outline plans 
for future developments" (Ealing 1985 pi) . It was because 
it encompassed these components that I insisted that the
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document refer to Information Systems. My objective was to 
try and foster the development of information systems by all 
managers within a common and comprehensive framework that 
drew attention to the definition of objectives, data 
definitions, standards, data processing, communications 
issues and the production of good quality information; the 
development of a corporate database was outlined which would 
encompass both textual and quantitative information that 
would be available for routine and ad hoc enquiries. The 
staffing and training implications of introducing such 
proposals was outlined, though it was recognised that "when, 
after the consultative process, the DISS is fully developed, 
it will also need to include a feasible financial and 
manpower plan". In short, I was concerned to enable the 
managers in the organisation develop for themselves co­
ordinated and communicating methods of processing data and 
producing information. Also that this would enable them, 
whether clinicians, nurses, departmental, Unit or District 
managers to make appropriate decisions, of both an 
operational and strategic nature, in the context relevant to 
them.
As a product of organisational intelligence, the document 
itself was well received in terms of giving a clear 
statement of the present situation (particularly the 
appendices concerning the information systems in the 
District), of giving some helpful user guidelines, though 
the protocols for purchasing systems were too restrictive 
and never implemented. It was also accepted that it did give
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a picture of what the future might look like. However, the 
presentation of the document was inappropriately academic 
both in terms of written and verbal presentations.
4.2 CONTEXT
An assessment of the historical and political context 
indicates that the DISS was not a necessary requirement for 
the District's management. Other Districts had similarly 
poor information management at District and Unit level, were 
all faced with the same Korner implementation agenda, and 
had similar rapid expansions of IT systems.
The critical factor was the joint perception of the DMO and 
myself that a DISS would serve our political interests. It 
was a means to achieve the DMO's objective of establishing a 
viable and prestigious Department of Community Medicine 
(with academic links) that contained the District 
Information Unit, in support of the DMO. As far as I was 
concerned, of it would help establish a viable District 
Information Unit (whether or not this remained within the 
Department of Community Medicine in the future) with an 
agreed agenda of work to carried out in conjunction with the 
Units. However, it should be recognised that the 
organisation accepted the need for such a strategy.
This acceptance was because of the changes in the context of 
information systems in the District. In addition to the 
stimulus provided by the Korner recommendations, there were 
two related reasons for this. Firstly, the introduction of 
Management Budgets had highlighted for the first time in any
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substantial way the poor quality of management information, 
and the need to relate activity, manpower and financial 
information together referenced to specialty, departmental 
and ward budgets so that it could be used by clinicians and 
nurse managers who were prepared to participate in the 
project. It was evident that what had been achieved in the 
period of November 1983 to July 1984 was insufficient, and 
that further developments were needed both in the Acute 
Unit, and in due course in the Mental Health and Community 
Units. The second reason was that managers were increasingly 
aware of the sudden burgeoning of microcomputers within the 
Authority. In 1982 there had been approximately 10 
computers. By 1985, the inventory of computing conducted by 
the DCO as his main input into the DISS showed that there 
were 72 computers of 15 different types. Proposals for 
controlling expenditure on computing, which had been routed 
via the Computer Steering Group, were becoming seen to be 
part of the new responsibilities of Unit General Managers. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of the response to the computing 
survey, which was couched in terms of needing to ensure the 
Authority got "Value for Money" from its investment in 
computers, some "strategic overview" was generally accepted 
as being needed at this time.
4.3 EXPERIENCE
Having accepted the case for developing a DISS, how could 
the organisation have proceeded? Firstly, it should be noted 
that the need for a DISS was not debated and agreed at the 
District Management Team meetings; it was accepted after
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discussion by the Computer Steering Group, with the DMT 
being content to let this Group, and then the Board member 
responsible ie. the DMO, get on with producing one. 
Experience in other organisations (Davis and Olson 1985) 
suggested that the development of information strategies for 
organisations required as a necessary condition for success, 
the clear involvement of the top-level managers in defining 
their objectives and associated information requirements. 
This approach was not adopted at Ealing. There had been no 
detailed discussion and debate over what the Authorities 
objectives and service development strategy were and 
therefore no analysis of what the concomitant information 
requirements were was possible. But, largely for reasons 
discussed in connection with the DMOs decision making, there 
was no discussion about what the information requirements of 
DMT or Unit Managers were. Although there was concern that 
the DISS had the backing of the new DGM, neither he nor his 
colleagues were involved in discussions over the structure 
and content of the information strategy. However, there was 
no NHS specific guidance or experience to underline the need 
for this approach to developing a DISS at this stage.
There was one approach to such a novel situation that was 
beginning to become increasingly familiar in the NHS: hire a 
firm of outside Management Consultants. Indeed, the District 
had had Coopers & Lybrands facilitating the Management 
Budgets project (albeit at the expense of the DHSS). Such a 
response has been used elsewhere to resolve political 
conflict within an organisation (Drury 1981), but it is a 
costly solution. The DMO certainly did not have the funds
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available to him to propose this solution; had he been able 
to employ consultants, or successfully made the case for 
funding by the Authority, the risk was that the result would 
not have been certain to strengthen his department in 
prestige or numbers. There was also the risk that the 
methods used by the consultants would be unsuitable in the 
local management context and yield jargon ridden results (an 
outcome he did not avoid entirely). The methods I proposed 
to use were novel, in that they built on an analytical 
framework which seemed to me to be necessary if a 
comprehensive strategy was to be developed, but they also 
were based on experience of the NHS and Ealing Health 
Authority. My proposal for the development of the DISS was 
that the organisation use methods with which it was 
familiar, ie. consultation on an individual basis and group 
discussion around the basis of a formal framework of 
questions. However, this approach was not used for the 
reasons discussed in Section 2.3.2. A legacy of the 
centralist approach is that it left no knowledgebase or 
organisational memory of how to analyse individual, 
departmental, corporate etc., information requirements.
4.4 SUMMARY
Was the production process appropriate? The highly 
centralist methods used were possible only because I had 
already a fairly comprehensive knowledgebase as a result of 
work on the Management Budgets project, the management 
services' surveys and the informal links I had established 
with the Medical records officers in the three Units.
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However, the centralist methods were appropriate from the 
DMOs perspective because they retained control over the 
production process and the recommendations within his 
Department. The DISS certainly was perceived as the work of 
the DMOs department. The start of the process in July 1984 
was used to help clinch the case for the new DCO post. A 
section of the document made the case for establishing a 
data administration function, and another new post for this 
purpose was agreed soon after it was completed.
In the context of organisational intelligence the production 
process was inappropriate in many respects. It was not set 
within any agreed statement of objectives by the Authority, 
DMT or local managers. Similarly, although a structured 
approach was used in a comprehensive analysis of the 
organisation's information systems, this was not tested in 
detailed discussions with the managers concerned, and, 
although it proved helpful in structuring the document, the 
final product was not wholly appropriate. There was also no 
discussion of the proposals with relevant outside parties, 
such as the Family Practitioner Committee, Local Authority 
or the Region before the document was prepared. The document 
added only a documentary "map" rather than any practical 
knowledge based on participation to the knowledgebase of the 
organisation. However, as a product for organisational 
intelligence, it did point the way to the establishment of a 
corporate database which had access to a network of 
information between applications and was built around the 
objective of building up a District Master Patient Index, 
and establishing "population health care systems".
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The essential outcome of this production process then was a 
product, and not an ongoing process of co-ordinated 
information systems development. The capacity of the 
District Information unit increased, and so did awareness of 
the need to develop Unit Information services. But these 
developments were under the control of the Unit General 
Mangers who did not feel any sense of ownership of the DISS 
and with whom the DMO continued to be in conflict over their 
proposals to assume more autonomy in developing information 
systems as general management was introduced.
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CHAPTER 8
ORGANISATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INFORMATION POLICY BY THE KORNER COMMITTEE
1 CONTEXT
1.1 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL
At its inception the NHS was not the fully unified and
comprehensive service that had been hoped for since the
1920s (Dawson 1920) . By the mid sixties the rapidly
increasing demand for services, the continuation of regional 
inequalities in the distribution of services and the
tripartite organisation of the service (Hospital services, 
Community services provided by the Local Health Authorities, 
and Family Practitioner Services provided by the Executive 
Councils) were sufficiently problematic to require a 
reorganisation of the NHS. 25 years after it was created the 
National Health Service had it first major reorganisation.
Whilst it is generally assumed that the primary determinants 
of change were the reports, commissions and studies produced 
in the sixties and early seventies within the NHS, Navarro 
(1978) argues that the origin of the 1974 reform must be 
seen as emanating from outside the NHS, and as very much 
rooted in the economic crises of the 1960's as well as the 
Labour leadership's political commitment to saving the 
capitalist economy. That commitment, Navarro suggests, 
implied a centralisation of social policies and the further 
strengthening of the centre's hold over the periphery
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through the creation of Regional and Area Health 
Authorities.
The 1974 reorganisation of the service saw the emergence of 
a more refined and complex service-oriented bureaucracy. 
Area Health Authorities (AHAs) emerged which were intended 
to be coterminous with the newly reorganised local 
authorities. The DHSS was to do strategic planning on a 
national scale and the Regional Health Authorities were to 
do planning on a local scale remaining faithful to the DHSS' 
guidelines. AHAs were to ensure that their constituent 
District Health Authorities provided comprehensive health 
services, including hospitals, community and domiciliary 
care, and that plans were made, (in conjunction with local 
authorities), that were within the resources allocated. The 
intention was that there was "maximum responsibility 
delegated downwards" matched with "clear lines of 
accountability upwards" (Levitt 1976). Central to this 
process was to be the planning cycle.
Until 1974 there was no formal or explicit planning system 
in the NHS. Indeed it was not until June 1976 that HC(76)30 
(DHSS 1976a) formally announced the introduction of the NHS 
Planning System which was explicitly stated as providing the 
"main means of giving practical effect to the requirements 
and intentions of the NHS Reorganisation Act, 1973". An 
accompanying Working Manual, entitled "The NHS Planning 
System" gave guidance and information about health service 
planning, including strategic and regional planning guidance
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and HC(76)30 promised "further guidance on the content of 
plans, and methodology and techniques to be used in 
producing service plans for the NHS". Thus, Districts, 
Areas, and Regions were required to submit plans to the 
"senior" authority, which allocated budgets to cover the 
items in the plans that had been approved, and "monitoring" 
of performance was given much greater emphasis in the new 
structure.
The introduction of a national planning system was 
complemented by the report of the Resource Allocation 
Working Party {RAWP} (DHSS 1976b). In response to the 
inequitable distribution of resources between, and within, 
Regions that had developed under the incremental approach to 
capital and service planning prior to 1976, the terms of 
reference of the RAWP report were to establish "a method of 
securing, as soon as practicable, a pattern of distribution 
responsive objectively, equitably and efficiently to 
relative need" (DHSS 1976b p5). The monetary target for each 
authority was based not on the previous years allocation but 
on the population served by the authority adjusted for a 
variety of factors such as age, sex, standardised mortality 
ratios and for patients resident in one authority and 
treated in another. The difference between an authority's 
hypothetical target and its historical provision was 
calculated and each year political decisions made about the 
speed with which the imbalance between the 14 Regional 
health Authorities could be corrected.
Within two years, however, the 1974 reorganisation became
319
subject to a Royal Commission. In describing the view that 
the NHS reorganisation had not worked, the Royal Commission 
(Merrison 1979) carefully distinguished between the changes 
in administrative structure resulting from the 1974 
reorganisation, and the other processes simultaneously 
affecting the NHS. The main examples of these were: shortage 
of funds, worsening industrial relations, the changing 
status of the medical profession and the position of nurses, 
the pay beds argument and the local government 
reorganisation.
The most common complaint in evidence was that the Area 
Health Authority tier was unnecessary resulting in "delays 
in decision making, buck-passing, excessive quantities of 
administrators and paper, duplication of work, too much 
consultation and too many meetings, and a lack of effective 
accountability at local level" (Merrison 1979 p30). The
Report also stated that "in our view the DHSS has tended to 
give too much guidance to the NHS both on strategic issues 
and matters of detail" (Merrison p304).
The 1974 reorganisation had been explicitly concerned with 
"management arrangements". Five years later, however, the 
flavour of new changes had shifted to emphasise "Services to 
Patients"? this idea informed the work of the Royal 
Commission, and was embodied in the title of the 1982 
reorganisation as "Patients First".
In short, the historical and political context was one of
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increasing turbulence as the limitations of the rationally 
planned centralised service bureaucracy in responding 
appropriately to local requirements for fast and firm 
decision making became clear.
1.2 INFORMATION
The management arrangements for the 1974 reorganisation 
recognised that "although much information is available at 
all levels of the Service, many improvements will be needed. 
Existing information is sometimes unreliable, of doubtful 
relevance and out of date, and there are gaps in what is 
available, especially about the community's needs for health 
services and the effectiveness of services in meeting these 
needs. Improvements will take a long time to achieve, but 
the reorganisation of the Service provides the opportunity 
to set about the task. This should be done in two different 
ways;
a) by a systematic assessment of what information is needed
at each management level, and
b) by the establishment of an expert information function at
Area and Regional levels." (DHSS 1972a p 55).
In 1975, the Development of Health Service Information and 
Information Services was the subject of a Health Circular 
(DHSS 1975). It commented that "radical changes in the short 
term are neither expected nor desirable. Any major 
developments should be preceded by stock-taking, evaluation 
of existing information, and assessment of likely future 
needs. For the time being the main considerations are to 
secure the continuity and essential adaptation of existing
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information services and to make the most effective use of 
information which is already available". It suggested that 
the prime tasks were to "ensure the timely flow of existing 
information in an appropriate form between Areas and 
Regions, and between authorities and the Department.... and 
for information to be available on a district basis at an 
early date where this has not already been done".
In 1976 HC (76) 30 commented that "the creation of a sound 
information base, which is essential to good planning, will 
require considerable time and effort" (DHSS 1976a). Also in 
1976, the RAWP report noted that "one of our main stumbling 
blocks has been the lack of relevant information in a 
suitable form" (DHSS 1976b pll) and saw "a clear and 
pressing need for improvement in the data routinely 
collected" (DHSS 1976b p81) . They went on to note that
although a mass of information is collected regularly about 
NHS activities and facilities, much of this is difficult to 
use to the full for allocation purposes because of problems 
in linking statistics from different data sources. 
"Furthermore, despite the scale of the operation, important 
gaps still exist. Out-patients represent almost as large a 
proportion of NHS expenditure as all psychiatric patients, 
yet virtually nothing is known about their characteristics 
and movements. Community care, including family practitioner 
services, is a significant and increasing element in NHS 
provision, yet the data collected on these services fall far 
short in comprehensiveness and reliability of those on 
hospital in-patients" (DHSS 1976b p82). As we shall see in
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Chapter 9 these limitations remain 14 years later.
In 1978 the DHSS mounted a study of the existing 
arrangements for collecting statistical data and other 
information in the NHS and issued a consultative document 
(DHSS 1979b). The study noted that data was collected 
primarily for the purposes of the DHSS and that local 
managers did not have the information they required. The 
separation of the collection and processing of activity, 
finance and manpower data and of variations in the timing, 
concepts and definitions used was also highlighted.
These criticisms were mirrored in the comments of the Royal 
Commission. "The information available to assist decision­
makers in the NHS leaves much to be desired. Relevant 
information may not be available at all, or in the wrong 
form. Information that is produced is often too late to 
assist decisions and may be of dubious accuracy. Without 
explicit measures of the need of groups of patients for 
health care rational decisions on priorities and 
geographical distribution of resources are impossible. The 
lack of outcome measures means that judgements of the 
efficiency of service delivery rest on insecure foundations" 
(Merrison 1979 p 350).
In response to these criticisms, the consultative document 
proposed a joint NHS/DHSS Steering Group "to provide a 
permanent forum for considering information matters". The 
Chairman of this group was Mrs Edith Korner, then Vice­
Chairman of South Western RHA.
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In outlining the development of information policy, then, 
the need for information for the purposes of planning, 
monitoring and control in a centralised bureaucracy had been 
recognised. But large gaps in information were apparent, and 
the lack of information systems appropriate in the local 
context of decision making was clear.
1.3 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
In many respects the stages of initiation (e.g. 
experimentation), contagion (proliferation of computers) and 
more (centralised) control as described in Nolan's stage 
theory of growth in information systems (see Chapter 3 
Section 5.4.3) can be discerned in the developments in 
information technology policy in the NHS during the 1960s 
and 1970s (Herbert 1982, Scrivens 1985a).
During the mid-1960s a computer procurement policy within 
the NHS was developed, alongside government procurement 
policy. Essentially, the policy was to standardise on ICL 
mainframes. Also in the mid-sixties an experimental 
programme in hospital medical computing was started by the 
DHSS, but by the end of 1969, it had become clear that there 
was a considerable amount of dissatisfaction with it. 
Computer systems were being introduced without waiting for 
the dated results of the DHSS experimental program. A review 
(DHSS 1972b) recommended that model systems should be 
produced for a variety of applications. The applications 
would emerge from an experimental phase, followed (if
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potentially viable) by development and operational phases. 
An annual rolling programme was introduced. In April 1972 a 
Computer Standardisation Steering Committee was set up to 
co-ordinate the policy of developing standard systems, such 
as the standard accounting system, and the standard child 
health system. Individual Regions were designated as 
"centres of responsibility" for specific systems.
By 1975, the NHS computing policies were becoming more 
concerned with directly introducing systems and hardware 
into the NHS rather than experimentation and evaluation. The 
experimental programmes were abandoned and in 1977 "A Review 
of NHS Computing Needs" (DHSS 1977) concluded that the 
degree of central (i.e. DHSS) control envisaged in the 
earlier (DHSS 1972b) report was not needed. The main 
innovation proposed was DHSS/NHS committee structure, in 
which research and development, technical, and system 
standardisation committees made proposals to a Computer 
Policy Committee (CPC) which in turn made recommendations to 
the DHSS. The CPC decided in 1978 to review the problems of 
NHS computing. A sub-group was set up made up of NHS and 
DHSS officers who could not reach agreement on whether 
radical solutions were necessary. The committee appeared to 
not be functioning as intended (Scrivens 1985a). It 
certainly was not integrated with current thinking about the 
information needs of the NHS. IT and information were 
divided, and the NHS far from any conception of information 
management at this stage.
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The theory of management decision making in which the 
recommendations of the Korner Committee had to be set was 
consensus management. Consensus management by a District 
Management Team was a feature of the 1974 reorganisation. 
The Royal Commission found that "support for consensus 
management was wide-ranging, and only a small minority of 
respondents thought that it could never be 
successful.... findings suggest that the chief executive 
alternative would not be popular in most places" (Merrison 
1979 314-5). Consensus management emphasised the need for 
data to be available to a variety of managers at unit, 
District, Area and Regional levels to interpret according to 
their perspectives. Clarifying what data needed to be 
collected was at the heart of the Korner approach, but 
should the focus be the centre or the periphery?. This 
raised the issue of information flows for control and 
monitoring.
The Secretary of State for Health is accountable to 
Parliament for performance and expenditure in the NHS. 
Around this requirement, and the many varied types of 
Parliamentary Questions, lie strong arguments for a 
centralised information service with clear standards set to 
enable health authorities to be monitored and held 
accountable for their actions. This approach may lead to a 
few "experts" at the centre scanning the "internal" 
information environment of the NHS, but being too overloaded 
to function effectively. Indeed, the information
1.4 GOALS AND THEORIES
326
implications of abandoning the Regional tier, were that the 
centre would have to maintain links with 90 Area Health 
Authorities, (and this proposal had been dropped from the 
final proposals for the 1974 reorganisation on the basis 
that the span of control would be too wide). The 
decentralisation of information systems could only proceed 
if the centre was able to receive sufficient data to meet 
its statutory obligations of accountability, and there were 
no calls for these to be changed. As Klein and Scrivens 
(1985) point out, a better but decentralised information 
system might permit the DHSS to exercise control without the 
kind of detailed, (and resented) day to day intervention in 
the affairs of health authorities, provided it was possible 
to develop some overall indicators of performance of health 
authorities.
The context in which the investigations of the Korner 
Steering Group began their work was fluid. The future of the 
discredited NHS management structures was uncertain, and 
although it was clear that they would become less 
bureaucratic, (at a simplistic level by losing a tier), 
nevertheless the information requirements of the planning 
process and of consensus management, and the endemic problem 
of the information for monitoring by the DHSS, were likely 
to remain.
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2 KNOWLEDGEWORK PROCESSES
2.1 SCANNING AND SELECTION
2.1.1. TERMS OF REFERENCE
The terms of reference agreed for the NHS/DHSS Steering 
Group were:
1. To agree, implement and keep under review principles 
and procedures to guide the future development of 
health services information systems.
2. To identify and resolve health information issues 
requiring a co-ordinated approach.
3. To review existing health services information systems.
4. To consider proposals for changes to, or developments 
in, health services information systems arising 
elsewhere and, if acceptable, to assess priorities for 
their development and implementation (DHSS 1982).
2.1.2 GUIDING PRINCIPLES
These terms of reference contained only a veiled reference 
to the co-ordination needed with IT developments. They gave 
no steer as to how the work was to be undertaken or by when 
reports should be produced. It was quite clear, however, 
that in selecting a chairman from the NHS, and one who was 
already knowledgeable in the technicalities of the subject 
and with a good grasp of health services internationally, 
the principles adopted would not revolve around the 
centralist concerns of the DHSS.
Mrs Korner herself noted that in the consultations which led 
to the setting up of the NHS/DHSS Steering Group the main 
plea of the service was to improve information for better
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information at district and unit levels. "The awareness of 
the districts' heavy and complex management responsibilities 
has informed the work of the information group from the very 
outset" (Korner 1983a pi) . The "guiding principle" of the 
Steering group's approach was "the requirement to collect 
data because they are essential for operational purposes. 
User-oriented information yields benefits to those who 
collect it, and thus provide an incentive for accuracy and 
expedition" (DHSS 1982 para 1.8). The Steering Group saw the 
accuracy of data as "depending crucially on the development 
of rigorous definitions and classifications, and on the 
enhancement of skills and understanding of those who record 
the information - medical records officers, pay clerks and 
operational staff. As for timeliness, modern technology 
holds out the promise of genuine and lasting progress 
through the ability to update information easily, to access 
well structured stored data and the potential to use 
existing or create new analyses and management capability" 
(Korner 1983a pi).
The Steering Group was concerned to "break the vicious 
circle of underuse of information and poor quality of data 
collected" and to do this it proposed as a central feature 
of its recommendations a minimum data set. "By identifying 
and recommending a minimum set of data, we imply that a 
District Health Authority and its officers who are not 
regularly using such data are handicapped by being 
inadequately informed when fulfilling their 
responsibilities" (DHSS 1982 para 2.5).
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As summarised by a Regional Administrator at the time, the 
Steering Group's approach was "radically different to that 
which preceded it. No longer are the data collected to be 
determined be a top downward view of the service; for the 
future they are to be determined by the needs of management 
(in the broadest sense) at the operational level. The data 
to be collected are to be determined by reference to a 
comprehensive overview of the needs of the management of the 
NHS and no longer are data to be conjured up in response to 
central ad hoc enquiries" (Fairey 1983 pl82).
2.1.4 WORKING GROUPS
The establishment of joint NHS/DHSS working groups was not 
novel. However, despite attempts to achieve balanced 
representation there is always a suspicion, whether or not 
it is justified, that the DHSS manages to exercise a 
powerful influence on the conduct of affairs in a variety of 
ways. Mrs Korner was keen to ensure that her secretariat 
owed their allegiance to her and not to the branches of the 
DHSS from which they were seconded (King 1985) . The only 
full time member of the secretariat drawn from the NHS was a 
medical records officer. This indicated Mrs Korner's 
determination that ensure that changes to information 
systems was not jeopardised by lack of commitment from 
medical records officers who traditionally had little 
influence in organisational decision-making.
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2.2. DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING
A number of sub-committees were set up covering a areas of 
work such as : hospital facilities, laboratory and
scientific services, paramedical services, community health 
services, patient transport, manpower and finance. All of 
the sub-committees worked in a similar fashion. Given the 
guiding principles discussed above, their first step was to 
identify the information requirements of a district health 
authority and its management team. This did not involve the 
development of a theoretical model. Indeed there was a clear 
bias towards drawing on the practical knowledge of health 
service managers. In the second stage, the sub-committees 
were supplemented by representatives from the regional 
health authorities and central government who had to justify 
any additional requirements of these higher tiers. The 
change in emphasis from the meeting the demands of the 
centre to meeting local needs at District level in the work 
of the Korner committees is reflected in the comment that 
"There have been very few cases to date where such (central) 
demands have been conceded" made by Mrs Korner and the 
Secretary to the Steering group (Korner and Mason, 1983 
P61) .
The third stage was to develop definitions and 
classifications for the data items which needed to be 
collected. Once this had been done, each subcommittee 
produced an interim report which, if approved by the 
Steering Group, was released for piloting and consultation.
The fourth stage, piloting and consultation, lasted about
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three months, before a final report was prepared for the 
Secretary of State.
2.3 COMMUNICATIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
The Steering Group was concerned with improving 
communications with the service since it believed that it 
needed to "create an environment which encourages the 
efficient collection, collation, processing and transmission 
of data" (Korner and Mason 1983 p60). To do this it started 
an unprecedented sales campaign which penetrated every part 
of the service. In addition to the traditional civil service 
method of writing to the administrator of each health 
authority and the relevant professional organisations, it 
was decided to mount a nation-wide marketing campaign. By 
arranging a series of day seminars round the country at 
which those involved in preparing the interim reports were 
able to present their findings, "not only is a better 
understanding of the work achieved but also valuable 
criticisms are made which influence the content and format 
of the final reports." (Korner and Mason 1983 p61-2) . Over 
1500 people attended the marketing seminars which preceded 
the preparation of the Final Report of the first working 
group on hospital clinical activity. Magazine articles, 
interviews, public appearances at annual professional 
conferences were established. There were, in particular, a 
variety of initiatives to assist with the training of data 
collectors, issuing standard training packages using 
videocassettes and interactive computer learning methods.
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Occasional papers were produced which were based on the 
results of workshops held with first or second in line staff 
from the NHS. They were intended to help the Steering Group
develop and disseminate ideas that related to other areas of
its remit. The topics which the papers covered illustrate 
the expanding conceptions of what information management was 
beginning to encompass
Introducing IT in the district office; a
study carried out in one health district.
Developing a district IT policy; the development of a 
district policy for the introduction of IT with 
particular emphasis on the implementation of 
computerised departmental systems.
Converting data into information; the management 
arrangements for collecting valid clinical data 
and setting up a district information service.
Enabling clinical work; the organisational arrangements 
required to enable hospital clinical work, based 
on studies done in five districts.
Providing a district library service; the contribution 
library services can make to the provision and use 
of information in the NHS.
Making data credible; the setting, achieving and 
monitoring of data standards, particularly for 
clinical activity data.
2.4 MONITORING AND CONTROL
The processes of monitoring and control in the development 
of Korner policy were characterised by their openness. 
Whilst most national committees deliberate in secret, the
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deliberations of the Steering Group and its sub-committees 
were open to all who wished to have them. The sub-committees 
discussed their findings widely with colleagues throughout 
the NHS. King, in commenting on this "novel twist" notes 
that "British public servants take some convincing that work 
is not best conducted in secret, and there was some danger 
that working openly would inhibit the working groups' 
activities. However, they soon became accustomed to 
explaining, consulting and negotiating and, consequently, 
remained in touch with what was acceptable and therefore 
possible" (King 1985 p8).
The work of the Sub-Committees proceeded at different paces. 
Work began on the first report in 1980. It was published in 
final form in 1982. Other reports followed at intervals. The 
reports on patient transport, manpower, community, finance 
and confidentiality of data reports were published in 1984, 
a supplement to the First and Fourth reports on maternity 
services in 1985 and a report from the joint working group 
with the Faculty of Community Medicine in 1987. Although 
there was a great deal of work to be done on each report, 
there was sufficient time allocated to ensure that each one 
could proceed to a timeframe that suited the subject matter 
and the procedural guidelines for each sub-committee. The 
Steering Committee retained monitoring and control through 
cross-membership, and the production of progress reports, 
minutes etc.
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3 KNOWLEDGEBASES
3.1 PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE
The Health Service had been managed, both locally and 
nationally, by managers who were well able to use practical 
knowledge and experience about "how to go on" in a situation 
where they might be deluged with data but in an information 
desert. The Korner approach was to make use of this 
knowledge rather than rely on the views of non-NHS 
management information experts.
The piloting exercise, as part of the consultation stage, 
was, as an exercise in field testing policy proposals, an 
important innovation (Foster, 1983, Korner 1983b) . The
prime aim of piloting was to test the feasibility of 
capturing, collecting and coding the data items recommended 
in the interim reports. A Feasibility Study Steering Group 
decided which of the data items recommended needed piloting, 
and for how long. Four pilot districts were selected; they 
varied considerably in size, facilities their previous 
experience and expertise in handling information. For each 
interim report a protocol and management checklist was 
developed, detailing the points to be covered by piloting, 
and at the end of each trial, all the districts produced a 
report covering these points. After discussion a combined 
report was drafted, drawing together the similarities and 
differences between the districts. The composite reports 
were then presented to the Feasibility Study Steering Group 
for onward transmission to the drafters of the final report. 
When a final report was submitted to the main Steering Group
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for approval, copies of the districts' reports on piloting 
were available separately.
Thus in drawing on the practical knowledge of service 
managers the need to study what members of the organisation 
believed were practicable, affordable and feasible 
propositions was emphasised; it did not draw on the 
expertise of, for example, the information managers of 
health services in the USA or the private sector or indeed 
of large corporations, or produce its recommendations by 
relying on advice given by management consultants to a DHSS 
run committee. As Korner put it "The proposals... can truly 
be said to have been developed by the NHS for the NHS. If 
they err, they err in the direction of frugality and 
pragmatism" (Korner 1983a p2). It was also clearly intended 
to develop a corporate stock of knowledge about how to 
improve information management in the NHS.
3.2 ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY
The Korner approach was to win the "hearts and minds" of 
senior management as well as the data collection clerks. It 
hoped that its approach to piloting, consultation, marketing 
and training would disseminate acceptable findings widely, 
and that there would be a cultural shift towards an 
appreciation of information as a corporate resource to be
I
maintained and developed. If this did not happen, then the 
NHS as a whole would find it difficult to demonstrate that 
it was getting value for money from the resources allocated 
to it and would be unable to produce the information
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necessary to compete successfully with other claims on the 
national economy. Given the squeeze on resources, 
particularly in the recession of the early eighties, the 
development of Korner policy found an organisation 
interested in remembering rather than forgetting the 
recommendations.
The "uniqueness" value of Korner's name was utilised to the 
full. Although it is accepted that reports are known by the 
chairman's name, in the case of the Korner her name came to 
signify much more. For example there were "Korner Klubs" 
set up in different parts of the U.K. in which practical 
examples of information and IT systems in use were 
demonstrated and discussed. "Korner" has certainly become a 
part of the memory of managers at all levels in the NHS. In 
more concrete terms, the Korner remit included considering 
how library services could be improved. It was recognised 
that "a library service is an essential component of the 
information handling activity of the NHS. Its role is to 
locate, collect, organise and disseminate information of all 
types and from many different sources and subject areas, 
both inside and outside the health service, including those 
in non-paper form" (Fairey 1985 p4). The proposals contained 
in the occasional papers series emphasised the role of 
libraries as a corporate resource, structured so that they 
are useful to all staff. They also noted that the efficiency 
with which libraries store documents and retrieve and 
disseminate information can be enhanced by the use of IT and 
IT networks, e.g. on-line (and full-text) databases, local 
systems for information handling at district and regional
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level, and microcomputers acting as terminals at the local 
or departmental level. It also suggested that information 
about developments within districts should be widely 
disseminated to avoid duplication of effort in securing 
suitable hardware and software.
3.3 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
As the "guiding principles" suggest, the approach adopted by 
Mrs Korner and the Steering Group to developing Korner 
policy was radical in that it developed and used a new set 
of rules. The data collection systems and statutory returns 
had developed since 1948 in response to both local and 
national requirements. For example, in 1949 a 10% sample of 
all discharges from all non-mental hospitals had been 
introduced (indicating for each patient, administrative, 
social and medical details, such as age, sex, domicile, 
admission and discharge dates, source of admission, 
diagnosis, operations, specialty and discharge or death). 
This had been extended in 19 69 to 100% coverage, with the 
introduction of the Hospital Activity Analysis system, to 
provide doctors and administrators with an information 
system whose primary use was in the answering of ad hoc 
local enquiries, rather than in the management of hospitals. 
(Barr 1977). Although, the timeliness, accuracy and 
relevance of the data available from these systems was 
widely criticised, the national initiatives embodied in the 
1974 reorganisation and its associated planning and 
monitoring systems had focused on the management and 
administrative structures needed nationally, with hospitals
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and health authorities only needing to be concerned that 
their data output met these requirements; the means they 
used to produce the necessary data were a matter of local 
concern. It was to overcome these uncertainties that the 
piloting exercises were undertaken to determine what data 
could be captured and processed locally.
Although the Steering Group produced minimum data sets for 
operational use in districts, their focus was on their 
usefulness if converted to information; it was not concerned 
with the data definitions or structures needed for 
computerisation. Indeed, one of the obvious omissions from 
the Steering Group was any member with computing expertise. 
The IT approach of Korner was to encourage dissemination of 
low cost micro-based solutions via publications, Korner Klub 
presentations etc. and sponsor the development of a 
Management Information Pilot Project as a low cost IT 
solution in Bromsgrove and Redditch District. This only 
started in late 1983 when the First Report had already been 
published; it extended to include hospital patient activity, 
manpower, financial and community health service information 
systems. However, these solutions were low cost because they 
were statistical rather than person-based systems. The 
minimum data sets could be produced, but many doubted 
whether this gave managers below the District level the 
operational information they needed. However, the Korner 
approach carefully emphasised that the data sets were to be 
regarded as "minimum" sets, with managers within each 
district wishing to amplify them in ways that provided them 
with the information they needed. Nevertheless, when
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resources were scarce, there was always the danger that the 
minimum would become the norm. It was essential, therefore, 
that the Korner approach had got it right.
However, the Report of a Joint Working Group of the Korner 
Committee on Health Services Information and the Faculty of 
Community Medicine commented that "the Steering Group failed 
to take account of the data processing revolution of the 
last twenty years ...the exploitation of modern data 
acquisition, data transmission and data analysis methods was 
almost totally neglected" (Knox 1987 p6). Indeed, it was
evident that the IT implications for implementing the Korner 
proposals were substantial, and that few Authorities would 
have all the systems in place by 1 April 1987 (see Chapter 5 
Section 8.2).
4 ASSESSMENTS OF THE KORNER REPORTS
4.1 PRODUCT
4.1.1 SCANNING AND SELECTION
Rather than focus directly on the content of the Korner 
reports as a product for intelligence, the following section 
briefly summarises their limitations in this respect.
The Korner reports gave a comprehensive assessment of the 
information requirements in the reports they made. But these 
reports were not a comprehensive assessment of health 
service information requirements. In brief, the limitations 
were largely because the scope of their terms of reference 
did not include the Family Practitioner Services^ and
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focused on operational requirements only.
The restricted scope of the Steering Group's considerations 
was made clear at a meeting between representatives of the 
Steering Group itself and the Faculty of Community Medicine 
held at the DHSS on 11 November 1981. "A distinction was 
made between (a) 'strategic' information related to the 
'needs for and effectiveness of health care 
information...predominantly information about health, health 
status, and the effectiveness of services' and (b) 
'operational' information ...concerned predominantly with 
the processes of health care and the...use of resources'. 
The Steering Group concentrated upon the second of these and 
regarded the first as largely outside its terms of 
reference." (Knox 1987 p9). This is a sobering reflection on 
the perceived role of a District Health authority and its 
officers. The Korner approach did justice to a remit that 
was taken to encompass management information needed for 
managing, and demonstrating the case for, resources. Hence 
its acceptance of the aggregate data needed in minimum data 
sets. But what of the requirements of those district 
officers charged with the "strategic" issues, such as the 
District Medical Officer? It must be assumed that the Korner 
Steering Group believed that the information requirements of 
community physicians and District Medical Officers could be 
met from the collation of minimum data sets together with 
data from other sources.
It is also evident that fully informed decisions about 
health care needs, and the effectiveness of health care
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programmes (for example cervical cancer screening, 
vaccination and immunisation programmes) cannot take place 
without knowledge of the work of GPs. The information 
requirements of the Family Practitioner Services, as opposed 
to the Hospital and Community Health Services, were outside 
the remit of the Korner reports because they were a 
completely separate component of the NHS. This is clearly 
another weakness in any serious attempt to construct 
information systems that can provide all managers, whether 
GPs, community or hospital doctors and nurses, as well as 
District and FPC level managers with the information 
appropriate to the objectives of providing a service as 
outlined earlier.
4.1.2 DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING
Little attention was paid to how the data was to be used. 
Interestingly, given that the minimum data set was a new 
concept in NHS information systems, there were no "worked 
examples" of how the data sets could be used. It was, 
perhaps, symptomatic of the reluctance of the Korner 
approach to be seen as prescriptive? the style was to 
provide a (minimum) framework and encourage managers to 
develop their own local variations, and take advantage of 
the education and training initiatives available. One book 
was commissioned, however, which did address the issues of 
using information, but it was written to assist members of 
health authorities rather than practitioners in the service 
(Day 1985).
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The comprehensive planning for local services was in fact 
restricted by the RAWP methodology. This is because the 
funds allocated to Districts under the RAWP formula were 
based on the resident population, but adjusted for cross­
boundary flows. Thus the health needs of the resident 
population (despite the espoused planning theories on which 
Districts were defined) were not of primary concern to the 
District management, although they are of course very much 
the concern of the managers of Community Health Services. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that the Korner reports did 
not concern themselves with the development of, for example, 
minimum data sets for District profiles of the population 
(See Chapter 5 Section 8.1 and Chapter 6). From the 
perspective of organisational intelligence, this lack of 
knowledge about the demographic context is a major weakness 
in the organisation of the NHS pre-Review. That is not to 
say that community physicians did not concern themselves 
with health care planning to address this issue, but with 
the abandonment of annual reports on the state of the Public 
Health (a legal responsibility of the Local Authority 
Medical Officers of Health pre-1974) the weight given to 
this aspect of organisational intelligence by District 
management was very light. It is regrettable that the 
community medicine input to the Korner process was not 
stronger and earlier.
4.1.3 COMMUNICATIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
The Steering Group, as indicated in Section 2.3, paid 
considerable attention to communications and knowledge 
organisation, though neither the promotional videos not the
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computer aided learning packages for data collectors were 
wholly successful. But in essence, the messages were clear 
and understood. A message sent too late (when it was clear 
that interim aggregate IT systems were needed) concerned the 
details of the IT implications of full implementation in the 
timescales agreed.
4.1.4 MONITORING AND CONTROL
Some other aspects of information, relevant in the context 
of organisational intelligence, that were not considered 
include the development of measures of outcome and quality. 
In the 1980s there has been a rapidly increasing literature 
on these issues in the NHS, but it was not substantial when 
the Korner reports were being produced. Similarly, nothing 
was said about medical audit, although the concept of data 
audits formed an important part of efforts to improve the 
quality of data.
Although not a limitation of the Korner reports, their 
impact on the development of Health Service Indicators was 
to vastly increase the potential range of indicators 
available (DHSS 1988a). The pathological consequences of 
overloading managers, and the indicator production systems, 
with too many detailed Korner indicators, have become 
apparent later (see Chapter 5 Section 2.1 and Chapter 9 
Section 4.5.3.3).
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The Korner reports do not indicate any clear policy towards 
the integration of data sets with each other, or with other 
sources of data or indeed on the needs for data linkage. For 
example, as Knox (1987) points out, there is no attempt in 
the Fifth Report (on Community Health Services) to link 
immunisation programmes with infectious disease: notification 
or contact tracing, or even to envisage the information- 
necessities which follow from the more general adoption of 
eradication programmes. Also the basic requirements for any 
information system oriented towards improving health care 
provided to patients and populations (as opposed to 
accounting for the processes of its delivery) must include 
some form of patient identifier. The Fifth Report was the 
only one to indicate accept the need for patient 
identifiers, but left their nature unstated. However, the 
introduction of postcodes was a major step towards being 
able to vastly increase the resolution level of analyses. 
For example, the ability to link postcodes to enumeration 
districts enabled the number of areas within Ealing Health 
Authority for which routinely available data on 
patient/population ratios could be analysed to increase from 
3 to 590.
An important knowledgebase omitted from the reports was the 
FPC register. FPC registers contain lists of patients 
registered with GPs within the FPC boundaries. However, FPCs 
were by no means fully computerised, nor were their records 
fully postcoded. Nevertheless, it was clear that the 
information recorded in the FPC registers had the potential
4.1.5 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
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to serve as population registers for Districts as well as 
FPCs and also for operational registers e.g. for cervical 
cancer screening, and as a technical link for combining 
information assembled under the different record linking 
systems of different Authorities.
Concern with the training and education needs of data 
collectors has already been mentioned, and the needs of 
information specialists was met, to some extent, by the 
promotion by the Steering Group of a day release course at 
Warwick University and at the King's Fund College. But as 
Chapter 5 Section 6.1 indicates, the training of information 
specialists had not progressed substantially by 1990.
4.2 CONTEXT
The changes in the management, information and IT contexts 
in which Korner policy was to be develop have been sketched. 
It can be argued that any rational model of policy making 
would suggest that something like the Steering Group should 
have been launched at least a decade earlier, for two 
reasons. Firstly, the documentary evidence as already 
discussed indicates that the need for such work was 
universally recognised. Secondly, the growing awareness of 
the uses and accessibility of information technology should 
have meant the design of an appropriate information system 
preceding, not following, the debates about information 
technology. It has been suggested that whatever prompted the 
creation of the Steering Group "the crucially relevant 
factor was not change in information technology nor
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information production, though these obviously played some 
part, but change in the political and economic environment 
in which the NHS operates."(Klein and Scrivens 1985 pl4).
As discussed in Section 1, in the historical and political 
context it was appropriate that there should be a wide 
ranging review of information systems, and the continuing 
squeeze on resources meant that information was becoming 
less of an optional extra, and more an essential 
requirement. The need was clear for better quality 
information for the NHS Planning system, and for (improving 
the RAWP formula for) resource allocation. During the course 
of the Steering Group's work the need for improved 
information systems for general management was further 
emphasised by the NHS Management Inquiry (Griffiths 1983).
Those concerned directly with information systems, whether 
as consumers or producers, were well aware of the need to 
make them more responsive to the needs of local management 
and of the need to develop an expert information function 
below the Area and Regional levels.
The major area of difficulty was with concurrent 
developments of policy for IT. The terms of reference for 
the Steering Group gave it the remit to review not only the 
data but to provide "the accepted route for seeking changes 
to, or developments in, health information systems" (DHSS 
1979b). However, the wide terms of reference failed to 
distinguish between the respective responsibilities of the 
Korner Steering Group, reviewing data content (but also
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responsible for the promotion of information technology), 
and the CPC concerned with management information systems. 
Once the former group started to encourage local information 
rather than national standard systems, "it was inevitable 
that these two bodies, led by strong, skilful and persuasive 
chairmen, would find collaboration difficult" (Peel 1985).
4.3 EXPERIENCE
The policy problem given to the Steering Group was novel: 
there had never been a such a comprehensive review of the 
data and information requirements of the NHS before. It came 
at a time when the limitations of a centralised bureaucratic 
system had been exposed, and the attractions of an
organisational structure that espoused to put the "patient 
first" were becoming more evident. The response to such a 
situation could have been to rely on the well tried method, 
familiar to the civil service, of a review held in camera 
with experts called to give their views.
However, Mrs Korner clearly did not believe this to be an 
appropriate response and in executing this task there were 
some novel approaches used. For example, the establishment 
of a joint NHS/DHSS Steering Group with an open access
policy to the deliberations of the Steering Group and its 
sub-committees (see 2.3 above), and a secretariat appointed 
directly by the Chairman. The emphasis on a bottom-up policy
of putting District needs first and working on the
hypothesis that what Regions and the DHSS require will be a 
sub-set of this was novel. The introduction of piloting
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interim recommendations before issuing the final report was 
novel in this context.
But, the development of Korner policy, relied on many 
component processes being defined, established, working, and 
producing output that could be co-ordinated to meet the 
overall objectives of report production and acceptance. For 
example, the establishment of Sub-Committees to examine 
particular aspects of the problem was a routine task, and 
the stages which each sub-committee was expected to proceed 
through became routine, as did the piloting procedures of 
the interim recommendations. To the extent that the sub­
committee could be "left to get on with it" the process had 
become automatised.
4.4 SUMMARY
The role played by Mrs Korner as chairman of the Steering 
Committee proved to be central. Her selection, and that of 
the secretariat and Working Group members, together with 
their orientation to a "bottom up" approach to defining what 
the problems were to be solved was an appropriate, and 
innovative, response to the brief to guide the future 
development of information. It recognised that the vicious 
circles of underuse of data which had resulted from a 
centralist "top-down" approach, and methodically decomposed 
the problems of defining the stages of work to be done; 
sufficient time was allocated for proper debate about the 
data items needed at DHA level, and the extent of the subset 
of them needed at the centre. Whilst the Steering Committee 
was clearly responsible for the final decisions made, they
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ensured that the proposals had been tested beforehand.
As far as getting the message transmitted that major changes 
were underway, the varied approaches succeeded in conveying 
that major changes to information and data collection 
systems were planned, but not their IT implications.
The details of the monitoring and control of the 
knowledgework processes are not available for analysis, but 
it is clear that joint working in "open" sessions were an 
important and appropriate part of the process of refining 
the proposals.
The knowledgebases drawn on were those of local NHS experts, 
not "external" management consultants or "central" civil 
servants. Practical knowledge from pilot studies emphasised 
the need for more skills in data collection and management. 
A deliberate attempt was made to improve the organisational 
"memory" by storing in it the "performance programs" (in the 
form of innovative, if not entirely successful, teaching 
materials) that could be used to train and educate data 
collectors. Also library resources were featured as an 
important resource for knowledgeworkers.
In the process of developing their reports, the Korner 
Committee was clearly concerned about the issue of the data 
available, and its management. But, there was a major 
weakness in their terms of reference, and thus throughout 
the process and product, namely the exclusion of any
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explicit concern with the IT issues. This reflects the 
embryonic stages of information management in the NHS in 
general, and of the policy divisions at the centre between 
IT and information. For the whole of the 1980s information 
and IT were presented as two separate, though complementary 
services. Whilst Korner was concerned to improve the use of 
information as a corporate resource, the product could never 
be one which dealt with information systems (ie. information 
and IT).
As a policy for organisational intelligence, the Korner 
Committee patently ignored the strategic issues, focusing on 
the operational. But, this meant that the information issues 
selected were too restricted. Although aimed at the decision 
makers at District level, there was little attention given 
to how the data could be used, or effectively presented 
either at District, or Unit level for the purposes of 
decision making or planning (e.g. concerning population 
health needs), monitoring and control, although the new data 
sets were to have a major impact on the number of Health 
Service Indicators available.
Were the processes and product contextually appropriate? The 
processes enabled the NHS to fit somewhat better into its 
political and economic environment, and at the time the work 
began understanding of the idea that information management 
embraced information systems was not widely accepted. The 
processes adopted did, however, take full account of the 
needs of local managers, and adopted an "in-house" approach 
which was, on balance, an appropriate one.
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CHAPTER 9
1 INTRODUCTION
To understand the information requirements of the NHS post­
Review the chapter is presented in three parts. Firstly, the 
development of the NHS Review itself is considered. This 
provides the context within which to consider, secondly, the 
component processes of Project 34, which defined the 
information requirements of the NHS post-Review. Thirdly, 
the intended outcome of the these process are then 
considered with respect to the changes in information 
systems.
All three parts use the basic framework of organisational 
intelligence, although with variations on it as appropriate.
2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NHS REVIEW
2.1 CONTEXT
2.1.1 POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL
The work preceding the 1974 reorganisation and the 1982 
"Patients First" reorganisation were preceded by lengthy 
political debate, work commissioned from management 
consultants and a Royal Commission. In many respects, this 
approach to policy development was mirrored by the work of 
the Korner Committee, in that its deliberations were 
measured, intentionally thorough and in essence open to 
being influenced by informed public debate (see Chapter 8).
THE INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE NHS POST-REVIEW
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However, the style of policy development changed with the 
proposals made by Griffiths (1983). The short, sharp, report 
compiled by Griffiths was made after consulting within the 
service, and though it was evident that the terms of
reference were going to focus on the introduction of some 
form of "general management", the speed with which it was 
produced contrasted with previous proposals to reorganise
the NHS. The thinking behind the Griffiths review echoed
Conservative policy towards emphasis on applying the
benefits of private sector management ethos and techniques 
in the public sector. The continuing development of general 
management in the NHS underlay the simple Conservative 1987 
election manifesto statement that "we will continue to 
improve the health service. We will continue to ensure that 
the service is as efficient as possible". The Conservative 
slogan for the election was simply that "The NHS is safe in 
our hands". It appeared that the Conservatives did not 
intend a radical overhaul of the NHS in their third term.
Nevertheless, the election exposed the NHS as an electoral 
liability for the Conservatives, and shortly after it John 
Moore, the Health and Social Services Secretary, was ordered 
to start work on an internal review of the NHS which "could 
cause sweeping changes, including the first privately- 
managed NHS hospitals and long term plans for managers and 
doctors to run 'opted out' hospitals under existing health 
authorities." (Hencke and Hildrew 1987). Demonstrable 
improvements were needed in the third term before a radical 
reorientation towards establishing some form of health care
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market in the fourth term.
However, during the last three months of 1987 the NHS was 
rarely out of the headlines. Shortages of staff, ward 
closures, cancelled operations and lengthening waiting lists 
were being reported almost daily. In an unprecedented 
statement the presidents of the Royal Colleges warned that 
the hospital services were close to breaking point. In 
December an extra £101 million pounds was made available. 
The essence of the debate was whether the NHS provided value 
for money, and if it did whether additional resources were 
needed. By mid-December it was reported that senior cabinet 
ministers believed the controversy over the performance of 
the NHS was so deep-rooted and damaging to the Government 
that it could not be solved by continual injections of extra 
funds and there was talk amongst members of the Cabinet 
inner circle about a far-reaching overhaul. (Wood and 
Webster 1987).
But, it was not until mid-January 1988 that the Prime 
Minister became convinced. By Monday 25th January "'She made 
a political judgement and it came quite rapidly' said one of 
those involved in what turned out to be a rare example of a 
public Thatcher U-turn" (Jones, M 1988); that evening on a 
Panorama program she let the news slip under pressure in 
questions on possible co-operation between the public and 
private health sectors that "we're considering those matters 
and looking at all the possibilities...we're considering all 
of those things". This turnaround and the launch of a full- 
scale review was unexpected, both by the Opposition and by
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the NHS as a whole.
2.2.2 GOALS AND THEORIES
There was no shortage of proffered goals and theories. As 
narrated by the Opposition's spokesman, Robin Cook, "When 
Mrs Thatcher sprang her NHS Review.. the announcement 
released a spate of monographs from the new seminaries of 
economic liberalism, each peddling their pet scheme for an 
alternative market model for the Health Service. Seasoned 
Thatcher watchers could tell that this was an orchestrated 
barrage to soften up public opinion for the Government to 
move against the NHS" (Cook 1989). A variety of proposals 
for Health Maintenance Organisations were put forward by Ray 
Whitney, a former Tory Health Minister, and Leon Brittan, 
the former Home Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. 
All the main policy centres including the Centre for Policy 
Studies and the Adam Smith Institute, produced papers. The 
No Turning back group of right-wing Tory MPs demanded tax 
relief for the elderly as a minimum concession. The Treasury 
and the Prime Minister's Policy Unit had both privately 
studied the proposals for an internal NHS market advocated 
by Alain Enthoven (1985). Left-wing Tories, such as Barney 
Hayhoe produced reports and the Reform Group advised the 
chancellor not to use available resources for tax cuts, but 
to meet the pressing needs of the NHS (Carvel 1988a).
The Prime Minister indicated her backing for the concept of 
an "internal market", but John Moore argued for people to be 
able to contract out of the National Insurance if they took
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out a private medical insurance. The long-term Conservative 
agenda, it was suggested, includes the gradual privatisation 
of individual hospitals or small groups of hospitals which 
would provide services at an agreed price for the publicly- 
funded NHS. (Carvell 1988b), but Kenneth Clarke, who 
succeeded John Moore in July 1988 denied that the review of 
the service had ever been intended to end in privatisation. 
To the Conservative Party Conference in October 1988 he 
explained that "Our goal must surely be to promote 
excellence and to regard efficiency. So the better the GP 
and the better the hospital the more patients and income 
they should be able to attract. The less good, for the first 
time, should have the real spur of competition to encourage 
them to perform as well as the best." (Jones 1988). It would 
seem that the goals and theories shifted as the review 
progressed, but the underlying theme was to be able to 
present a radical review of the NHS, to reorientate it to 
run on "market" lines, but to avoid the charge that the NHS 
was being destroyed.
2.2 KNOWLEDGEWORK PROCESSES
In presenting an account of the processes that produced the 
"Working for Patients" White Paper, the accounts of action 
are necessarily derived. Nevertheless, the framework of 
considering the processes of scanning and selection, 
decision-making and planning, communications and knowledge 
organisation and monitoring and control provide an 
appropriate framework with which to analyse what the 
sequence of what happened.
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2.2.1 SCANNING AND SELECTION
Having announced that there would be a review, the Prime 
Minister then had to select the means of carrying it out. 
She did not want a Royal Commission which would produce a 
politically unacceptable answer. Instead her first actions 
were to opt for the tried and tested method of an internal 
review chaired by herself. This gave her more influence over 
the outcome of the inquiry than any "independent" report. 
Also, while holding the whole inquiry in camera avoided the 
problem of voluminous correspondence from the public, 
contributions from competing think-tanks could be invited. 
The members included the Chancellor, Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury, the Secretary of state for Social Services, the 
Minister of State for Health and the deputy chairman of the 
NHS management board. They were supported by senior and 
trusted Civil Servants from the Downing Street Policy Unit, 
the Treasury and the DHSS.
2.2.2 DECISION-MAKING AND PLANNING
However, by May 1988 it was also evident to observers that 
the Prime Ministerial team had got bogged down in the deluge 
of advice and were in danger of losing their way. Decisions 
had to be made on the way forward. In early May, as related 
by Colin Brown (1989), John Moore submitted a paper 
advocating splitting the financing and delivery of the NHS. 
This was agreed. But a strenuous internal debate was 
intensified by Mr Moore's submission of a range of ideas for 
allowing patients to opt out of the NHS into private health 
care. Nigel Lawson had strongly argued against tax relief
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and other opt-out ideas on the ground that it offered 
incentives to those who had already decided to act, but then 
shifted his ground, submitting a paper dropping Treasury 
opposition in principle to some form of opt-out. This helped 
to put the review back on track.
In mid-May the Prime Minister tried to freshen up her own 
ideas by going outside Government for information. She held 
a private seminar at Chequers for NHS managers and others 
intimately involved in the NHS with Tory sympathies to find 
out how they felt the review should go. Another turning 
point was the departure of John O'Sullivan of the Downing 
Street Policy Unit and his pressure for some form of Health 
Maintenance Organisation. This was quickly followed by the 
decision to split the DHSS into two parts in the July 
reshuffle and the appointment of Mr Clarke as Secretary of 
State for Health. At the same time, an alliance between the 
Adam Smith Institute and the No Turning Back Group sought to 
provide more subtle changes, using the Policy Unit at No. 10 
to put forward its package. The Prime Minister held informal 
dinners with up to 2 0 members of the Group and junior 
ministers to discuss the proposed changes. This stiffened 
her resolve for tax relief for the elderly and convinced her 
that the "internal market" reforms were the way forward. 
(Hencke 1989). The results of the Review were not finally 
agreed and launched until January 1989.
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2.2.3 COMMUNICATIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
Communications from the NHS to the review team 
had. been severely restricted whilst the decisions were being 
made as to what the findings of the Review would be, and the 
corollary was that a massive effort had to be made to 
communicate and "sell" its results. The contents of the White 
Paper were leaked three weeks before it was published. This 
gave both Opposition and Government time to test reactions 
and present their case more effectively when it was 
published on 31st January 1989. The White Paper's importance 
to the Government was shown by the £1 million closed-circuit 
telecast by Mr Clarke from Limehouse to 2,200 NHS chairmen, 
managers, and senior doctors and nurses. There were links to 
six cities. The Limehouse audience were allowed to submit 
questions in writing, but with no follow-up questions. 
Health ministers then ran six "roadshows" to sell the 
reforms to NHS staff in Birmingham, Newcastle, Nottingham, 
Bristol, Manchester and Leeds over the next three days. 
Every District General Manager was given a presentation pack, 
professionally packaged and designed, to help "cascade" 
information about the reforms throughout their organisation.
It contained a 20 minute video in which the Secretary of 
State for Health outlined the White Paper; speaking notes 
and overhead projector transparencies of the key points to 
help managers present the main proposals in more detail; and 
a "question and answer" brief covering the issues that might 
be raised. Nothing had been attempted on this scale before 
in the NHS.
Whilst the expensive efforts made to cascade information
361
down the organisation from the initial Limehouse broadcast 
succeeded in getting the Government's message across quickly 
to middle managers, thereby avoiding the dilution of the 
messages from criticism, considerable expectations, and 
apprehensions, were raised. The initial language used was 
full of phrases such as "budgets", "contracts", "market", 
"purchasers", "opting out", and expectations were raised for 
substantial changes from 1 April 1991 with up to. By mid 
1990, however, the messages being communicated to the public 
and the service have a different gloss. The words "contract" 
and "market" do not feature in the booklet sent to all 
households in 1990 (at a cost of a further £3 million) . 
Instead the term "arrangements" is used. GPs may now wish to 
become "Fund" rather than "budget" holders. Districts will 
become "commissioners" of services, rather than 
"purchasers". The phrase "self-governing" is now used to 
avoid the implication that some hospitals may "opt out" of 
the NHS. Managers in the service are being told to plan for 
a "smooth take-off" and of the NHS Management Executive's 
wish to avoid any "hard-landings". There are to be "no 
surprises" and the emphasis in contracting in the first year 
is now to establish block contracts that reflect current 
referral patterns. In other words, as the complexities of 
making such a transition and the uncertainties of the 
marketing approach become apparent, it is prudent now to 
emphasise continuity wherever possible.
Having launched the Review, the next phase was to monitor 
and control its implementation. In fact the "Working for
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Patients" White Paper did not contain much detail on the key 
proposals. These were to follow in a series of Working 
Papers. The first 8 were heralded at the launch of the White 
Paper, others, including one on information systems, were 
produced later.
2.2.4 MONITORING AND CONTROL
The monitoring and control processes of the development of 
the White Paper are not available, but monitoring and 
control is needed to ensure its proposals become enacted. In 
the Department of Health, the proposals contained in the 
White Paper before its launch were known only to a very 
select few. Once the document had been produced, the 
implications had to be teased out and all the detailed 
matters of policy agreed. To do this, 34 projects were 
identified. Their briefs varied, but the essence was the 
same: determine as soon as possible what is needed to make 
the Review work. The work of each project was analysed and 
presented in a standard flow chart by a central support 
unit, the software for which was made available to project 
managers. By requiring regular monthly reports, which soon 
became based on a standard set of issues (progress to date, 
slippage etc.) the intention was to enable each project 
manager, and staff, to know of and then keep in touch with 
the progress of related projects. This approach began in 
June 1989, but by February 1990 it was clear that a review 
of the number of projects was needed.
The appointment in January 1990 of a new Deputy Chief 
Executive (DCE), with specific responsibility for
363
implementing the NHS Review, soon focused on a selected 
subset of "Critical Results" projects. At the same time the 
focus of the work was changed from an emphasis on 
"development" to "delivery" mode, i.e. the time had come to 
switch from refining policy development and concentrate on 
activities and guidance to support implementation. The 
mechanistic co-ordination of the non-critical projects was 
dropped, as did the production of the flow charts.
The output from all the projects was made available to NHS 
managers in a variety of forms. But the common denominator 
was the "Briefing Pack for NHS Managers" which bundled up 
key documents, or summaries and publicity etc. and made it 
available to all NHS managers.
An important innovation in efforts to improve control of the 
implementation work in the Regions, has been the 
introduction, in May 1990, of a "Regional contract". In 
these contracts, which are agreed with the NHS Management 
Executive, are set out the specific actions on which Regions 
commit themselves to deliver, and, when finalised, they are 
regarded as a component of the annual objective setting and 
performance review system.
2.3 KNOWLEDGEBASES
2.3.1 PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
Underlying the knowledgework processes discussed above, 
there are a number of underlying knowledgebases whose use 
needs to be briefly considered. Firstly, whilst the
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"practical knowledge" of key actors can only be surmised, it
is clear the approach taken to setting up the Review, once
the decision to have one had been taken, was one the Prime 
Minister had tried, tested and trusted. She knew how to go 
about conducting one in a style that suited her. On the 
other hand, the Secretary of State, John Moore, it was 
suggested, unlike his predecessor, Mr Norman Fowler, did not 
anticipate that Mrs Thatcher wanted action on the NHS. Mr 
Fowler, faced with rising social security costs, used a tip- 
off from the Treasury to sell his own plans to the Prime
Minister. He thus was able to control the social security
review of the early 1980s. Mr Moore was not in the same 
position, or, according to some sources, in the same league, 
so Mrs Thatcher, aided by her policy unit at No.10 could set 
the pace. "Mr Moore made the mistake of twice bringing to 
the committee plans for a separate health tax and a 
compulsory national insurance scheme to replace the present 
free service. Sources say Mr Moore arrived back at the DHSS 
'handbagged by Mrs Thatcher'". (Hencke 1989). It would 
appear that Mr Moore's practical knowledge of politics was 
insufficient to sustain him in office. His successor, Mr 
Clarke, was familiar with the Department, having been a 
Minister of State for Health under Norman Fowler. He had 
some "practical knowledge" of the way doctors, nurses and 
managers would react to the proposals, and was under no 
illusion as to the efforts that would be needed to win the 
"hearts and minds" of staff who believed that lack of 
resources were the essential problem, and were only just 
nearing completion of the introduction of general management
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after the Griffiths proposals in 1983/4.
2.3.2 ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY
The organisational memory of the 1974, 1982 and 1983/4
reorganisations were still influential in the scepticism 
with which many staff greeted the news of the Review. Once 
again it seemed as though a major review was being 
introduced for essentially political reasons, i.e. to 
deflect criticisms about lack of funding, and being done 
without using the knowledgebase that already existed in the 
NHS. The development of the proposals was conducted in 
think-tanks, and key members of the Review board, such as 
the Chancellor and First Secretary of the Treasury, had no 
first hand knowledge of running the NHS. However, this was 
presented as entirely appropriate on the basis of past 
experience, as discussed further below.
2.3.3 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
The essential evidence to support the need for a review, on 
the basis of indisputable needs to improve efficiency, came 
from Health Service Indicators. Putting this argument at the 
October 1988 Conservative conference, Mr Clarke said "There 
is still a huge gulf between the best and the worst of the 
service...Why is it that in one District Health Authority, 
only 4% of patients have to wait for treatment for over a 
year, whereas in the Health Authority bang next door, nearly 
a quarter of the patients have to? Why is it that one Health 
Authority treats an average of 29 patients per bed per year 
while another treats nearly 70? What we have to ensure is 
that the whole service becomes at least as good the best
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parts of it already are" (Jones J, 1988). Using the existing 
information systems in this way enabled an effective counter 
to the images of closures and cuts that dominated the media.
However, other interpretations of the available information, 
particularly if presented in a cross-national context 
revealed a different picture. Health economists, pointed out 
that the NHS is extremely cheap to manage, its 
administrative costs are amongst the lowest internationally. 
Apparently during the first stage of the review in February 
and March 1988, civil servants were sent abroad to find out 
how Britain could run its health service better. They 
returned to say that everywhere else performance was less 
efficient. Discussion then concentrated on how to spend 
limited sums of extra money more wisely (Carvel 1988b). The 
difficulty remains that although Health Service Indicators 
might indicate large variations in practice between 
hospitals "the causes of these are difficult to analyse let 
alone remedy because of poor management information, the 
product of low administrative costs and little incentive for 
managers to strive to 'confuse' their choices with such 
facts. There is evidence recently of more effective use of 
resources, for instance reduced length of stays, but the 
effects of this on the quality of care and outcomes are 
unknown" (Maynard 1989).
Whilst the information systems that comprised the 
knowledgebase of the NHS were used to provide contextually 
appropriate information to bolster opposing viewpoints on
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the need for reform of the NHS, their management was to be 
as radically altered as that of the general management 
arrangements of the NHS (see Section 4.5).
2.4 ASSESSMENTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NHS REVIEW
2.4.1 PRODUCT
The NHS Review may be examined as both a product of 
organisational intelligence and as a product for the 
generation of organisational intelligence. The latter is the 
concern of Section 4. Although its appropriateness in the 
political context cannot be assessed yet, the knowledgework 
processes can be commented on.
Firstly, what were the signals that indicated the need for a 
review? There was certainly no intelligence as news coming 
from within the NHS that indicated a desire for the switch 
to a market-based system. It was the interpretation by a few 
senior politicians in the Cabinet of the signals of "unrest" 
in the NHS as indicating the need for a review,.(rather than 
only providing additional resources), that was critical. The 
indicators available could readily be interpreted by them as 
legitimising the need for radical changes to alter seemingly 
endemic variations in performance. But, as Maynard and 
others pointed out, the health service indicators remain a 
blunt instrument. Whilst Government ministers deliberately 
began to stress the achievements of the NHS (on the Panorama 
programme Mrs Thatcher said that although much was heard of 
complaints, what was not talked about were the 45,000 
operations carried out every week), these were "internal" 
comparisons; "external" comparisons with other countries
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were publicised by the Opposition to demonstrate how cheap 
the NHS is to run, a view endorsed by the Social Services 
Committee of the House of Commons. Thus whilst there were 
undoubtedly signals indicating that the NHS was in 
difficulties, the selection of the "Review" response may not 
have been appropriate (at least for other than political 
reasons).
Given the decision to have a Review whose results were to be 
implemented before the next election, it was understandable 
that the decision-making process was not an "open" one in 
the way of a Royal Commission. Nevertheless there were a 
plethora of theories to select from. But those doing the 
selecting were for the most part politicians who needed to 
call in managers and hospital consultants from time to time 
to assess the proposed approaches. It was the "internal 
market" idea advanced by Enthoven that proved to be central; 
but this was because it reflected the ideology of the market 
that underpinned "Thatcherism". What was less evident was 
how such ideas demonstrably worked in practice in health 
care to provide as comparably cost-effective a service as 
that already being achieved by the NHS.
Whilst it is more likely that the implications and 
complexities of the management changes intended were not 
fully appreciated initially, (nor of their ramifications for 
the supporting information systems), it could be suggested 
that it is appropriate to talk up changes initially and get 
managers to believe that changes will happen, before
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refining the language and expectations as the start date  ^
draws closer and the details of changes needed become 
clearer.
For example, even while the Review was being conducted in 
secret, in May 1988 it was being suggested that "the message 
has got through that the service is geared too much to 
providers and not enough to consumers and that a better deal 
has got to be offered to the public. Although in many cases 
this has not yet permeated any deeper than rhetoric, it is 
still a startling shift in attitude, and it has to be said, 
one that would not have come about were it not for the 
Review. So there is talk now of short-term contracts for 
hospital consultants, reviewing their performance, 
questioning why there are such large variations in their 
workload. There is now the realisation that health service 
managers simply don't possess adequate information with 
which to evaluate the quality, rather than the quantity of 
the service they are providing." (Phillips 1988).
The Department, via its Management Briefing Packs, 
Ministerial speeches and the Management Executive's 
Newsletter, endeavoured to give advice and guidance, but, 
lacked any real intelligence as news concerning whether 
their intentions and plans were influencing operational 
practice. This reflected the lack of any existing means of 
conveying such information to the centre. Relying on reports 
from Regional General Managers was inadequate, and the 
Department only had first hand knowledge of progress in 
particular Districts as a result of the various enabling
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schemes that it supported via its Review projects. For 
example Project 26, which was concerned with the "New Roles 
of the District" sponsored development work in a number of 
Districts; similarly the NHS Trusts Unit had close 
relationships with potential Trust candidates. Although the 
Regional Liaison branch had close links with the service, 
there was no comprehensive intelligence system to enable 
progress and problems to be monitored. It was only by 
writing round to all RGMs, for example, and asking for 
information about the state of plans for invoicing and 
billing systems, that it became clear that there was a need 
for "interim" solutions.
Whilst a form of comprehensive intelligence system to 
monitor progress in introducing change in the NHS was 
introduced via the bureaucratically formal planning system 
after the 1974 reorganisation, this "rational comprehensive" 
approach has been succeeded by a progressively more 
decentralised, and increasingly more market oriented 
approach. In this context it seems appropriate that the 
solution to the problem should have been to formalise the 
intended and actual changes by means of the "Regional 
contracts". The debate then shifts to the level of detail it 
is necessary for them to contain. At the time of writing the 
first round of monitoring visits to discuss progress on the 
contracts is being undertaken. They will certainly be 
products which contain a great deal of intelligence-as-news.
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In the political context of a third Conservative government, 
given its perceived vulnerability on the issue in the 1987 
election campaign, and the other major items on the 
political agenda such as the Poll Tax, it was clearly 
thought inappropriate to have a fundamental review of the 
NHS. To resolve the crisis that developed over bed closures 
etc. in late 1987, the option favoured by most NHS staff was 
to provide additional resources and to develop further 
existing initiatives, (such as the Resource Management 
Initiative and Medical Audit - see Section 4.5.2.4) to 
improve value for money. Another full scale review, 
particularly one conducted in camera, was perceived as 
inappropriate, essentially because it avoided the central 
issue of adequate funding (Smith 1989). To the Prime 
Minister, however, it gave a much needed opportunity to be 
seen to be doing something, of taking the initiative. Indeed 
she wished initially to have the results of the Review 
available after 6 months or so. This may have been because 
she was aware of the central difficulty facing any change to 
an organisation of the size and complexity of the NHS - it 
takes time.
The range of options to be considered was considerable, and 
it was not surprising that it took 12 months to complete the 
review; even then the document was vague in important 
respects, not least of which was its lack of explicit 
appreciation of the changes to information systems needed - 
simply pointing to investment in IT for the Resource 
Management Initiative and practice budgets.
2.4.2 CONTEXT
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There was also the need to steer the legislation through 
Parliament. There was always the suspicion that, despite the 
protestations of Kenneth Clarke, the "hidden agenda" was 
that the hospitals that were most successful in generating 
"surpluses" would then become private companies, though as 
Robin Cook commented "Not that these hospitals will be sold 
this side of the next General Election." And he went on to 
comment that "Mr Clarke unwisely has devised a timetable in 
which his proposals reach crisis point round about polling 
day, when the public will be able to give their verdict on a 
review on which they were not consulted." (Cook 1989). The 
counterview is that there will be sufficient authorities and 
providers (particularly, the Government will hope, NHS 
Trusts) achieving demonstrable improvements to enable claims 
that the reforms will work everywhere given time. It must 
remain an open question, at least until the next election, 
as to whether in the political context the initiation and 
recommendations of the Review were appropriate.
2.4.3 EXPERIENCE
It seems paradoxical that in reforming the largest 
organisation in the U.K. the expertise and experience of so 
few people should have been drawn on. Indeed, in announcing 
the Review, Mrs Thatcher said on the BBC's Panorama 
programme that if the Government could not provide enough to 
meet people's expectations on the present system it had to 
consider whether to make different provisions. She added "We 
shall consider all these things. It is our bounden duty to
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do so just as we considered education, the community charge, 
and housing. We are now considering the health service". 
(Webster and Ford 1988) . Experience suggested that Royal 
Commissions took far too long and that acceptable results 
could be achieved quicker using the decision-making 
arrangements already outlined.
Kenneth Clarke's experience of academic analyses of 
alternative proposals persuaded him against the option of 
having pilot trials. This was seen as a "recipe for 
inaction". He feared that given this opportunity those in 
the NHS opposed to the reforms would have the opportunity to 
stifle them completely. However, to policy analysts this was 
a major weakness. One was quoted as saying "To embark on 
change of this magnitude without a limited number of trials 
smacks of recklessness. In practice, even though Kenneth 
Clarke has said there will be no experiments, that is in 
fact what the first batch of self-governing hospitals and GP 
practice budget holders will be" (Timmins 1989).
Indeed in the only controlled pilot simulation the system 
"crashed" in year 3 (see Section 4.4.4). This embarrassment 
was interpreted in the light of being a "learning" 
experience which needed to be gone through to help avoid it 
happening in reality. In fact in the East Anglia Region an 
experiment of shadow and then real contracting arrangements 
began in 1989 between certain providers and Districts. But, 
taking risks may be contextually appropriate behaviour. 
Kenneth Clarke's position is clearly that to make such a 
switch to the concept of an internal market requires a
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national experiment This is not only on the grounds that it 
would be difficult, though by no means impossible, to have a 
pilot Region (even one as isolated from other Regions as 
possible, such as South-Western) , but because, once the 
argument is accepted that the organisation and provision of 
health care will be improved by separating the functions of 
purchaser from provider of services (i.e. the Districts 
become essentially purchasing authorities only), then 
putting it into practice has to proceed as fast as possible 
and on a national scale. What has to be avoided is the risk 
that by trying to introduce a perfect system after pilot 
trials etc. the momentum for change will be lost.
2.4.4 SUMMARY
The NHS Review is a major political experiment on a national 
scale. It was only necessary because of the reluctance to 
resolve the crises of 1987 by increasing its funding. 
Whether this was appropriate remains to be seen. The policy 
making process was certainly one that was highly centralised 
and closed to public debate, and the conclusions are not 
all demonstrably viable in any pilot setting. Nevertheless, 
the introduction of an internal market between buyers and 
providers has major information requirements which, in 
themselves, may create a major advance in organisational 
intelligence.
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3 COMPONENT PROCESSES OF THE INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
PROJECT
This study examines the knowledgework processes used in a 
project to define the information requirements of the NHS 
post-Review. It is set within the political and historical 
context outlined in the previous section.
3.1 CONTEXT
3.1.1 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL
At the time of the publication of the White Paper within the
DH the Health Service Information and Indicators Branch, (HS
Inf & Ind) was headed by RR, and was responsible for
information. The Information Technology branch was headed up 
by MR. Both reported separately to the Director of Planning 
and Information, MF. This arrangement had a long history 
within the DH, and reflected the distinction commonly made 
between IT/computers and information within the rest of the 
NHS. It was generally perceived as a contentious 
distinction, and one which had been a continuing source of 
delicate power plays for some time (see Chapter 8).
In June 1989 34 projects were established within the
Department of Health to implement the Review (see Section 
2.2.4). The IT branch were responsible for Project 25 on the 
IT implications of the Review, and the Health Service 
Information and Indicators branch were responsible for
Project 34 on the information requirements of the Review. 
Performance in managing these projects was, of course, was 
stimulated in part by the tension between them. However, 
this study focuses on Project 34, for which I was project
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co-ordinator, and does not dwell in any great detail on 
Project 25. Nevertheless, its existence and progress were of 
course relevant to Project 34.
Prior to the publication of the Review there was no 
knowledge within the Health Service Information and 
Indicators branch of the DH of its likely information 
implications. A corollary of this is that the Review team 
had assumed that the information systems in the service 
would be capable of being adapted to meet the requirements 
of the review. The size of this assumption is proving to be 
much greater than anticipated.
3.1.2 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
By April 1989 the NHS remained in the throes of implementing 
the Korner recommendations. In the hospital context, where 
Korner data had been collected, in theory, for two years, 
most acute hospitals had installed computerised Patient 
Administration Systems and the emphasis had shifted from the 
mechanics of installing computer systems to the analysis of 
the information produced. The results were not encouraging. 
For example, the new concept of a consultant episode that 
Korner had introduced was evidently not being recorded in 
the same way in every hospital. The levels of completeness 
of postcoding and diagnostic coding were low and often not 
completed for many months after discharge. Nevertheless, 
there was a set of minimum items of data, as defined by 
Korner, that were being collected for every consultant 
episode of care within a District, but few hospitals had
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installed out-patient systems at all, and even fewer had 
them in every clinic. There were, as always, exceptions to 
these generalisations. North East Thames Region, for 
example, had a widely installed base of out-patient systems. 
In the community health and paramedical services, where the 
Korner data had only begun to be collected from April 1988, 
the information systems remained embryonic.
New methods of managing information systems were beginning 
to be tried. The perception of computing as a complex, 
specialist and costly service to provide in-house was 
growing, and the attractions of having it "contracted out", 
were apparent (thereby also getting round the difficulties 
of recruiting staff on the uncompetitive NHS pay rates). 
Reflecting the trend elsewhere in the NHS (and outside it) 
towards using the private sector where possible, there had 
been an increasing use of "Facilities Management" in which 
external specialist firms were contracted to provide service 
to an Authority, in effect acting as a bureaux. Information 
specialists continued to be accountable to a variety of 
managers, e.g. Directors of Public Health, Directors of 
Finance, (see Chapter 5 Section 6.1), but an important trend 
was the increasing numbers that were being employed by Units 
as part of the Resource Management Initiative teams (see 
Section 4.5.2.4).
3.1.3 GOALS AND THEORIES
The primary goal of Project 34 was to ensure that the NHS 
was able to have operational from 1 April 1991 the data sets 
and data flows necessary to implement the recommendations of
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the NHS Review. To get to this position RR, as Project 
Manager, had to formulate and then get agreement for his 
proposed approach. Essentially there were two types of 
"theories" to be tested. Firstly, that it was possible to 
make pragmatic adaptations to existing systems to provide 
the necessary information, and secondly, that a 
participative style of project management was needed.
Between February and May 1989, RR discussed the implications 
of the Review with colleagues in HS Inf & Ind, and others in 
the DH, and some District General Managers. The results of 
these deliberations were presented in a document entitled 
"Information Requirements Post-Review: Preliminary Thoughts" 
(Rogers 1989). The document showed how fundamental the 
impact of the Review would be. For example, Korner was based 
on the concept of Districts being both buyer and provider 
and directly managing all the Hospital and Community Health 
Services within its boundary. The separation of buyer and 
provider functions, the emergence of NHS Trusts and GPs 
with practice budgets, and the "arms length" contractual
relationship with directly managed units, will require 
changes to these concepts.
For example, since the basic management unit will now become 
the "provider", the Korner concept of a "District spell" 
(the total continuous stay of a patient using a bed in a 
hospital or hospitals within the District) has to be
replaced by the concept of a "provider spell". Data which
flows from NHS Trusts to the DH would no longer legitimately
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flow through their old District since there would be no 
managerial relationship with it, or indeed with the Region 
within which it is situated. Although there was a chapter 
on community health services, attention was overwhelmingly 
directed on the acute hospital sector because it was assumed 
that this would be where the Review will cause the biggest 
changes soonest. It was made clear that "the document is 
throughout based on a series of assumptions which are, as 
far as practicable, explicitly stated. They are all open to 
challenge - indeed the purpose of this paper is to invite 
those who are responsible for the areas where assumptions 
have been made to deny or refine them. THE PAPER DOES NOT 
SEEK TO PRE-EMPT THE POLICY RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHERS SINCE 
INFORMATION SHOULD SERVE NOT LEAD. The PRELIMINARY 
conclusions derive, hopefully logically, from the 
assumptions. If the latter change so may conclusions" 
(Rogers 1989 para 6) . This makes clear the status of the 
document, and the sensitivities of putting forward 
conclusions that might be interpreted as having a policy 
steer. Nevertheless, having had wide circulation with the DH 
it was well received.
Its preliminary conclusions on in-patient information 
requirements were central. Essentially these were that: 
i Districts will require a record for each of its
residents treated as an in-patient no matter where treated 
or whether subject to a contract, in order (a) to hold a 
data base about the health of its residents and the events 
which affect it, (b) to help choose between providers, (c) 
to authorise payment of bills and (d) to appreciate the
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pattern and extent of GPs with Practice Budgets (GPPBs or GP 
Fund Holders - GPFHs, as they were later to be termed) and 
other GP referrals.
ii The data required by District on each record would be 
very similar to the existing Korner in-patients minimum data 
set but some Korner concepts become inappropriate with the 
emergence of NHS Trusts.
iii Districts could obtain the records with the required 
data through its contracts and bill paying conditions with 
the exception of those of its residents referred, and paid, 
by GPPBs. The latter may be required to provide the data.
iv The records required of the private sector will, as 
now, need to be the same as from NHS hospitals.
v The Office of Population Census and Surveys (OPCS) and 
the Department will continue to require a comprehensive data 
base of in-patient activity with individual records 
containing much the same data as present (but with the 
addition of a site identifier, provider identifier, and 
possibly DRG group) . It is possible that OPCS and the 
Department's requirements could be met by aggregated data 
quarterly and an annual submission of a sample of in-patient 
records (rather than 100%).
Having set out some preliminary thoughts, the next step, 
having received feedback from within the DH on the document 
was to establish Project 34 to test these assumptions.
In this case study, there were far too many participants to 
assess any individual goals. RR ensured that his staff were
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clear that the successful completion of Project 34 was their 
primary mutual goal.
3.2 KNOWLEDGEWORK PROCESSES
3.2.1 ACCOUNTS OF ACTION
I joined the Department of Health, on a two year contract, 
on July 10th 1989. The contract had been agreed before the 
publication of the White Paper. I arrived to find that 
instead of working on a series of projects that related to 
the development of information systems in different health 
authorities, thereby complementing my work in Ealing, I was 
to be the full-time project co-ordinator for Project 34. 
Preliminary Thoughts had been produced, and the next step 
was to establish a project.
RR had already established close working relationships with 
the Statistics and Management Information division (SMI4), 
who were invited to attend the fortnightly "team meetings" 
held in HS Inf & Ind to discuss Project 34 matters. SMI4 
dealt with the more technical statistical aspects of 
information, with particular responsibilities for central 
returns. During the next 12 months Project 34 totally 
dominated the agenda of these meetings, despite the fact 
that other section heads who attended them, other than 
myself, had other responsibilities. This simply reflected 
the scope, importance, and necessary intensity of the 
project. At these meetings progress, problems, and possible 
solutions were debated. It acted as a test bed prior to 
dealing with issues in the formal Project 34 groups. The 
Information Management Group (chaired by MF, and consisting
382
of RR, MR, the head of SMI4 and the two Directors of the 
Information Management Centre in Birmingham) also served as 
a source of formal authority, guidance and advice for both 
Projects 34 and 25. It was under its auspices, and logo, (as 
a part of the NHS Management Executive) that the project was 
presented.
The first task was to establish a Steering Committee. RR was 
to chair it. The key feature of this Steering Committee, and 
the associated Working Groups (WG) was that they were joint 
DH/NHS groups. Whilst RR knew those people both within the 
DH and in the NHS whom he wanted to serve on the Steering 
Committee, and the chairmen and most of the DH members for 
the WGs finding the members for them was more problematic. 
RR wrote on 29th June, to DH, the lead Regional General 
Manager on information matters, outlining proposed nominees 
and asking for agreement and suggestions for others. DH was 
obviously a key person to have on the Steering Committee 
(even though he was only able to attend two meetings). He in 
turn undertook to bring the proposed arrangements to the 
notice of RGM colleagues on 6th July, and ask for suitable 
nominations.
Listed below are the WGs which were established and their 
chairmen. RR was concerned to maintain NHS "ownership" of 
the Working Groups, not only by ensuring that there were an 
NHS interests were adequately represented, but that where 
possible NHS chairmen were appointed.
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Group DH/NHS Chair Members
NHS DH
Steering Committee DH 7 10
In-patients NHS 7 10
Out-patients NHS 5 4
Accident & Emergency NHS 2 4
Waiting Times and Waiting Lists DH 4 6
Community Health and Paramedical NHS 7 3
Finance NHS 7 5
Manpower NHS 7 5
Estate DH 5 4
Availability & Use of Facilities NHS 3 3
Family Practitioner Services DH 2 8
DH Central Requirements DH 3 16
Identification Codes DH 5 5
District Information Requirements NHS 3 2
The role of a Project 34 WG in the case of Finance and 
Manpower was taken on by existing DH/NHS groups. In addition 
a data definitions support group was established to discuss 
the details of the new data definitions that emerged from 
the other WGs. A WG looking at Comparative Information and 
Indicators was not established until 9 April 1990 as it was 
always intended that this would run behind the other groups, 
taking on board their findings. A section head in HS Inf & 
Ind or SMI4 provided secretariat services to each group. I 
was also expected to attend as many meetings of each group 
as I could.
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The objective, as at the end of June 1989, was for all WGs 
to meet at least once in July, and then to meet every 4 to 6 
weeks until the end of October by when they were to produce 
a report which would be combined into a composite
consultative document for issue by the end of December. The 
deadline for comments would be the end of March 1990 to 
allow the publication of a final report by the end of April 
1990. The detail of the data item, data flows and returns 
for implementation from 1 April 1991 would have to have been 
agreed by the Committee for Regulating Information
Requirements by the end of September 1990 in order to comply 
with the "six month rule" of giving notice to the NHS of any 
proposed changes.
During July and August most of the membership of the groups 
was established. But, despite the initial objectives it was 
impossible to convene any meetings until the end of August.
The dates of the meetings of the Steering Committee and the
WGs in 1989 were as follows:-
Working Group Dates of Meetings
Steering Committee 4/8 22/9 1/11 1/12
In-patients 14/8 30/8 20/9 19/10 8/11
Out-patients 5/9 28/9 12/10 26/10
Accident & Emergency 27/9 25/10 3/11 9/11
Waiting Times/Lists 25/8 15/9 3/10 18/10 3/11
Community & Paramed 24/8 21/9 28/9 5/10 26/10
Finance 18/9 11/10 10/11 27/11
Manpower 30/8 21/9 11/10 24/10 9/11
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Estates 23/10 15/11 30/11
Facilities 8/8 7/9 21/9 2/10 19/10 16/11
Family Practitioner 
Central Requirements 8/9 29/9 18/10
5/10 2/11
Identification Codes 10/8 5/9 14/9 2/10 16/10 30/10
District Info. Reqs. 25/10 20/12
At its meeting on 1 November the Steering Committee had 
essentially encouraging progress reports from all the WGs. 
By this time it was clear that there was to be a joint 
consultation exercise with Project 25, and a Project 25/34 
overview that would take the form of a "Working for 
Patients" Working Paper. It was also clear that the 
documents arising from the Project 34 WGs could only be 
handled on an individual basis as stand alone annexes to a 
main Project 34 consultative document.
The timetable of events was:
November 14 Project 25/34 overview cleared by the
Information Management Group 
November 20 Draft of Project 34 consultative document
circulated to the Project Managers of the 
other DH projects, and key DH staff.
November 23 Chief Executive Working Group meeting
considers draft of Working Paper, and the 
supporting consultative documents for 
Projects 25 and 34 (excluding annexes).
November 27 All WGs reports (except Finance and Estates) 
circulated to Project 34 Steering Committee, 
DH Project managers and key DH staff.
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December 8 
December 8
December 15
December 1 Project 34 Steering Committee.
December 7 Regional General Managers meeting consider
revised Working Paper, and supporting 
consultative documents from Project 25 and 34 
(excluding annexes).
Redraft begins of Project 25 report.
Working Paper and Project 34 consultative 
document sent to HM Treasury for comment. 
Working Paper and supporting consultative 
document from Project 34 (excluding annexes) 
sent to Minister of State for Health.
Project 25 consultative draft to Minister of 
State for Health.
Clearance received from HM Treasury.
12 Annexes sent to printers.
Main text of the Project 34 Consultative 
Document sent to printers.
Working Paper and final annex sent to 
printers.
Project 25 consultative document to printers. 
Distribution of all documents to delegates 
attending the Information Management Group 
day launch.
Distribution of all documents throughout the 
service.
IMG day launch.
January 17-March 31 Consultation period, including IMG 
roadshows in each Region.
April 1 - April 26 All WGs meet to consider comments and
December 18
December 2 0 
December 2 2 
December 28
January 5
January 8 
January 12
January 16
January 17
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May 9
May 16 
May 17
May 24
May 24
May 24 
May 3 0
June 5
June 7
June 11 
June 11 
June 14 
June 19
April 27
key issues arising from consultation.
Project 34 Steering Committee considers 
response and key issues.
First draft of the final report ("The Next 
Steps") sent to MF.
Second draft of Next Steps cleared by MF. 
Issued for comment to DH, IMG, HM Treasury 
and selected NHS staff.
Deadline for DH to notify urgent substantial 
problems.
MF sends to Minister of State for Health and 
to NHS Management Executive for clearance. 
Clearance received from HM Treasury. 
Clearance received from NHS Management 
Executive.
Photocopy version sent to all IMG day 
delegates.
Minister of State recommends clearance to 
Secretary of State.
Secretary of State clears.
Document to typesetters.
Typeset version received at IMG day launch. 
Distribution throughout the service.
As will be apparent, the timetable for issuing the 
consultative document slipped by about 2 weeks, and that for 
the final report by about 6 weeks, though it was clear that 
the scope of the exercise had been underestimated in June 
1989 when the target dates were set. For example, it was 
expected that the consultation document would be a single
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consolidated report. In the event the size of the 
consultative documents and the annexes was such that they 
had to be dispatched in what soon became known as the "Shoe 
box", an apt description of its dimensions. With over 222 
written comments to analyse, there was little chance that a 
final report could have been prepared and cleared within the 
DH in a month. In the event, for both the IMG day launches 
the delegates had to receive advance copies, and in the case 
of the second one to receive a photocopied "confidential - 
for IMG day delegates only" version since there had not been 
time to get clearance form the Secretary of State. Typeset 
and bound versions arrived at the launch venue just before 
the delegates began to assemble!
3.2.2 SCANNING AND SELECTION
The initial scanning and selection of the approach to be 
used was developed by RR. Whilst the problems posed by 
"Working for Patients" were completely novel, he had had 
three years experience of running HS Inf and Ind, and, by 
virtue of experience gained in overseeing the implementation 
of Korner, and in finalising the NHS Strategic Framework for 
Information, was familiar with the information systems, and 
the information specialists as well as the General Managers 
interested in information issues. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, he used the demonstrably successful model, as 
developed within HS Inf & Ind, of open and joint working on 
information policy issues, via the medium of joint DH/NHS 
WGs and a consultation process.
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The Terms of Reference for each Working Group were:
To recommend changes which, as a result of the NHS 
Review, should be implemented
- in Korner minimum data sets and associated concepts
- in central requirements
- in the direction, nature and content of data flow 
between organisations
and to recommend an implementation timetable on the 
following basis:
- by 1 April 1991
- by 1 April 1993
- after April 1993.
These terms of reference were agreed at the first meeting of 
the Steering Committee. They were designed to focus 
attention on changes to existing systems necessary for 1 
April 1991 and 1993. Given the time constraints it was 
readily accepted that proposals for the longer term were not 
to be considered, though recommendations about how to carry 
forward such issues were made.
In setting the initial agendas, the secretariat ensured that 
WG members had the relevant chapters from "Preliminary 
Thoughts". Also, a number of key questions for each WG were 
prepared by myself, considered and agreed by the Steering 
Committee and also served to help select the key issues to 
address. RR also made sure that he had met or contacted each 
WG chairman personally and briefed him on the necessity of 
producing a report which addressed the terms of reference by 
31st October.
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In short, there were a number of issues and people to be 
scanned and selected. There were also a series of dates to 
be selected by when policy and definitional work had to be 
completed in order to meet a further series of dates in 
1991, 1993 and thereafter. The selection of issues was
"open" in that they had been presented in "Preliminary 
Thoughts", and essentially endorsed by those senior staff in 
the DH and the NHS to whom it had been circulated. The 
selection of people was also "open" in that it explicitly 
involved the Regional General Managers in nominating staff. 
The timing of the work to be done was driven both by the 
September 1990 "six month" rule and by the recognition that 
suppliers needed as much notice as possible of the minimum 
data sets and data interchange standards etc. so that 
systems could be adapted or developed. Some of the issues to 
be addressed were considered as major problems, e.g. how to 
balance opportunity costs of installing the interim out­
patient systems (that would be needed from 1 April 1991 for 
contracting purposes in many hospitals) against the 
resources and time needed to install the fully functioning 
out-patient systems that are needed for improving patient- 
care. Other issues, however, were readily seen as presenting 
great opportunities, e.g. the use of the NHS number as the 
universal identifier for exchanges of information between 
different parts of the NHS family.
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The extent of decision-making delegated to the WGs was 
substantial. The SC agreed the terms of reference and key 
issues for each WG. It was only particularly contentious or 
cross-WG issues that were brought to it for resolution. The 
WGs shared only one rule, that was verbally invoked, to 
resolve issues. It became known as the "minimum change 
rule". Unless changes were necessary to meet the 
requirements of the Review, they should not be made.
An issue that was both contentious and cross-sector, and 
which violated the "minimum change rule", was the recording 
of ethnic origin. The initiative for suggesting that the 
ethnic origin of be recorded came from policy divisions 
within the DH, and had the backing of the then Minister of 
State for Health, Roger Freeman, who saw it as good 
management practice, though it was clearly not explicitly 
required by "Working for Patients". It was this politically 
powerful backing that broke the "minimum change "rule. It 
was asked whether it could be collected from 1991, to 
coincide with the baseline provided by the Census. I was 
therefore charged with making sure that it was an issue 
considered by those WGs dealing with patient-based 
information. The In-patient Group felt that its merits were 
debatable, and that it could only be collected from 1993. 
The Out-patient WG thought that the practical difficulties 
of collecting it outweighed the benefits, and proposed 
sample surveys conducted by Districts. The Community Health 
WG were in favour of collecting it. The Waiting Times WG did 
not consider it necessary given its remit, and the Family
3.2.3 DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING
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Practitioner Services Group did not consider it. 
Consultation showed that there was considerable support for 
the principle of collecting ethnic origin throughout the 
NHS, provided the definitions were those used by OPCS in the
1991 census, but substantial concern was expressed about the 
practical difficulties in such data collection and the need 
for adequate training. There was a strong view that the 
problems could be eased if ethnic origin was included in the 
GP referral letter mds and if population registers/master 
patient indexes etc. included ethnic origin. The Steering
Committee acknowledged the resistance to a start date of 1 
April 1991, and therefore considered the options of 1 April
1992 and 1 April 1993. It was decided that the DH should 
conduct studies into the practicalities of collecting ethnic 
origin data in different activity areas such as in-patient, 
out-patients, etc., the inclusion of ethnic origin in GP 
referral letters, and its incorporation in population 
registers for health purposes. Subject to a review of these 
studies, it was agreed that the aim was to collect ethnic
origin data in all providers from 1 April 1992, and to
include it in the contract minimum data set sent to
purchasers by no later than 1 April 1993.
In taking this decision the Steering Committee was guided by 
RRs presentation of the issues, of the need to acknowledge 
ministers' keenness to see this data item collected, whilst 
at the same time acknowledging the practical difficulties 
and leaving the escape clause of the recommendations being 
"subject to further studies". The "subject to further
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studies" option was used when issues could not be resolve 
(e.g. the recording of well babies, possible replacements 
for marital status).
Whilst most issues were resolved by decisions taken in WGs 
both before and after consultation, and some contentious 
and/or cross sector issues, such as, confidentiality, use of 
NHS number resolved by the Steering Committee, there were 
other decisions taken outside these forum. The reasons for 
this were to do with the pressures of time. It was not 
possible to reconvene the Steering Committee at short 
notice, yet as the near final drafts of the consultative 
documents, and the "Next Steps", were circulated within the 
DH for final comment there were issues raised on which 
decisions had to be taken. For example, after the last 
meeting of the in-patient WG and the Steering Committee in 
December 1989, RR was contacted by the National Confidential 
Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths and asked if an additional 
data item "code of surgeon performing the operation" could 
be included in the minimum data set. RR agreed that this 
should be a late inclusion to the annex issued by the in­
patients WG. Another example concerned the length of the 
identification code for organisations. During consultation 
no comment had been made concerning the proposals that it 
should be a 7 digit code. It was not until the last stages 
of drafting the document that the case was very firmly, but 
convincingly, put to RR and colleagues in SMI4 that it was 
in fact possible (by using the full range of alpha-based 
variations) to cater for all the necessary changes to 
distinguish the new types of organisational entities within
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the old length of five digits. The reason for ignoring the 
endorsements received during consultation for a 7 digit code 
was the benefit to be gained from not having to enlarge a 
key field on all existing Patient Administration Systems.
Thus, the "central executive" was not the Steering 
Committee, but the central secretariat, and RR in 
particular. The point was never made explicitly, but it was 
always clear that RR, as chairman of the Steering Committee, 
was always able to exert a considerable amount of "final 
say", and on occasion this was very "final". For example, 
the day before the "Next Steps" document was photocopied for 
IMG delegates I was able to persuade him that, in the case 
of out-patient contract minimum data sets, in the interim 
1991-1993 period Districts might be able to choose to 
receive it for individual rather than aggregate cases but 
only "subject to a provider's ability" to provide such 
individualised data. Whilst RR accepted that providers might 
find it impractical to provide minimum data sets for all 
individual out-patients he was equally concerned that no 
arguments were presented that were politically 
inappropriate. For example, he was very careful to make sure 
that the proposals coming from the out-patients and District 
Information Requirements WGs did not contain any explicit 
reference to the need for particular sums of money to 
resource the proposals. This would have caused difficulty 
with the Public Expenditure Survey bidding procedures with 
HM Treasury which were already in progress, and the 
clearance for the Treasury was another hurdle to be passed
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before publication of consultative and final documents. RR 
made the point where necessary that the views of the 
Steering Committee, e.g. on ethnic origin, "trumped" those 
of any WG. In turn, though, he himself could be "trumped" by 
MF or Ministers. For example, MF found the first draft of 
the "Next Steps" confusing (trying to combine too much 
detail that arose in consultation with major policy issues). 
It had to be rewritten in a week. Since Ministers had a 
final veto over the document, it was with considerable 
relief that they approved it, particularly since photocopied 
versions had been circulated to delegates prior to the IMG 
day launch.
Whilst inappropriate decisions were taken as a result of the 
pressures of time, of inappropriate or insufficient 
nominations to the WGs, nevertheless the feedback to the 
consultation documents was overwhelmingly constructive and 
supportive.
3.2.4 COMMUNICATION AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
Given the time constraints and the subject matter - the 
reorientation of the information systems of not only the 
largest but also one of the most complex organisation in the 
country, an assessment has to be made as to whether the 
"central executive" organised the knowledgework that needed 
to be done in an appropriate way.
The view of the proposed approach for Project 34, as 
developed in "Preliminary Thoughts", was minuted by one 
senior member of the Project 25 team in July 1989 "In
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general terms, I find Mr Rogers' proposals daunting to say 
the least. The idea of so many different working groups 
coming up with a coherent approach to information 
requirements is, in my view, quite unattainable". RR 
however, believed his approach to be the most appropriate 
one, and felt that he did not want any close contact with 
Project 25. Although a Project 25 member was on the Project 
34 Steering Committee, I was only involved in one meeting 
(on my second day in post) to discuss matters of joint 
interest. I was not surprised to find that faced with a 
similar problem Project 25 was taking a different approach.
Project 25 employed outside management consultants and let 
them facilitate the debates essentially within the IT Branch 
in the DH on the IT requirements of the Review. They spent a 
considerable amount of time interviewing relevant people 
within the DH. The result was a tightly defined project in 
project management terms, but one which in its first draft 
report "took forty pages to say nothing" as one senior civil 
servant commented. It had to be hastily rewritten and made 
more specific.
In fact, the approach adopted by Project 34 could have been 
extended further. More groups could have been set up to 
address more tightly defined set of issues. But the risk 
would have been that it would have been impossible to 
maintain monitoring and control of the project as a whole. 
Despite having someone (myself) working full-time as co­
ordinator on the project, there was a limit to the number of
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groups I could keep in contact with given the intensity of 
the workload required by the scope of the subject matter 
that had to be considered in 3-4 months.
For all of the civil servants involved as WG secretaries, 
there was a repertoire of readily known "performance 
programs" to draw on. They knew how to do the type of job 
required of them. They were also well able to contribute to 
the "Productive " aspects of problem solving and creating 
new solutions - either by verbal discourse or in the 
construction of text. The only difficulty in this respect 
was that they typed the text, and whilst some were able to 
make the switch to Wordperfect software (which was 
introduced in an attempt to introduce standardisation for 
the purposes of Project 34) others were not, including RRs 
secretary, and continued to use Wordstar. This meant that 
once a near final version had been transferred to the master 
set which I maintained I had to undertake all final 
amendments. Again, the decomposition of the workload proved 
to be at the limits of what was manageable in the crucial 
and time-critical period when the final document(s) are 
being prepared.
One method of maintaining communications was to ensure that 
the minutes of all the meetings were sent to each secretary. 
The minutes of each Steering Committee meeting were 
similarly circulated, but also sent to all Regional 
Directors of information, and colleagues in Wales Scotland 
and Northern Ireland. Other communication channels used were 
the regular meetings of Regional Directors of Information,
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the joint DH/NHS Committee for Regulating Information 
Requirements.
Getting the message over that there were a large number of 
information issues that need to be taken seriously was part 
of the intention of the consultation "Shoe-box". The launch 
of both the consultative documents and the "Next steps" at 
an IMG day, with speeches and presentations by WG chairmen 
was designed to reinforce this point. Also, the fact that 
there was a "Working for Patients" Working Paper emphasised 
the importance of the issues to General Managers. Indeed in 
October 1990 a further short document entitled "NHS Review 
Information Systems: Action for Managers" is to be issued to 
ensure that the key decision takers were all aware of what 
needed to be done. By the end of September 1990, (most of) 
the detailed "data set change notices" for changes 
commencing on 1 April 1991 will have been issued giving the 
specific detail and instructions of what has to be done to 
implement the policy decisions given in the "Next Steps". 
For the data collectors revised User Guides are to be issued 
in January 1991.
Finally, it is worth commenting on the symbolic significance 
of the term "Information Systems". RR had been concerned in 
ensuring that the titles of the consultative documents 
contained this term. For the "Next Steps" he was able to 
drop the suffix ":Information" and ":IT" since in May MF had 
finally agreed the formal restructuring of HS Inf and Ind 
and the IT branch so that they combined to become the NHS
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Information Systems Directorate, of which MF was the 
Director, RR the Director, and MR took a years secondment to 
a University. Projects 25 and 34 were combined to become a 
new Project 35. At last the problem that bedevilled the 
Korner Committee was being resolved, and the key issue was 
to determine how to specify requirements for information 
systems as a whole. Whether this fusion will work in the DH 
remains to be seen, as does its impact in the NHS, where the 
split between information and IT has become well entrenched 
in many authorities.
3.2.5 MONITORING AND CONTROL
The decisions as to how to decompose the problem needed to 
be reviewed as work progressed. For example, it was not 
until the first meeting of the out-patients group that it 
became apparent that a separate WG for Accident & Emergency 
Services would be needed. And it was not until December 1989 
that it became clear that there were substantial 
difficulties in dealing with the issues facing paramedical 
services (ie they are usually organised both managerially 
and in terms of data collection on a District wide basis, 
yet with provider-bound relationships replacing these how 
was the data for contracting to be available, particularly 
given the poor state of data collection systems anyway). The 
report coming from what was until then the "Community Health 
Services" WG was retitled to include Paramedical Services, 
and a separate section set out within it to deal with these 
issues. The lack of an early recognition of the importance 
of paramedical issues, and the subsequent non-allocation of
400
a separate WG to address their issues, reflected the view 
within HS Inf & Ind that "as a general rule" the problems of 
paramedical services were secondary to the main information 
sectors that were acknowledged by having a separate WG. 
Indeed it was only at a very late stage that the view of DH 
staff responsible for policy on paramedical staff were 
sought. The response to consultation from the professional 
paramedical associations in particular indicated that an 
error of omission had been made.
Part of my role as co-ordinator was to keep in constant 
touch with each of the WG secretaries, and many corridor 
conversations were held. It was no coincidence that the only 
annex that needed to have an "overview" by the Steering 
Committee was the only one in which the secretariat was 
provided by Regional Information staff and therefore working 
in isolation. Nevertheless, there was a limit to the amount 
of power I was able to exercise over the construction of the 
consultation documents. I was not able to insist on any 
standard method of presenting the issues, though I did write 
the first of them (on In-patients) and circulated it in 
large part to help attain some uniformity of presentation. 
Whilst aware of the discrepancies between annexes of some of 
the recommendations, e.g. concerning ethnic origin, 
emanating from the different WGs, the secretaries were 
concerned that the views of the WG should be presented. 
Whilst it might appear that the annexes were "un­
coordinated", I was not able, and indeed did not wish to, 
enforce compliance in this respect. It was of course
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necessary to ensure that the final document, as informed by 
the results of consultation, resolved these issues.
The most important aspect of monitoring and control of 
Project 34 was its 'open' method of project management. The 
NHS nominees on the WGs kept its recommendations in line 
with what was practical at the "grassroots", and the DH 
nominees kept it in line with DH policy development. The 
major feedback process of course was the consultation 
exercise.
Monitoring the responses proved to be a major task, the 
solutions for which had to be developed quickly. A routine 
was developed in which each response was numbered, scanned 
by myself or the IMG Secretary for items relevant to each WG 
and a copy sent to the secretary if appropriate. The 
secretaries developed their own techniques for presenting 
the information, but essentially the relevant sections were 
then cut out and pasted to "issue sheets" which the 
secretary then submitted to a meeting of the Working Group. 
This meant that every response was considered but having 
been decomposed on an issue by issue basis.
Fortunately the bulk of the responses were supportive and 
constructively critical. The paramedical colleges indicated 
clearly our errors in not explicitly recognising their 
interests! It was a great relief to know that the initial 
feedback from the roadshows to explain the issues was 
confirmed in writing, and that the Project remained broadly 
on course. There were a number of points that were
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reemphasised, e.g. the need for adequate resources, concerns 
about maintaining confidentiality when flows of individual 
records about the NHS increases, and the need to get 
decisions made quickly to enable IT specifications to be 
made and systems developed or adapted.
3.3 KNOWLEDGEBASES
3.3.1 PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE
I joined the DH ignorant of both the explicit rules and the 
tacit ones. Yet I needed to learn about them quickly if I 
was to start a project that required me to be in contact 
with large numbers of people both within and outside the DH. 
Learning the explicit rules was not difficult - there were 
documents available which indicated the format of memos, the 
organisation of the branches within the DH, written 
procedures for dealing with Parliamentary Questions etc. It 
was picking up the tacit knowledge and theories-in-use that 
was more difficult, and more important.
For example, on my first day in post I attended a meeting 
convened and chaired by RR and attended by 25 senior staff 
within the DH to discuss out-patient issues. In the round­
table introductions I introduced myself as a "consultant", 
which indeed I was, but RR suggested to me afterwards that I 
play this down and emphasise my background and knowledge of 
the service. It was clear that there was a tacit suspicion 
of the relevance of the knowledgebase of consultants, though 
not of their capabilities. The meeting was also a useful 
introduction to the niceties of getting agreement to enable
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one branch to take the lead in tackling what were large 
cross-departmental issues. Indeed, by observing the number 
of memos sent, the people to whom they were copied both for 
information and for comment (and the fact that all comments 
were also sent to the original memo's copyees), and the fact 
that, particularly from senior civil servants, statements in 
internal memos could be quickly worked into official DH 
policy, and the niceties of the language used and its 
general "civilities", I soon began to interpret the tacit 
theories of DH communication. I decided to style myself 
"Project 34 Co-ordinator" and soon became an accepted part 
of a number of different policy networks.
As far as running the WGs were concerned, there were a 
number of pre-established procedures governing the structure 
and processes of such groups that were clearly part of the 
"practical knowledge" of all concerned, both in and outside 
the DH. It was accepted as routine that there should be a 
chairman whose role was to essentially to guide, summarise 
and ensure progress was made through the agendas, and that a 
secretary should provide minutes of the meetings, and be 
responsible for compiling any supporting papers for the 
agendas. However, the styles of the chairmen varied 
considerably, as did the detail of the notes taken by 
different secretaries. Nevertheless, these were variations 
around a tacitly accepted set of standards.
Of central importance to the process was the approach 
adopted to carry the work forward. Much depended on the 
practical knowledge and expertise of the "project director".
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RR needed to ensure that he packed as much as possible of 
his own knowledge or "preliminary thoughts" into the WGs. It 
was critical, therefore, that the allocation of resources 
(in particular, the involvement of the WG secretaries) was 
appropriate. A careful judgement had to be made as to how 
much of their other work could be ignored, "put on the back 
burner" or delegated. The WGs were set up to test out, 
elaborate and refine the issues raised, leaving RR free to 
deal with some of the major issues, e.g. securing funds. 
They were to perform the task that he (via the Steering 
Committee) gave them, with his role, and mine, being to 
plan, monitor and revise the process. When there were issues 
that they could not resolve he, and the Steering Committee 
if necessary, were available to give direction. That he was 
able to give a speedy response on the wide range of issues 
referred to him was critical if the process, from his 
perspective, of "automatisation" was to succeed.
Of course the work which the WGs were asked to do was far 
from being "reproductive" problem solving. The members of a 
WG were selected, it was hoped, to bring to it a wide range 
of relevant expertise. They need to be able to rethink the 
assumptions and theories which underpinned the existing 
systems, and see what needed to be adjusted to meet the new 
goals of the White Paper.
3.3.2 ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY
The "open" joint working with the NHS was an effort to tap 
into key parts of the expertise stored within the service.
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And RR knew that his approach had precedents in the Korner 
and information Strategy work. The recollection of one (of 
the very few) who had been involved in the Korner working 
parties was that the main difference was that "This (Project 
34) is all having to happen so much more quickly". There was 
nothing to be drawn on explicitly to help in the equivalent 
task of rethinking the information requirements of the NHS, 
just a "memory" of how things had been done using joint WGs 
in the past.
In the early stages RR was concerned that the WGs should all 
attempt to produce a matrix. In it each of the data items to 
be recorded in one information sector, e.g. in-patients, 
formed one axis. The other axis consisted of organisations 
to which the data was to be sent together with the uses to 
be made of it (e.g. for contracts, planning, central 
requirements, Public Expenditure Survey bids etc.). His 
intention was to create an organisational "map" so that the 
Service could debate and then agree on a common 
understanding of what was to flow where and why. In practice 
only one WG came close to completing such an analysis, three 
others (guided by the same secretary) produced some diagrams 
detailing the data flows between organisations. It was too 
complex a task to document completely in the time available. 
Nevertheless the early attempts to construct such maps did 
draw on the stocks of knowledge of the WG members in 
defining "where" the NHS was now and "where" it ought to aim 
to get to.
In terms of storing the knowledge acquired during the
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process, there were sufficient collective memories of 
previous disasters to ensure back-ups were taken of all 
material committed to disk as a matter of routine. However, 
in the case of dealing with the returns to consultation, 
lack of experience on my part meant that we had received and 
distributed a number of the consultation replies to the 
appropriate secretary (plus a copy of all replies to RR, MF, 
Project 25 and myself) before ensuring that each had an 
identification/reference number on them. This was rectified 
and numbered reference lists issued that enabled me to keep 
a ready count of the number of replies that had been 
received by type of organisation. Despite the storage of 
written material in files, however, a great deal of the 
knowledgebase of issues to be included, cross-referenced to 
other WGs, referred elsewhere, consulted further on etc. was 
contained in RRs and my personal memories. Had either of us 
been incapacitated, particularly during the crucial months 
of December and May, the Project would have been badly 
delayed.
Having produced the "Next Steps", attention focuses on the 
problem of transferring knowledge about the "new rules of 
the game" to those whose task it is to make the information 
systems work. For example: diagnostic codes must now be
given within 28 days, all patients must have the correct 
contract identifier. This process of implementation will 
involve new sets of problems becoming the concern of the 
managers of information systems in Regions, Districts and 
providers (and their General Managers). Whilst solving them
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will be an increasingly local matter, at the time of writing 
consideration is being given to the provision of a central 
help desk at the DH.
3.3.3 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
The definition of a complete set of information requirements 
for the NHS post-Review would have been far too ambitious an 
undertaking. The shortage of time had to concentrated 
attention on the minimum necessary changes to be in place 
for 1 April 1991, and to indicate what should be in place 
for 1 April 1993. Indeed, MF was concerned that the "Next 
Steps" should not be presented as a "Framework Mark II". 
Instead, it was made clear that further work would be 
undertaken to define the strategic information requirements 
of the NHS. Thus the study focused on the operational 
requirements of the short term whilst laying the groundwork 
for future developments.
Given that the new environment was uncertain, it might have 
been appropriate to use an experimental pilot approach to 
defining information requirements. This was ruled out on 
political grounds (see Section 2.4.3). The combination of a 
wide scope of information systems to be considered within a 
very tight timescale ruled out the use of structured 
methodologies which focus on the detailed data models and 
understanding of end-users' requirements. The problem was 
that there were no "end-users" experienced in the 
information requirements of a health market. Hence the 
recourse to asking users already familiar with existing 
systems to consider how the existing outputs, e.g. of Korner
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minimum data sets, could be adapted to fit in with the 
expected new processes of the different organisations and 
the expected inputs from their respective environments. 
Without the existence of Korner minimum data sets, it is 
unlikely that the target date of 1993 for individual 
contract minimum data sets flowing at the end of each in­
patient episode could reasonably be expected to be achieved. 
The lack of comparable data systems for out-patients makes 
the equivalent flows for each out-patient attendance by 1993 
subject to a review on progress by 1992.
3.4 SUMMARY OF THE COMPONENT PROCESSES
Unprompted, the "Next Steps" was described to me by one 
District Information Manager as "one of the best documents 
ever to have come out of the Department". It (and the 
preceding consultative documents) were certainly perceived 
by information specialists as addressing the important 
issues and coming up with essentially sensible solutions. 
There was certainly no reaction to either document 
disagreeing with what was required, the major difficulty was 
finding the resources and time to meet them.
The processes adopted for Project 34 proved successful for a 
number of reasons. There was an executive director who was 
able enough to analyse quickly, and essentially correctly, 
the requirements of the "Working for Patients". He was able 
in his analysis to indicate how the problem could be 
decomposed so as to maintain a balance between the logistics 
of managing WGs and the level of detail that was needed.
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With the knowledge that a co-operative and open approach had 
worked in the past in information policy development, he 
proceeded to get support and ownership from the NHS by 
ensuring that the WGs and the Steering Committee were, on 
the whole, demonstrably joint groups. The WGs were given a 
brief, based on "Preliminary Thoughts" (to which reference 
could be made to see how the overall picture had been 
sketched out), and were able to refer issues to a Steering 
Committee if necessary. Though the external political 
context prescribed a tight timetable, the allocation of work 
between a secretariat of experienced civil servants, for 
whom it was their main priority, ensured that deadlines were 
usually met. The appointment of a full-time co-ordinator 
(myself), enabled progress and problems to be monitored and 
controlled. The processes used drew on the organisational 
memory of the NHS, using the experience of this approach 
which had been developed successfully by RR and his 
predecessor. Whilst it succeeded in producing a 
comprehensive document that was endorsed by the NHS to the 
timetables agreed, its outcome in terms of producing 
contextually appropriate products for organisational 
intelligence remains to be assessed.
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4 INTENDED OUTCOMES OF CHANGES TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS
4.1 CONTEXT
This section looks at the intended outcome of the 
information requirements for the NHS post-Review. The 
context in which it is set has been the subject of the 
previous two sections, ie the political and historical 
context of the "Working for Patients" White Paper, and the 
development, via a consultative process, of the "Next Steps" 
statement of the requirements of information systems post­
Review. First, some of the key goals and theories of both 
these documents will be outlined. Then the knowledgework 
processes post-Review for three sets of organisations are 
considered: providers, purchasers, and the Region/DH.
Attention can only be given here to a subset of the key 
information issues, but it is hoped that this is sufficient 
to validate the use of the framework used in this thesis. 
The knowledgebases on which these organisations depend will, 
however, be considered as a whole.
4.1.1 "WORKING FOR PATIENTS"
Of the seven key proposals contained in "Working for 
Patients", (described in Chapter 3, Section 1.4) the most 
fundamental concerns the new funding arrangements. The 
espoused theory is that "in future, all NHS hospitals - 
whether run by health authorities or self-governing - will 
be free to offer their services to different health 
authorities and to the private sector." The money allocated 
to a District, on a weighted capitation basis for its 
residents, will follow the patient across District 
boundaries to the provider unit which treats the patient.
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The District in agreement with the GPs of the District, will 
place contracts for care with those providers it believes 
will give best value for money. It will pay, however, for 
those patients treated extra-contractually. GP Fund Holders 
may also agree contracts with providers and pay for a 
specific range of agreed services for their patients (the 
funds being reallocated by the Regional Health Authority 
from Districts' budgets). From April 1991 the totality of 
business of all Directly Managed Units (DMUs) should be 
covered by management contracts with their home districts, 
and contracts with any other DHAs or GPFHs for whom they 
provide services (though formally, because of their lack of 
corporate existence the contracts will be between DHAs). NHS 
Trusts, of course, have to earn all their income from the 
contracts they, as independent legal entities, negotiate 
with purchasers.
4.1.2 THE INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS PROJECT (PROJECT 34)
The key task of Project 34 was to define the information 
required to support the internal market outlined in "Working 
for Patients". In Working Paper 11 it was pointed out that 
at present the DHA obtains information from hospitals as a 
consequence of its managerial role. The data obtained 
relates to patients treated within its boundary (catchment 
population) . It does not get to know directly about 
treatments received by its residents outside its district. 
Post Review, the DHA's rights to data will derive primarily 
from contracts, and for NHS Trusts only from contracts 
(unless legislation or central directives give additional
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rights) . It will wish to know only about its residents 
irrespective of where treated (resident population). These 
will be the patients for which it is billed and, as a 
condition of payment, it may demand data about the episodes 
of care for which it is to pay. This argument, put initially 
in "Preliminary Thoughts" led to the concept of a "contract 
minimum data set" (mds) which the DHA will require in 
association with an invoice.
From the providers perspective, even where there are block 
contracts (and it is expected that most care will be given 
under block contracts initially) an account will need to be 
provided for services rendered. This means that data will 
have to be collected
(a) to associate every patient with a contract and/or 
to identify the source of funding - the "payer"
(b) to characterise the service rendered
(c) other data which the "payer" may require, e.g. 
waiting experience, length of stay.
Again, the argument was accepted that there needed to be 
national uniformity in a "contract mds", on which 
elaborations could be agreed locally. It will not 
necessarily flow with the invoice, but needs to be 
associated with it to ensure that purchasers can account for 
what they have been authorising payments.
4.2 KNOWLEDGEWORK PROCESSES WITHIN PROVIDERS
4.2.1 SCANNING AND SELECTION
The provider, whether acute, long stay or community, will
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face similar problems, though they differ in the degree of 
sophistication with which they can be dealt with at least 
initially. It is in the Acute provider that the information 
requirements and systems are most complex.
The provider unit has to scan potential purchasers of its 
range of health care services and select the most 
appropriate combinations for further contractual 
negotiations. Providers now have to "look for business".
4.2.2 DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING
The provider has many decisions to make. Some will concern 
long terms strategic decisions about its "product lines" 
(Fottler and Repasky 1988), others will be decisions to 
actually sign contracts. Most of the time, and effort in 
terms of information systems, however, have historically 
been concerned with ensuring that its internal management 
and patient management systems are operating as planned. 
Now, there is an additional requirement: to ensure that it 
can send invoices that will be paid.
4.2.3 COMMUNICATIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
The provider has to be able to communicate effectively 
internally, and to be able to organise its knowledge of what 
is happening internally (against expectations), in order to 
be able to communicate effectively with external 
organisations. For example, consultants need to be able to 
know what has happened to their patients in order to write a 
summary for the case notes and send a letter to the GP (to 
do this they need case notes to be available when needed,
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and for them to be well organised) . Medical Records and 
information staff need to know the activity volumes in order 
to produce central returns. Unit General Managers need to 
know which are the key areas for budgetary control. Post 
Review, providers will need to be able to send invoices and 
contract mds to the appropriate payer. They also need to be 
able to present themselves so as to be able to sell their 
services.
4.2.4 MONITORING AND CONTROL
Providers will need a number of information systems to 
support them. They need to monitor and control operational 
systems (such as Patient Administration Systems or pathology 
laboratory systems), workload management systems to enable 
the workload plans and budgets to be monitored on a regular 
basis (probably using standard costs), and contract 
management systems to check that contract plans and budgets 
are proceeding on schedule. Providers may also wish to have 
access to some comparative information, e.g. about the 
costs per work unit, of other providers to enable them to 
monitor performance as a peer group.
4.3 KNOWLEDGEWORK PROCESSES WITHIN PURCHASERS
This section is written from the perspective of DHAs as 
purchasers, though the requirements of GP Fund (or budget) 
Holders will be similar, though based on the needs of their 
patients.
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4.3.1 SCANNING AND SELECTION
A criticism of the Korner reports was that they ignored the
strategic information related to the needs for and 
effectiveness of health care services and concentrated on 
the operational information primarily concerned with the 
processes of health care and the use of resources (see 
Section 4.1). A major impact of the separation of the 
purchaser from the provider function is that DHAs as 
purchasers will now need to have information concerning the 
health needs of their residents. They will need to be able 
to "scan" their resident population to quite high resolution 
levels. This will be because they need to be able to assess 
the current and future health needs of localities (e.g. 
Wards or groupings of Enumeration Districts), and be able to 
relate their assessments of health need to be related to the 
GP referral patterns as part of the preparatory work for 
letting contracts. They will also need to be able to check 
whether the invoices sent to them for payment are actually 
for their residents, hence a need to be able to know which 
postcodes (or parts of postcodes) are in their District.
Another important scanning process will be the examination 
of services and performance offered by potential provider 
units, in effect market research.
4.3.2 DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING
DHAs as purchasers will have to decide what view to take on
assessments of their current and future health needs. They 
will need to decide which contracts will suit their GPs 
needs and provide best value for money. Having negotiated
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contracts with providers, bills will then need to be 
authorised for payment. The District will also retain some 
decision-making and planning responsibilities over its 
directly managed units. Crump et al (1990) discuss some of 
the conflicting roles facing DGMs as both purchaser and 
provider (for directly managed units).
4.3.3 COMMUNICATIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
A major potential problem for purchasers is handling 
invoices and minimum data sets that are sent to it by all 
the providers who have cared for its residents, particularly 
if they come incomplete or the invoice and the contract mds 
can't be matched, or if they come on paper or disc but in 
different formats that cannot be readily handled by its 
contract management and bill paying systems. Districts face 
major problems in setting up databases to organise the 
contract-based information so that the key problems and 
issues are known. In recognition (on the purchasers' part in 
particular) of the information systems difficulties, block 
contracts are seen as the way forward initially. However, 
all Districts will have to deal with a number of one-off 
extra-contractual invoices, e.g. for an emergency admission 
of a resident in a distant hospital, and it is known that 
where experiments have already taken place, as in East 
Anglia, there is considerable pressure to move towards cost 
and volume contracts sooner rather than later, hence the 
pressure for more sophisticated contract management systems.
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4.3.4 MONITORING AND CONTROL
Purchasers need to be able to report performance of 
providers, and of the DHA as a purchaser, in terms of 
contracts, outcomes, changes in health status and "unmet" 
need. They will also need to be able to keep track of 
patients with unfinished episodes of care, monitor the
number of their residents waiting by provider and contract,
and be able to account to the RHA and DH, by way of new 
resident-based central requirements, for their performance 
in securing effective health care for their residents.
4.4 KNOWLEDGEWORK PROCESSES AT THE RHA AND DH LEVEL
4.4.1 SCANNING AND SELECTION
A key source of information for "scanning" the internal NHS 
environment from the perspective of RHAs and the DH has been 
the Health Service Indicator package. The information 
available from Districts will become related to their 
resident population, and new indicators will be needed to 
assess Districts' performance as buyers.
In scanning the "external" environment information is needed 
on public opinion (particularly concerning the electoral 
implications of issues such as NHS Trusts, GP Fund Holders, 
waiting lists etc.,) the opportunities and constraints of 
the economic and political environments, and latest advice 
on measures to improve health care emanating from academic 
institutions and experience of other health care systems.
4.4.2 DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING
"Working for Patients" proposed that whilst the DH will set
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a clear framework of aims, objectives and priorities, it 
will intervene less in day-to-day management. Regions will 
have new management responsibilities for FHSAs making it 
easier to plan and monitor services as a whole, including 
primary care.
However, it is possible that the Secretary of State will be 
drawn, unwillingly, into an increasing number of contractual 
disputes. Indeed, in the problems of imposing penalty 
clauses for non-performance it has been argued that there 
may be a "selective tightening of controls at the centre" 
since "despite the rhetoric of devolving power downwards, 
how effectively disputes are resolved is likely to depend on 
the central managerial authority of the health secretary and 
the DH - the very methods of control that are ostensibly to 
be relaxed" (Hughes 1990).
Prowse (1989) argues that the creation of a health care 
market will effectively fragment the NHS and make long-term 
planning extremely difficult. The DH and RHAs will need to 
be able to ensure that it becomes clear (it is not at the 
time of writing) how it is that Regions can exert any major 
influence on a comprehensive capital development programme 
within their Regions given the autonomy of NHS Trusts. It is 
only in the manpower planning field that Working Paper 10 
explicitly gives Regions responsibilities that require them 
to have information for planning purposes from NHS Trusts.
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4.4.3 COMMUNICATIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION
The importance of good communications with the rest of the 
NHS to explain, publicise, and "win the hearts and minds", 
has prompted considerable investment in publicity, and the 
appointment of a communications advisor to the NHS 
Management Executive. Regions have also devoted resources to 
explaining the developments in their necessarily complex 
programmes for implementing the NHS Review.
4.4.4 MONITORING AND CONTROL
The DH is embarked on a full-scale review of its central 
requirements. This has to take into account Ministers' 
stated desires to see a reduction and the increasing 
devolution of responsibilities down from Regions to 
Districts and providers, whilst also recognising the loss of 
direct managerial relationships between Regions and NHS 
Trusts, and its lessening in the case of DHAs and DMUs, must 
still be squared with Ministers' statutory accountability to 
Parliament. It is requiring rethinking the purposes for 
which information is required from the NHS by the DH. These 
purposes combine both a scanning function, and the 
monitoring and control of agreed programs. The new emphasis 
on contracts as a means of monitoring and control will 
provide, and require, new sorts of information.
As Regions' responsibilities become clearer, particularly in 
the planning of services and monitoring the performance of 
purchasers, including GPFHs, and providers, so will their 
information requirements for monitoring and control. 
Nevertheless, with the exception of information from NHS
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Trusts, which in principle flows direct to the DH (with the 
exception of some manpower information), the Korner 
principle remains that what the centre needs should be a 
subset of what Regions require.
The information needed for monitoring and "control" of the 
internal market by Regions and the DH will need to evolve 
with experience of its operation. That it will be needed is 
not in doubt. The scenario of an increasing number of 
autonomous GP Fund Holders and NHS Trusts, in addition to 
existing District Health Authorities, and the potential of 
an increasing role of Local Authorities as purchasers, will 
present increasing pressures on existing Regional 
capabilities to monitor performance.
The first experience of a detailed simulation of the 
internal market over a three year period showed that it 
"crashed" in the third year. This was largely because of the 
lack of any consistent and coherent strategic framework for 
purchasing between Local Authorities, Health Authorities and 
GP Fund Holders. It had been hoped that a set of Regionally 
agreed health and quality outcome measures (of equity, 
effectiveness, efficiency, access, appropriateness, and 
responsiveness) would provide such a framework. But in the 
simulation the Region "lacked the leverage" to make this 
stick, especially with Local Authorities and GPs. The result 
was that the three sets of purchasers pursued separate and 
conflicting strategies. "Purchasers began to compete for 
limited hospital services; being unable to adjust for volume
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or price, purchasers actually pressed providers to lower 
quality in order to meet contracted caseloads and stay 
within their budget" (Liddell and Parston 1990 p731).
Information for monitoring and control will be needed to 
ensure that this does not happen in reality. The difficulty 
is that with no increase in the overall budget for the NHS 
there is very little room for error on the part of 
individual purchasers or providers. Agreeing the size of the 
contingency funds that Regions will need to hold to bale out 
those unable to manage their budgets will in itself 
introduce distortions into the market. Methods for ensuring 
that adjustments to contracts can be made as the financial 
year progresses will probably become a central feature of 
monitoring and control.
4.5 INFORMATION SYSTEMS IN THE NHS POST-REVIEW
To support the knowledgework processes outlined above, 
organisations will need to develop and foster all available 
practical knowledge and organisational memory. These are not 
issues that will be discussed here. Rather the focus is on 
the information systems. Essentially the question to be 
addressed is, will developments in information systems 
required to implement the Review, for example by supporting 
the knowledgework processes outlined above, improve 
organisational intelligence? Some of the major issues in the 
development and management of Information Systems are 
discussed below.
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4.5.1.1 Provider and Contract Minimum Data Sets 
At the heart of the internal market is the expectation that 
the purchaser will pay the provider for the care received by 
its residents, or in the case of a GP Fund Holder its 
patients. Since this is how the provider generates its 
income, the key context for considering the flow of 
financial resources ceases to be the adjustments of 
allocations, carried out by Regions on the basis of 
historical (by at least a year) estimates of catchment 
populations, and becomes the periodic (usually monthly) 
billing and receipt of payment within a period agreed by 
contract, or stipulated centrally for extra-contractual 
cases (e.g. emergency admissions). The provider needs to be 
able to account for the work done, not only to ensure that 
purchasers will pay but also to improve the internal 
monitoring of expenditure.
From the perspective of the District as a purchaser the 
context also changes. As discussed in Section 4.3, whilst 
still retaining some "Directly Managed Units", which are to 
become managed on an "arms-length" contractual basis, the 
District has to become primarily concerned with the 
allocation and control of the financial resources allocated 
to it on the basis of its resident population. Central to 
both these functions is an understanding of the performance 
of providers in providing care for its residents whether or 
not this is under an agreed contract.
4.5.1. DATA MANAGEMENT
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The concept of a "contract minimum data set" is expected to 
prove essential to the capabilities of the NHS to improve 
the performance of both providers and purchasers.
From the providers' perspective the contract mds, certainly 
for in-patients, is essentially the Korner minimum data 
sets, but has some important additions, in particular the 
"contract identifier", which includes both the purchaser and 
provider organisation code. The major problem for providers 
becomes assembling such data quickly and accurately enough 
after the end of an episode to enable it to account for the 
work undertaken to the appropriate purchaser so that its 
bill, which may or may not be sent separately, will be paid. 
Where a block contract exists, aggregate data will suffice 
initially ie. simply counts of the work undertaken. 
However, even from the start of the market, provision has to 
be made to deal with the requirements of GP Fund Holders, 
who operate relatively small budgets and therefore need more 
detailed management information. Also extra-contractual 
referrals, (those patients treated "outside" the contract 
agreed by the District with its residents' GPs for their 
referrals which may be to one or more providers who may be 
in or outside the District) will need to be accounted for in 
a uniform way so that providers can submit bills e.g for 
emergency treatment given to a resident of a far-off 
District, and expect payment.
Whilst initially the emphasis may be on block contracts, for 
which aggregate counts of work done may be adequate, 
pressure to improve the management of resources (by both
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provider and purchaser) will increase the number of cost per 
case type contracts. Indeed, were aggregate data to remain 
the sole source of input to a purchasers' knowledgebase 
concerning care given, it would be difficult to refine its 
allocation of resources. Hence the intention to phase in the 
abilities of District to process individual level data so 
that by 1 April 1993 it becomes possible to drop all 
aggregate accounts of activity sent by providers, and 
instead expect individual minimum data sets to be sent in 
association with each invoice.
The provision of such contextually appropriate information 
will increase the knowledgebase of both providers and 
purchasers. In addition to the "minimum" data that may be 
specified, it is also a clear that the development of 
contracting will encourage substantial improvements in the 
requirements for quality and outcome data in individual 
contracts.
4.5.1.2 Data Definitions
These policy developments require a number of changes in 
data definitions that have been considered by the Data 
Definitions Support Group. Although the opportunity has been 
taken to improve and tighten up some of the existing 
definitions, some have proved too difficult either to define 
or refine. An example of the former concerns the definitions 
of a "bedday". Because of difficulties in establishing 
uniformity over the recording day cases, ward attenders 
etc., it has been known that, post-Korner, a range of
425
different interpretations have developed. "Bedday" now 
becomes a data item that may be of crucial importance in 
contracting. Purchasers and providers must agree which of a 
number of different definitions they will use in agreeing 
their contract. Whilst this helps improve the accuracy of 
the data recorded, it will mean that it remains difficult to 
make any cross-authority and national comparisons. Rather 
than count beddays, an alternative count might be of
"contract episodes". However, the basic building brick of 
hospital activity since Korner has been the consultant 
episode; the Patient Administration Systems are designed to 
produce counts of these. But, post-Review, a patient may 
change contract within a consultant episode, e.g. turning 
from an elective case into an emergency one whilst still 
under the care of the same consultant. Again, accounting for
the work done under the separate contracts will have to
remain a matter for "local negotiation" at present. It is 
not possible to specify changes to the existing PAS systems 
in sufficient time to allow for analyses of sub-consultant 
episode episodes to be made for 1 April 1991. There are 
likely to be major communication pathologies here in
communicating accounts of work done, both to purchasers, and 
on to the DH in terms of counts of activity.
4.5.1.3 Coding and Classification
The Review has generated the need for a very rapid 
improvement in the recording of work done in out-patients. 
This is because, at present, the only data available, other 
than in the medical record itself, is essentially an 
aggregate count of attendances. Prospectively, a purchaser,
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whether District or GPFH, will require much more detailed 
knowledge of the significant procedures and reasons for 
attendance for individual patients. The refinement of the 
codes and classifications of out-patient procedures may 
indeed extend to embrace the new concepts of ambulatory 
patients (ie. including day cases, ward attenders, accident 
& emergency).
Whilst the Review is stimulating new work, it is also 
requiring the levels of accuracy and completion of existing 
codes to be vastly improved. Postcodes, for example, were 
recommended for collection by Korner, but now become a 
necessary part of the contract minimum data set. Providers 
need them to identify who the payer is (and attention is now 
focusing down to the level of knowing how to allocate 
postcodes that straddle District boundaries) , whilst 
Districts need them to build up their knowledge of the 
spatial distribution of health needs and demands (Gatrell 
1988). Diagnostic codes have also been a requirement, but 
levels of completion have been very low and slow. Now 
diagnostic codes are needed within 28 days of the end of the 
patient episode to enable a contract mds to be sent. In 
fact, knowledge of the diagnosis now becomes important in 
determining the bill, and a change of diagnosis may result 
in a change of contract.
Codes for GP practices have been developed within Regions. 
Now some national uniformity has been needed. GP codes have 
been available from two sources (the General Medical Council
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and the Prescription Pricing Authority). A choice has had to 
be made to standardise on the use of one for purposes of 
national uniformity (the PPA code). New codes and 
classifications have had to be developed for organisations. 
Whilst existing coding structures have been used where 
possible, codes for new entities, such as GPFHs and NHSTs 
have had to be invented.
Whilst the Review is requiring the quality of data to be 
significantly improved, it remains the case that there is 
very little by way of uniform codes or classifications to 
assess the quality of care or outcome. Whilst contracts are 
expected to deliver much improved specifications of the 
standards of care, there will be little data routinely 
available to support assessments of performance; providers 
will have to weigh up the costs of ad hoc enquiries and 
samples against the benefits of attracting the contract. 
Since all contracts once signed are in the public domain, 
such comparative information on contract specifications for 
quality standards can be expected to result in greater 
organisational intelligence.
4.5.1.4 Data Interchange Standards
Contract minimum data sets must be exchanged for all 
patients by 1 April 1993. Nevertheless, individual data on 
some patients will be needed from 1 April 1991. At present 
the data is not available in a format that enables all 
providers to send all the data needed in a contract mds to 
all purchasers. Hence, the need to define data interchange 
standards. This is being done using the EDIFACT standard
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which is the international language promoted by the United 
Nations; their standards are regarded as "off the shelf" 
having been proven in real situations. The standards concern 
message formats; for example the for the statements in prose 
of a word, phrase and sentence EDIFACT has a data field, 
segment and message respectively. The analogy is not 
perfect; for example, there are only a finite number of 
combinations of "words" (data fields) into "phrases" 
(segments), and every "sentence" contains only a pre­
determined selection of "phrases". The interchange standard 
is akin to a "template" in that it defines which data fields 
belong where in an interchange. Associated with the detailed 
definition of each data interchange is a dictionary of data 
elements that has been based on the NHS minimum data set 
model, suitably revised with the new data definitions. 
Whether information managers can grasp these technicalities, 
which are designed to reduce many of the pathologies of 
machine to machine communications, remains to be seen.
In essence, then, the requirement to handle the volume of 
individual in-patient and out-patient contract minimum data 
sets, which contain contain up to 70 different data items, 
have forced consideration of methods of storing the data in 
a uniform way. No equivalent consideration has been given to 
the sending of bills as, initially at least, the emphasis is 
on block contracts with regular monthly payments. 
Nevertheless, as contracts become refined so will the volume 
and complexity of bills, and similar considerations may be 
needed.
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Data interchange standards concern the format of messages 
for transmission via electronic media, e.g. floppy disk, 
magnetic tape or via electronic data interchange over a 
network. However, whilst floppy disks may be the most 
commonly used media initially, common communication 
protocols will be necessary if any network solution is to be 
used. The existence of agreed national and international 
standards for open systems interconnection (OSI) now 
provides a framework for the NHS to link different systems 
together. Adherence to OSI standards was generally welcomed 
in the Project 25 consultation response, though full 
compliance with (the Government's protocol) GOSIP was seen 
as more long term. The IT needed to support the Review will 
not only be within providers and purchasers, but also in the 
communication networks between them.
4.5.2 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
4.5.2.1 The Requirements of the White Papers 
In the consultation document produced by Project 25 on IT, a 
table was produced which summarised the changes arising from 
both the "Working for Patients" White Paper and the 
preceding White Paper "Promoting Better Health" which 
addressed reforms in the Family Practitioner Services (DHSS 
1988d). This table is reproduced in Appendix 1. It indicated 
the new requirements for 1991, the current practice on 
relevant information and IT systems, necessary action on IT 
needed or in hand either by the DH or locally and gave some 
comments to substantiate proposed actions.
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The appendix indicates the very wide range of new IT 
requirements, yet also notes that in may cases interim 
solutions will be needed for 1 April 1991. However, looking 
beyond 1991, an effective communications infrastructure is 
presented as the key to any strategic development, and the 
DHs role is seen as facilitating its development. Hence the 
emphasis on common data interchange standards, (see Section 
4.5.1.4), network services to support the electronic 
transmission of information, and the development of 
computer-based information services to make information and 
other data services widely available.
4.5.2 . 2 NHS Network
The basis of a national network for data interchange had 
already been planned for the purpose of improving links 
between Family Practitioner Services. The network is being 
implemented during 1990 with the NHS Central Register being 
connected in April 1991. The national network is being made 
available to all groups of users in the NHS who wish to use 
it. The sorts of information services envisaged are:
a. information databases which provide information 
about services available from providers to buyers 
and which disseminate information about contracts 
in force.
b. Finance systems to support the movement of cash
around the NHS and the settlement of invoices.
c. Systems to support the mechanics of contracting,
such as clearing houses to handle cross-boundary
flows of information.
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4.5.2.3 GP Systems
Although most of the needs of GPs can be met by manual 
systems or be enhancement of systems provided elsewhere, for 
GP Fund Holders computers are necessary for practice 
accounting. The introduction of GPFHs in "Working for 
Patients" clearly required urgent work on specifying the 
completely new accounting procedures and associated software 
specification. Ideally this work should have followed on 
from the Project 34 report rather than preceded it, but the 
implementation timescales did not permit this. The result 
was that a series of changes to the specifications to the 
GPFH software had to be made so that, for example, the 
structure of the organisation codes recommended as standard 
by Project 34 were incorporated. Conversely, during these 
meetings it became clear that the GPFH accounting procedures 
had to be run on an accruals basis. This resulted in 
recommendations to provide information on an accruals basis 
having to be made in the "Next Steps" that had not been 
consulted on.
4.5.2.4 Hospital Systems
In the years preceding the NHS Review considerable money had 
been allocated to the Resource Management Initiative (RMI). 
Its twin aims have been to involve clinicians in management 
and, via patient activity based databases, to provide 
information for clinical and general management. However, 
the white paper proposals are not in themselves dependent on 
the RMI. In 1991-92 and possibly for some time after 
hospitals will use their existing costing systems to derive
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average specialty costs per patient episode or patient day. 
Nevertheless, an ambitious roll-out of RMI has been funded 
(Buxton et al 1989).
An associated Hospital Information Support Systems (HISS) 
project also began before the Review, with the objective of 
achieving the installation of a total hospital suite of 
integrated systems on three test sites. The main thrust of 
the second phase, however, is to secure enhancement by 
improving existing systems and trying to produce realisable 
benefits in a more compressed timetable.
Given the scale of these two initiatives, it might be 
expected that resources for enhancing out-patient systems 
which are needed to provide the contract mds required by the 
Review would be forthcoming. In fact, a pared down bid is 
still being considered, but even if there is agreement by 
Treasury it will not be available until the 1991/92 
Financial Year. The impetus behind existing RMI and HISS 
initiatives has proved too strong to be diverted to release 
funds for Review work, and the timescales for finding new 
money are too protracted to avoid users being faced with the 
dilemma of whether to install interim out-patient systems.
4.5.2.5 Community Systems
Community health and paramedical services have a low level 
of IT investment. The Korner systems that have been 
introduced have not had to be patient-based, and again there 
is a dilemma of whether to continue implementing the Korner
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systems so that the basic aggregate counts of patient 
contacts is accurate, or invest in patient-based systems for 
which there are no nationally uniform standards that can
assure the investment of some degree of compatibility with 
other systems and standards in the future. A major study to 
determine what person-identified systems can be in place by 
1 April 1994 is planned. Once again, the community systems, 
as with Korner, are (at least) a year behind other sectors.
4.5.2.6 District Systems
As with out-patient systems, there is no certainty that the
money needed to enable Districts to have the IT
infrastructure necessary to handle (resident) patient-based 
databases will be in place by 1993. Nevertheless the
District Information Support Systems project, which was set 
up under the aegis of Project 3 4 has a clear program of 
joint working with selected Districts to develop a range of 
modules, capable of being installed independently on a range 
of hardware. A structured analysis of the new business 
functions of the District defined the following "business 
processes": planning, invoice processing, contract
management, management information, resident population 
register and healthcare event linkage. These products will 
be available for Districts to install by 1993. For 1991 
there are again a number of interim systems that are being 
developed. Whilst the IT resources for both hospital and 
District systems are considerable, they need effective 
management if the information requirements of the Review are 
to be met.
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4.5.3.1 Patient based systems and record linkage 
The need to move away from system specific and primarily 
event driven systems towards systems that enable patient 
details to be passed to, extracted from or linked with 
records from other systems was very evident in the proposed 
developments in information management, as outlined in 
Project 34. Wherever in the consultation documents such an 
orientation was proposed it received substantial support 
e.g. individual episode contract minimum data sets for in­
patients and out-patients; episode of care concepts for 
community systems; health care event linkage in the DISS 
project; linkage at patient level between District, Family 
Health Service Authority (FHSA) and community systems. Other 
forms of individual patient based systems and communications 
media are also being developed, for example the testing by
8,000 people in Exmouth of the use of "smart cards" for 
carrying their medical history with them, and facilitating 
the transfer of data between hospital and community 
services. Magnetic stripe cards are being considered as one 
way of storing the NHS number and associated NHS 
registration details, something which is of great importance 
since the NHS number becomes a minimum data set item in 
1993. This latter concept presents a major advance in 
organisational intelligence, since it will enable the FHSA 
registers, the GPs and the DISS and Provider systems to have 
a common number by which to uniquely identify individuals 
(although it is not intended to make it a necessary 
condition for intra-organisational information systems). It
4.5.3 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
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will be at the heart of what is termed "service management".
The concept of "service management" was introduced in the 
context of "The Next Steps" referring to the close co­
operation needed between Districts, Regions and FHSAs. In 
many respects they need "similar information if they are to 
fulfil their potential as planners and commissioners of 
health services to meet the healthcare needs of their 
resident populations, to monitor their own performances in 
those roles, and to account for that performance" (DHSS 
1990b p21). For example, the common issues involve:
- the need to access data about residents in terms 
of both aggregate demographic information and 
detailed information about individuals as required
- DHAs, FHSAs, and RHAs have a variety of planning 
and operational systems, some of which utilise 
data derived from a residents database
- knowledge of GP referral patterns.
Whilst the objective of service management is to improve the 
flow of information appropriate to each of these 
organisations, via networks and access to a resident 
population database, there are many potential pathologies, 
which are shared with of the patient based systems. For 
example, there may be transmission errors and corruption of 
the data, or it may prove difficult to maintain the 
integrity a single central database that can be updated from 
many sources. It may be necessary for each District to hold 
its own register, or for Regions to have their own one which 
may also provide a "bureau" service to Districts. Joint
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ownership of data between DHAs and FHSAs may prove difficult 
to manage. The most fundamental issue is that of 
conf identiality.
4.5.3.2 Confidentiality
There were a number of comments on the subject of 
confidentiality in relation either to the contract mds or 
access to population registers, particularly FHSA registers. 
The concern was not one of opposition to either contract mds 
or access to FHSA registers - quite the reverse - those were 
repeatedly and positively welcomed. The concern was about 
ensuring that proper arrangements were in place to safeguard 
conf identiality.
A series of guidelines is in the process of being issued. 
For example, subject to basic safeguards, (for example to 
gain unauthorised access to data) FHSAs are free to share 
patient registration data with DHAs for general NHS purposes 
including, for example, planning, management and audit. 
Also, there is the new issue of subject access under the 
Data Protection Act to files held by a District containing 
data which may have been recorded by providers for which the 
DHA is not managerially responsible.
The handling of the confidentiality issue has been very 
careful. Without the confidence of patients and public in 
the confidentiality of the handling within the "NHS family" 
of personal patient details the linkage of data for 
assessments of health need (of individual patients and whole
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populations) and the medical diagnoses/procedures in the 
contract mds will not be exchanged.
4.5.3.3 Comparative Information and Indicators 
The Korner indicators were derived as a result of joint 
DH/NHS Working Groups and a consultation process. Much more 
detailed indicators in all areas, and particularly for 
different age groups were proposed, and the total number 
increased to over 3,000. This has proved to be an almost 
unmanageable number to produce, let alone analyse. The 
Review has offered an opportunity for a substantial 
revision.
It is being suggested that, post-Review, comparative 
information and indicators will need to encompass the 
perspectives of the following types of organisation:-
a) Monitoring and central planning bodies (DH, RHAs 
and the Audit Commission).
b) Commissioning bodies (DHAs and GP Fund Holders).
c) Providers (Directly managed units, NHS Trusts, 
private hospitals etc.).
d) Family Health Services Authorities.
Monitoring and central planning bodies will need indicators 
to judge the performance of Districts as buyers, and as 
direct managers.
Commissioning bodies will need to have indicators to help 
them assess the needs of their resident/client population; 
the types of services available and the relative cost-
438
effectiveness of them in different provider units; and 
comparative performance data with other similar 
commissioning bodies in meeting health care needs.
Providers will need to have comparative information to 
monitor the effectiveness, efficiency and quality of their 
services and may need comparative cost data, albeit that it 
would have to be anonymised and certainly not available to 
purchasers.
The needs of FHSAs contain elements of all three 
perspectives (as they monitor primary care services, buy the 
services of dentists and provide a patient registration 
service). However, they may also need indicators to assess 
the performance of GPFHs as buyers.
New sorts of comparative information will be needed to 
assess health needs of resident populations, and the use of 
indicators in Annual Health Reports is clearly relevant 
here. Also there will be new indicators needed to monitor 
the pattern of contracting. The emphasis in existing types 
of indicators will need to shift to a focus on indicators of 
what is provided and at what cost and quality (the latter 
being a long-standing gap in indicator and other information 
systems to date).
4.5.3.4 Changes to Organisational Roles and Information 
Flows
What impact will the information requirements of the Review
439
have on the flows of information? Firstly, it should be 
noted that the organisational structures of the NHS are 
becoming much more complex and dynamic. There are new 
entities: GP Fund Holders and NHS Trusts, and their numbers 
are expected to increase over the next five years, though 
targets are being avoided. Existing organisations have 
different roles: in addition to their continuing role as the 
providers of patient care, providers must become
increasingly concerned with managing and monitoring 
contracts; Districts now become responsible primarily for 
"commissioning" services for their residents; Regions' roles 
remain unclear, but they retain a strategic planning and
monitoring role, and remain an important conduit of 
information flow to the centre. The FHSAs now become part of 
the RHA, and therefore much more closely linked with DHAs, 
e.g. for "service management" purposes. The DH has had the 
least change in role; whilst endeavouring to shed
responsibilities that RHAs and DHAs can undertake, it still
remains responsible for central policy making, and advising 
ministers who remain accountable to Parliament. However, the 
information strategy for the DH itself will not be agreed 
until 1992, and this reflects continuing uncertainties on 
the extent of its planning and monitoring roles. 
Nevertheless, in terms of information management the role of 
the DH is clear.
Role of the DH
In essence, the role of the DH is seen as being to 
collaborate with the service in providing a framework of 
central guidance and support within which information
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systems are developed locally. The joint NHS/DH approach to 
the National Strategic Framework for the Hospital and 
Community Health Services (see Chapter 5 Section 7) 
discussed guidance and standards in a number of areas. In 
line with this approach, advice and guidance for the HCHS 
has subsequently been published, including, for example, 
comprehensive guidance on investment appraisal, the 
consequences of EEC open tender procurement, the management 
of data, and most importantly of all the recommendations 
contained in "The Next Steps". This joint working approach 
will continue with the proposed "Strategic Conference". This 
will comprise senior management from both the Service and 
the Department, and meeting a few times a year to agree 
priorities for plans for national initiatives and regional 
strategies, and monitor overall progress across the NHS 
(including the Family Practitioner Services) in achieving 
agreed objectives. In terms of agreeing changes to 
operational systems, the joint DH/NHS Committee for 
Regulating Information Requirements will continue to debate 
the issues agree and issue the formal Data Set Change 
Notices, but its remit will now have to be extended to 
include the Family Practitioner Services.
As far as its information gathering role is concerned, the 
interim review of DH central requirements, which was 
completed in June 1990, indicated no major reductions - only 
20 of the "more obvious" returns were dropped. This was 
because of an insufficiently clear view of the future 
planning, monitoring and review system(s). In continuing
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with the full review, it is possible that new returns needed 
as the new responsibilities become clearer.
Although from 1991 until 1993 central requirements will 
continue as now, (with the exception of Waiting List returns 
which are so politically sensitive that they will be 
provided on both a provider and District or residence 
basis) , post 1993 it will become the exception for 
information to come direct from providers and Districts of 
treatment. Yet the DH will be in receipt of more returns in 
the future, since it will receive them from individual NHS 
Trusts. Whilst what it receives from Regions will be 
essentially on a District of residence basis, nevertheless, 
there will be certain needs - for example on overall service 
capacity and key facility information and on manpower - 
where the DH, or in some cases Regions, will retain a role, 
so some returns from providers will still be required.
NHS Trusts
NHSTs have jealously fought for recognition of their 
independence in information flows. The part of "The Next 
Steps" which was most hedged with caveats concerned the flow 
of manpower information from NHSTs. There was particular 
sensitivity over information on earnings information; in the 
end it was agreed that the DH would accept the information 
contained in the standard financial returns, which would be 
sent direct to the DH. Another contentious issue was whether 
the medical manpower census data should flow direct to the 
DH, and then be sent back to the Regions so that they could 
fulfil their responsibilities to plan for medical manpower
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on a region wide basis, as required by Working Paper 10, or 
whether the NHSTs would be content (as both Regions and the 
DH would prefer) for this information to flow via Regions. 
(This is not yet resolved) . It is only because of the 
backing of Working Paper 10 that exceptions in the case of 
manpower have been made to the general rule that NHSTs send 
their data direct to the DH.
Districts
What Districts receive from providers will, as standard, be 
provider-level data, and not down to the sites within a 
provider. Essentially, in the post-Review world of 
contracting, it is the "provider" which is the management 
entity involved. Therefore, what goes on "inside" it is not 
the concern of external bodies such as the District (except 
for the role of the external Audit Commission, which has yet 
to be full defined). Despite arguments to the contrary from 
those concerned with financial returns, the only exception 
to this concerns the estates returns where site level data 
(and below) is needed. Where purchasers require site- 
specific information, e.g. for quality monitoring, this may 
be agreed in local contracts.
Providers
Whilst providers may be relieved not to have to send site- 
level data, this does not mean that they will have no need 
to collect it for internal management purposes. An important 
issue for directly managed providers is how to produce a 
contract mds, yet, as "The Next Steps" recognised beneath
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the contract mds there is a "provider" mds which is more 
extensive, since it contains the information needed within 
the provider. For example, the in-patient "provider" mds 
contains new data fields to allow the codes identifying the 
surgeon performing an operation, and the anaesthetist 
involve, to be identified - a recommendation made by the 
National Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths - so 
that medical audit can be improved, and thereby meet another 
explicit commitment of the Review.
GPFHs and FHSAs
The information management skills of GPFH practices are
going to need to be considerable to operate the new manual 
of accounts and the associated software. It remains to be 
seen whether the extent of the technicalities involved 
sharply reduces interest in the scheme, as some suspect.
FHSAs will also need improved information management to
handle the new contracts for GPs and dentists, to allocate 
and monitor prescribing budgets, and to monitor GPFHs and 
provide data to the RHA (though there are no major changes 
nationally in this respect in the standard reports produced 
for the DH).
The changes in organisational roles and the flows of
information between them indicate that the NHS can no longer 
be characterised as a bureaucratic hierarchy, but must be 
considered more in terms of a decentralised market, in which 
information flows not so much to enable central (or 
regional) control and monitoring of resource allocation and 
usage, but because it is needed for trading. The cost of
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providing information now becomes an important overhead for 
providers, yet without sending adequate information (invoice 
plus contract mds) they cannot be sure of receiving any 
income. Whilst inter-District rivalry was only stimulated by 
the comparison of performance indicators that were two years 
out of date, intense rivalry is likely to develop, 
particularly in urban areas such as London, where the choice 
of providers is greatest. In information terms, this means 
that the composition of service costs now becomes 
confidential information, although there will be openness in 
pricing.
For the purposes of planning and monitoring, the attention 
of Regions and the DH now shifts away from the provider, and 
onto the information needed to assess whether the purchaser 
is obtaining "value for money" from contracts agreed with 
the providers selected from the comparative performance of 
providers to provide care for residents. The co-ordination 
of plans of different providers so as to enable a Region 
wide balance of services now becomes much harder to achieve, 
particularly when NHS Trusts are only obliged to provide 
"business plans" as an indication of their planning intent, 
and control the management of their "operational surpluses". 
The danger is in allowing too much of the knowledge of the 
performance of providers to be derived indirectly, via 
purchasers. The bounds of the acceptable decrease in 
"control" this implies for the DH have not yet been agreed. 
If there is none, then, in theory, market forces alone will 
determine that some providers may close. These changes may
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be unpredictable and sudden. It may be that increasing 
(albeit informal) use is made of the work and findings of 
the Audit Commission to highlight what is going on in 
particular providers (particularly where there are 
suspicions of poor performance).
The increasing decentralisation of the NHS may have to 
generate countervailing methods of centralising 
intelligence-as-news. One method will be to use contracts to 
specify the relationships between DH and Regions, Regions 
and Districts as well as between Districts and their 
providers. Other approaches may use the developments of the 
NHS network to provide "common" information services so 
that services on offer and contracts signed, together with 
their associated qualitative and quantitative information 
requirements, can be made available to all. These sorts of 
services are, however, being left to market forces to 
determine at present, the role of the DH is to provide the 
necessary information systems and infrastructure to support 
them.
4.5.3.5 Changes to Information Management Roles and 
Relationships
As the organisations change roles, so do those of their 
information managers. For example, the role of District 
Information Managers now focuses on the collection of 
information to support contracting, and, in due course, the 
presentation of resident-based central returns. The role of 
the unit information manager, which was being extended by 
the Resource Management Initiative, now becomes concerned
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with gathering information to assist in the costing of work, 
setting of prices, the marketing of the providers' services, 
as well as the production of contract mds and associated 
information systems and the dispatch of central returns to 
the DH (directly initially, and then, with much more 
difficulty to patients' Districts of residence).
The corollary is that the role of the "information 
specialist" envisaged by Korner now becomes very much more 
differentiated. For example, by July 1990 in North West 
Thames, the regular meetings of District Information 
Officers was acknowledging the need to have joint meetings 
with the "Unit Information Managers", and also the need to 
get representatives from the FHSA information managers - yet 
another new specialism. Another change, particularly evident 
at a Regional level, is the development of Facilities 
Management - the contracting out of services, especially for 
the management of IT, to the private sector, or in some 
cases to the previous Regional staff who have set themselves 
up as a private company, as in West Midlands for example.
In short, the picture is one of increasing diversity in 
methods of information management as the "business" and its 
information systems diversify.
4.6 ASSESSMENTS OF ORGANISATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
4.6.1 INTRODUCTION
What does the perspective of organisational intelligence 
have to contribute to assessing the information requirements
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of the NHS Review? Firstly, any analysis of the Review must 
be put in its historical and political context. This was 
done in Section 2. Secondly, the organisational intelligence 
perspective focuses on the development of knowledgework 
systems. The processes of defining the information systems 
to provide the basis for appropriate knowledge post-Review 
were discussed in Section 3. But this last section of the 
Chapter has been concerned with intended outcomes, 
commencing from 1 April 1991.
One of the features of the organisational intelligence 
approach is that assessments of contextually appropriate 
behaviour and/or information can be conducted from different 
perspectives. In this concluding section, the perspectives 
of managers, information managers and social analysts will 
be considered in making these assessments.
4.6.2 PERSPECTIVES OF MANAGERS
Firstly, considering the perspectives of managers in 
general, and general managers in particular, the goals and 
theories of organisation which they are expected to follow 
and espouse have been provided by the theory of the internal 
health market. This theory, developed outside the NHS, has 
been adopted as being conformant with the dominant political 
ideology of the Conservative government. Nevertheless, the 
first of its objectives (see Chapter 3 Section 1.4), of 
giving patients better health care and greater choice of the 
services available has always been implicit, although the 
rider of "wherever they live in the U.K." also implies that 
they may now have to travel to get it. The innovation of
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NHS Trusts and GP Fund Holders is clearly intended to meet 
the second of the Government's two objectives, of giving 
greater "satisfaction and rewards for those working in the 
NHS who successfully respond to local needs and 
preferences". The emphasis on decentralisation to increase 
efficiency is another aspect of the (current) Conservative 
espoused theory of action, though in practice, as Flynn 
(1989) suggests, there is often a need for more central 
control (e.g. via Health Service Indicators).
For the general manager, the fundamental features of the 
Review are the split between the purchaser and the provider 
functions, and the allocation of resources on the basis of 
the resident population of the purchaser. The focus of 
organisational intelligence then becomes to enquire what it 
is that managers need to know in order to make the new 
arrangements work? The general manager has certain policy 
objectives, e.g. to keep within budget whilst providing 
optimal levels of care to patients (in the case of a 
provider) or populations (in the case of a purchaser) . For 
the first time since the NHS began these roles have become 
explicit and distinct. To achieve these objectives the 
manager, in essence, needs to know about resource 
utilisation and patient activity in relation to need and 
demand.
At this stage the organisational intelligence perspective 
then becomes concerned with how the manager is provided with
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this knowledge, and focuses on the perspective of the 
information manager.
4.6.3 PERSPECTIVES OF INFORMATION MANAGERS
For information managers the context of their concerns are 
the historical and political background to the issues, 
personalities, and organisational (and power) relationships 
in their organisation. To these are added the state of their 
current information systems and information management 
structures. The goals of their organisation may have been 
made explicit by their general manager, but the information 
manager, in a purchaser, will now be concerned primarily 
with monitoring the effectiveness of contracts secured for 
the health of the resident population and providing 
"marketing analysis" to improve this. The information 
manager in a provider will be concerned with collecting the 
necessary activity and finance information about patient 
care to produce appropriate invoices, and improve the 
costing and pricing of services. The policies for these new 
information requirements have been given as a result of the 
joint DH/NHS working, consultation and the conclusion 
reached in "The Next Steps" (and supplementary and 
explanatory guidance specifically tailored for general 
managers) as described in Section 3.
Information managers in both providers and purchasers have 
complementary knowledgework processes to perform. The 
provider information manager has to ensure that the general 
managers can scan and select the purchasers with whom they 
wish to agree contracts. Over time the specificity of these
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contracts is expected to increase. But the speed at which 
this can happen from the provider's perspective depends on 
how the internal problem of providing information is 
resolved. Organisational intelligence pays particular 
attention to how complex problems are decomposed.
In each provider unit arrangements have to be made for each 
patient to be assigned to a contract. How this information 
requirement is interpreted locally will vary, but 
assessments of organisational intelligence would examine the 
trade-offs between the costs of producing it, the speed of 
producing it and its accuracy. For example, provided a 
postcode is attached, and the the GP is recorded, each in­
patient episode can be retrospectively assigned to a 
contract via a series of look-up tables. But whilst this 
may be adequate where there are unlikely to be many patients 
from outside local districts, or outside existing contracts, 
correcting errors will be much more difficult - in large 
part because they may only arise when the patient has left 
hospital. An alternative is to invest in micro-computers 
which contain algorithms to identify a district of residence 
from postcodes, all GP codes, all organisation codes and a 
register of all local contracts, and place the machines at 
each patient registration point. But whilst this would mean 
an accurate patient identifier is available at the start of 
an episode, the costs may not be worth it, particularly if 
most of the contracts are block (ie. buying access to a 
service rather than any specified volume). Different 
contexts will require different solutions, each of which may
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be locally appropriate, though not necessarily optimal.
However, from 1 April 1993, the provider is required to send 
a contract minimum data set for each in-patient and out­
patient attendance. This will enable the provider to know 
much more precisely what services are being provided and how 
much they cost (and therefore how to progressively improve 
pricing and product strategies).
The information manager in the provider will become 
increasingly involved in developing information systems that 
enable care given in different parts of a provider unit to 
be recorded and combined on a patient's invoice, or 
associated minimum data set. The impetus for improving 
communications within a provider unit is of concern from the 
perspective of organisational intelligence, (including the 
ways in which the relevant data is stored, processed and 
presented). As the knowledge of costs and activities improve 
so can the methods used to monitor and control them. But, in 
organisational intelligence, the focus is also on how the 
organisation uses information to learn and develop its 
internal structures appropriately. This would be an area for 
further comparative work in different provider units in due 
course.
From the perspective of the purchaser, the information 
manager will also need to be able to develop information 
systems that scan the market and lead to appropriate 
contract selection. An important aspect of this, however, is 
the assessment of health need and knowledge of the (quality
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of) past performance by providers contracted to meet it. The 
purchaser will also need to be able to confirm that the 
invoices sent should be paid, and to do this the associated 
contract minimum data set must be verified, ie. the 
purchaser too will have to know the appropriate address - 
postcode - District of residence (essentially for his 
District only), as well as the GP codes etc. Initially, the 
purchaser may only receive individual contract minimum data 
sets for cost per case and extra-contractual referrals, but 
by April 1993 he must be in a position to handle full 
contract minimum data sets for all his residents. This 
information will provide a very significant increase in 
organisational intelligence, and thus help to improve the 
decision making and planning processes.
In the purchaser's case, the perspective of organisational 
intelligence focuses attention more on external than 
internal communications. The evidence of the market 
simulation (see Section 4.4.4) suggested that purchasers, 
including GP Fund Holders, and Local Authorities, may have 
conflicting interests, and need to communicate (or have 
their conflicts monitored and resolved if necessary). 
Information to monitor contract performance and control 
expenditure, particularly towards the end of financial 
years, will need to be in place.
These knowledgework processes of providers and purchasers 
have to be supported by a knowledgebase. The organisational 
intelligence perspective directs attention firstly to the
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practical knowledge and expertise of the information 
managers. The picture, at present, is dire. It is not just 
that the skills base is low pre-Review (see Chapter 5 
Section 6.1), or that the information management structures 
are now becoming split between providers and purchasers, but 
the basic lack of sufficient trained medical records clerks, 
diagnostic coding skills and invoice clerks threaten the 
viability of all but the crudest block contracts and 
associated aggregate data. However, one can expect practical 
knowledge to develop, and also to see an increase in the use 
of expert systems to help coding.
The organisational intelligence framework also draws 
attention to the importance of the corporate knowledgebase. 
A number of "bridging" systems are needed to be in place for 
1 April 1991 to enable providers and purchasers to start 
trading, before installation of more powerful systems to 
handle the full minimum data sets and vastly increased data 
flows in April 1993. Again, it has become evident that the 
DH does not see its task, as a matter of routine, being to 
draw together and then disseminate information on the 
technical/managerial bridging systems being developed. 
Whilst this issue is beginning to be addressed, it is in 
response to requests from Health Authorities rather than 
knowledge based on experience that this is a helpful way to 
develop a corporate knowledgebase.
Whilst there has long been a perceived need to improve the 
information systems internal to providers, perhaps the most 
important aspect of the Review with respect to fostering an
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increase in organisational intelligence concerns the 
development of person-based data systems that are available 
to purchasers and to other providers.
The contract minimum data sets which flow from 1 April 1993 
will of course place great strain on the communication 
systems, hence the concern for data interchange standards, 
clearing houses, and confidentiality. But once the data has 
been received, it will be capable of being linked to other 
data about the same individual. This is because of the 
introduction of the NHS number as the NHS wide unique person 
identifier. Thus a contract minimum data set containing this 
number, and codes for the organisation providing care 
including the improved diagnostic codes (necessary for 
increasingly refined costing), and dates of admission and 
discharge will enable record linkage. This is not new, but 
rather extends nation-wide the work that has been pioneered 
in the Oxford Record Linkage Study (Acheson 1967). It will 
then be possible to study readmission rates, links between 
hospital and community care, develop patient care profiles 
for the purposes of medical audit and outcome assessments 
etc. In addition, with the inclusion of the postcode, it 
becomes possible to substantially increase the spatial 
resolution level. Whilst the data has to be interpreted 
carefully, e.g. the existence of a nursing home may well 
skew the distribution of episodes, particularly of the 
elderly, recorded in certain postcodes, it can refine the 
epidemiological and spatial analyses of health needs. 
Geographical information systems, with additional
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information provided by agencies such as the FHSAs, GPs, 
Local Authorities and voluntary organisations may be ways in 
which the storage and presentation of contextually 
appropriate information can be refined further.
However, there are important technical issues of how such 
data can be made available to form a register of health (and 
possibly social) care contacts. Careful analyses of the 
information requirements of all parties with an interest in 
the development of a comprehensive health register for a 
population would need to include the needs and contributions 
of the following types of health related organisations: 
hospitals, DHAs, RHAs, FHSAs, GPs, pharmacies, opticians, 
dentists, community social services, audit teams, OPCS, 
laboratories, community health services, Medical Officers, 
blood donor services, and tissue transplant services. Viewed 
in this context it is apparent how poor is the state, and 
restricted the scope, of information management and 
organisational intelligence in the arena of comprehensive 
health care.
Nevertheless, the NHS Review has provided the stimulus of 
information being needed as a necessary condition for 
effective management by contract. Whether such systems as 
develop survive the inevitable changes in organisational 
structure in the future remains to be seen.
4.6.4 PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL ANALYSTS
From the perspective of the social analyst, the 
assessment of the NHS has always been problematic. Klein
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(1982), for example, argues that the NHS is best seen as an 
organisation which is not unique, but which ranks high on a 
number of dimensions: uncertainty about the relationship
between inputs and outputs; heterogeneity of activities and 
aims; and the ambiguity of the available information. He 
argues that the development of information to support 
performance evaluation has to be seen as a response to
external pressures. If this was true of the development of
Health Service Indicators in the early 1980s it is equally 
true of information system developments post-Review. On the 
other hand, Koch (1988) emphasises the internal pressures 
for change. He argues that following the introduction of
general management, the feature of "constant
innovation...must be sustained by paying attention to 
innovation, shaping it up by 'wandering around' the Service, 
rewarding those who have the energy and creativity to 
produce winning ideas" (Koch 1988 p 212) . Some analysts have 
focused on exposing competing groups, conflicts, pluralism 
and political processes within the NHS (Thompson 1987) at a 
macro-level, whilst others have been more concerned with 
understanding change in management at a more local level 
(Ham 1981).
Pettigrew et al conclude that in understanding change in the 
NHS there is a need for more research which "is processual 
(a emphasis on action as well as structure); comparative (a 
range of studies of local health care agencies); pluralist 
(describe and analyse the often competing versions of 
reality seen by actors in the change processes) ; and
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historical (take into account the historical evolution of 
ideas and actions for change as well as the constraints 
within which decision makers operate)" (Pettigrew et al 
1988b p314) . With this conclusion I would agree, but add 
that the framework for assessing organisational intelligence 
has an internal theoretical coherence, being based on an 
information-processing perspective on human and 
organisational behaviour. It also pays attention to the 
products of any process (either of or for intelligence), and 
can be used to assess contextually appropriate behaviour and 
/or intelligence in both the routine and novel aspects of 
action in organisations, and at either a macro- or micro­
level .
In the context of the NHS review, therefore, the framework 
for assessing organisational intelligence has been used to 
examine the historical context in which the policy 
developments took place (see Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 Section 
2), and the processes of defining the information 
requirements (Section 3) . The development of conflicting 
perceptions of roles has been alluded to as well as the 
inherent conflicts of access and confidentiality in 
information systems. It is too early to undertake a series 
of comparative analyses of local progress in different 
Health Authorities. In addition, the organisational 
intelligence perspective does stress the importance of 
making such comparative knowledge available in a dynamic 
knowledgebase. The case studies in other chapters illustrate 
how organisational intelligence could be used to assess the 
appropriateness of behaviour and intelligence in local
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studies. Also as the previous sub-section in this chapter 
and elsewhere (e.g. Chapter 6 Section 2) suggest, the 
organisational intelligence framework can be used to assess 
products for developing organisational intelligence. 
Finally, the framework encourages studies over time, so that 
the development of expertise and experience can be assessed 
with respect to the way routine and novel problems are dealt 
with.
The NHS Review has presented the NHS with a novel problem to 
resolve. The outcome in terms of improved automatisation of 
its knowledgebases may lay the basis for knowledgebases 
that, in being person-based, are more easily adapted to 
meet future organisational developments. Whilst such 
developments in information management (selecting 
appropriate IT solutions, communications, data models etc.,) 
are based on information systems, full information 
management recognises people in their roles as information 
processors for the organisation.
The ways in which the "theories of use" of individuals 
harmonise with the theories of action promulgated by the 
chief executive, general manager, project director etc., may 
well be more critical in determining whether providers or 
(purchasers) with equivalent knowledgebases prosper or not. 
The fostering of human intelligence is at the heart of 
organisational intelligence (see also Chapter 2) . Indeed, 
Stanley (1988) suggests that an organisation may be viewed 
as an expert system in which "people are often used to plug
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the gap and fulfil difficult and unpredictable 
organisational functions, yet are rarely the subject of 
disciplined optimisation in the way capital investment would 
be" (Stanley 1988 p 63). He goes on to suggest that this is 
because of their ability to design "on the fly" solutions to 
problems as they arise. The NHS Review, the determination of 
its information requirements and the outcome of its 
proposals will clearly depend on how organisational 
intelligence can be used to support the necessary creativity 
of human intelligence in resolving the many problems that 
have and will arise.
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CHAPTER 10
THE ORGANISATION OF INTELLIGENCE 
1 CHARACTERISTICS
This concluding chapter begins by presenting a preliminary 
model of the "organisation of intelligence" focusing on the 
characteristics of an organisation that can be assessed for 
organisational intelligence. Although it summarises the 
concepts developed in the preceding chapters it has to be 
tentative because there are many aspects of it that cannot 
be considered in sufficient detail in a thesis such as this, 
which is focused on one organisation - the NHS. Having 
presented the general model, we can then use it to summarise 
the findings of the case studies into some limited aspects 
of intelligence in the organisation of information 
management in the NHS.
The range and diversity of organisation theory (Burrell and 
Morgan 1979) testifies to the complexity of what an 
"organisation" is taken to be. Considering an organisation 
from the perspective of organisational intelligence I make 
the following assumptions:
i) All organisations are conceptualised in general terms 
as agencies to achieve some defining or at least 
descriptive overall global, and usually complex, task e.g. 
provide health care. Organisational intelligence, whether 
for an individual or organisation, is assessed in part by 
its relationship to the achieving of goals. Organisations
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have an internal environment, which consists of all the 
actors, and the physical facilities, and resources, and also 
the knowledgebase of the organisation. That is to say, there 
is contained within human and organisational memory stocks 
of knowledge about the rules, procedures, results, location 
of data etc., that have been accumulated. These memories 
help continually to redefine its "culture". An important
part of this knowledgebase may of course be knowledge about 
how to get access to knowledge outside the organisation.
ii) The organisation operates in an "external" environment 
too. The relevant parts of this environment may be full of 
competitors, scarce resources to acquired/exploited, 
necessary inputs to the organisation (e.g. sick people) ; it 
may also at any given level of analysis be the organisation 
itself, e.g. the District Health Authority is part of the 
external environment of a directly managed Unit. But the 
"context" of an organisation also includes, at any given
time, the "state of play" of past decision making and the
results of knowledgework processes. These may be reflected 
in the allocation of resources, including information. These 
resources are used during the knowledgework processes of the 
organisation to get work done. To generate and achieve 
goals, (which may or may not support the primary objectives 
of the organisation, or indeed the individual actor) and to 
deal with problems and opportunities that arise, the 
knowledgework processes may be conceptualised in terms of 
the scanning and selection of the (internal and external)
environment, the decision making for short term or planning
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for longer term resolutions of problems, the organisation of 
knowledge and knowledgework associated with each decision 
and its communication to others so that work is done, or 
appropriate information conveyed, and finally, the processes 
need monitoring and control and evaluation.
iii) The results of these processes may be physical products 
or services or knowledgework products which may or may not 
be appropriate in the context in which they were required. 
They may be processed inputs to the organisation, or 
products to help its internal processes, or products that 
are outcomes, either for short or longer term use.
Whilst none of these conceptualisations of what 
organisations are or do are unique, my contention is that 
the concept of organisational intelligence provides a 
framework in which organisations can be assessed in a way 
which focuses attention on one of the key, but perhaps 
relatively neglected, aspects of organisations, namely the 
use of knowledge and information. Also it does so in a way 
which can be applied to both the micro- and macro- aspects 
of the spectrum. Based on insights from cognitive 
psychology, the model can readily be focused on the 
behaviour of individuals or small groups, but it can also 
encompass the structural aspects of organisation in their 
macro-environment.
The central theme of organisational intelligence is. the 
assessment of contextually appropriate behaviour and 
information. A central point is that intelligence is a
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relative concept, rather than an absolute one that can be 
measured e.g. by "IQ" tests of task performance, or by 
indeed by reference to one body of theory. It means that the 
assessment of contextually appropriate behaviour and 
intelligence may be different when made of the same (or same 
type of) organisation but in different historical/political 
contexts; different observers may come to different 
assessments etc. Sternberg's approach to assessing human 
intelligence emphasised the importance of examining the 
processes (and pathologies) that went on in performing a 
task, but that a full assessment of performance has to be 
undertaken in the light of the context and the experience of 
the task. Thus in the development of organisational 
intelligence, the point has to be reiterated that what is 
being developed is a framework within which these 
assessments can be made and related to one another. We may 
suggest that, with respect to knowledgework processes, 
organisational behaviour and information is more likely to 
be appropriate if pathologies are avoided and if appropriate 
knowledge is drawn upon from a knowledgebase.
Thus, organisational intelligence is increased in so far as 
these processes are or have;
Scanning and Selection
- clear selection parameters and models of the
(un)expected searched for
- spatial and organisational resolution levels are
appropriate
- historical and forecasting time horizons are
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appropriate
- both problems and opportunities are recognised.
Decision making and Planning
- there is an appropriate decomposition of a problem with 
sub problems (particularly those that require 
programmable decisions) being delegated where possible, 
but without giving grounds for any biased response.
- unstructured problems are dealt with by those with the 
appropriate expertise, and/or appropriate time 
allocated to their resolution
- responsibilities for decision making are clear and not 
disavowable
- the decision makers are themselves intelligent in their 
"informed guesses".
Communications and Knowledge Organisation
- the instructions / information to be communicated is 
meaningful to the recipient (whether in or outside the 
organisation)
- knowledge about how to solve problems (between central 
and and local processing), performance programs, 
relevant data and rules are appropriately organised and 
accessible (from organisational memory)
- messages are accurately and efficiently transmitted, 
presented and interpreted.
Monitoring and Control
- in self-organising systems there is monitoring of 
performance that can adjust (future) performance to
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conform to (appropriately set) expectations
- new patterns of interactions can result in revised, or 
new, expectations and plans
- the criteria for monitoring and control are clear, and 
adjustments made do not produce overreactions.
Whilst all these knowledgework processes are affected by the 
historical and political contexts in which they are set, and 
are also the medium for the operation of many power
relations between the actors/collectivities, (all factors
which must of course be considered in any assessment of 
them), each of these processes draws on a "knowledgebase".
An organisation will be more likely to exhibit
organisational intelligence, if its knowledgework processes 
draw on a knowledgebase which has the following features
Practical Knowledge and Expertise
- the espoused and revealed theories of actions of 
individuals are congruent with those of the 
organisation
- individuals have the necessary practical knowledge, 
skills and expertise to perform their roles.
Organisational Memory
- the knowledge and expertise of individuals (either
within or outside the organisation) is encoded
accurately and stored in a form accessible to actors in
the organisation as appropriate to their requirements
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(and rights of access)
- organisational memory is dynamic
- organisational memory enables linkage of knowledge. 
Information Systems
- data is available concerning the key processes of the 
organisation and relevant inputs from its environment
- data is accurately defined, collected, stored, 
processed, accessed and communicated
- information requirements are appropriately determined
- information systems are managed as a corporate resource
- the organisation of information management is 
appropriate given the context of the organisation.
However, just given these desiderata for appropriate 
knowledgework processes and knowledgebases, assessments of 
organisational intelligence would remain incomplete. 
Firstly, there are the "products" of these processes to be 
considered. These may be products of organisational 
intelligence, i.e. they may be the results of inputs to (ie. 
scanned intelligence-as-news) the organisation; the 
appropriateness of these intelligence products may only be 
assessed much later when other checks on the validity of 
their interpretation of the state of the internal or 
external environment can be made. They may also be the 
products of the "intelligence and research" division of the 
organisation which has been given a particular issue to 
analyse, usually by a central/senior executive. Such policy 
analysis products may only be appropriately assessed once 
their recommendations have been accepted, actioned and
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evaluated. The contextual appropriateness of such 
intelligence products can be judged by other researchers, 
end users, customers/clients, other managers etc., and many 
methods may be used to assess them.
There is one class of information product, however, for 
which the framework for assessing organisational 
intelligence is appropriate, and these are products for 
organisational intelligence. That is to say, products that 
are intended to develop policies for improving knowledgework 
of knowledgebases can be assessed using the framework for 
organisational intelligence. Although there are other 
perspectives available with which to analyse them, the 
organisational intelligence framework at least ensures that 
a comprehensive assessment has been made.
To assess organisational intelligence only on the basis of 
the capability to produce appropriate products of or for 
intelligence is to limit the analysis. In addition to 
considering the knowledgework and knowledgebase processes 
involved in their production, the organisational 
intelligence of an organisation must be assessed in context.
Whilst there are many aspects of the "context" of an 
organisation, or a social setting within one, the key 
features proposed here suggest that there will be more 
evidence of organisational intelligence to the extent that:­
- the knowledgework of the actor / organisation is able 
to adapt, shape or select an increasingly better fit
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with the environment, (taking account of historical 
developments and political / power relationships, and 
the state of the information systems available)
- the knowledgework processes take account of the goals 
of the organisation and its theories of action
- uncertainty in the task environment is appropriately 
dealt with, e.g. in terms of organisational structure, 
product design, information strategy selection.
It should be noted that there may be conflict with the goals 
of the organisation; in these circumstances it may of course 
be "contextually appropriate" to leave the organisation, or 
invent new knowledgework processes or products which can 
change the context in which the goals are relevant, and 
thereby their importance, or indeed provide alternative 
goals. As mentioned earlier, it is also a feature of this 
approach that organisational intelligence is relative to the 
observer, and it may be that some would advocate contexts in 
which it is appropriate for there to be conflicts of goals, 
actions etc., - that competition and conflict between actors 
may be to their benefit or to that of the organisation.
The experience of the individual or organisation in dealing 
with a particular issue is another aspect of assessing 
organisational intelligence. There will be more evidence of 
organisational intelligence to the extent that;
- novel issues are dealt with by understanding and 
executing the necessary knowledgework processes 
appropriately, and allocating appropriate resources 
(including time and expertise) to them
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- routine issues are dealt with by automatic local
procedures.
Some tasks will be novel for some actors / organisations but 
routine for others; also some issues will have both novel
and routine aspects to different extents in all the
knowledgework processes and knowledgebases involved in them. 
This affects how the assessments of knowledgework processes 
are made.
Summary
In summary, what can be given are assessments of
organisational intelligence, that may be taken together to 
form an overall view, or may be considered separately, 
sometimes giving conflicting views. The development of 
organisational intelligence must remain an iterative process 
of improving on the different characteristics and the 
associated assessments.
2 THE CASE STUDIES AND KNOWLEDGEWORK PROCESSES
In assessing organisational intelligence, as indicated in 
Chapter 4, multiple methods and perspectives are 
appropriate. Assessing "contextually appropriate behaviour 
and information" is a matter of making a judgement on what 
is an inherently relative concept. The framework for 
assessing organisational intelligence is, therefore, 
explicitly multi-dimensional, encouraging assessments to be 
made from the perspectives of the knowledgework processes 
themselves, the uses of knowledgebases, the products of or
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for organisational intelligence, the contexts in which the 
study is set and the experiential dimension. The methods 
used to make assessments within these perspectives must be 
technically appropriate.
The case studies presented here use largely the qualitative 
methods associated with the single investigator. However, as 
the case studies in Chapter 5 demonstrate, surveys and 
comparative analyses of texts may be appropriate. More 
qualitative assessments of, e.g. speed of processing as an 
indicator might be undertaken by analysing responses to 
national requirements for a piece of information or of 
studies of Health Service Indicators, but these of course 
would be only one particular perspective on any overall 
assessment of organisational intelligence.
Whilst my arguments would be strengthened by having more 
comparative material, as suggested in Chapter 4, these 
comparisons could be appropriately made with other types of 
organisation, or in other contexts; in the first instance 
the development of information management in other service 
organisations, or comparative studies of health care 
organisations in other countries.
The framework is intended to enable social and information 
analysts describe what has happened, or been produced, i.e. 
it provides a reasonably comprehensive framework for asking 
questions in terms of who did what, or what happened. Any 
particular process could of course be analysed in more 
detail. Chapter 5 gave examples of more detailed studies of
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one type of process, but it is also possible to take one 
sub-episode and analyse that in further detail if required. 
For example, the work of producing a report from the Project 
34 Working Group could have been treated in the detail of 
the processes analysed in Chapter 6 on the production of an 
Annual Report, and so on. In describing the knowledgework 
processes, and their pathologies, there are many indications 
of whether particular aspects are more or less appropriate 
given the relevant management or organisation theory. For 
example, the underlying power relations, or leadership 
styles, or development of informal rules, problem 
decomposition and co-ordination may be recurring features.
Using the features of the model of organisational 
intelligence presented in Chapter 3, and summarised in the 
preceding section of this chapter, it is then possible to 
assess these descriptions of the processes or products, as 
well as the contextual and experiential aspects. This has 
been done in the summary at the end of each chapter.
However, whilst the studies are unique, the common framework 
enables some brief comparisons of the four main case studies 
of different knowledgework processes in developing policies, 
primarily for information.
Context
Three of the studies, NHS Review Policy (NRP), Ealing 
Information Strategy (EIS) and the Ealing Annual Report 
(EAR) were, from the perspective of the "central executive",
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or "project director", attempts to influence or shape the 
political context in which they were located. The other two 
studies, the NHS Review Information Requirements (NRIR) and 
the Korner Report (KR) were attempts to adapt to an existing 
political environment.
Scanning and Selection
With the exception of KR all the studies were characterised 
by some search of the problem space for model solutions 
developed elsewhere (NRP, EAR) or formally proposed (EIS, 
NRIR). In the case of KR the "guiding principles" indicated 
where their solutions would lie - in the District level 
minimum data set. In the "shaping" case studies political 
opportunities were recognised. Whilst in the case of the NRP 
this was a reluctant response initially, both towards 
acceptance of the scale of the problems manifest in the 
autumn of 1987 and to introduce major changes before the 4th 
term. But once the decision was made the opportunity for 
radical changes had to be seized and implementation begun 
before the next general election (and showing the potential 
for success). In the EIS and the EAR studies, it was largely 
the political opportunities given by such a process and 
product that were provided the incentive to start.
Decision Making and Planning
The "shaping" studies were all characterised by a "closed" 
centralist approach to decision-making; the "adaptive" 
studies were both characterised by an "open" participative 
approach. The number of studies are too small to draw any 
firm conclusions from this, but it can be suggested that
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where a project is being used for primarily political 
purposes by the "project director" then a high level of 
central control will be needed. The problem is unlikely to 
be decomposed beyond the extent to which it can be dealt 
with by central sources of expertise over which the project 
director has control. This has the advantage that the 
project can be conducted quickly, and its results then used 
for still current political purposes. The disadvantages are 
that those with theoretical expertise and able to make 
intelligent guesses, may not have the necessary practical 
knowledge. The proposals made may need fleshing out further 
(as in the case of the NRP) or discussing briefly and in 
outline with interested parties so as to gain their backing 
(e.g. EIS and EAR).
In both the "adaptive" studies, an open participatory style 
was adopted. The problem was decomposed and Working Groups 
established including on them users with practical knowledge 
of the issues, as well as a skilled secretariat and central 
policy making experts. Minutes of meetings etc., and 
progress reports were openly available to interested 
parties. Whilst the KR Working Groups had few time pressures 
to complete their work, the political context for the NRIR 
Working Groups required concentrated work.
Communications and Knowledge Organisation
One danger of a centralised closed approach is that the 
message is misunderstood. The NHS Review was launched and 
cascaded with attention paid to this problem, but the EIS
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was not and failed. The EAR was not "launched" as such to an 
audience since it was in many respects a self-contained 
position statement - it did not seek to change thinking 
about the organisation, or its information systems. The KR 
did require rethinking of the management of information 
systems, and particular attention was paid to the educating 
of data collectors and information managers, with supporting 
booklets, videos etc. For similar reasons, a user guide is 
in preparation for the NRIR project, and all general 
managers are being given (in September 1990) a detailed 
briefing document. Whilst the Korner approach was novel at 
the time, the attention paid to good presentation of policy 
is now becoming routine; an example of organisational 
learning.
Monitoring and Control
The monitoring and control for the centralised closed 
approach of policy development is relatively 
straightforward, but the open approach requires careful 
project management in terms of clear expectations of what is 
required, e.g. in terms of reports, resources needed, 
timetables etc. These basic principles of good management 
now have an interesting variant of "monitoring by contract" 
in the implementation of the NHS Review.
It is also evident that in all these cases there was very 
little use made of any organisational memory. Although each 
of them was dealing with an essentially novel problem, from 
the perception of the participants, it remains the case, in 
1990, that there is very little comparative material on
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information strategies, or annual reports that is stored in 
a way that is accessible to "novices" concerned to establish 
the nature of the common problems that others have found. In 
the NRIR project it was impossible to establish which DHAs 
had what systems in place, other than by mounting an ad hoc 
survey. The only information available in organisational 
memory are the central statistics and Health Service 
Indicators, but nothing on the information system or 
information management staff and skills in place. Health 
Service Indicators were used, for political purposes, in 
emphasising the need for the NHS Review, and cross-national 
comparisons were also used (to show that the NHS already 
gave relatively good value for money) . But, in short, the 
development of these policies for Information Management are 
notable for their lack of readily available knowledge about 
the information systems already in place.
This reflects the lack of any management of information as a 
corporate resource which has, as part of its remit, the 
requirement for such knowledgework products to be stored 
centrally, or even in Regions, analysed and indexed so that 
searches can be made of comparative case studies (though 
there is the possibility that databases of comparative 
material on signed contracts and providers' services may 
develop post-Review).
In summary the knowledgework processes seen in their 
political context were appropriate. That is to say, the 
choices made by the respective project directors was
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appropriate. The "shaping" approach, accompanied by a closed 
centralised knowledgework process, produced results that 
enabled the project director to achieve the objective of 
increasing political influence, certainly in the case of EIS 
and EAR, though it is too early to know if the same is true 
of the NHS Review. This is not to say that the products were 
appropriate; certainly in the case of the EIS it was not. 
For the adaptive studies, it would have been inappropriate 
to have taken a centralist and closed approach, though this 
could have been justified in the case of KR by lack of 
precedent, and in the NRIR by lack of time.
But, from the perspective of end users. the assessments are 
different. The general hypothesis is that policy processes 
and products that do not draw on, and contribute to, the 
corporate knowledgebase are unlikely to result in products 
for improved information systems management. Thus there has 
been considerable concern that the NHS Review was not 
developed "by or with" the NHS, but "for" it, by a closed 
and secretive central policy making body. The lack of end 
user involvement in EIS resulted in a strategy that was not 
"owned" by the organisation. Whilst "expertise" is clearly 
necessary, e.g. in producing documents that are politically 
acceptable to the project director (viz Moore on the NHS 
Review and myself on EIS for examples of lack of it), or in 
running projects to tight timescales whilst keeping project 
staff motivated etc., (e.g. EAR and NRIR), those involved in 
large scale policy making for information systems also need 
practical knowledge of such systems. End user involvement in 
KR (on the Working Groups and in pilot studies) , and on
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NRIR, was entirely appropriate. However, where such products 
are more focused, then other more centralised approaches may 
be appropriate, as in EAR (although even here, it should be 
noted, there was evidence of much more end-user involvement 
in the production of Annual Reports elsewhere).
From the analysts' perspective, the key features of the 
"open" approach are that it recognised that the organisation 
was able to mobilise its resources to work in parallel on 
different aspects of the whole problem; that practical 
knowledge and expertise should inform theories and goals and 
the methods of delivering them; that the end product had to 
be a reasonable compromise between the achievable, desirable 
and affordable; that the process involved debate of 
alternatives to reaching goals, and resolved conflicts by 
consensus (if not, by "trumping") between alternatives 
and/or goals. The "closed" approach, in contrast, is not 
able to conduct detailed analyses of a wide range of 
conflicting issues, since the decision making processes are 
all retained in a "central executive", and no local 
performance programs developed to enable the problem to be 
decomposed yet approached in a consistent way by others. The 
results of the exercise depend very much on the practical 
knowledge of the central executive or project director in 
deciding what are "reasonable solutions".
Both approaches, however, draw on knowledgebases, and some 
of the features of such knowledgebases of the organisation 
of intelligence will be considered next.
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What does the framework have to offer social and information 
analysts interested in understanding developments in the
organisation of health intelligence? The focus in this 
section of the conclusions is not so much on the 
knowledgework processes and products of the organisation as 
on the development of the knowledgebase to enable and
support, in a contextually appropriate way, the 
knowledgework processes and produce products of/for 
organisational intelligence. Chapter 5 was used to sketch 
out key features of information management in the NHS and 
provide a context for the more detailed case studies. These 
will now be used, in conjunction with the other case
studies, to illustrate some of the features of the 
organisation of health intelligence.
The framework proposes that the organisation of (health) 
intelligence would have the following features:
(1) Information management structures which are
contextually appropriate.
(2) Information systems which are managed as a corporate 
resource.
(3) Information requirements which are appropriately 
determined.
(4) Data that is managed effectively.
(5) Data systems which support the key processes.
(6) Knowledge and expertise that is stored and linked in 
a dynamic memory.
(7) Individuals who have appropriate practical knowledge,
3 THE CASE STUDIES AND KNOWLEDGEBASES
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expertise and theories of action.
(8) Novel problems or opportunities and routine issues 
are recognised and dealt with appropriately.
(9) Products of and for organisational intelligence are 
produced with organisationally intelligent 
knowledgework processes and knowledgebases.
The organisation of health intelligence is but one aspect of 
the organisation of health care. Indeed the latter forms 
part of the environment of health intelligence, e.g. 
providing the "theories of action" of the organisation. In 
addition there is the external socio-political environment 
of the organisation and the external socio-economic and 
physical environment of the population and its health needs.
Also, the organisation of health intelligence within the NHS 
can be conceptualised at a number of resolution levels, any 
given level having both internal and external environments. 
A corollary of this is that there may be conflicting 
perceptions of what constitute the goals of the organisation 
in question, and therefore conceptions of what constitutes a 
"corporate resource", for example. It is important, 
nevertheless, to recognise what the nature of the "global 
task" or goal is. As discussed in Chapter 3 Section 1.4, 
there have been different elaborations on this in the NHS, 
but in essence, the global objectives focus on improving the 
health care for populations in general and patients in 
particular. Thus, whilst the organisational means for 
achieving these ends are continually changing, there remains
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a baseline on which to make an overall assessment of the 
organisation of health intelligence, namely, is it 
supporting and monitoring progressive improvements in the 
provision of health care. Definitions of what constitutes an 
"improvement" vary, shifting away from the emphasis on 
equity in the 1970's to efficiency and value for money in 
the 1980s, for example.
(1) Information Management structures are contextually 
appropriate.
Were the organisational structures of the NHS to have 
remained in a relatively stable political, socio-economic 
environment, and demographic, environment since 1974, then 
the task of refining the information management structures 
would have been concerned with the appropriate balance of 
centralisation, specialisation and hierarchy as outlined by 
Wilensky (see Chapter 3 Section 5.4.3). However, as 
discussed in Chapter 8 Section 1.2, it was recognised from 
1972 (albeit only at the Regional and Area level) that 
substantial developments in the internal environment of 
information were needed, though the developments in 
information technology were a separate issue. The setting 
up of the Korner committee (see Chapter 8) reflected these 
divisions, however, they clearly endorsed the need for 
better local information systems and sufficient "internal 
communications specialists" able to provide managers with 
intelligence about internal performance, supported by "facts 
and figures men". As noted in Chapter 5 Section 5.1, Health 
Authorities, such as Ealing, had no routine form of activity 
data presented to the District Management Team by 1983.
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In addition, however, NHS information managers have had to 
deal with a rapidly changing environment. Changes in 
patterns of health need (more elderly needing long term 
community based care), medical knowledge and (high cost) 
technologies together with a cash limited approach to 
service development have produced continuing assertions of 
underfunding during the 1980s. During this period there has 
been the loss of the Area tier of management, and the 
abandonment of consensus management in favour of general 
management. Indeed it was the cash crisis in late 1987 that 
stimulated the NHS Review.
From the perspective of information management the change in 
organisational structures from a bureaucratic health service 
to a local health market run by general managers along 
business lines (see Chapter 9) , has major consequences. As 
Wilensky suggests, the more an organisation is in conflict 
with its environment, the more "contact men" are needed. The 
evidence of increasing attention being paid to 
communications and knowledge organisation in disseminating 
publicity for the NHS Review is an example of this. More 
importantly, however, is the element of competition 
introduced. As indicated in Chapter 9 Section 4.5.3.5, these 
changes in role will increase still further the range of 
information skills required within the NHS, yet reduce the 
likelihood of information being managed as a corporate 
(whole NHS) resource, and also make any professionalisation 
of information management harder to achieve.
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(2) Information Systems are managed as a corporate resource 
Against the desiderata of information management there is 
little evidence in the NHS as yet of the "mature" 
organisation, to use Nolan's stage theory (see Chapter 3 
Section 5.4.3). The information strategies of the mid-1980s 
(Chapter 5 Section 7.2) revealed the very wide range of 
topics concerned with information management, e.g. data, 
communications, information technology, text and management 
information systems. But, not one strategy considered all of 
them.
The stimulus of Korner resulted in a variety of information 
systems being selected, many not being installed by the 
start date (see Chapter 5 Section 8.2), and even by 1990 
there was still one health authority without a Patient 
Administration System (East Berkshire) , whilst installation 
of community systems was so poor that the key message for 
implementing the NHS Review was simply to get them installed 
and to work. Another indication of the lack of any corporate 
approach to information is the continuing separation of 
administrative, financial, and manpower information, as 
evidenced by the monthly reports from Districts in NW Thames 
(see Chapter 5 Section 5.2).
However, at least by 1990 the concept of joint management of 
information and information technology had been endorsed by 
the Department of Health with the establishment of a 
directorate concerned with "Information Systems". But 
whether this major step towards the full implications of
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information management will be replicated in other parts of 
the NHS remains to be seen. Chapter 7 Section 4.1 summarises 
an early approach in Ealing to develop an Information 
Systems approach to the full range of District services.
As indicated above, the conception of what is "corporate" 
changes over time. In the NHS, the move from a bureaucratic 
hierarchy to a competitive market suggests that the 
information managers of service providers will have a 
different conception of the information systems they have to 
manage from those of purchasers. Each will have to ensure 
that the information systems are managed as a corporate 
resource. But, is their still any "national" conception of 
how information is to be managed? As Chapter 9 Section 
4.5.3.3 outlined, the national health service indicators 
will perhaps need to be presented on a tri-partite basis, 
with commercial confidentiality restricted access to some 
comparative information.
(3) Information requirements are appropriately determined 
Information requirements are determined with respect to the 
existing state of the external environment, the goals and 
objectives of the organisation and its decision makers (in 
particular the "project directors"), and the state of the 
existing information systems. It is in this context that a 
method of determining the specific information requirements 
has to be appropriately selected, and as indicated in 
Chapter 3 Section 5.4.3, there are a number of methods which 
may be more of less appropriate.
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As far as information strategies are concerned, the NHS 
experience is limited. In the mid 1980s there were only 15 
comprehensive and detailed documents, and a variety of 
methods were being used to make strategic statements. 
However, a national strategic framework for information 
management was developed (see Chapter 5 Sections 7.1 and
7.2), and considerable effort spent on assessing exemplars 
of how to develop District information strategies by 
defining the information requirements using a number of 
structured methodologies. Chapter 7 Section 1.4.2 described 
an approach in Ealing, based on the theory of mixed- 
scanning, to ensure an equitable allocation of resources to 
develop minimum data sets across all parts of the 
organisation. However, the production of District 
information strategies planned for 1989 was postponed 
because of the radical changes in the objectives, structures 
and power relations within and between Districts introduced 
by the NHS Review.
(4) Data is managed effectively
Knowledgebases depend on selecting, combining and comparing 
information. The meaning of the information has to be 
accurately inferred from the "facts", either directly, or 
via the operation of rules or procedures. Hence, the 
importance to the organisation of intelligence of having 
accurate data definitions, codes and classification 
procedures.
The 1980s has seen the development of national standard data
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definitions, stimulated by the Korner recommendations and 
work on a common data model of the processes in the NHS has 
proceeded. There remain difficult definitions to resolve, 
e.g. an "out-patient session" (Chapter 8 Section 8.3.3), 
quality of care, outcome etc. Whilst some of the definitions 
are maintained by others (e.g. the World Health Organisation 
for the International Classification of Diseases, or the 
General Post Office for postcodes) many are dependent on the 
organisation of the NHS. New concepts, such as "provider 
spell" have been introduced as a result of organisational 
change, others become more important to define accurately, 
e.g. bed-day (see Chapter 9 section 4.5.1.2).
Just as definitions need to be kept under review for their 
contextual appropriateness, so do the methods of data 
collection. The appropriate training of data collectors was 
emphasised by Korner (see Chapter 8) , and they will need 
retraining to deal with the new data items. But, whilst the 
Korner report emphasised the need for good definitions and 
training to help break the vicious cycle of underuse of 
data, they did not consider directly the data processing 
issues.
Effective management of data processing is difficult when 
the organisation i& in what Nolan terms the state of 
"contagion" (see Chapter 3 Section 5.4.3). In Ealing, for 
example, as noted in Chapter 7, Section 4.2, the number of 
computers increased from 10 in 1982 to 72 in 1985. Whilst 
the need to implement Korner was a major factor in this
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increase, the Korner recommendations were criticised for 
ignoring the data processing revolution (see Chapter 8 
Section 3.3). On a regional scale, the variety of systems in 
place in Districts by 1 April 1988 (see Chapter 5 Section
8.2) suggested that a mixture of central rationalist 
solutions and local autonomy reflected a complex 
organisational environment in which information management 
was in a transitional state between centralised authority 
and local autonomy. The assessment of organisational 
intelligence, however, in these approaches includes 
considering how accessible the data held by different data 
processing systems is to different users.
An analysis (in Chapter 5 Section 8.1) of the accessibility 
of a wide range of data to support the production of an 
Annual Report to a key end user, the District Information 
Officer, suggested that data processing (and manual) systems 
are far from being effectively managed. For example, half of 
the Districts reported that it would take more than one week 
to get access to data on hospitalisation rates by cause.
Another aspect of accessibility is the inter-connection of 
systems. Whilst the development of local area networks as a 
solution to a hospital's information requirements have been 
available since the early 1980s (Drury 1981), the wide area 
networking of systems offers substantial increases in 
organisational intelligence. The development of the NHS 
network (Chapter 9 Section 4.5.2.2) offers greatly increased 
accessibility of knowledgebases. But the benefits of being 
able to retrieve facts or link, compare and generate new
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knowledge in such open systems has to be constrained by 
confidentiality and security arrangements (see Chapter 9 
Section 4.5.3.2). There may also be inconsistencies between 
the knowledgebases, e.g. concerning the identification of a 
patient or place of residence, and hence new rules or 
arrangements will need to be developed to deal with them. 
Another example of these new rules are the emerging data 
interchange standards (Chapter 9 Section 4.5.1.4).
Nevertheless, given the primary goal of the organisation of 
intelligence, the combination of knowledgebases, either 
locally or over a wide area, to improve knowledge about the 
health care needs and provision of services to an 
individual, or a population, will continue. It will also 
continue to be an issue in which the benefits of local 
autonomy in data processing have to be balanced with 
centralised standardisation of common definitions and 
technical communication protocols. The balance is 
influenced, but not wholly determined, but the macro- 
organisational arrangements of the NHS.
(5) Data systems support the key processes
The key knowledgework processes have been discussed in terms 
of the development of policies for information management in 
the four main case studies. In the organisation of 
intelligence, these processes draw on a readily available 
and comprehensive knowledgebase.
However, the coverage of existing knowledgebases are
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limited, as described in Chapter 3 Section 5.4.2, 
particularly with respect to assessments of health need in 
populations, person based episodes of care, and measures of 
outcome. Yet there are extensive collections of patients' 
records, e.g. up to 38 different types in Ealing (Chapter 7 
Section 1.2.2). To support the scanning of the environment 
and the selection of issues, person based data, provided a 
postcode is attached, can be used to increase the resolution 
level, and Chapter 6 Section 2.4.1 outlined how maps at ward 
Local Authority ward level could be used in assessing health 
need.
Another type of "mental map" or "model" is also needed in 
scanning and selection. One well developed source has been 
the Health Service Indicators (HSIs) . The use of HSIs in 
scanning and selection has been described in Chapter 5 
Section 2.1. Whilst they reflect reality (albeit via 
statistics that may be questioned locally, and which are 
dated) the hierarchical structure of the data presents a 
model view of the relative importance of individual 
indicators. The proposals for "templates" of HSIs, tailored 
for particular types of users is one aspect of a modelling 
process; another is the use of an expert system (using 
"Crystal" software) to model the relationships between the 
HSIs. The development of comparative information and 
indicators post-Review (see Chapter 9 Section 4.5.3.3) will 
draw on the lessons learnt regarding the number of HSIs that 
are manageable for a central agency to produce, and focus 
attention on those needed by providers, purchasers and 
central monitoring bodies. In so doing, they will also
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encourage the development of more local indicators, 
particularly in the areas of medical audit and outcome, 
where the inter-organisational data is not routinely 
available.
HSIs have been used to support decision making and planning. 
But there are many other components of a knowledgebase. For 
example, the proposal to develop a communications network in 
Ealing was in part so that the infrastructure would be in 
place for a corporate information centre (Chapter 7 Section
3.3). The knowledgebases would need to be able to draw on 
the considerable range of data systems in the organisation 
to answer different questions. For example, the integrated 
support systems for hospitals (see Chapter 9 Section 
4.5.2.4) are intended to provide a basis for clinicians to 
know about the full extent of their patients' medical 
history and experience in the hospital, yet from the Unit 
General Manager's perspective post-1991 such systems must be 
able to answer questions about contract management and 
alternative "product lines" to pursue.
Having access to a knowledgebase does not imply that the 
results are presented or interpreted appropriately. Indeed 
the study of District General Managers (Chapter 5 Section
4.1) indicated the range of different types of 
knowledgebases used, and the different preferences for 
providing raw data or interpreted information to them. 
Equally important to consider are the variations in the 
styles of graphical presentation that may be preferred (see
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Chapter 5 Section 4.2) by managers. The case studies on 
activity reports also demonstrated a large range of 
presentational styles, both in terms of the balance between 
graphics and text, and in the balance between description 
and analysis. These findings were repeated when the subject 
matter was common across all Districts in the analysis of 
HSIs (see Chapter 5 Section 2.1). Clearly developments in 
the organisation of intelligence systems have to consider 
local factors and variations on common themes (if they are 
known); but they also have to develop over time.
The development of knowledgebases to support monitoring and 
control is a process of continuing learning. The development 
of activity reports in Ealing (Chapter 5 Section 5.1) for 
example, showed how this can be influenced by the political 
context. Centrally produced reports were developed but not 
used by the District Management Team until their collective 
information requirements were defined more appropriately, 
ie. by not relying on the "expertise" of the District 
Medical Officer. Even then the reports were not really well 
used until they were seen as being produced and owned by the 
local management units whose general managers could be 
accountable for them, and when the decentralisation of 
specialist skills from the District could stimulate some 
productive competition between the units.
At the level of the Department of Health, the central 
requirements for data from the NHS have been reviewed in the 
light of the NHS Review (Chapter 9 Section 4.5.3.4) and a 
more detailed review is proceeding. The changing roles of
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existing organisations and the creation of new ones, e.g. 
NHS Trusts, will also require new data flows, and new data, 
for monitoring and control.
(6) Knowledge and expertise is stored and linked in a 
dynamic memory
As briefly discussed earlier, a corollary to establishing 
knowledgebases to support knowledgework processes is that 
knowledge and expertise has to become available for others 
in the organisation to draw on and update.
One of the implications of the emphasis of the Korner 
reports on the minimum data needed by managers at District 
level, and of the lack of IT input to the recommendations 
was that the solutions adopted were low cost micro-based 
systems that could provide aggregate counts of activity 
rather than being the patient-based systems needed by 
operational level managers (Chapter 8 Section 3.3). However, 
the need for individual contract minimum data sets to be 
sent from providers to purchasers (see Chapter 9 Section
4.5.1.1) is stimulating the development of patient based 
systems in both hospital and community environments. There 
are also new possibilities opening up with magnetic stripe 
and smart cards for decentralising knowledgebase systems so 
that copies of parts of them are carried about by the 
patient (see Chapter 9 Section 4.5.3.1). This is one way to 
reduce the problems of retrieving relevant data when a 
patient presents. The use of the NHS number as a common 
identifier will provide the key to linking data about the
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same patient held in different (parts of) organisations, and 
also the link to a population health register.
At present the routine linkage of health needs data and 
demography is very crude. For example, in the development of 
an Annual Report (Chapter 6 Section 3.4.3) it became 
possible to extract mortality and hospitalisation rates for 
different Local Authority wards as a matter of routine.
Other aspects of the development, or need for the 
development, of a dynamic organisational memory have been 
commented on. Firstly, in terms of providing a source of 
comparative information about current, and good, practice in 
developing information strategies (Chapter 5 Section 1.1), 
presentations of activity data (Chapter 5 Section 5.1) and 
HSIs (Chapter 5 Section 2.1), there is little organisational 
intelligence at present. Although each of these products of 
or for intelligence represent the state of expertise of the 
local knowledgework given the local context, knowledgework 
processes and systems, little is made available for sharing 
(see Section 2 above). This is true not only in terms of the 
details of such documents, but also the process of producing 
them, as in the case study of the development of the 
National Strategic Framework for Information Management (see 
Chapter 5 Section 7.2). However, the structuring of 
knowledge, particularly concerning the information systems 
and their interrelationships in complex organisations, is 
difficult to achieve. For example, the attempt to define a 
matrix of the data flows between organisations in the post­
Review period proved too complex a task to achieve in the
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time available (see Chapter 9 Section 3.3.2). Finally, when 
it is the expertise itself that needs to be retrieved, 
particularly when knowledge about it is unstructured, e.g. 
by professional organisations, as is the case in information 
management in the NHS, then the informal network of contacts 
may prove an appropriate means of search. But as the case 
study in Chapter 5 Section 7.1 suggested, it may rely 
largely on chance.
(7) Individuals have appropriate practical knowledge 
expertise and theories of action
Compared with the development of medical knowledge and the 
methods developed to store medical case studies, the state 
of organisational memory for information managers is 
rudimentary. But as indicated above, it is a major task to 
build on the practical knowledge of practitioners and 
formalise the results for containment, either as artefacts 
in a library or, more interestingly, to formalise the rules 
which practitioners use in producing knowledgework products 
(which are assessed as contextually appropriate) and thereby 
formalise the expertise. In some domains, e.g. the 
formalisation of rules to record accurate diagnostic codes, 
or in the analysis of related Health Service Indicators, 
expert systems have begun to be used in information 
management (though there use is well advanced in medical 
knowledge). But, little has been done to build up a culture 
which exchanges information about the analysis and 
integration of data and the presentation of information. A 
corollary is that there is a very wide range of skills and
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expertise required of information managers in the NHS.
Although there is increasing attention being given to 
improving the information management skills of general 
managers the skills of the supporting information management 
staff are inadequate (see Chapter 5 section 6.1). There is a 
great deal of practical knowledge, amongst data collectors, 
DIOs, Medical Records Officers, etc. but little sharing of 
it. Although DIOs in North West Thames Region found 
quarterly meetings helpful to exchange experience and news, 
such meetings are not held in every Region. The background 
of and roles of information managers is very varied and it 
is also changing. The NHS Review, for example, may stimulate 
the development of increasingly autonomous provider unit 
information managers, whilst DIOs, if their role as such 
exists, will focus on the health needs of the population and 
the performance of providers. Although in many respects the 
separation of purchaser and provider functions clarifies the 
role of information managers in the respective 
organisations, it does not alter the basic argument that 
there is unlikely to be sufficient expertise in either.
The case studies demonstrated some other aspects of this 
issue. Firstly, there is the dependence of some projects on 
the specialist expertise of, for example, certain key 
authors, or software experts (see Chapter 6) , or on the 
availability of sufficiently broad expertise on Working 
Groups to make numbers manageable (as in Chapter 9) and also 
of the availability of skills in the more routine tasks of 
minute taking and typing. All four of the detailed case
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studies acknowledged the importance of the theories of 
action of the "project director". In some cases, as in 
Korner (Chapter 8), this was to challenge existing theories, 
e.g. regarding a top-down approach to defining information 
requirements; in the case of the NHS Review information 
requirements, the challenge was to develop an appropriate 
model of the information requirements of new organisational 
arrangement that changed existing assumptions of information 
management. In the other cases at Ealing, the theories of 
action of the project director were more concerned with 
local organisational politics. This was a perception which, 
almost by definition, was in conflict with the views of 
other senior colleagues. But, because of the "closed" style 
adopted the documents which which were produced, whilst 
appropriate and indeed innovative products in their own 
right, were not "owned" by the rest of the organisation.
(8) Novel problems or opportunities and routine issues are 
recognised and dealt with appropriately
The summaries of the case studies have considered the 
experiential component of assessing organisational 
intelligence. Although they dealt with essentially novel 
problems, there were some parts of the processes which could 
be delegated and made routine. For example, the performance 
programs used by staff in the production of the Annual 
Report (Chapter 6) . Although the production of activity 
reports developed over time, it was evident that there were 
both some computer-based performance programs and expertise 
that could be transferred to the units when the production
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process was decentralised (Chapter 5 section 5.1), and which 
could be enhanced by giving local managers more local 
control over the way their information was presented.
(9) The products of and for organisational intelligence are 
produced with organisationally intelligent work processes 
and knowledgebases
The assessments made of the case studies in the previous 
section, and at the end of each chapter address this issue.
4 SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE PERSPECTIVE OR ORGANISATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE
4.1 FOR MANAGERS
In the organisation of intelligence managers need to use 
their own intelligence to recognise opportunities and 
decompose problems and issues. They will deal with (the 
aspects of) those for which their practical knowledge and 
expertise is needed, perhaps those which are "novel" in some 
way, but delegate to others those (parts of) problems which 
they can resolve. However, a corollary is that the 
information products which a manager uses to help resolve 
issues must be contextually appropriate, ie. the manager 
needs (to make arrangements) to be given products of 
intelligence. ie. contextually appropriate information.
Whilst this formulation allows for differences in managerial 
style (some like to have the raw data) the focus of change 
is towards management arrangements which can process data, 
convert it to information, scan and select from it those 
aspects which indicate a novel problem (for which decision
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making and planning by the relevant "executive" may be 
necessary). These arrangements should also be able (by 
drawing on local knowledgebases and performance programs 
stored from previous experience) to deal with routine 
problems. As products of their "local" intelligence, they 
also should be able to produce (on time, accurately etc.) 
for decision making by the executive those issues which 
arise, either as unusual events in the routine processing of 
data, or the results of work commissioned by the executive.
The results of such knowledgework, by information managers 
in particular, should be products for organisational 
intelligence.
4.2 FOR INFORMATION MANAGERS
The central role for information managers is to ensure that 
the knowledgebase of the organisation can support the 
knowledgework processes of its actors in recognising 
opportunities, problems and issues, which may be novel or 
routine, and dealing with them appropriately.
But organisational intelligence also needs to be related to 
the primary goal of the organisation. In the case of the 
NHS, as argued earlier, this is to provide improving health 
care to populations in general and patients in particular. A 
fundamental issue then is the extent to which "intelligence" 
is dependent on the organisational means currently in use to 
reach this objective. An important insight of Sternberg's 
theorising (Chapter 2 Section 2.5.1) was that whilst the
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contextual aspects of intelligence, when looking from the 
outside inward, is idiographic in nature, the components of 
intelligence, when looking from the inside out are 
nomothetic. This suggests that there are certain 
characteristics of information systems which are needed to 
enable health services, of whatever organisational 
configuration, to meet their objectives. What varies in 
different contexts is the weightings given to these 
components. Post-Review, for example, the weight given to 
the NHS number, postcode and diagnosis increases 
significantly, though they have long been "good practice" 
data items. The agenda for information strategists then is 
twofold. Firstly, to ensure that whatever is proposed is 
"contextually appropriate", and secondly to ensure that the 
knowledgebase concerning the health care of populations and 
patients is improved. Thus whilst the NHS Review is 
enforcing major changes in information systems to meet the 
new organisational requirements, the proposals made will 
represent a substantial advance in organisational 
intelligence, as discussed in Chapter 9.
The local contexts in which information managers work will 
require the appropriate decision making and plans in the 
shorter term too. The organisational intelligence 
perspective also emphasises that attention should be paid to 
improving the organisational memory in such a way that data, 
information and the knowledge and experience of actors is 
stored as a dynamic corporate resource. This does not mean 
that it is all stored centrally, but that it is accessible, 
subject to suitable confidentiality / security arrangements,
500
to all working in the organisation, either locally or not. 
Finally, information managers need to be concerned with the 
development of the practical knowledge and expertise of 
actors in the organisation generally, and information 
systems specialists in particular.
4.3 FOR SOCIAL ANALYSTS
For the analyst of organisations in general, but of the NHS 
and its information systems in particular, the concept of 
organisational intelligence offers a comprehensive framework 
to assess the complexities of organisations, but with a 
focus on the development of "knowledge". This is not to say 
that other important features of organisations, such as 
power relationships, decision making and structural issues 
do not inform the analysis, they do. But it is with how 
organisations and individuals develop knowledge that 
organisational intelligence is primarily concerned.
To understand how knowledgework is done in an organisation 
the organisational intelligence perspective directs 
attention firstly to the context of action, and then to the 
generic processes of scanning and selection, decision making 
and planning, communications and knowledge organisation, and 
monitoring and control. But it also focuses attention on how 
these processes are supported by knowledgebases (including 
information systems, organisational memory and practical 
knowledge and expertise). However, it accepts that what is 
"contextually appropriate behaviour and information" is 
relative, both to different analytical perspectives, and to
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the actors themselves. The central question then becomes how 
to assess what has happened.
There are many different ways of defining human 
intelligence, as indicated in Chapter 2, and at the micro 
level of analysis the study of organisational intelligence 
shades into the sorts of assessments made by psychologists. 
Of particular relevance, I believe, is the work of Sternberg 
who stresses the importance of complementing assessments of 
the organisation of the component processes of intelligence, 
or knowledgework, by considering them for their contextual 
appropriateness, and then in terms of experience of the 
problem.
Translated to the situation in the NHS case studies here, 
the techniques used need to be contextually appropriate as 
assessments of organisational intelligence are made with 
respect to the criteria listed in Section 1. The framework 
encourages multiple methods to be used and provides a 
comprehensive framework (knowledgework processes and 
knowledgebases, products, context, and experience) which can 
be used to address macro policy development issues as well 
as the micro.
Although the approach also encompasses the need to consider 
how organisations and individuals deal with change, this 
aspect has not been considered in any detail in this thesis. 
And, of course, what has been proposed rests on a limited 
number of case studies. Although further testing and 
development is needed, the perspective of organisational
502
intelligence has, I believe, at the very least proved to be 
useful in understanding (some of) the developments of 
information management in the NHS.
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